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Abstract
The study attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the role of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN)- It 
considers the contributions of the ICJ towards the UN system and concludes that, 
although the ICJ’s contribution has been significant, many practical and theoretical 
issues regarding its role remain unsettled. The study proceeds as follows.
The first chapter sets out the history of international adjudication and the 
relationship between international adjudicatory mechanisms and political international 
organisations. It also includes a review of the legal basis and extent of the relationship 
between the ICJ and the UN.
The second and third chapters aim to throw light upon the advisory role of the ICJ 
and the manner in which the Court, through this jurisdiction, plays a role in interpreting 
and developing the institutional law of the UN.
The fourth chapter addresses the Court’s role in facilitating the realisation of the 
purposes and principles of the UN through its contentious jurisdiction. This chapter 
discusses the basis of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, then examines the 
practice of the Court in achieving these purposes and principles.
The fifth chapter examines the role of the ICJ as a “constitutional court” in the UN 
framework and its competence to review the legality of acts of the UN organs.
The sixth chapter evaluates the Court’s role as a court of appeal in respect of the 
judgments of administrative tribunals established within the framework of the UN and 
its specialised agencies, particularly in the light of General Assembly Resolution 50/54 
(1995).
By way of conclusion, the Court’s role within the UN system is evaluated and a 
number of recommendations are made with a view to enhancing the role of the Court to 
enable it to address new challenges.
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Preface
Preface
1. Purpose and significance of issues
The world has changed dramatically and in terms of historical development it can 
surely be said that we are witnessing a new era. These changes are equivalent to 
those that led the international community to establish the League of Nations in 
1919 and the United Nations (UN) in 1945, giving rise to a number of questions 
regarding the effect of these changes upon the structure of the international 
community.
Because the UN enjoys a central position in the international forum, and 
because it is considered to be the only universal organisation, it is natural that many 
of these questions should concern the future of the international legal order in terms 
of the expected role of the UN (for example, its constitutional structure, the new 
role of its organs, the balance of power in the work of these organs, and the 
relationship between them). According to the UN Charter, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) is one of the principal organs of the UN. It therefore seems 
acceptable that international efforts directed towards the development and 
improvement of the UN to cope with the new challenges should touch upon the 
position of the ICJ and its role.
The purpose of the present study is to examine and evaluate the role of the ICJ 
as the principal judicial organ of the UN in the light of its experience and 
contribution during the past five decades, f  Has it helped the UN to achieve its 
purposes and principles? Has it worked harmoniously within the UN system? Has 
it achieved the hopes of its founders?
2. Scope and methodology
This study will focus on the role of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN. 
It does not deal with the ICJ as an international court in itself. Nor does it deal with 
some related issues such as the jurisdiction of the Court, intervention in cases before 
the Court, interim measures, its authority in fact finding, or the position of third
1
Preface
parties. However, some of these issues will be dealt with to the extent that they 
throw light on the role of the ICJ within the UN.
3. Structure
The study will be divided into the following chapters. Chapter One examines the 
historical development of the notions of international organisations and 
international adjudication which has led to the integration of these two phenomena. 
The provisions of the UN Charter that organise the relationship between the UN and 
the ICJ are then analysed.
Chapter Two deals with the Court’s role as a legal adviser to the UN and its 
specialised agencies. A detailed account of how advisory opinions are requested is 
given and the ICJ’s practice of its advisory jurisdiction is described.
Chapter Three examines in detail the ICJ’s role in developing the law of the 
UN. The ICJ has had the opportunity to remove the ambiguity of some provisions 
and to settle many controversies regarding the application of the Charter. In 
addition, the study focuses on the role of the Court in developing the function and 
the role of the UN and its organs.
Chapter Four focuses on the Court’s role in facilitating the realisation of the 
purposes and principles of the UN through its contentious jurisdiction. It illustrates 
the important role given by the Charter to the Court in settling international 
disputes. The current controversy regarding the relationship between the ICJ and 
other political organs authorised with the same function will be analysed in depth. 
In addition, this chapter will focus on the role of the Court in achieving the other 
purposes and principles of the UN. It will illustrate how the Court, through this 
role, has interpreted, defined and clarified these purposes and principles.
Chapter Five deals with the role of the ICJ as a “constitutional court” charged 
with reviewing the acts of the principal organs of the UN. An overview of the rule 
of law in domestic and international forums will be given, followed by a careful 
study of international lawyers’ opinions and the Court’s jurisprudence.
Chapter Six examines the position of the ICJ within the UN as a court of appeal 
upon the judgments of other tribunals acting within the framework of the UN and its 
specialised agencies.
2
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The conclusion recalls, thought not exhaustively, many of the principal issues 
in the preceding chapters. It will identify the obstacles to the satisfactory 
functioning of the ICJ and ways and means of removing them. Suggestions for 
improving the role of the ICJ and enabling it to function more effectively as the 
principal judicial organ of the UN will be provided.
It should be noted that there is considerable material on the ICJ in the 
publications of the Court and in various books and journals. In contrast to these 
studies, which focus on one or another of the aspects of the role of the ICJ, the 
present study seeks comprehensively to explore and analyse the objects, scope and 
limits of the role of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN. This study 
deals with the jurisprudence of the ICJ up to October 1996.
It is hoped that the present study will help to increase awareness of the role of 
the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN by stimulating and provoking 
academic discussion. It is also hoped that this study might make a modest 
contribution to knowledge on the subject of the position of the ICJ within the 
framework of the UN.
3
Chapter One
Chapter One 
Introduction
Introduction
The position of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN may appear to be a 
recent phenomenon in the history of international organisations and international 
adjudication. However, the status of the ICJ was a product of developments that 
took place over centuries in the arena of international organisations and 
international adjudication. An account of the historical developments in 
international co-operation and international adjudication prior to the establishment 
of the ICJ is relevant, because they explain the circumstances in which the ICJ was 
established and they can also help us to understand the reasons behind the adoption 
or rejection of a certain position.
The legal basis of the organic relationship between the UN and the ICJ will be 
examined in the light of the Charter and the Statute’s provisions. Then the effect of 
this relationship upon the ICJ and the UN will be examined extensively.
1. International courts and international organisations: A historical 
development
In this section the development of the notion of international organisations and the 
development of the international tribunals within these organisations will be 
considered.
1.1. The situation prior to the First World War
1.1.1. Prior to 1899
(i) The development of the notion of international organisations
Prior to 1899, several attempts were made to establish international organisations 
with a view to preventing war and promoting international co-operation. These
4
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attempts go far back in history to ancient Greece.1 A turning point could be seen in 
the seventeenth century when several attempts were made, especially in the 
aftermath of wars, to reach agreements on territorial changes and adjustments 
resulting from war and to prepare peace treaties regulating the new situations. For 
instance, the Westphalia Peace Conference of 1648 marked the end of the Thirty 
Years War and the emergence of the modem concept of the sovereign state as a 
basis for international relations.2 The Congress of Utrecht of 1713 represents an 
effort in the same direction.3 These two steps laid down the basis for the notion of 
sovereignty in Europe, which later extended to the rest of the world.4
The modem concept of international organisations can be traced back to 1815, 
which marked the commencement of co-operation between European states in 
response to the rapid changes in the world.5 In that year the Congress of Vienna 
was held by the European nations victorious over Napoleon in 1814-1815. The 
governments represented in this Congress decided to continue their co-operation on 
a more regular basis with a view to avoiding future conflicts. They also codified the 
mles of diplomacy, thereby establishing an accepted mode of regular peaceful 
relationship among most European states.6 Following that, several international 
meetings were held with a primary objective of preventing wars; for instance, the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1856, the Vienna Conference of 1864, the London 
Conferences of 1871, and the Berlin Congress of 1878 and 1884-1885.7
For more details, see Potter, P., An Introduction to the Study o f  International 
Organisations, 1948, pp. 24 f f ;  Leonard, L., International Organisations, 1951, pp. 23 f f ;  Reuter, 
P., International Institutions (translated by J. Chapman), 1958, pp. 35 jf.\ Bennett, A., International 
Organisations: Principles and Issues, 1995, p. 9; Amerasinghe, C., Principles o f  the Institutional 
Law o f International Organisations, 1996, pp. 1 ff.
2 Gross, L., “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” in Wood, R. (ed.), The Process o f  
International Organisations, 1971, pp. 35 f f ;  Randle, R., Issues in the History o f  International 
Relations, 1987, pp. 36 ff.
3 Randle, ibid., p. 67.
4 Archer, C., International Organisations, 1992, p. 4; Reuter, supra note 1, pp. 40 f f
5 Kirgis, F., International Organisations in their Legal Setting, Documents, Comments and
Questions. 1977, pp. 1-2.
6 Reuter, supra note 1, pp. 46 ff.\ Archer, supra note 4, p. 6.
7 For more details, see Leonard, supra note 1, pp. 31 f f ;  Archer, supra note 4, p. 8;
Knight, W., et al., “The United Nations’ Contribution to International Peace and Security” in Dewitt,
5
Chapter One
During the nineteenth century, it was felt that the promotion of the notion of 
international co-operation in other fields was needed. Therefore, several 
international institutions were established as official unions, commissions and 
bureaux; for instance, the International Commission for the Elbe, 1821, the Central 
Committee for Navigation on the Rhine, 1832, the Sanitary Council for Tangier, 
1840, and the European Danube Commission, 1856. Following that, various 
international organisations were set up and granted powers; for instance, the 
International Telegraphic Union, 1865, the Universal Postal Union, 1874, the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures, 1875, the Union for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, 1880, and the International Union for the Publication of 
Customs Tariffs, 1890.®
(ii) The emergence of the notion of international adjudication
Prior to 1899, the idea of the settlement of inter-state disputes by a neutral third 
party could be traced back to the ancient Greek and Roman times. In this period, 
several treaties provided for arbitration as an ad hoc method of settling disputes 
related to these treaties.9 But, the growth of the superpowers of that period (the 
empires of Macedonia, Rome and Byzantium) disrupted the further development of 
this practice.10
The first attempt to establish an organised arbitration process can be traced 
back to the treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and 
the United States of 1794, commonly known as the Jay Treaty.11 This treaty
D., et al. (eds.), Building a New Global Order, Emerging Trends in International Security, 1993, pp. 
284-5.
8 For an account of the establishment of these organisations, see Potter, supra note 1, pp. 
272 ff.\ Reuter, supra note 1, pp. 54 f f ;  Baehr, P., et al., The United Nations in the 1990s, 1994, pp. 
7-8; Archer, supra note 4, pp. 12-13.
9 Ralston, J., International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, 1929, pp. 153-73, 191; 
Oppenheim, L., International Law, vol. II  - Disputes, War and Neutrality, 1952, p. 34; Murty, B., 
“Settlement of Disputes” in Sorensen, M. (ed.), Manual o f Public International Law, 1968, p. 684.
10 Yamold, B., International Fugitives. A New Role fo r the International Court o f  Justice, 
1991, p. 76; Rosenne, S., The World Court - What It Is and How It Works, 1995, pp. 3-4.
11 In the Interpretation o f  Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania case 1950, 
Judge Read noted that international arbitration has been developed since the Jay Treaty of 1794. See 
ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 242. In his Presidential Address at the special Commemoration Sitting o f the 
International Court of Justice in 1972, Judge Muhammad Zafrulla Khan praised the Jay Treaty as the 
“historical landmark from which the trend which was to lead to the establishment of a true 
international judicial system is usually dated”. ICJYB, 1971-2, No. 27, p. 130. Similarly,
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contained several provisions calling for arbitration of cases concerning territorial 
delimitation and the seizure of ships at sea and other confiscation of private 
property that had arisen from the War of Independence.12 The Jay Treaty was 
followed by a large number of other treaties in the nineteenth century whose general 
feature was reference to a mixed commission. For instance, in 1862 Great Britain 
had, by virtue of a treaty with other states, established permanent mixed courts at 
Sierra Leone to adjudicate on seizures of vessels suspected of engaging in the slave 
trade. The success of these commissions depended upon the ability of their 
members to combine the roles of judges and negotiators to produce decisions 
acceptable to both parties.13
A departure from the practice of constituting mixed commissions occurred in 
the arbitration of the Alabama Claims between the United States and Great Britain 
in 1871-1872. This arbitration gave “the process a new impetus, and introduced a 
number of rules and practices which were gradually to command general 
acceptance”.14 It also established a collegiate body of arbitral practice in that a 
tribunal consisted of one member nominated by each party, and three members 
nominated by the King of Italy, the president of the Swiss Confederation and the 
president of Brazil, respectively. Several disputes were subsequently settled 
through arbitration, such as the Newfoundland Lobster dispute (1891) between 
Britain and France, the Behring Sea Fur-Seal Fisheries dispute (1893) between
Schwarzenberger noted that “ 1794 is the landmark which neatly divides ‘les anciens errements de 
pratiques modemes’; it was then established that international judicial organs are entitled to vote by 
majority, determine their own jurisdiction, and settle international disputes on the basis of 
international law.” Schwarzenberger, G., International Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals, 1986, vol. IV, p. 22.
12 Jessup, P., The Price o f International Justice, 1971, pp. 25 ff:, McNair, A. The 
Development o f International Justice, 1953, pp. 1 ff:, Ralston, supra note 9, p. 191.
13 Simpson, L., et al., International Arbitration - Law and Practice, 1959, p. 3.
14 As noted by Simpson, this arbitration “influenced the draft arbitral code, which the 
Institute of International Law drew up in 1875, and the Convention for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes of 1899 and 1907”. Simpson, ibid., p. 9. In respect of this arbitration, it has 
also been noted by Ralston that “for the first time men opened their eyes to the possibility o f wide 
application of judicial method to the settlement of international disputes”. Ralston, supra note 9, p. 
123.
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Britain and the United States, and the British Guiana-Venezuelan Boundary dispute 
(1899) between Britain and Venezuela.15
The above precedents resulted in the inclusion of arbitration clauses in several 
international treaties as a dispute settlement mechanism; for instance, the Treaty of 
Washington, 1871, the Universal Postal Convention, 1874, the General Act of 
Brussels, and the Convention on Railway Freight Transportation.16
In this regard, it should be noted that, although these tribunals played a role in 
settling some international disputes, they worked in an isolated fashion. Thus, in 
1875, the Institut de Droit International discussed a project on arbitral procedure 
and formulated model regulations.17 The first actual attempt to institute a 
mechanism for the settlement of international disputes can be traced back to The 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
1.1.2. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907
The two Hague Conferences constitute the cornerstone of the development of the 
notion of international adjudication. They might be considered as the first 
endeavour to codify a vast domain of international justice.18
The First Hague Conference of 1899 adopted the Convention on the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes. According to this Convention, the participant states agreed 
“to use their best efforts to ensure the pacific settlement of international 
differences”.19 The Convention provided several ways to settle international 
disputes between the member states. For instance, it dealt with good offices, 
mediation and commissions of inquiry.20 It also stipulated that the “signatory 
powers” agreed to settle their disputes through international arbitration and to work
15 Schwarzenberger, supra note 11, p. 82.
16 Hudson, M., The Permanent Court o f  International Justice 1920-1942, 1943, p. 3; Singh, 
N., The Role and Record o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1989, p. 7.
17 Bowett, D., The Law o f  International Institutions, 1982, p. 260.
18 For more details, see Potter, supra note 1, pp. 228 ff.\ Leonard, supra note 1, pp. 254 ff.\ 
Bederman, D., “The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907” in Janis, M. (ed.), International 
Courts fo r the Twenty-First Century, 1992, pp. 9 ff.
19 Part I, Art. 1.
20 Arts. 2-14.
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towards the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration.21 One of the major 
achievements of this Conference was the acknowledgement of the utility of a 
permanent instance of international arbitration, with a view to solving conflicts 
among states and preventing wars.
The Second Hague Conference 1907 expanded the concept of pacific settlement 
of disputes. The Convention contained an obligation upon states “to use their best 
efforts to ensure the pacific settlement of international differences”.22 It referred, 
pursuant to Art. 14, to the establishment and maintenance of a Permanent Court of 
Arbitration as a more permanent institution.23 In addition, it attempted to establish 
an International Prize Court to deal with claims between neutrals and belligerents 
arising out of the exercise of the belligerent right of prize at sea. The establishment 
of the latter Court faced some obstacles regarding the law that would be applied by 
the Court because the attempts to codify the existing law of maritime warfare were 
not successful. In addition, there were difficulties in finding a satisfactory 
procedure for electing judges and guaranteeing their independence. Thus the 
Convention did not enter into force and the efforts to create an International Prize 
Court did not attain their objective.24
1.1.3. The establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
The PCA, as mentioned above, owes its existence to The Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907. The PCA was organised and established at The Hague and was to 
meet at least annually. Its competence was to be derived from either general treaty 
or special agreement. At the Second Peace Conference 1907, many delegations
21 Art. 20 provides that, “with the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration 
for international differences, which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, the signatory 
Powers undertake to organise a Permanent Court of Arbitration, accessible at all times and 
operating, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of procedure 
inserted in the present convention”.
22 Part I, Art. 1.
23 It should be noted that The Hague Peace Conferences had an influence at the regional 
level. For instance, the Central American Court of Justice was established in 1908, and exercised 
true compulsory jurisdiction until its demise in 1918 following the signing by Nicaragua and the 
United States o f the Bryan Chamber Treaty.
24 Gregory, C., “The Proposed International Prize Court and Some of its Difficulties”, AJIL, 
2, 1908, pp. 458 ff.\ Brown, H., “The Proposed International Prize Court”, AJIL, 2, 1908, pp. 476 
ff.\ El-Erian, A., “The International Court of Justice and the Concept of Universality”, CJTL, 19, 
1981, p. 200; Rosenne, supra note 10, p. 10.
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were convinced that the PCA ought to enjoy a truly judicial character, and that it 
should be supplemented by a permanent Bureau acting as the Court’s Registry.25 
The draft convention annexed to the Final Act of the Second Peace Conference 
called for the creation of a Court “of a free and easy access, composed of judges 
representing the various judicial systems of the world and capable of ensuring 
continuity in arbitral jurisprudence”.26
Between 1899 and 1914 more than 120 arbitration agreements were concluded 
making reference to the PCA. The Court decided upon fifteen cases that had not 
been resolved through diplomatic channels.27 The Court still exists, though it has 
had comparatively little work since the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) 1921. There is no obligation upon states to refer their 
disputes to it and no means of enforcing its decisions. Nowadays, the PCA is used 
mainly (through its national groups)28 to nominate candidates for the election of 
judges of the ICJ.29
An evaluation of the PCA’s practice leads to the conclusion that, despite the 
fact that it facilitated the setting up of arbitral tribunals by providing a central 
administrative body, it is neither permanent nor a Court stricto sensu. It is rather a 
panel of international arbitrators from which states can designate specific arbitrators
25 The Final Act of the Second Peace Conference, 18 October 1907, stated that “[t]he 
Conference recommends to the signatory Powers the adaptation of the annexed draft convention for 
the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice and the bringing it into force as soon as an agreement has 
been reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the Court” (cited in 
Hudson, supra note 16, p. 81).
26 Hudson, supra note 16, p. 81; Gilmore, G., “The International Court of Justice”, YLJ, 55, 
1946, pp. 1050-1.
27 Hudson, M., International Tribunals: Past and Future, 1944, p. 7; Janis, M. “The 
International Court” in Janis, M. (ed.), International Courts fo r  the Twenty-First Century, 1992, p. 
16.
28 It should be noted that Art. 44 of The Second Hague Convention, 1907, for the pacific 
settlement of international disputes deals with the appointment of the “national groups” as follows: 
“each contracting power selects four persons at the most, of known competency in question of 
international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties o f arbitrator ... 
Two or more powers may agree on the selection in common of one or more members. The same 
person can be selected by different powers.” According to this article, the persons selected are 
members of the PCA. See Lissitzyn, O., The International Court o f  Justice: Its Role in the 
Maintenance o f International Peace and Security, 1951, p. 10; Bowett, supra note 17, pp. 260ff.
29 t . (The national groups of the PCA had the same role in respect of the nomination of the 
PCIJ’s judges.
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to sit on ad hoc tribunals to hear cases submitted voluntarily by states. Despite this 
conclusion, the Court is considered to be the forerunner of the PCIJ and the ICJ, in 
that it established and approved of the idea of international machinery as a means of 
settling international disputes.
1.2. After the First World War
1.2.1. The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ)
During the First World War, a number of independent initiatives were made, all of 
which were aimed at avoiding another world war by creating an international 
organisation and machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the meeting 
of the Paris Peace Conference, a resolution was passed that called for the creation of 
a League of Nations “to promote international co-operation, to ensure the fulfilment 
of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war”. Its 
Covenant came into force early 1919.30 The League of Nations became the first 
effective move towards the organisation of a political and social order on a global 
scale.
To achieve the objective of maintaining “international peace and security”, the 
Covenant of the League adopted the system of collective security for the first time 
in the history of international institutions. Any attempt to give a full treatment to 
the League system would be outside the scope of the present study. What needs to 
be mentioned here is that the parties to the Covenant of the League accepted the 
idea that they should attempt to resolve their disputes peacefully before having 
recourse to war. Therefore, the drafters of the Covenant were convinced that 
international disputes should be resolved in accordance with principles of law as an 
essential and necessary requirement.31 Accordingly, Arts. 12 and 13 were embodied 
in the Covenant. Pursuant to Art. 12, a mutual undertaking was given by all 
members of the League to submit their disputes to judicial settlement, arbitration or
30 Yamold, supra note 10, p. 79; Archer, supra note 4, pp. 15 ff.\ Bennett, supra note 1, pp.
2 4 #
31 Hudson, supra note 16, p. 93; Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f  the International 
Court, 1985, p. 13.
11
Chapter One
inquiry. Pursuant to Art. 13, disputes on questions of fact or international law were 
generally to be submitted to arbitration and judicial settlement as an instrument for 
solving their international disputes. In addition, Art. 14 referred to the 
establishment of an international tribunal to settle international disputes.32 Pursuant 
to Art. 14, the Council appointed a Committee of Jurists to draft a Statute of the 
Court in 1920. The Assembly adopted the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice on 13 December 1920. On 16 December, the Assembly 
adopted a protocol of signature that was to be ratified by states to accept that they 
would be bound by the Court’s Statute. The Statute came into force on 1 September 
1921 upon the signature of the Protocol by the majority members of the League.33
The PCIJ, which functioned effectively between 1922 and 1940,34 was the first 
institutional international tribunal rather than a panel from which ad hoc tribunals 
could be constituted. It created a precedent in the history of international 
adjudication by establishing an international tribunal simultaneously with an 
international institution. It was also the first world-wide tribunal to which states in 
all parts of the world could submit their controversies for judicial settlement.
1.2.2. The institutional relationship between the PCIJ and the League of 
Nations
Art. 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was the only article that referred 
to the PCIJ. This article made a general reference to an international tribunal 
without details. The PCIJ was not enumerated among the organs of the League of
32 Art. 14 provided that “the Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the 
League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The 
Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the 
parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or 
question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.”
33 In this regard, it should be noted that the idea of the establishment of the PCIJ can be 
traced back to 1918, when the British Government Committee on the League of Nations proposed 
that a court be designed out of the forthcoming treaty of peace and that the tribunal also be 
empowered to hear cases concerning other international disagreements. At Versailles in 1919, the 
idea of establishing a new court was discussed and, as a result, Art. 14 was embodied in the 
Covenant. See Janis, supra note 27, p. 17.
34 Between 1921 and 1945, the PCIJ issued 31 judgments, 25 substantive orders, and 27 
advisory opinions. With regard to the evolution of the PCIJ’s activities, see Elian, G., The 
International Court o f  Justice, 1971, pp. 34 ff.\ Rosenne, supra note 31, p. 10; Knight, et al., supra 
note 7, pp. 284-5, 288.
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Nations pursuant to Art. 2 of the Covenant.35 Moreover, the PCIJ’s Statute was not 
an integral part of the Covenant because it was adopted by a resolution of the First 
Assembly of the League of Nations as an international treaty distinct from the 
Covenant.
This situation led to a theoretical discussion among international lawyers 
regarding the institutional relationship between the PCIJ and the League of Nations.
It is noted by some lawyers that the PCIJ was not an organ of the League of Nations 
but was a separate and independent organisation like the International Labour 
Organisation.36 This opinion is based upon the absence of any specific provision in 
the Covenant and in the PCIJ’s Statute referring to any institutional relationship 
between them.
The above view is rejected by other lawyers, who conclude that the PCIJ was 
an organ of the League despite the fact that its Statute was not an integral part of the 
Covenant.37 This opinion is based on several grounds. The discussion of the 
travaux preparatoires of the Covenant, especially the Pact of Paris, 1919, left no 
doubt that the PCIJ was envisaged as a part of the League. Art. 415 of the 
Versailles Treaty referred to “the Permanent Court of International Justice of the 
League of Nations” .38 In addition, the statement made by the Court’s President, / 
Judge Loder, in the opening session of the PCIJ referred to the Court as “one of the 
principal organs of the League” which “occupies within the League of Nations a 
place similar to that of the judicature in many states”. Moreover, the Constitution 
of the International Labour Organisation adopted the opinion of the PCIJ’s 
President in the ceremony of the opening of the Court, where he described the Court
35 Art. 2 provided “[t]he action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through 
the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat”.
36 Hammarskjold, A., Jurisdiction International, 1938, p. 61; Kelsen, H., Peace Through 
Law, 1944, p. 49; Kelsen, H., The Law o f  the United Nations, 1951, p. 465; Simpson, et al., supra 
note 13, p. 25; Gill, T., Litigation Strategy at the International Court: A Case Study o f  the 
Nicaragua v. United States Dispute, 1989, p. 5.
37 Hudson, supra note 16, pp. 111-12; Waltera, F., A History o f  the League o f  Nations, 
1952, vol. 2, p. 815; Khan, M., “The Contribution of the Principal Judicial Organ of the United 
Nations to the Achievement of the Objects of the Organisation”, ARUNA, 1969/70, p. 42.
38 Hudson, supra note 16, p. 111.
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as a Court of the League.39 Finally, the invitation of the Council of the League to 
the Committee of Jurists stated that “[t]he Court is a most essential part of the 
organisation of the League of Nations” ;40 and the report of the Committee concluded 
that “[t]he new Court, being the judicial organ of the League of Nations, can only be 
created within this League” .41
The above two views are not without merit. However, it should be noted that, 
despite the fact that there was no provision either in the Covenant or in the Statute 
confirming the integral relationship between the PCIJ and the League of Nations, 
the PCIJ was sufficiently close to the League of Nations that we cannot notice any 
difference between their relationship and the current relationship between the UN 
and the ICJ. This was reflected through several provisions. First, the administrative 
and financial links between the League and the PCIJ appeared in several provisions 
of the Covenant and the Statute.42 According to these provisions, the League of 
Nations was charged with the election of the Court’s judges;43 the expenses of the 
Court were met by the League; its budget was a part of the League’s budget and was 
examined and passed by the financial authorities of the League;44 and it played a 
role in determining the conditions on which non-member states could be parties to 
cases before the Court.45 Second, the practice of the PCIJ’s functions toward the 
other organs of the League leaves no doubt about its close relationship to the 
League. It operated as a part of the League machinery, playing a role in achieving 
the League’s principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Third, 
the PCIJ co-operated with the Council of the League by providing advisory
39 LNOJ, 1922, p. 312; Politis, N., La Justice Internationale, 1924, pp. 180 jf.
40 The Council of the League Doc., 1921, p. 6 (cited in Keith, K., The Extent o f  the Advisory
Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1970, p. 144).
41 Hudson, supra note 16, pp. 144-5.
42 In addition to these provisions, it should be noted that Art. 1 of the PCIJ’s Statute
affirmed that the Court was established in accordance with Art. 14 of the Covenant.
43 Art. 4 of the PCIJ’s Statute.
44 Art. 32 of the PCIJ’s Statute.
45 Art. 35/2 of the PCIJ’s Statute.
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opinions.46 Fourth, this relationship has been clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
the collapse of the League of Nations led to the collapse of the PCIJ. Finally, this 
closer relationship was confirmed by the report of the Informal Inter-Allied 
Committee, which described the relationship between the PCIJ and the League as 
“organic” .47
In light of the above, it would be reasonable to pose the following question: 
why did not the founders of the League embody an express provision in the 
Covenant indicating that the PCIJ was an organ of the League? This question is not 
answered in the literature on the PCIJ. However, the status of the PCIJ may be 
attributed to the following factors. First, there might have existed a belief that the 
Court’s independence entailed its separation from the political organs. Second, it 
might have been envisaged that the separation between the Court and the League 
would guarantee the survival of the Court even if the League collapsed for whatever 
reason. Third, the fact that the PCIJ was the first attempt to establish a permanent 
court with a truly judicial character in the international forum might have led the 
drafters of the Covenant to concentrate on its Statute rather than its institutional 
relationship with the League. Fourth, at that time the League of Nations was the 
first real attempt at international co-operation between states, and it might have 
appeared to member states that an organisation that represented the international 
community and in a sense participated in regulating it in some way could affect 
their sovereignty. Therefore, a court within the structure of the organisation could 
have been deemed as a further threat to the sovereignty of member states. Hence, if 
the Court had been embodied in the League’s structure it could have affected the 
decision of states to join the League. Finally, the issue of the organic relationship 
was hard to perceive prior to asserting whether an international court had something 
to offer to the international community and that it could really work.
46 Having analysed the PCIJ’s dicta in respect of some advisory opinions, Keith noted that 
“ [t]he Permanent Court then, clearly considered itself to be under a duty to time its replies to 
requests for opinions so that they would be of most value to the Council; doubtless this duty resulted 
at least in part from its links with the League”. Keith, supra note 40, pp. 144-5.
47 See UNCIO, 3, pp. 87-9; AJIL, 39, supp., 1945, p. 4.
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1.3. After the Second World War
1.3.1. The development of the notion of international organisations
The development of international relations on the one hand, and the disaster of the 
Second World War on the other hand, revealed to the world the necessity and 
expediency of creating several permanent international institutions to enable states 
to co-operate. There was a call for the establishment of an international 
organisation for the “maintenance of international peace and security” among the 
Allied powers during the Second World War. The establishment of the UN and its 
specialised agencies was a logical consequence of this movement.
1.3.2. The establishment of the United Nations and the International Court of 
Justice
During the Second World War, the Allied powers made some suggestions about 
establishing a new world organisation after the end of the war to play a leading role 
in maintaining international peace and security. These bore fruit in the adoption of 
the UN Charter, which was signed on 26 June 1945.48
With regard to the ICJ, there was no reference to it during the first stages of the 
travaux preparatories.49 The idea of establishing an international court appeared for 
the first time in the report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, which convened between 1943 and 
1 9 4 4  50 Two questions were considered by this Committee: first, whether to keep 
the PCIJ with some modification to its Statute or to establish a new court by means
48 For more details, see Bennett, supra note 1, pp. 43 jf.
49 Neither the Moscow Declaration nor the Tehran Conference resulted in any reference to
the Court.
50 Hudson, M., “The Succession of the International Court of Justice to the Permanent Court
o f International Justice”, AJIL, 51, 1957, p. 570. It should be noted that, in early 1943, the
Governments of Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, and Poland as well as the French Committee of National Liberation, agreed to 
nominate a number of their experts to constitute an informal committee to examine the question of 
the Court. The members of this Committee were acting in their personal capacity and without 
binding their governments. See Rosenne, supra note 31, pp. 27-8; Marston, G., “The London 
Committee and the Statute of the International Court of Justice” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), Fifty Years 
o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1996, pp. 40 jf.
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of a new Statute; second, whether this court would be institutionally integrated into 
the new organisation.
The above Committee did not deal with the first question because it concluded 
that “reference to the future court in this report should be regarded as applicable 
whether that court be the Permanent Court of International Justice or a newly- 
created body” .51 With regard to the second question, the Committee found that it 
was not desirable to connect the court with a future international organisation. In its 
opinion, the PCIJ had suffered from its quasi-organic connection with the League,
i
which resulted in its prestige being dependent upon the varying fortunes of the 
League. The Committee also noted that this organic connection was undoubtedly 
responsible for the unwillingness of some states to become parties to the PCIJ’s 
Statute. Moreover, it was observed that any general international organisation 
would in its early stages be of a tentative character and might undergo changes as 
the result of experience. Therefore, it was desirable for the court to be on a 
permanent basis and not to be liable to be affected by changes that the organisation 
might undergo. Finally, it was considered that such an organic connection between 
the court and a general international organisation would not function satisfactorily 
unless the membership of the two institutions was entirely, or at any rate practically, 
identical.52
Although the Dumbarton Oaks proposal of 1944 did not deal with the question 
of whether to keep the PCIJ or to establish a new court, it embodied the court within 
the principal organs of the organisation. Chapter VII stated that the court should 
constitute the principal judicial organ of the organisation. It also stated that this 
court should be constituted by and function in accordance with a Statute that should 
be annexed to and be a part of the Charter of the organisation. Furthermore, it 
pointed out that the membership should be identical in both the court and the 
general organisation.53
51 For the report of the Committee, see AJIL, 39, supp., 1945, p. 2 ff.
52 Ibid.
53 Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, see AJIL, 39, supp., 1945, p. 42; Hudson, M., “The Twenty- 
Third Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and its Future”, AJIL, 39, 1945, p. 3; 
Hudson, supra note 50, p. 570; Fakher, H., The Relationships Among the Principal Organs o f  the 
United Nations, 1951, pp. 19-20.
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At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 there was a disagreement among the 
participants regarding the question of whether to keep the PCIJ or to establish a new 
court. Two different views were expressed.54 Some participants were in favour of 
keeping the PCIJ and introducing some amendments to its Statute corresponding 
with the new needs of the replacement of the League of Nations by the UN. This 
view was based on the fact that there were in existence several hundred international 
treaties that contain the so-called compromissory clause providing that in the event 
of dispute the PCIJ should have the power to interpret the treaty, and that these 
treaties, despite the war, would probably continue in force. Conversely, it was 
noted that, if there was an intention to establish a court as part of the post-war 
organisation, it would be technically easier to adopt a new court rather than revive 
the PCIJ.
The latter view was upheld for several reasons. First, it was noted that, if the 
PCIJ were to continue, amendments in its Statute would be required as a result of 
the discontinuance of the League of Nations. This was legally impossible in the 
light of the absence of any provision for revision in the Statute of the PCIJ, and in 
the light of the absence of some parties to the Statute - the Axis states - which were 
not represented at the UN travaux preparatoires. Therefore, it was impossible to 
introduce any amendments because the voting requirements could not be fulfilled. 
Second, it was impossible to elect new judges because this election could be 
conducted only by the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations, which 
was on the verge of collapse. Finally, some states that participated in the travaux 
preparatoires, such as the Soviet Union, were not parties to the PCIJ’s Statute. In 
the light of the above, the First Committee of the Fourth Commission of the San
Jessup, P., “The Court as an Organ of the United Nations”, For.Aff., 23, 1945, p. 235; 
Russell, R., A History o f  the United Nations Charter: The Role o f the United States (1940-1945), 
1958, p. 879; Anand, R., Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1961, p. 20; 
Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f  the International Court, 1965, vol. 1, p. 62; Goodrich, L., et 
al., Charter o f  the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 1969, p. 546; Rousseau, C., Droit 
International Public, 1974, p. 331; Hilderbrand, R., Dumbarton Oaks. The Origins o f  the United 
Nations and the Search fo r Post-War Security, 1990, pp. 116-17.
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Francisco Conference,55 decided, for the first time, to propose the creation of a new 
court.56
With regard to the position of the new court within the new organisation, the 
Rapporteur of Committee IV/I noted that the new international court should play an 
important role in the new organisation. The Rapporteur emphasised that the court 
had to be one of the principal organs and its Statute therefore should be a part of the 
Charter.57 It was also stressed that the court was not established upon any different 
basis than that of the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), and other 
organs of the organisation.58
The San Francisco Conference therefore decided to establish a new court which 
would be designated the “principal judicial organ” of the UN. The Conference also 
decided that the Statute of the court would be “annexed” to and form an integral 
part of the Charter. As a consequence, the PCIJ was officially dissolved in 1946, by 
a resolution of the Assembly of the League convened for the last time, 59 and the new 
court, the ICJ, started functioning on 18 April 1946.60
1.3.3. The ICJ and the PCIJ: Is it a new Court?
As a result of the discussions during the travaux preparatoires stage and the 
provisions of the UN Charter and the ICJ’s Statute, there is no doubt that the ICJ is 
a new court and not a legal extension of the PCIJ. However, the PCIJ and its 
Statute were the basis of the ICJ and its Statute, and similarity and continuity 
between the ICJ and the PCIJ were reflected in various ways. The ICJ inherited the 
objectives and the primary purposes of the PCIJ. First, the ICJ, like the PCIJ, was
55 Hereinafter the Committee IV/I.
56 This proposal was justified as follows: “[a]fter balancing the advantage to be gained and 
the objections to be overcome in the adoption of either course, the First Committee [IV/1] decided to 
recommend the establishment of a new C ourt... Moreover, the creation of a new court seems to be 
the simpler and at the same time the more expedient course to be taken. If the Permanent Court 
were continued, modification in its Statute would be required as a result of the discontinuance of the 
League o f Nations.” UNCIO, 13, pp. 196, 381, 527.
57 See UNCIO, 13, p. 381-4.
58 See UNCIO, 17, pp. 37,47-9.
59 See LNOJ, supp., 1946, p. 256.
60 It should be noted that the Statute of the PCIJ and the Statute of the ICJ were both in force
until April 1946.
19
Chapter One
designed to contribute to world peace by means of the judicial settlement of 
international disputes, to develop international law through its judgments and 
opinions, and, finally, to help the development of international institutions by 
providing them with advisory opinions on the legal matters that they were dealing 
with when exercising their functions. Second, the rules of procedure adopted by the 
new court in 1946 were virtually identical to those of the PCIJ. Third, the Statute 
itself is very closely based upon the Statute of the PCIJ, as is made clear in the 
Charter. Art. 92 states that the ICJ “shall function in accordance with the annexed 
Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter” .61 This article expresses 
the intention of the drafters of the Charter to maintain continuity between the ICJ 
and the PCIJ.62 Fourth, the jurisdiction of the Court is still no different from that of 
the old one. Fifth, it is interesting to note that the ICJ has often referred to decisions 
of the PCIJ as supporting a given position taken within the context of a judgment.63 
Seventh, the ICJ’s Statute makes various references to the Permanent Court and has 
maintained a considerable degree of continuity in the jurisdiction that was conferred 
upon the PCIJ. In this respect, Arts. 36/5 and 37 of the Statute carry over to the ICJ 
valid acceptances of jurisdiction conferred upon the PCIJ with regard to the 
“optional clause” system and in multilateral and bilateral treaties.64 The adoption of 
these provisions was justified by Committee IV/I on the basis that the new court 
would be the successor of the Permanent Court in respect of the matters with which 
these provisions deal and “the creation of a new Court will not break the chain of
It should be noted that the Washington Committee of Jurists, which was established to 
prepare a draft of the Statute, decided to take the Statute of the Permanent Court as the basis of the 
work, together with such modifications as might be required. See Rosenne, supra note 31, pp. 31-2.
62 In his Diss. Op. in the Interpretation o f  Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania case, Judge Read explained that Art. 92 of the Charter disclosed the intention o f continuity 
in jurisprudence as well as in less important matters. ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 232-3.
63 In this regard, it should be mentioned that during the San Francisco Conference there was 
a strong emphasis that the traditions and experiences of the PCIJ would be employed in the 
proceedings of the new Court and would be utilised just as if the Permanent Court had been 
continued. See Goodrich, L., et al., Charter o f the United Nations, 1949, pp. 476-90. With regard to 
the reliance o f the ICJ on the practice of the PCIJ, see Shahabuddeen, M., Precedent in the World 
Court, 1996, pp. 23 ff.
64 See Chapter Four below.
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continuity with the past” .65 In addition, some international lawyers used to use the 
term “International Court” or “World Court” when they referred to both courts.66 
Finally, the ICJ in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua case 1984,67 stated that “the primary concern of those who drafted the 
Statute of the present Court was to maintain the greatest possible continuity 
between it and its predecessor” .68
Despite the similarity and continuity, the ICJ is still considered to be a new 
court and not, as noted by some lawyers, in effect the PCIJ with the only change 
being in its name.69 The latter view ignores several fundamental elements, such as 
the fact that the ICJ’s Statute is considered to be an integral part of the UN Charter 
whereas the PCIJ was created by separate instrument, the fact that member states of 
the Charter are parties to the Court’s Statute, and the fact that the PCIJ’s jurisdiction 
in matters arising under the Covenant rested solely on Art. 36/1, giving the Court 
competence in “all matters specially provided for in treaties or conventions in 
force”, whereas the ICJ Statute states that the Court’s competence includes also “all 
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the UN”. Moreover, Art. 36/3 of the 
Charter provides that the SC “should take into consideration that legal disputes 
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court” 
whereas the Covenant was silent on this point. Finally, the ICJ - in contrast to the 
PCIJ - is under an obligation, as a consequence of its organic relationship with the 
UN, to co-operate with the UN to achieve its aims and objectives. This was 
clarified by the ICJ in the Interpretation o f Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania case (1950),70 where it noted, in comparing its position in relation to 
the UN with the position of the PCIJ in relation to the League, that it had a special
“  See UNCIO, 13, p. 384.
66 In this regard, it should be noted that Hudson wrote his articles entitled “The World 
Court” in the AJIL from 1923 to 1959.
67 Hereinafter the Nicaragua case.
68 ICJ Rep., 1984, p. 407.
69 Schwarzenberger, G., International Law, vol. 1 (International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals), 1957, p. 3; Tomaritis, C., “The Review of the Role of the 
International Court of Justice”, RHDI, 24, 1971, p. 35.
70 Hereinafter the Peace Treaties case.
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relationship with the UN. It pointed out that “it is not merely an ‘organ of the 
United Nations’, it is essentially the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the organisation” .71 
This indicates that the Court considers its relation to the UN to be different from 
that of the PCIJ to the League of Nations.
2. The ICJ as a part of the UN system
As mentioned above, the ICJ constitutes an integral part of the UN. This organic 
relationship has been confirmed by various provisions in the Charter and in the 
ICJ’s Statute. This relationship has affected both the ICJ and the UN. In this 
section the legal basis of this organic relationship and its dimensions will be 
demonstrated.
2.1. The legal basis of the organic relationship
The drafters of the Charter and the ICJ’s Statute were determined to make clear 
provisions in respect of the organic relationship between the ICJ and the UN, in 
order to avoid the confusion that occurred in the determination of the position of the 
PCIJ within the framework of the League of Nations. These provisions are 
incorporated both in the Charter and in the Court’s Statute.
2.1.1. The UN Charter
The basis on which the ICJ was created is the UN Charter. In respect of the Court, 
the Charter’s provisions can be classified into two categories: first, the general 
provisions, which deal with the legal position of the ICJ within the legal and 
political framework of the UN; second, the specific provisions, which deal with the 
organisation and tasks of the ICJ as an organ of the UN.
(i) The general provisions
First, Art. 7/1 crystallises the position of the Court within the framework of the UN. 
It stipulates that the Court is one of the six principal organs, together with the GA, 
the SC, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat.72 This
n ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71.
72 Art. 7/1 of the Charter provides: “[t]here are established as the principal organs o f the 
United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a 
Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat.”
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enumeration is exhaustive and does not place these organs in a hierarchical order, 
since each has an equal status in its capacity as a principal organ of the UN.73
In addition, Art. 33/1 imposes an obligation on UN members to achieve first of 
all a peaceful solution by various means, including judicial settlement, of any 
dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security. This article means that the drafters of the Charter considered the position 
of the ICJ as the judicial organ within the framework of the UN as an appropriate 
means to achieve one of the main objectives of the UN, namely the settlement of 
international disputes by peaceful means. This position was confirmed by Art. 36/3 
of the Charter, which provides that the SC when making a decision should consider 
that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the ICJ in 
accordance with the provisions of the Statute.74
(ii) The specific provisions
In contrast to the general provisions, the specific provisions are many and varied. 
The Charter devotes Chapter XIV to illustrating the organisation and the 
competencies of the ICJ.75
Art. 92 of the Charter complements Art. 7/1 and reflects the constitutional 
position of the Court within the UN. It provides that the ICJ is the principal judicial 
organ of the UN and that it should function in accordance with its Statute, which is 
considered an integral part of the Charter.76
Art. 93/1 of the Charter indicates that the member states of the UN are ipso 
facto parties to the Court’s Statute. This article reflects the development of the
73 Despite this fact it has been noted by some lawyers that “some articles o f the Charter 
might allow one of these organs to control the activities of the other to some extent”. See Jaenicke, 
G., “Article 7” in Simma, B., et al. (eds.), The Charter o f  the United Nations: A Commentary, 1994, 
pp. 195-6.
74 Art. 36/3 of the Charter provides: “[i]n making recommendations under this Article the 
Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be 
referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute of the Court.”
75 Arts. 92 to 96.
76 Art. 92 of the Charter provides: “[t]he International Court of Justice shall be the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which 
is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part 
o f the present Charter.”
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intimate relationship between the ICJ and the UN. Such a provision did not exist in 
the League of Nations Covenant, under which a state could become a member of the 
League without adhering to the Statute of the PCIJ.77
Art. 96 of the Charter also reflects the organic relationship between the Court 
and the UN. Pursuant to this article, the Court is the only competent organ among 
the UN’s organs to give advisory opinions on any legal question referred to it by 
any political organ or specialised agency of the UN. In this regard it has been noted 
by Schwebel that this article is “central to relations between the Court and the 
United Nations” .78
2.1.2. The Statute of the ICJ
The integral relationship between the ICJ and the UN is reflected in several 
provisions. Art. 1 provides that “[t]he International Court of Justice established by 
the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the present 
Statute”. This article is considered to be an introduction to the Statute and affirms 
the link between the Charter and the Statute which is derived from the integrated 
relationship between the ICJ and the UN. It also leads to the fact that both the 
Charter and the Statute are read as one instrument.
The organic relationship between the ICJ and the UN seems clear in the light of 
Arts. 4-14, which deal with the role of the UN with regard to the composition of the 
Court and the election of its judges,79 Arts. 32 and 33, which deal with the salaries 
and other expenses of the Court being bome by the UN, 80 and Art. 35/1, which
In this respect, it was noted by Kelsen that “the provision of Article 93, paragraph 1 ... is 
superfluous since this is the necessary consequence of the provision of Article 92 that the Statute 
forms an integral part of the present Charter”. Kelsen, 1951, supra note 36, p. 81. This view cannot 
be easily accepted. Art. 92 indicates only that the ICJ is an organ of the UN, and it could not be 
interpreted as indicating that all member states of the UN become ipso facto  parties to the Court’s 
Statute.
78 Schwebel, S., “Relations Between the International Court of Justice and the United 
Nations” in Virally, M. (ed.), Le Droit International au Service de la Paix, de la Justice et du 
Developpement, 1991, p. 435.
79 See pp. 32 Jf. below.
80 See p. 36 below.
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allows all non-members of the UN to be parties to the ICJ’s Statute.81 In addition, it 
has been noted that Art. 38 of the Statute is considered to be the most significant 
provision regarding the relationship between the ICJ and the UN. It states that the 
Court’s function is “to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it”. Accordingly, the Court, although it is an organ of the UN, is 
not limited to applying some sort of “UN Law”, but is entitled and indeed bound to 
apply general international law in force between all states. It is undoubtedly for the 
Court to apply the purposes and principles of the UN as stated in Arts. 1 and 2 of 
the Charter, but it is bound to do so by giving decisions “in accordance with 
international law” .82
These articles constitute the kernel of the organic relationship between the ICJ 
and the UN. This position has been illustrated by several commentators and 
international lawyers. For instance, Mr Heald, speaking as the Attorney-General of 
the British Government, noted that the Charter “placed the International Court in a 
more powerful position than the old Permanent Court of International Justice of the 
League of Nations” .83 This organic relationship was also confirmed by the ICJ in 
several cases. For instance, in the Peace Treaties case, the Court stated that: “the 
reply of the Court, itself an ‘organ of the United Nations’, represents its 
participation in the activities of the Organisation.” 84
2.2. The dimensions of the organic relationship between the ICJ and the UN
The integration of the ICJ within the principal organs of the UN has effects upon 
both the ICJ and the UN.
2.2.1. The effect on the ICJ
The position of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ and its integrated relationship 
with the UN has several consequences.
81 See pp. 33 jf. below.
82 Singh, supra note 16, p. 43.
83 See GAOR, (VI), 6th, p. 27 (cited in Rosenne, supra note 31, p. 65).
84 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71. A similar statement was made in the Nottebohm case (ICJ Rep., 
1953, p. 119) and the Certain Expenses o f  the United Nations case (ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 155).
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(i) The parties to the ICJ’s Statute
Pursuant to the Charter, UN members are automatically parties to the Statute of the 
ICJ.85 Art. 93/1 of the Charter lays down a fundamental coincidence of membership 
of the organisation and membership of the ICJ.86 According to this article, a 
member state is ipso facto a party to the Statute of the ICJ as soon as it becomes a 
member of the UN and therefore there is no requirement for a separate ratification 
to be a party to the Court’s Statute. This means that every member of the UN is 
entitled to the benefits of the Court from the date of their admission to the UN. In 
addition to the above, cessation of membership of the UN, whether by withdrawal, 
suspension87 or expulsion, 88 must lead to cessation of being a party to the Statute.
It should be noted, however, that not all the parties to the ICJ’s Statute are 
parties to the UN Charter. It is possible for a non-member state of the UN to be a 
party to the ICJ’s Statute, as will be shown later in this chapter.89
(ii) The domestic jurisdiction of states and the ICJ’s powers
As one of the organs of the UN, the ICJ’s jurisdiction is limited by the general 
limits imposed by the Charter upon the other organs of the UN. However, the 
question has arisen whether the limit of domestic jurisdiction as indicated by Art. 
2/7 of the Charter could be considered to be a limit on the Court’s power.90 The
85 Not all members of the League were parties to the PCIJ Statute. For instance, the Soviet 
Union became a member of the League of Nations in 1934 without ever adhering to the Statute of 
the PCIJ. As mentioned above, the PCIJ’s Statute was constituted as a treaty distinct from the 
Covenant, and membership of the League did not ipso facto lead to membership of the Statute o f the 
PCIJ. See pp. \2 ff. above.
86 Schwebel noted that “this provision is straight forward. It is no less significant for, in 
contrast with the situation of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it assures the Court a 
constituency, the membership of the United Nations, which today is virtually universal.” Schwebel, 
supra note 78, p. 434.
87 Art. 5 of the Charter.
88 Art. 6 of the Charter.
89 See pp. 33 jf. below.
90 Art. 2/7 provides: “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction o f any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” With 
regard to the general literature concerning Art. 2/7 of the Charter, see, for instance, Schapiro, L., 
“Domestic Jurisdiction in the Covenant and the Charter”, GS, 33, 1947, pp. 195 ff.\ Preuss, L., 
“Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction”,
26
Chapter One
importance of this question is derived from the fact that some states, when accepting 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, attach reservations to their declarations 
whereby they do not recognise the jurisdiction of the Court over disputes “in regard 
to matters which essentially fall within the domestic jurisdiction” .91
The ICJ was given an opportunity to address this question in the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company case (1952). In this case, the Court’s jurisdiction was disputed on the 
ground of the limitation of Art. 2/7.92 The ICJ did not make any pronouncement on 
the validity of this contention since it upheld the objection that it has no jurisdiction 
on the basis of the reservation ratione temporis.93
In the light of the silence of the Court, it has been noted by some lawyers that 
Art. 2/7 of the Charter does not ipso jure operate to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Court.94 This opinion is based on the fact that, although the Statute is considered as 
an integral part of the Charter, from which it follows that acceptance of the Charter 
automatically entails acceptance of the Statute of the Court, this does not preclude
RCADI, 74, 1949, pp. 553 jf: , Rajan, M., United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, 1958; 
Conforti, B., The Law and Practice o f the United Nations, 1996, pp. 133 jf.
91 The first reservations of this type appeared in declarations accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ in September 1929, when, after mutual consultation, the UK, Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa deposited declarations containing 
identically phrased reservations withholding from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court “disputes 
with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction” of the 
declaring states. See Briggs, H., “Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice”, RCADI, 93, 1958, pp. 309-10.
In the ICJ era, this reservation was introduced for the first time by the United States in its 
declaration made in 1946. It is now included in several declarations. See ICJYB, 1993-4, No. 48, 
pp. 82 ff:, Guechi, K., Reservations to the Acceptance o f the Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the 
International Court o f Justice, Ph.D. thesis (Glasgow University), 1988, p. 251.
92 In this case, Iran argued that “the Court should declare that it lacks jurisdiction ex officio 
in application of Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, the matter dealt with 
by the nationalisation laws of March 20th and May 1st, 1951, being essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States and incapable of being the subject of an intervention by any organ of the 
United Nations”. ICJ Rep., 1952, p. 98; ICJ Pled., 1952, pp. 292-3, 465 ff., 621 ff:, Waldock, C., 
“The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction before International Legal Tribunals”, BYIL, 31, 1954, p. 122. 
Conversely, the UK interpreted Art. 2/7 as applying only to the organs whose authority is derived 
from the Charter. Accordingly, this article does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction since the Court 
derives its authority from the consent of the state parties and not from the Charter. See ICJ Pled., 
1952, pp. 1 5 6 # , 3 2 7 # , 3 5 0 # , 5 6 1 # , 6 5 4 #
93 ICJ Rep., 1952, pp. 1 0 3 #
94 Minagawa, T., “The Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction and the International Court of 
Justice”, HJLP, 8, 1979, pp. 13-14; Shihata, I., The Power o f  the International Court to Determine 
Its Own Jurisdiction: Competence de la Competence, 1965, pp. 231-2; Briggs, supra note 91, pp. 
320-1; Rajan, supra note 90, p. 505.
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the Charter and the Statute from constituting formally distinct and separate 
instruments. Moreover, the term “the present Charter” is fairly regularly used in the 
narrow sense to exclude the Statute of the Court. In addition, the advocates of this 
view note that the Court’s jurisdiction is derived from the consent of states, and 
neither the Charter nor the Statute gives such adjudicative powers to the ICJ; there 
is no provision in the Charter directly establishing the jurisdiction of the Court. 
They rely on the ICJ’s dictum in the Aerial Incident o f 27 July 1955 case between 
Israel and Bulgaria (1959),95 in which it observed that “Article 36, contrary to the 
desire of a number of delegations at San Francisco, does not make compulsory 
jurisdiction an immediate and direct consequence of being a party to the Statute” .96 
Therefore, the advocates of this view conclude that any limits on, inter alia, the 
domestic jurisdiction of states should be derived from the states’ declarations by 
which they accept the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction and not from the UN Charter.
This view is - rightly - opposed by the majority of international lawyers, who 
note that Art. 2/7, as a general limitation on the UN as a whole and on each of its 
organs individually, applies ipso jure to the ICJ.97 This view is based on Art. 7 of 
the Charter, which describes the Court as one of the principal organs of the UN. In 
addition, Art. 92 of the Charter indicates that the ICJ is the judicial organ of the UN 
and consequently its Statute is an integral part of the Charter, and that the Charter 
and the Statute are to be read as one instrument. Accordingly, the Court should 
respect and apply the general principles that are imposed in the Charter, inter alia 
Art. 2/7. Therefore, the state party to the Statute, having recognised the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 36/2 of the Statute, will be able to deny the
95 Hereinafter the Aerial Incident case.
96 ICJ Rep., 1959, p. 145.
97 Kelsen, H., “Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations”, YU, 55, 1945-6, p. 
1000; Kelsen, 1951, supra note 36, pp. 79-80, 527-31; Rajan, supra note 90, p. 121; Rudzinski, 
A., “Domestic Jurisdiction in the United Nations Practice”, IndQuer., 4, 1953, pp. 329-30; Christol, 
C., “The Jurisdiction of the International Court o f Justice”, SCLR, 33, 1960, pp. 378-9; Bramson, 
A., “Probtemes de Competence dans le Statut et la Jurisprudence de la Cour International de 
Justice”, AUMCS, 8, 1961, pp. 101-36; Wright, Q., “Domestic Jurisdiction as a Limit on 
International and Supra National Action”, NULR, 56, 1961, p. 31; Bains, J., “Domestic Jurisdiction 
and the World Court”, IJIL, 5, 1965, p. 485; Trindade, C., “The Domestic Jurisdiction of State in 
the Practice of the United Nations and Regional Organisations”, ICLQ, 25, 1976, p. 750; Rosenne, 
supra note 31, pp. 49, 65-8; Diss. Op. of Judge Schwebel in Elehronica Sicula S.p.A. case, ICJ 
Rep., 1989, pp. 96-7.
Chapter One
jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of Art. 2/7, claiming that the subject-matter of the /  
dispute is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. /
In addition, it could be argued that the limit of domestic jurisdiction of the state 
applies to the ICJ on the ground of Art. 38 of the Statute, which stipulates that the 
Court must apply rules of international law. Accordingly, any matter that is deemed 
by international law to be a domestic affair ought to be so determined by the Court 
as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the states concerned unless the re js  a 
contrary agreement. Moreover, Art. 36/2 of the Statute, which enumerates the legal 
disputes that would be affected by acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, affirms J  
such a limitation.98 This article refers to questions that, owing to their nature and j j /  
essence, pertain to the field of international law and therefore do not fall under the 
umbrella of the domestic jurisdiction of the states.
Finally, one may refer to the Court’s opinion in the Peace Treaties case, where 
its advisory function was challenged on the basis of Art. 2/7 of the Charter. Having 
clarified that it was not called upon to deal with the alleged violation of the 
provisions of the treaties concerning human rights and fundamental freedom, the 
Court held that:
“The object of the Request is much more limited. It is directed solely to obtaining from 
the Court certain clarification of a legal nature regarding the applicability of the procedure 
for the settlement of disputes by the Commissions provided for in the express terms of 
Article 36 of the Treaty with Bulgaria ... The interpretation of the terms of a treaty for this 
purpose could not be considered as a question essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of a State. It is a question of international law which, by its very nature, lies within the 
competence of the Court.”99
The above dictum is cited to prove that the Court would accept the challenge of 
domestic jurisdiction stated by Art. 2/7 of the Charter and it could refuse to indicate
Art. 36/2 of the Statute provides that “[t]he states parties to the present Statute may at ahy 
time declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto  and without special agreement, in relation A  
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes 
concerning: j '
a. the interpretation of a treaty; l
b. any question of international law; I
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; j
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.”
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the requested opinion if it found that the question is considered to be a matter within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the states.
To conclude, domestic jurisdiction is considered to be one of the principles of 
the UN itself. It restricts the competence and authority of all UN organs, including 
the ICJ, which cannot exceed the limits assigned by the parent organisation, namely 
the UN. As a consequence, the Court’s jurisdiction - advisory and contentious - is 
limited by the domestic jurisdiction of the state, quite apart from any reservations in 
the declarations accepting the Court’s jurisdiction. States are not required to 
include the specific reservation of domestic jurisdiction in their declarations by 
which they accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. 100
(iii) Notification of the ICJ’s procedures
Art. 40/3 of the Statute provides that the Court’s Registrar should “notify the 
members of the UN through the Secretary-General” (emphasis added). This 
provision illustrates the relationship between the Court and the UN by which the 
UN should be informed about proceedings before the ICJ. At the same time, it 
imposes a restriction on direct communication between the Court and the non- 
parties to the dispute entitled to appear before the Court. This kind of 
communication can be made only through the UN and not directly by the Court. 101
(iv) The depository function
The Secretary-General of the UN has a depository function with regard to the 
instruments concerning the ICJ. First, pursuant to Art. 36/4 of the Statute, the 
Secretary-General has a depository function for the declarations of states in 
accordance with Art. 36/2 of the Statute by which they accept the ICJ’s compulsory
100 The reservation of domestic jurisdiction has been criticised by some lawyers on the basis 
that it leaves it to the reserving state to make the final decision in each case. They conclude that a 
declaration with this reservation cannot be valid as an instrument for submission to compulsory 
jurisdiction. See Hambro, E., “The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, RCADI, 76, 
1950, p. 187; Kebbon, N., “The World Court’s Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Clause - 
Past, Present and Future”, NJIL, 58, 1989, p. 264.
101 Kemo, I., “L’Organisation des Nations Unies et la Cour Internationale de Justice”, 
RCADI, 78, 1951, pp. 556-7.
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jurisdiction. Second, the Secretary-General is a depository of the instruments of 
acceptance submitted by non-members of the UN to accept the Court’s Statute. 102
These articles reflect the fact that the Secretary-General of the UN, and not the 
Registrar of the Court, acts as a depository for all instruments related to the ICJ. In 
these cases, the date on which these instruments and declarations come into force is 
the date of deposit to the Secretary-General not the date of the Court’s notification.
(v) Amendment of the Statute
Because the Statute is an integral part of the Charter, Art. 69 of the ICJ’s Statute 
provides that any amendment in the Statute is equivalent to an amendment to the 
Charter. 103 It requires the same process as amendment of the Charter itself. 104 
Therefore, pursuant to Art. 108 of the Charter, the amendment of the Court’s Statute 
requires a vote of two-thirds of the members of the GA which must be ratified by 
the acceptance of nine members of the SC including all the permanent members. 105
In this regard, it should be noted also that the GA, acting upon the 
recommendation of the SC, provides means for participation in the amendment 
process of those parties to the Statute that are not members of the UN. 106
(vi) Submission of the annual report
Pursuant to Art. 15/2 of the Charter, the GA receives and considers reports from the 
other organs of the UN. This article applies to the ICJ since it is considered as one 
of the UN organs. This report covers the period from 1 August of the preceding 
year to 31 July of the current year. It contains a short account of the cases pending 
before the Court and of the orders and judgments that have been made. Needless to
102 Ibid., p. 558.
103 Pursuant to Art. 70 of the Statute, the initiative for amending the Statute may come from 
members of the UN or from the Court itself.
104 Art. 69 of the Statute provides: “[a]mendments to the present Statute shall be effected by 
the same procedure as is provided by the Charter of the United Nations for the amendments to the 
Charter, subject however to any provisions which the General Assembly upon recommendation of 
the Security Council may adopt concerning the participation of states which are parties to the present 
Statute but are not Members of the United Nations.”
105 Schwelb, E., “The Process of Amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice”, 
AJIL, 64, 1970, pp. 880 ff.
106 With regard to the possibility of a non-member state o f the UN being a party to the ICJ’s 
Statute, see pp. 33 ff. below.
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say, this submission has great importance because it contributes to a better 
understanding of the Court’s role and its responsibilities within the UN system. 107 
However, it is worth mentioning here that this submission does not affect the 
independence of the Court and does not mean that the Court is accountable to the 
GA in the exercise of its judicial function. This is supported by the fact that the GA 
just takes note of the report, and consequently has no right to discuss and approve it. 
It also has no right to issue directives to the ICJ where it has no such authority under 
other articles of the Charter or the Statute. In this regard, it has been noted by 
Jaenicke that, “[b]y virtue of its judicial independence, the ICJ, as the ‘principal 
judicial organ’ of the UN, clearly stands outside any hierarchical order, if indeed 
there is any, among the principal organs of the UN” . 108
2.2.2. The effect on the UN
The integration of the ICJ within the UN system has several consequences upon the 
UN, which may be summarised as follows.
(i) The election of the ICJ’s judges
The system of election of the Court’s judges is designed to reflect the position of the 
Court within the legal and political framework of the UN and the organic 
relationship between them, the ICJ’s judges being elected by the political organs of 
the UN. 109 They are elected by simultaneous voting in both the GA and the SC from 
a list of candidates nominated by the national groups of the PCA, 110 or, in the case of 
UN member states that do not have such formally constituted national groups, by ad 
hoc national groups especially appointed by those UN member states for that
107 It should be noted that in the earlier years of the UN no annual report had been submitted 
to the Assembly. The first report was submitted in 1968 and there has been one every year since, 
with one exception in 1975. See Lachs, M., “Problems of the World Court: A Member’s 
Perspective”, New York University, Centre for International Studies Policy Papers, 3, 1970, p. 18; 
Hilger, R., “Article 15” in Simma, B., et al. (eds.), The Charter o f  the United Nations: A 
Commentary, 1994, p. 291.
108 Jaenicke, supra note 73, p. 196.
109 The present method of electing judges by the SC and the GA was really bom in 
September 1921 when the first elections were held by the Council and the Assembly of the League. 
With regard to the election of the ICJ’s judges, see McWhinney, E., “Law, Politics and 
‘Regionalism’ in the Nomination and Election of World Court judges”, SJILC, 13, 1986, pp. 1 jf.
1,0 It was proposed during Dumbarton Oaks to entitle the GA alone to elect the Court’s 
judges. See Rosenne, supra note 31, pp. 35, 170-5.
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purpose. Pursuant to Art. 5 of the Statute, each “national group” may nominate up 
to four persons, but not more than two of them may be of the nationality of the 
nominating group, and the number of candidates nominated by a group may not be 
more than double the number of seats to be filled. 111
In the performance of this election, the GA and the SC proceed separately. 
Candidates are elected when they obtain an absolute majority of votes in both 
organs; and the vote in the SC is taken without any distinction between permanent 
and non-permanent members of the SC. 112
The SC and GA have another role in this regard. Pursuant to Art. 4/3 of the 
Court’s Statute, they formulate the conditions under which a state party to the 
Statute and not a member of the UN may participate in the election of the Court’s 
judges. 113
(ii) The ICJ and non-parties to the UN Charter and the Court’s Statute
In contrast to Art. 34 of the PCIJ’s Statute, which provided that “only states or 
Members of the League of Nations may be parties in cases before the Court”, the 
current draft of Art. 34/1 of the ICJ’s Statute omits the words “members of the 
United Nations”. According to the new draft, the ICJ’s jurisdiction allows all states 
of the international community to have access to the Court regardless of whether 
they are members of the UN or not. 114 This may facilitate the employment of the
111 Art. 6 of the Statute requires that, before making the nominations, each national group 
should “consult its highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools o f law, and its national 
sections of international academics devoted to the study of law”.
112 It should be noted that if seats are not filled by the election, a second meeting, then a third 
meeting if necessary, will be held (Art. 11 of the Statute). If  seats remain vacant after three 
meetings of the electors, a joint conference will be held for this purpose (Art. 12 of the Statute).
113 Art. 4/3 of the Statute provides: “[t]he conditions under which a state which is a party to 
the present Statute but is not a Member of the United Nations may participate in electing the 
members of the Court shall, in the absence of a special agreements, be laid down by the General 
Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.”
114 Nowadays, the importance of allowing non-members to the UN Charter to have access to 
the ICJ has little value because of the quasi-universality that the UN has achieved. As noted by 
Rosenne, “with the virtual universality o f the contemporary United Nations, the question of 
participation in the Statute of states not members of the United Nations has lost most of the 
importance it once might have had”. Rosenne, supra note 31, p. 274; see also Engel, S., “States 
Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice” in Gross, L. (ed.), The Future o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice, 1976, vol. 1, p. 307; Coquia, J., “The Problem of Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice”, PU, 52, 1977, p. 158.
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ICJ in a wider field if the parties to the dispute are not members of the UN or parties 
to the ICJ’s Statute. This importance has been reflected in practice: some states that 
are not members of the UN have referred their disputes to the ICJ (the Nottebohm 
case, the Interhandel case, and the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case) . 115
In this regard, the Charter has entrusted the political organs of the UN, namely 
the GA and the SC, with the role of accepting the non-members of the UN as parties 
to the Statute. They also have a role in formulating the conditions under which a 
state that is a party neither to the Charter nor to the Statute can refer its dispute to 
the ICJ. 116
(a) States not members of the UN but parties to the Statute
A state that is not a member of the UN may become a party to the ICJ’s Statute 
subject to satisfying the conditions determined by the GA upon recommendation of 
the SC. 117
In 1946, the GA laid down the conditions on which Switzerland, a non­
member state to the UN, could be a party to the ICJ Statute. 118 These conditions 
were subsequently applied in each case where a non-member of the UN wished to
115 The Nottebohm case was between Liechtenstein, a non-member state of the UN at this 
date, and Guatemala; ICJ Rep., 1953, pp. M iff .  The Interhandel case was between Switzerland, a 
non-member state o f the UN, and the United States; ICJ Rep., 1959, pp. 6 ff. The Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru case was between Nauru, a non-member state of the UN, and Australia; ICJ Rep., 
1992, pp. 240 ff.
116 Engel, supra note 114, pp. 287 f f
117 Art. 93/2 of the Charter provides: “[a] state which is not a Member of the United Nations 
may become a party to the Statute of the International Court o f Justice on conditions to be 
determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council.”
At Dumbarton Oaks it was accepted that, although the Court was to be a principal organ of the 
UN, states that were not members of the organisation would be enabled to become parties to the 
Statute o f the Court on conditions to be determined in each case by the GA upon recommendation of 
the SC. This view was adopted by the San Francisco Conference, where Committee IV/I had “taken 
into consideration the existing international situation and the present circumstances o f different 
States, which requires that the conditions must be determined in each case”. See UNCIO, 13, p. 
385; Rosenne, supra note 31, p. 271.
118 On 26 October 1946, Switzerland asked what were the conditions under which it could 
become a party to the Statute. The request was referred to the Committee of Experts, which 
recommended that Switzerland might become a party after accepting, first, the provisions of the 
Statute; second, the obligation to comply with the decision of the International Court o f Justice in 
any case in which it is a party; third, an undertaking to contribute to the expenses o f the Court. See 
Bailey, S., The Procedure o f  the UN Security Council, 1988, p. 281.
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become a party to the Court’s Statute. 119 In addition, the GA, upon recommendation 
of the SC, establishes the conditions under which these states may participate in the 
process of amending the Statute120 and of electing the Court’s judges. 121 Currently,^
f *Switzerland and Nauru are parties to the Statute although they are not parties to the; i 
UN Charter. 122 {
(b) States not parties to the Statute to whom the Court may be open
The ICJ is open to a state that is not a party to the Statute on conditions laid down 
by the SC. 123 In 1946, the SC laid down the conditions on which the states not 
parties either to the Charter or to the Statute are granted the freest possible access to 
the ICJ. 124
In practice, several declarations were made pursuant to this article: Albania, 
1947; Italy, 1953; Federal Republic of Germany, 1955, 1956, 1961, 1965 and 
1971; Finland, 1953 and 1954; Italy, 1955; Japan, 1951; Laos, 1952, and 
Republic of Vietnam, 1952, prior to their admission to the UN. 125
119 These conditions were applied to Liechtenstein (1950), Japan (1954), and San Marino 
(1954) when they applied to be parties to the ICJ’s Statute.
120 GA Res., 2520 (XXIV), 4 December 1969.
121 GA Res., 264 (III), 8 October 1948.
122 ICJYB, 1993-4, No. 48, p. 69. In this regard, it should be noted that these states are on an 
equal footing with those that are parties to the Statute by virtue of their membership o f the UN: they 
are entitled to appear as parties in disputes before the ICJ, they may make declarations recognising 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Secretary-General of the UN should transmit to them 
copies of declarations made under 36/4; Art. 35/5 of the Statute, subject to some conditions, applies 
to them by which the declarations made under the PCIJ and still in force will be applied to the ICJ; 
Art. 37 of the Statute, subject to some conditions, also applies to the parties to the Statute, whereby 
the acceptance of the PCIJ’s jurisdiction under treaties or conventions shall be referred to the ICJ; 
they may participate in electing the Court’s judges; and, finally, they have the right to adopt, ratify, 
and bring into force amendments to the Statute. See Engel, supra note 114, p. 294.
123 Art. 35/2 of the Statute provides: “[t]he conditions under which the Court shall be open to 
other states shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the 
Security Council.”
124 SC Res. 9, 15 October 1946. See SCOR, 1st year, 2nd ser., 1946, p. 468; ICJYB, 1946-7, 
p. 106. It should be noted that, pursuant to Art. 35/2 of the Statute, these states have an equal 
position as parties to the Statute. The only requirement o f the states in that case is to declare that 
they accept in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided 
in the Charter. See Goodrich, et al., supra note 54, p. 555.
195 ___ICJYB, 1993-4, No. 48, p. 70. Nowadays, since almost all states are members o f the UN 
or at least are parties to the Statute, declarations made according to SC Res. 9 and Art. 35/2 o f the 
Statute have little importance.
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(iii) The budget of the ICJ
Pursuant to Art 17 of the Charter, the GA has exclusive power to determine the 
budget of the UN. 126 Because the ICJ is an organ of the UN, Art. 33 of the Statute 
provides that the ICJ has no independent budget of its own and its budget is a part 
of the overall UN budget and derived from it. 127
Accordingly, the Court’s budget is subject to the regulations laid down by the 
GA for the general financial activities of the Court and the Court’s budget is subject 
to approval by the GA. The power of the GA to allocate all expenses of the Court 
to the UN extends to the fixing of the judges’ salaries, allowances, and 
compensation. 128
(iv) The enforcement of the ICJ’s judgments
In the domestic field of states, the executive organs have the power to enforce the 
municipal courts’ awards on the premise that all effective law must be supported by 
power. This fact was considered by the drafters of the UN Charter in respect of the 
ICJ’s judgments. Because the Court is the principal judicial organ of the UN, Art. 
94 provides a formal machinery of enforcement of its judgments. 129 It considers that 
failure to fulfil obligations under a judgment of the ICJ is an undermining of the 
judicial authority of the principal judicial organ of the UN. Therefore, the UN 
organs must ensure respect for the rule of law and the mission of the organisation, 
especially because the ICJ has no power to enforce its judgments. 130
126 Art. 17 of the Charter provides:
“1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organisation.
2. The expenses of the Organisation shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the 
General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements 
with specialised agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of 
such specialised agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.”
127 Art. 33 of the ICJ’s Statute provides: “[t]he expenses of the Court shall be borne by the 
United Nations in such a manner as shall be decided by the General Assembly.” Accordingly, it 
worth noting that the budget of the ICJ is considered as one chapter o f the UN budget. For details, 
see Kemo, supra note 101, p. 559; Meron, T., “Budget Approval by the General Assembly o f the 
United Nations: Duty or Discretion”, BYIL, 42, 1967, pp. 107-8.
128 Schwebel, supra note 78, p. 441.
129 Art. 94/1 provides: “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”
130 The Washington Committee of Jurists, 1945, noted that “[i]t was not the business o f the 
Court itself to ensure the execution of its decision”. UNCIO, 14, p. 835.
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Needless to say, empowering UN organs to enforce ICJ judgments represents a 
duty upon them to enhance the role of the Court, since the effectiveness of any legal 
system depends on the existence of machinery to execute and apply the law. This 
was affirmed by limiting the role of these organs to enforcing the ICJ’s judgments 
only, and not the judgments of other international tribunals. 131 In this regard, the 
UN organs have the power to recommend or decide measures should a party to a 
case fail to fulfil judgments rendered by the ICJ.
The SC, according to Art. 94/2, 132 is empowered “if it deems necessary” 133 to 
recommend or decide on appropriate measures to secure compliance with a decision 
of the ICJ against a reluctant state. 134 In addition, the GA has the power to discuss 
and make recommendations in the event of non-compliance with judgments of the 
ICJ if there is compliance by either party, despite the fact that the Charter fails to
131 According to Art. 13/4 of the Covenant, the Council o f the League was competent to 
enforce the decision of any international tribunal. In the light of the current draft o f Art. 94, the 
scope of the ICJ’s judgments is a subject of disagreement among international lawyers. This 
disagreement is related to determining whether the term “judgment” is limited to the Court’s final 
decision or extends to its interim measures. See Elias, T., The International Court o f  Justice and 
Some Contemporary Problems: Essays on International Law, 1983, p. 78; Nantwi, E., Enforcement 
o f  International Judicial Decisions and Arbitral Awards in Public International Law, 1967, p. 150; 
Hudson, supra note 16, p. 420; Rosenne, supra note 31, p. 12; Al-Ashall, A., “Non-Compliance 
with the Interim Measures of the International Court of Justice”, REDI, 34, 1978, pp. 317-18.
132 Art. 94/2 provides: “[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent 
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be 
taken to give effect to the judgment.”
133 Two issues have been raised regarding the power o f the SC to enforce the ICJ’s 
judgments. The first concerns the discretion of the SC to enforce the ICJ’s judgments. See Fakher, 
supra note 53, p. 67; Nantwi, supra note 131, p. 135; Tanzi, A., “Problems of Enforcement of 
Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations”, EJIL, 6, 1995, 
pp. 541-3. The second issue relates to the power of the SC to review the ICJ’s judgment when 
practising this power. See Kelsen, 1951, supra note 36, p. 540; Kelsen, H., “Collective Self- 
Defence Under the Charter of the United Nations”, AJIL, 42, 1948, p. 790; Reisman, W., Nullity 
and Revision. Review and Enforcement o f International Judgments and Awards, 1971, p. 782; Foda, 
E. The Projected Arab Court o f Justice, 1957, pp. 215 ff:, Rosenne, S., The International Court o f  
Justice: An Essay in Political and Legal Theory, 1957, p. 105; Fakher, supra note 53, p. 68; 
Kerley, E., “Ensuring Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice” in Gross, L. 
(ed.), The Future o f the International Court o f Justice, vol. 1, 1976, p. 276 ff.
134 Recently, and in the light of Libya’s refusal to implement the ICJ’s judgment in respect of 
its dispute with Chad over “Aouzou Strip”, the Chad Government referred the issue to the SC. For 
details, see UN Doc. S/1994/296, 15 March 1994; UN Doc. S/1994/332, 24 March 1994; UN Doc. 
S/Res./910 1994; UN Doc. S/Res./915, 4 May 1994; UN Doc. S/Res./926, 3 June 1994; UN Doc. 
S/1994/424, 13 April 1994; UN Doc. S/1994/432, 13 April 1994; UN Doc. S/1994/512, 27 April 
1994; UN Doc. S/Res./915,4 May 1994; UN Doc. S/1994/657, 2 June 1994.
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mention such a role specifically. 135 The power of the GA in this respect is based on 
Art. 10 of the Charter, which confers broad competencies to deal with any matter 
within “the scope of the present Charter”. In addition, the obligation to comply 
with the decisions of the Court is specifically provided for in para. 1 of Art. 94, 
which, in conjunction with Art. 92, leaves no doubt that complaints regarding non- 
compliance with decisions fall entirely within the scope of the Charter. 136 It should 
be noted however that Arts. 11/2 and 12/1 of the Charter limit the competence of the 
GA in this regard, such that it cannot lawfully deal with a dispute over non- 
compliance with a Court’s decision while the matter is pending before the SC. 137
Furthermore, it has been noted that the ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council 
may have the same power within the framework of their functions. 138 This view is 
based on the analysis of the task of enforcement as a political issue that might be 
entrusted to all the political organs of the UN, not to a specific organs. In addition 
to the principal organs of the UN, it has been noted also that the ICJ’s judgments 
might be enforced by the specialised agencies of the UN in matters that fall within 
their limited competence. 139 For instance, Art. 33 of the Constitution of the ILO,
135 Jenks, C., The Prospects o f International Adjudication, 1964, pp. 694-5; Schachter, O., 
“Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions”, AJIL, 54, 1960, pp. 1, 6; Anand, R., 
Studies in International Adjudication, 1969, p. 283; Fakher, supra note 53, p. 69; Reisman, supra 
note 133, pp. 729 ff.; Kerley, supra note 133, p. 282; Rosenne, supra note 31, p. 155; O’Connell, 
M., “The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the International Court of Justice: A Study 
of Nicaragua’s Judgment Against the United States”, VJIL, 30,1990, pp. 912-13.
136 Nantwi, supra note 131, pp. 158-9. In addition to these bases it has been noted that the 
GA’s competence is derived from Chapter VI of the Charter. Accordingly it has been concluded 
that “if requests for enforcement of judgments of the Court are received by the Council as ‘dispute’ 
or ‘situation’ under Article 35/1, the competence of the GA to receive them under the same 
provision is difficult to question”. Kerley, supra note 133, p. 282.
137 Art. 11/2 provides: “[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United 
Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make 
recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security 
Council or to both.”
Art. 12/1 provides: “[wjhile the Security Council is exercising in respect o f any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”
138 Al-Ashall, supra note 131, p. 326.
139 Anand, R., “Execution of International Judicial Awards: Experience since 1945”, UPLR, 
26, 1965, p. 701-2; Dubisson, M., La Cour Internationale de Justice, 1964, pp. 251 ff.; Al-Ashall, 
A., Non-Military Sanctions in the United Nations, Ph.D. Thesis, (Cairo University), 1976, p. 273; 
O’Connell, supra note 135, p. 911.
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after providing for the reference of disputes between members to a Commission of 
Inquiry and the ICJ, stipulates that:
“In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the 
recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry or in the 
decision o f the International Court o f Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body 
may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to 
secure compliance therewith.”140
Similar articles have been embodied in the International Civil Aviation 
Convention, and in the Statutes of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Developement.
2.3. Final remarks
Having discussed the position of the ICJ within the framework of the UN, three 
points need to be made.
First, it is necessary to clarify the fact that the integration of the ICJ within the 
UN does not impair its function as the world court, or prevent it from being an 
independent international judicial body for the international community. 141 It should 
be noted that its status as a judicial organ of the UN is different from the status of 
the political organs of the UN; consequently it has to some extent to distance itself 
from them. The ICJ is not only a principal organ of the UN but also the principal 
public international law court, and it is considered by international lawyers to be the 
central judicial body of the international community. This fact was affirmed by the 
Court’s geographical separation from the UN’s other organs - the headquarters of 
the UN being in New York and the European offices of the UN in Geneva. 142 This 
special position is also marked by the fact that the staff of the Registry do not 
belong to the staff of the UN Secretariat. In addition, the legal position and duties 
of the staff members are determined in general provisions of the Statute, detailed in 
the rules of procedures enacted by the Court and in the staff regulations drawn up
140 UNTS, 15, 1948, p. 92.
141 Anand, supra note 54, p. 24; Keith, supra note 40, pp. 239-40.
142 Singh, supra note 16, p. 37; Goodrich, et al., supra note 54, p. 548.
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by the Registry and approved by the Court. 143 Moreover, cases decided by the Court 
are issued by it in its capacity as the “International Court of Justice” with no 
reference to the UN. 144 Finally, states that are not members of the UN may be 
parties to the ICJ’s Statute.
The second point to be clarified is that the position of the ICJ as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN does not mean that it is the only judicial organ within the 
framework of the organisation. The term “principal organ” may be interpreted as 
meaning that it is the only tribunal directly established by the Charter as an organ of 
the UN. In addition, it affirms that the Court is one of the organs of the UN and, 
finally, that the connection between the Court and the ICJ is organic. 145 But this 
term does not preclude the possibility of the existence of subsidiary judicial organs 
under UN auspices. In practice, several subsidiary judicial organs have been 
established within the framework of the UN; for instance the International Labour 
Organisation Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT) and the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal (UNAT).
The third point to note is that when the Court is dealing with an issue related to 
the UN, such as giving advisory opinions, it will apply not only the UN Charter and 
the Statute, but also other sources of international law, as indicated by Art. 38/1 of 
the Court’s Statute. 146 This is based on the fact that, when the Court deals with 
issues as the principal judicial organ of the UN or as a court of the international 
community, it is a court of law. In addition, because the UN is seen as a legal entity 
distinct from its members, the applicability of these rules is explained as a necessary 
implication of legal capacity and activity in the international legal order. Finally, 
this is also affirmed by Art. 6 8  of the Statute, which provides that the Court in the 
exercise of its advisory function, which is considered one of the main points of its
143 Art. 21 of the ICJ’s Statute, and part III of the Rules of the Court. See Mosler, H., 
“Article 92” in Simma, B., et al. (eds.), The Charter o f the United Nations: A Commentary, 1994, p. 
979.
144 Amerasinghe, supra note 1,161.
145 Goodrich, et al., supra note 63, p. 447.
146 Mosler, supra note 143, p. 991; Mosler, H., “Article 96” in Simma, B. et al. (eds.), The 
Charter o f  the United Nations: A Commentary, 1994, p. 1010; Morgestem, F., Legal Problems o f  
International Organisations, 1986, pp. 32 ff.
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relationship with the UN, shall be guided by the provisions of the present Statute 
that apply in contentious cases. This article is confirmed by Art. 102 of the Court’s 
rules. This view is also confirmed by Gross, who notes that the language of Art. 38 
(“the Court... shall apply”) is broad enough to encompass advisory opinions along 
with judgments. 147 Accordingly, in deciding issues related to the UN, the Court (i) 
applies general and particular international conventions, inter alia the UN Charter 
and its Statute; 148 (ii) applies the rules of international custom, the general principles 
of law; (iii) as an auxiliary means for determining the terms of a solution, guides 
itself by judicial decision and the opinions of international lawyers. 149 Beside these 
principles, the Court, if the UN requests, may decide a case ex aequo et bono; thus 
solutions of equity and compromise are also possible.
Conclusion
It seems obvious that the emergence of the notion of international organisations had 
an effect upon the existence of permanent international courts. As noted above, one 
of the major obstacles to the creation and development of a permanent international 
tribunal in the early stages was the fact that no international organisations were in 
existence. The attempts at arbitration that took place prior to 1889 failed to produce 
a consistent and permanent body of arbitral law because they were both irregular 
and spasmodic. A step forward was taken by the conclusion of The Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes 
and the establishment of the PCA. Needless to say, despite the fact that the PCA is 
not a court of law stricto sensu, it was a great step towards the institutionalisation of
147 Gross, L., “The International Court of Justice and the United Nations”, RCADI, 120, 
1967, p. 326.
148 The Court has referred to the Charter provisions on several occasions: for instance, its 
opinion in the International Status o f  South-West Africa case, 1950, in the Competence o f  the 
General Assembly fo r the Admission to the United Nations case, 1950, and in the Certain Expenses 
o f the United Nations case, 1963. It has referred to general international conventions also in its 
advisory opinions: for instance, its opinion in the Peace Treaties case, 1950, in the Western Sahara 
case, 1975, and in the Interpretation o f  the Agreement o f  25 March 1951 between the WHO and 
Egypt case, 1980.
149 It is beyond the scope of this study to throw light on whether these sources are exhaustive 
or not, and whether the Court could decide on the ground of other sources. On this point, see 
Rosenne, supra note 10, pp. 1 4 6 ^
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the international tribunal and a cornerstone of the idea of a true permanent court for 
the settlement of international disputes.
The League of Nations was the first effective move towards the organisation of 
a political and social order on a global scale. Its founders realised that all attempts 
to establish permanent international tribunals on a purely inter-states basis had not 
succeeded, and therefore the creation of the League should represent a new step 
towards the phenomenon of international adjudication. Accordingly, the 
establishment of a first permanent court was set in motion by the Covenant of the 
League. The PCIJ was considered to be the first genuine international experiment 
in a permanent judicial system. Despite the quasi-organic relationship between the 
PCIJ and the League of Nations, and despite the fact that it was an important part of 
the League system, it was not a principal organ of the League.
The final stage of evolution is the UN, where the establishment of the new 
court was to be even more linked with the UN than was the case with the League- 
PCIJ relationship. The new Court is fully integrated into the UN system, being 
itself the principal judicial organ; in other words it is considered to be part and 
parcel of the UN. This is affirmed by several articles in the Charter and the Statute. 
The integrated position of the ICJ within the framework of the UN has been 
demonstrated in the various impacts upon the ICJ and the several duties put upon 
the UN. The effect of this relationship on the ICJ is evident in the facts that: any 
member state of the UN becomes party to the Court’s Statute; the ICJ as an organ of 
the UN is obliged to respect all the general limitations upon the other organs of the 
UN, inter alia the domestic jurisdiction of the states; any notification by the Court’s 
Registrar should be done through the Secretary-General of the UN; the Secretary- 
General of the UN and not the Court’s Registrar is the depository of any instrument 
related to the ICJ; any amendment to the Statute should be done in the same way as 
an amendment of the Charter; and, finally, the ICJ submits an annual report of its 
activities, as do the other organs of the UN, to the GA. The other face of the coin is 
the effect of this relationship upon the UN: the UN has a duty to formulate the 
conditions under which a non-member state of the UN can become a party to the 
Statute and can appear before the Court in the event that it is not a party to the
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Statute; the UN is competent to elect the Court’s judges; the budget of the ICJ is 
determined by the UN; and, finally, the UN is responsible for enforcing the ICJ’s 
judgments in the event of non-compliance by a party to the case.
However, as mentioned above, the Court’s being the principal judicial organ of 
the UN does not impair its role as the World Court. Accordingly, it has a dual role: 
within the international community as a recognised international court, and within 
the UN as its principal judicial organ. In addition, the ICJ’s being the principal 
judicial organ of the UN does not prevent the UN from establishing subsidiary 
judicial organs within its framework. Finally, being the principal judicial organ 
does not mean that the Court, when determining the law so as to enable the UN to 
function effectively and to achieve justice, is restricted to applying the Charter and 
the Statute. It can use the same sources of law as are indicated by Art. 38 of the 
Statute.
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Chapter Two 
The Advisory Role 
of the International Court of Justice
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role of the ICJ as legal adviser to the UN. 
This role epitomises the Court’s integration into the UN family and its status as a 
principal judicial organ of the parent organisation. Meanwhile, the place of the ICJ 
within the framework of the UN has considerable bearing on its position in giving 
advisory opinions, and on the position of those organs requesting such opinions.
The advisory jurisdiction had its starting-point in Art. 14 of the Covenant, 
which provided that “[t]he Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any 
dispute\>r question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly”.1 Similarly, 
theTCJ was given the jurisdiction to provide UN organs with legal opinions upon 
their request. This jurisdiction was provided for several reasons:2 it might assist the 
organs and agencies in deciding on the course of action they should follow;3 it 
might furnish them with legal advice and guidance in respect of disputes submitted 
to it and for action in all future cases and situations; it might simply be a means of
It should be noted the PCIJ’s Statute as originally drafted contained no provisions relating 
to its advisory jurisdiction. See Hudson, M., The Permanent Court o f  International Justice 1920- 
1942, 1943, pp. 107-8, 210-13; Keith, K., The Extent o f  the Advisory Jurisdiction o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice, 1971, p. 13; Waldock, H., “Aspects of the Advisory Jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice”, Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture delivered on 3 June 1976, pp.
1 ff-
2 Goodrich, L., et al., The United Nations and the Maintenance o f International Peace and 
Security, 1955, p. 160; Koray, B., The International Court o f  Justice. The Position o f  Third Parties 
Reconsidered, Ph.D. Thesis (University o f London), 1992, pp. 343-4; Pratap, D., The Advisory 
Jurisdiction o f the International Court, 1972, p. 5; Brownlie, I., Principles o f  Public International 
Law, 1990, p. 731; Baxter, R., “The International Court of Justice: Introduction”, VJIL, 11, 1971, 
pp. 29\ ff.\ Lachs, M., “Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of Justice 
to the Development of International Law”, SJILC, 10, 1983, p. 249.
3 In this regard, Mr Fitzmaurice - the UK representative on the Committee of Jurists - noted 
that “the frequent use of the request for advisory opinions might be made to avoid actual litigation 
and to resolve differences before they reached the stage of a dispute”. UNCIO, 14, p. 179.
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gaining time and avoiding the necessity for an immediate decision;4 it might help by 
eliminating further controversy over the legal aspects of a dispute or by having a 
calming effect on parties;5 and, finally, it might be used to review the judgments of 
the Administrative Tribunals acting within the framework of the UN.6
This chapter aims at discussing the advisory role of the ICJ. To examine this 
role, one needs to shed light on the mechanism laid down in the Charter resulting in 
consultation of the Court. Accordingly, this chapter will focus on how the advisory 
jurisdiction is triggered. It will not focus on the advisory opinion per se; rather it 
endeavours to answer several questions that are paramount in respect of the Court’s 
role within the UN, namely, how an advisory opinion can be requested and the 
limits thereto, the ICJ’s discretion to provide an opinion, and finally the legal effect 
of advisory opinions.
1. The legal basis of the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction
As a consequence of the ambiguity and difficulty in respect of the interpretation of 
Art. 14 of the League of Nations’ Covenant regarding the PCIJ’s advisory 
jurisdiction, the drafters of the UN Charter and the ICJ’s Statute insisted on making 
the Court’s advisory jurisdiction clear. The advisory role of the ICJ has been 
explicitly indicated in both the Charter and the Court’s Statute. Art. 96 of the 
Charter stipulates that the GA and the SC, as well as the other political organs and 
specialised agencies that are authorised by the GA, have the right to request 
advisory opinions from the ICJ.7
Jimenez de Ar^chaga observed that: “[a] request for an advisory opinion normally implies 
a postponement of a decision on the merits by the requesting organ until the answer has been 
received.” De Ar^chaga, J., “The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice”, AJIL, 67, 1973, p. 9.
5 With regard to the value of the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ, it has been noted that 
advisory opinions are sometimes more important than judgments, in international relations, because 
the persuasive nature of advice is frequently superior to force and coercion. See Hudson, supra note 
1 , p. 524; Baxter, supra note 2, pp. 291 ff. It has been noted also by Lachs that “[ajdvisory 
opinions offer the Court a much greater potential to further develop the law than judgments in 
contentious proceedings: the former, unlike the latter, are not limited to a strict analysis of the facts 
and submission that are presented to the Court”. Lachs, supra note 2, p. 249.
6 This issue will be examined in Chapter Six below.
7 Art. 96 of the Charter provides: “ 1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may 
request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
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This article was substantially incorporated in Art. 65 of the ICJ’s Statute.8 The 
inclusion of this article in the Statute was challenged in Committee IV/I, and 
described as “superficial” on the grounds that the Charter contains the same 
provision and that the Statute is an integral part of the Charter.9 This argument was 
rejected by the Committee, which decided to add a new paragraph (1) to Art. 65. 
This paragraph explicitly provides for the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction. In fact, the 
inclusion of para. 1 of Art. 65 is significant for several reasons. First, the drafters 
avoided the mistake made by the drafters of the PCIJ’s Statute when they ignored 
any reference to the PCIJ’s advisory jurisdiction on the ground that there was 
provision in the Covenant (Art. 14) with the same meaning. This situation led to 
great disagreement among international lawyers regarding the power of the PCIJ to 
give advisory opinions and whether or not it was under an obligation to reply. 
Second, this article is justified by the fact that not all the states parties to the ICJ’s 
Statute are parties to the UN Charter. Third, the ICJ itself has referred in many 
cases to this article as the basis of its advisory jurisdiction.10 Finally, as rightly 
noted by Pratap, it is Art. 65, and not Art. 96, of the Charter that illustrates the 
discretionary power of the ICJ when dealing with a request for an advisory 
opinion.11 Therefore, it seems clear that the inclusion of Art. 65 of the Statute was 
important and justifiable.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies, which may at any time be so 
authorised by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal 
questions arising within the scope of their activities.”
8 Art. 65/1 of the Statute provides: “The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations to make such a request.”
9 Kelsen, H., The Law o f the United Nations, 1951, p. 548; Pratap, supra note 2, p. 42.
10 The ICJ referred to this article alone in the Certain Expenses o f the United Nations case as 
the sole basis of its jurisdiction. It stated that “[t]he power of the Court to give an advisory opinion 
is derived from Article 65 of the Statute” (ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 155). It also stated in the Legality o f  
the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons that “[t]he Court draws its competence in respect of advisory 
opinions from Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute” (ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 7 - unpublished). In 
addition, it referred to this article alongside Art. 96 of the Charter as the basis of its advisory 
jurisdiction in several cases; for instance, the Conditions o f  Admission o f  a State to Membership in 
the United Nations case (ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 61); the Competence o f  the General Assembly fo r  the 
Admission o f  a State to the United Nations case (ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 6); the Western Sahara case (ICJ 
Rep., 1975, p. 21); the Legality o f  the Use by States o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case (ICJ 
Rep., 1996, p. 6 - unpublished).
11 Pratap, supra note 2, p. 117.
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In addition to these articles, the Court devoted some articles in its Rules to 
regulating its advisory jurisdiction with a procedural character.12
2. Organs authorised to request advisory opinions
Pursuant to Art. 14 of the League of Nations’ Covenant, only the Council and the 
Assembly of the League were entitled to request advisory opinions from the PCIJ.13 
Such a limited scope was not adopted in the UN Charter. However, having decided 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction to give advisory opinions during the travaux preparatoires 
stage,14 there was discussion regarding who would be authorised to request. The 
Informal Inter-Allied Committee proposed that the power of request should be more 
enlarged than it was in the League of Nations era, and should not be restricted only 
to the executive organ of the new organisation.15 This view was rejected by some 
participants in Dumbarton Oaks on the basis that this authority should be limited to 
the SC only as an exclusive competence.16 This view was rejected by other 
participants and, consequently, the matter was referred to the Washington 
Committee of Jurists, which was entrusted with drafting the Court’s Statute. This
Arts. 102 to 109 of the Court’s Rules of 1978.
13 In the Interpretation o f  the Caphandaris-Molloff Agreement case, the PCIJ stated that: 
“[b]y the terms of Article 14 of the Covenant, the right to submit a question to the advisory 
jurisdiction of the Court is given only to the Assembly and to the Council of the League.” PCIJ, Ser. 
A/B., 1932, pp. 45, 68, 87.
14 It should to be mentioned here that entitling the Court to give advisory opinions was a 
moot point at the stage of the travaux preparatoires, where it was noted that the functions of the 
International Court should be limited to contentious jurisdiction. Accordingly, the advisory 
jurisdiction should be abolished because it is inconsistent with the nature and the function of a court 
of law, which is devoted to hearing and deciding disputes. This view was rejected by the majority, 
who were of the opinion that the Court’s advisory jurisdiction is essential and should be wider than 
the advisory jurisdiction of the PCIJ. An intermediate view was adopted by some of the participants 
on the Committee of Jurists who announced that empowering the Court to give advisory opinions 
depended upon whether it would have compulsory jurisdiction or not. According to this view, the 
Court should be so empowered if the drafters of the Charter failed to adopt the compulsory 
jurisdiction system. See UNCIO, 14, p. 178; Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f  the 
International Court, 1985, pp. 655-6; Keith, supra note 1, p. 11; El-Rashidy, A., The Advisory 
Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f Justice, 1992, pp. 72-3.
15 See UNCIO, 14, p. 445.
16 In this regard it should be noted that it was proposed that “[justiciable disputes should 
normally be referred to the ICJ. The Security Council should normally be referred to the Court for 
advice on legal questions connected with other disputes.” See UNCIO, 3, p. 14; Rosenne, S., The 
Law and Practice o f  the International Court o f Justice, 1965, vol. 2, p. 656; Fakher, H., The 
Relationships Among the Principal Organs o f  the United Nations, 1951, p. 127.
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committee recommended that the power to request advisory opinions should not be 
restricted to the SC solely, and that the GA too should have such a power.17 At the 
same time, it rejected the suggestion presented by some participants that other 
international organisations should be allowed to request advisory opinions. The 
committee failed to reach any acceptable solution in this regard and recommended 
the referral of this matter to the San Francisco Conference because it felt that the 
determination of the authorised organs should be left to the Charter.18
The San Francisco Conference entrusted this matter to a special Committee 
- Committee IV/I - which proposed extending the power to request advisory 
opinions from the Court to the GA in addition to the SC as regards any legal 
question.19 It also proposed that the Charter should empower the GA to authorise 
any other organ or specialised agency brought into relationship with the 
organisation to request opinions on any legal question arising within the scope of its 
activities.20 These proposals were adopted by Committee IV/I on 15 June 1945.21 
They were also incorporated in Art. 96 of the Charter and reaffirmed by Art. 65/1 of 
the ICJ’s Statute.
Accordingly, authority to request advisory opinions from the ICJ could be 
classified as direct and indirect, as will be illustrated below.
2.1. Direct authorisation
The GA and the SC are directly authorised, by virtue of Art. 96/1, to request 
advisory opinions on any legal questions. This power has been confirmed by the 
ICJ in many precedents, inter alia the Reservations to the Convention on the
17 See UNCIO, 14, pp. 177-9. This view was rejected by the US representative, who noted 
that: “[t]he reference to the GA had been omitted from the United States’ proposal since it felt that 
the GA would not function in an executive capacity ... However, he saw no objections for granting 
the GA the same right, provided the request relates to juridical questions.” UNCIO, 14, pp. 177-8.
18 Rosenne, supra note 14, pp. 656-7.
19 See UNCIO, 13, pp. 216,241, 385, 395,411.
20 See UNCIO, 13, pp. 13, 386, 395. Russell, R., A History o f  the United Nations Charter - 
The Role o f  the United States 1940-1945, 1958, p. 874. In this regard, it has been noted by Rosenne 
that “[tjhere is no doubt that the San Francisco Conference also intended to maintain this type of 
judicial process, both for the organs of the UN and for the Specialised Agencies”. Rosenne, S., “The 
Non-Use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice”, BY1L, 39,1963, p. 4.
21 See UNCIO, 13, pp. 96, 101; Russell, supra note 20, pp. 890-1.
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Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f Genocide case (1951),22 where it 
observed:
“Article 96 of the Charter confers upon the General Assembly and the Security Council in 
general terms the right to request this Court to give an Advisory Opinion on any legal 
question.”23
The authority of the GA and the SC to request advisory opinions was described 
by Bowett as an original right, compared with the derivative right of the other 
organs and specialised agencies.24
2.2. Indirect authorisation
The other UN principal organs and specialised agencies, by virtue of Art. 96/2, may 
be authorised by the GA to request advisory opinions of the ICJ directly and 
without any previous approval. Before illustrating these organs and agencies, the 
nature and the scope of this authorisation will be considered.
2.2.1. The nature and limits of the authorisation
As mentioned above, Art. 96/2 empowers solely the GA to authorise the other 
organs and specialised agencies to request advisory opinions from the ICJ.25 This 
provision raises an initial question regarding the reason for restricting this power to 
the GA. The restriction can be justified on the basis that the Charter considers the 
GA as the plenary organ of the UN, whereby it occupies a special position. It has, 
pursuant to Art. 10, a wide competence to discuss any matter or question within the 
scope of the Charter. In addition, it is linked to other UN organs in several ways: 
(i) it has a role in electing the members of other organs; (ii) it has the right to 
approve agreements concluded between the UN and its specialised agencies;26 (iii) it
22 Hereinafter the Reservations case.
23 ICJ Rep., 1951, p. 20.
24 Bowett, D., The Law o f International Institutions, 1982, pp. 277-8.
25 Contrary to this fact, some lawyers have noted that this power is entrusted to the GA and 
the SC. For example, Stone noted that “so may other United Nations organs when authorised by the 
Assembly or Security Council on such questions arising within the scope of their activities”. Stone, 
J., Legal Controls o f International Conflicts, 1959, p. 120.
26 Art. 63/1 of the Charter provides: “the Economic and Social Council may enter into 
agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the
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has control over the budget and administrative aspects of the organisation;27 (iv) 
finally, it is the only organ within the UN that has the right to receive and consider 
reports from the other UN organs.
The Assembly’s authorisation may be obtained on request by any organ or 
agency, or on the initiative of the GA.28 For instance, the GA authorised the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) upon the Council’s request, whereas it 
authorised the Trusteeship Council upon its own initiative. It may also authorise the 
agencies upon a recommendation by the ECOSOC. For instance, authorisations 
were given by the GA to UNESCO, WHO and ICAO in this way. In this regard it 
has been noted that a simple majority of the members “present and voting” suffices 
for the adoption by the GA of decisions authorising other organs and specialised 
agencies of the UN to request advisory opinions.29
The study of the nature and the limits of the GA authorisation should be 
extended to focus on two issues: first, whether the Assembly’s authorisation is 
general or ad hoc, and, second, its power to revoke this authorisation.
(i) General or ad hoc authorisation
In authorising other UN organs and specialised agencies to request an advisory 
opinion, should the GA make only a special authorisation with regard to each 
individual question, or should such authorisation have a permanent character? 
Before Committee IV/I, the Soviet Union proposed that the GA should authorise 
UN organs and specialised agencies to request advisory opinions from the Court on 
a case-by-case basis.30 This view was rejected by the Committee on the basis that 
the words “in each case” can be substituted by “any time” in Art. 96/2 of the 
Charter.31
agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall 
be subject to approval by the General Assembly.”
27 Arts. 17 and 101 of the Charter.
28 Dubisson, M., La Cour Internationale de Justice, 1964, p. 281; Pratap, supra note 2, p.
77.
29 Jenks, C., “The Status of International Organisations in Relation to the International Court 
of Justice”, GS, 32, 1946, p. 4.
30 See UNCIO, 13, p. 298.
31 Ibid., pp. 298-9.
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The Soviet Union expressed the same view on another occasion before the GA 
when it dealt with the request of the ECOSOC to be authorised to request advisory 
opinions from the ICJ. Its view was based on its interpretation of Art. 96/2 of the 
Charter, concluding that this authorisation should have an ad hoc character. This 
view was rejected by the GA, which drafted its resolution closely to the language of 
Art. 96/2, by authorising the ECOSOC to “request advisory opinions ... on any legal 
question arising within the scope of the activities of the Council”.32
The GA’s interpretation of Art. 96/2 of the Charter is consistent with the 
attitude of Committee IV/I. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union’s view would 
have had the effect of nullifying para. 2 of Art. 96, because the GA would in effect 
be requesting every single opinion. This view would also lead to a conclusion that 
each request originating outside the Assembly and the Council could be challenged 
through the Assembly.33 Moreover, this view did not consider the fact that normally 
the GA meets once a year and that the need for authorisation in between sessions of 
the GA would be a difficult process.34
(ii) The power of the GA to revoke its authorisation
Because the right of other UN organs and specialised agencies to request advisory 
opinions is based on authorisation by the GA, the question which needs to be 
clarified here is whether the GA can revoke its authorisation unilaterally at any 
time. The opinion that the GA can revoke its authorisation at any time is based on 
the report submitted to Committee IV/I, and on the report submitted to the Sixth 
Committee of the GA at its first meeting.35 These reports expressed the view that 
the GA is competent under the Charter to revoke its authorisation. In practice, this 
view was adopted to some extent by the GA when it authorised certain specialised 
agencies to be empowered to request opinions and stated its understanding that it 
could revoke this authorisation.
GA Res. 89 (I), 11 December 1946; Dubisson, supra note 28, p. 281.
33 Keith, supra note 1, p. 39.
34 Rosenne, supra note 16, p. 672 ff.; UNCIO, 17, pp. 372-3.
35 Zollikofer, L., Les Relations Prevues entre les Institutions Specialisees des Nations Unies 
et la Cour Internationale de Justice, 1956, pp. 69-70; Elian, G., The International Court o f  Justice, 
1971, pp. 73-4.
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The above attitude cannot easily be accepted and should be examined. 
Enabling the GA to revoke its authorisation whenever it deems it appropriate would 
obstruct UN organs and agencies in achieving their objectives and aims. In 
addition, most of these authorisations are embodied in treaties between the UN and 
the specialised agencies. Therefore, revoking these authorisations could be 
considered as unilateral modification by the GA, which might constitute a breach of 
the agreement on the part of the UN and would give rise to the usual remedies for 
the violation of a treaty obligation.36 Notwithstanding this fact, if the GA uses its 
power to revoke its authorisation, this should not affect advisory proceedings, if 
any, pending before the ICJ at that time, otherwise such conduct by the Assembly 
would result in it giving itself the opportunity to challenge the authority of the Court 
in that matter. In the event of any disagreement in this regard it would be for the 
Court itself to determine whether or not the revocation of authority by the Assembly 
would affect its jurisdiction.37
2.2.2. Authorised organs
The determination of the authorised organs was not an easy task. This is because 
the draft of Art. 96/2 mentions only “other organs and specialised agencies”. This 
wording does not identify the precise meaning of the term “other organs”. Is it 
restricted to the other principal organs, pursuant to Art. 7/1 of the Charter, or does it 
include all UN organs? This is a matter that requires examination.
(i) Other principal organs
Pursuant to Arts. 7/1 and 96/2 of the Charter, the other principal organs are the 
ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat. Their respective positions 
are as follows.
(a) The Economic and Social Council
The ECOSOC was the first organ which demanded authorisation from the GA to 
request advisory opinions from the ICJ. The GA, by its Res. 89 (I) of 11 December
36 Jenks, supra note 29, p. 21.
37 Sloan, F., “Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court o f Justice”, CLR, 38, 1950, p.
834.
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1946, authorised the ECOSOC to request advisory opinions from the ICJ “on any 
legal questions within its scope, including legal questions concerning mutual 
relations of the United Nations and Specialised Agencies”.38 The limitation of this 
authorisation was the subject-matter of consideration among international lawyers 
relating to its limitation because the Council has wide competencies pursuant to Art. 
63/2 of the Charter.39 In this regard, Jenks has asked whether, according to this 
authorisation, the Council can request an advisory opinion from the ICJ regarding 
any legal question related to these agencies without their consent. Jenks concluded 
that the situation depends on the nature of the question. If the question relates to the 
relationship between the specialised agency and the UN or another specialised 
agency, the request is considered to be within the scope of the activities of the 
Council in view of its co-ordinating functions. But if the matter is related to an 
internal organisation of the specialised agency or to its entire objectives, this matter 
is considered to be within the scope of the activities of the specialised agency itself 
rather than within the scope of the activities of the ECOSOC and therefore should 
be referred to the Court by the agency.40 This view can be justified not only on the 
ground of the provisions of the Charter, but also on the basis of the principle of the 
separation of powers between the organs and specialised agencies of the UN. In this 
regard, it should be noted that, in the event of any disagreement regarding this issue, 
it should be for the Court to decide on the basis of its competence to determine its 
jurisdiction.41
In practice, the ECOSOC requested an opinion from the ICJ for the first time in 
1989 regarding the applicability of Art. VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
38 Rosenne, supra note 16, p. 669; Dubisson, supra note 28, p. 281.
39 Art. 63/2 provides that the ECOSOC, “may co-ordinate the activities o f the specialised
agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations”.
40 Jenks, supra note 29, p. 11-2.
41 With regard the Court’s competence to determine its jurisdiction, see pp. 98 ff. below.
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(b) The Trusteeship Council
In the GA’s session in 1947 and as a consequence of its discussion related to the 
necessity of the use of the ICJ by the UN, upon its own initiative, the GA authorised 
the Trusteeship Council to request advisory opinions related to any legal question 
within the competencies conferred upon it by Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter.42 
The Trusteeship Council has never used this authority. This attitude of the Council 
could be justified on the basis of the decrease in the Council’s activities now that 
decolonization has almost been completed.
(c) The Secretary-General43
Pursuant to Art. 7/1, the Secretariat is considered one of the principal organs of the 
UN. The Secretary-General, as the chief administrator of the organisation, is in a 
position to exercise considerable authority over the Secretariat. Therefore, if the 
Secretariat were so authorised, a fortiori the Secretary-General as head of that organ 
would be constitutionally and ultimately responsible for any request. In this regard, 
it has been asked whether the Secretariat, acting through the Secretary-General, 
could be authorised by the GA to request advisory opinions of the ICJ with regard 
to any legal question within the scope of its activities.
The Secretary-General has suggested to the GA the necessity of granting such 
authorisation on several occasions.44 As early as 1950, in the Secretary-General’s 
report on whether the Committee of Human Rights could get authorisation to 
request advisory opinions from the ICJ, the Secretary-General concluded that this 
committee has no right under Art. 96/2 to be given such authorisation because it is 
neither an organ of the UN nor a specialised agency. He proposed that the 
ECOSOC and the Secretary^General should enjoy a similar power to the GA to 
request such an opinion on behalf of the committee.45 Later, as consequence of the
42 GA Res. 171 B (II), 14 November 1947.
43 Kemo, I., “L’Organisation des Nations Unies et la Cour Internationale de Justice”, 
RCADI, 78, 1951, pp. 560ff.
44 Dubisson, supra note 28, p. 281; Higgins, R., “A Comment on the Current Health of 
Advisory Opinions” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), Fifty Years o f International Court o f  Justice, 1996, p. 
569; Pratap, supra note 2, p. 68.
45 UN Doc. E/1732, 26 June 1950, p. 7; Dubisson, supra note 28, p. 281; Higgins, supra 
note 44, p. 569.
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ICJ’s advisory opinion in the Effects o f the Awards o f Compensation made by the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunals case (1955),46 the Secretary-General 
reminded the GA to authorise him as the head of a principal organ of the UN to 
request advisory opinions from the Court on legal questions concerning 
Administrative Tribunals’ judgments.47 Recently, in his Agenda for Peace - 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making, and Peace Keeping, the Secretary-General 
stated that:
“I recommend that the Secretary-General be authorised, pursuant to article 96, paragraph 
2, of the Charter, to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court.”48
Despite all these attempts, the GA did not accept these suggestions of the 
Secretary-General.49 This attitude has been upheld by some lawyers, who find that 
the Secretary-General (or Secretariat) is not eligible to be authorised to request 
advisory opinions from the ICJ.50 In their view, the provisions relating to the 
Secretariat are ambiguous, because they refer to it sometimes as a Secretariat and 
sometimes as the Secretary-General, with the same meaning. In addition, this organ 
has a specific nature: unlike other political organs, it consists of a number of 
employees and not of states with the Secretary-General as the head of them. 
Moreover, the Secretary-General is not a “collegiate” organ, and the Court under
46 Hereinafter the UN Administrative Tribunal case.
47 Judicial Review of UNAT’s Judgments, working paper submitted by the Secretary- 
General. See UN Doc. A/AC. 78/L.l and Corr. 1 (1955).
48 UN Doc. A/47/277, 1992; S/24111 (17/6/92), para. 38.
49 However, it should be noted that the Secretary-General may indirectly seek an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ by asking the GA or another authorised organ to make the request. For instance, 
according to the Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the USA, either o f these 
parties may ask the GA to request an opinion on any legal question arising in the course of arbitral 
proceedings concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement. This clause was applied 
in 1988, when the GA, having considered the reports of the Secretary-General, requested an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ regarding to the application of this agreement. See GA Res. 42/229 
B, 2 March 1988; ICJ Rep., 1988, p. 12 ff. In addition, the requests by the GA for advisory 
opinions in the Reparation fo r Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United Nations, Reservations 
and UN Administrative Tribunal cases were made at the instance of the Secretariat. But it should 
also be noted that, despite this possibility, such an indirect method would not be satisfactory in all 
instances in which the Secretary-General might find it desirable to consult the ICJ directly. See 
Sloan, supra note 37, p. 833.
50 Kelsen, supra note 9, p. 547; Rosenne, supra note 16, p. 447, 673; Pratap, supra note 2, 
pp. 82-3.
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Art. 65 of its Statute is empowered to give opinions only to a “body”, which does 1 ,
not apply to the Secretariat because it cannot be considered as a “body” of the UN.51 
Finally, Waldock noted that authorising the Secretariat to request advisoiyljpTmdnsf 
might put it in a delicate position, because most of the requests for advisory 
opinions involve a political issue, and a request from the Secretariat might create 
undue friction with states.52
The above view and the GA’s attitude cannot be easily accepted and should be 
examined. The majority of international lawyers have already strongly 
recommended that the Secretary-General or the Secretariat of the UN should be 
authorised to request advisory opinions from the ICJ.53 Such authorisation is 
desirable, especially with the emergence of the political functions of the Secretary- 
General and the recognition that his position is much more than the administrative
51 Kelsen, ibid., p. 136. It also has been noted that “if the General Assembly authorises the 
Secretariat to request opinions within the scope of its activities, it should be the Secretariat eo 
nomine, because it is the Secretariat which is designated as the organ under Art. 7 of the Charter. 
However, if the Security Council or the General Assembly entrusts the Secretary General with any 
function under Art. 98 of the Charter ... it is arguable that he should have a right to obtain the advice 
of the Court on legal questions arising in the discharge thereof. In such a situation grant of 
competence to request opinions within the limited scope of his particular function might appear 
unobjectionable. But in such a situation also, he can always propose to the organ which entrusts him 
with the function itself to make the request.” See Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 73-4.
52 Cited in Pratap, supra note 2, p. 73.
53 In this regard, Schwebel notes that “[t]here is no reason to believe that, if the Secretary- 
General were accorded the authority to request advisory opinions of the Court, he would exercise the 
authority incautiously”. Schwebel, S., “Authorising the Secretary-General o f the United Nations to 
Request Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice”, AJIL, 78, 1984, pp. 876-8. See 
also Sloan, supra note 37, p. 833; Jenks, C., The Prospects o f  International Adjudication, 1964, p. 
195; Jessup, P., “To Form a More Perfect United Nations”, RCADI, 129, 1970, p. 17; Keith, supra 
note 1, p. 38; Szasz, P., “Enhancing the Advisory Competencies of the World Court” in Gross, L. 
(ed.), The Future o f the International Court o f  Justice, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 513, 531-2; Higgins, supra 
note 44, pp. 572-3; Kemo, supra note 43, pp. 555-70; Mosler, H., “The International Court of 
Justice at its Present Stage of Developement”, D U , 5, 1979, p. 563. In addition to the international 
lawyers’ opinion in this regard, it was suggested by some states in the proceedings of the Special 
Committee on the Charter of the UN and on strengthening the role of the organisation that Art. 96 
should be amended to authorise the Secretary-General to request advisory opinions, in these terms: 
“[t]he General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Secretary-General may request the 
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.” UN Doc. A/32/33, 
1976. The UN’s Legal Counsel has also stated that “to receive an authoritative legal advice as to 
questions of international law arising within the scope of his activities, particularly in respect of 
disputes in which the Secretary-General has been asked to play a role such as the exercise of good 
office or mediation ... if the Secretary-General himself has the competence to request Advisory 
opinion, he would be able to do so in a quiet and discreet manner and without having to involve 
states not parties to the dispute i.e. states who are members of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.” See Report o f a Special Committee on the Charter, UN Doc. A/47/33, 1992; GAOR, 
47th Sess., Supp. No. 33, 1992, pp. 9-10.
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well as the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions at the UN. He also
plays a role as an active diplomatic agent in the peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
authorising him with the power to request advisory opinions could be considered as 
a further diplomatic option to offer the parties. In addition, he has assumed an
increasingly active and influential role. Allowing him to request advisory opinionsv- ^
might increase the business and utility of the Court, and might be more fruitful than 
a similar grant to other political organs.54 Therefore, it seems clear that such 
authorisation would assist the Secretariat to achieve the objectives of the UN. It 
also seems obvious that the GA’s attitude is not legally justified because it is 
contrary to the explicit provision of Art. 7/1 of the Charter. According to this 
article, the Secretariat is considered to be a principal organ of the UN. Moreover, 
enabling the Secretary-General to request advisory opinions might help to remove 
any uncertainties about his functions, and would give him more guidance in 
determining whether a decision is or is not lex lata. Finally, the Assembly’s attitude 
is contrary to its Res. 171, by which it encouraged all organs of the UN to seek the 
help of the ICJ with regard to their legal questions. It is also contrary to a broad 
interpretation of Art. 96/2, which authorises many organs and specialised agencies 
and even subsidiary organs to request advisory opinions from the ICJ.
(ii) The subsidiary organs
According to the Charter, UN organs have the right to establish subsidiary organs.55 
In this regard, the question has been raised whether these subsidiary organs have the
n
Jessup, supra note 53, p. 17; Szasz, supra note 53, p. 513; Dubisson, supra note 28, p. 
282; Kelsen, supra note 9, p. 547.
55 Art. 7/2 of the Charter provides: “[s]uch subsidiary organs as may be found necessary 
may be established in accordance with the present Charter.” In respect of the GA, Art. 22 provides 
that, “[t]he General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions”. In respect of the SC, Art. 29 provides that, “[t]he Security Council 
may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”. 
With regard to the ECOSOC, Art. 68 provides: “[t]he Economic and Social Council shall set up 
commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other 
commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.”
57
Chapter Two
right to be authorised by the GA to request advisory opinions from the ICJ, or 
whether they may get this power only through delegation from their parent organ.56 
The key issue relates to the interpretation of Art. 96 of the Charter: it neither 
mentions the possibility of delegating this power to the subsidiary organs nor 
mentions these subsidiary organs as being included under “other organs and 
specialised agencies” of the UN.
It has been noted that the power to request advisory opinions could be 
delegated to these subsidiary organs because the parent organ is empowered to 
create these bodies, and there is no express provision in the Charter or in the Court’s 
Statute to prevent the parent organ from delegating.57 Conversely, some lawyers 
have noted that there is no need to discuss the right of UN organs to delegate their 
power to their subsidiary organs, because the GA could authorise them to request 
advisory opinions from the Court directly.58 This view is based on the fact that Art. 
96/2 does not prevent the GA from authorising subsidiary organs to request 
advisory opinions from the ICJ. In addition, as regards the determination of to 
which bodies of the UN the term “organ” employed in Art. 96/2 applies, in their 
view Chapter III is entitled “organs” and the text of this Chapter contain provisions 
for the establishment of two groups of organs: “principal” and “subsidiary”. 
Therefore, according to this article, the term “organ” conveys the meaning of all the 
organs of the UN regardless of whether they are principal or subsidiary. Moreover, 
they note that this interpretation helps to determine the exclusive responsibility of 
the principal organs from the responsibility of the subsidiary organs.
In view of the above disagreement, the GA’s practice in this regard is 
paramount. In 1948, when the GA dealt with the renewal of the mandate of the
56 It should be noted that some lawyers were in favour of these subsidiary organs having no 
right to request the Court to give advisory opinions. In their view, the Charter (Art. 96) and the 
Statute (Art. 65) give the right to request advisory opinions of the Court solely to organs and 
specialised agencies that already exist and have a personality of their own, and can in no 
circumstances confer such a power to subsidiary organs. This view was mentoined by Judge de 
Castro in his dissenting opinion in the Application for Review o f Judgment No. 158 o f  the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal. ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 276.
57 Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 57-8.
58 Vallat, F., “The Competence of the United Nations General Assembly”, RCADI, 97, 1959, 
p. 215; Fakher, supra note 16, p. 131; El-Rashidy, supra note 14, pp. 91-2.
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Interim Committee, it had been recommended that the GA could authorise this 
committee to be able to request advisory opinions under the terms of Art. 96/2. 
This recommendation was rejected by some participants on the basis that subsidiary 
organs have no right to be authorised because this right is limited to the principal 
organs of the UN and its specialised agencies.59 The GA, by its Res. 196 (III) of 
December 1948, authorised the Interim Committee to request advisory opinions 
pursuant to Art. 96/2.60 This resolution was based on a broad interpretation of Art. 
96/2 of the Charter whereby it interpreted this paragraph as applying to both the 
principal and the subsidiary organs. This broad interpretation was confirmed on 8 
November 1955, when the GA authorised its subsidiary Committee for Review of 
the Judgments of the UN Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) to request advisory 
opinions from the ICJ.61 There was no argument at that time in the discussion of the 
GA as regards the possibility of authorising subsidiary organs pursuant to Art. 
96/2.62 Accordingly, it seems clear that the GA found itself lacking the right to 
delegate its direct power to request advisory opinions to its subsidiary organs; 
otherwise, if it had been convinced that it had this right, it would have entitled its 
subsidiary organs on this basis without making such a broad interpretation of Art. 
96/2 of the Charter.
In the light of the above, the practice of the GA in this regard indicates that the 
term “other organs of the United Nations” in Art. 96/2 includes both the principal 
organs according to Art. 7/1 and the subsidiary organs according to Arts. 7/2, 8, 22,
For the debate during the 168th Plen. Mtg., see UN Doc. A/PV. 168,1948, p. 32.
60 This resolution was repeated in Res. 295/4, 21 November 1949, by which the mandate of 
the Interim Committee was prolonged indefinitely.
61 GA Res. 957 (X), 8 November 1955.
62 It should be noted that this authorisation was criticised by some lawyers; for instance, the 
Diss. Op. of Judge Morozov in the Application for Review o f  Judgment No. 158 o f  the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal case, who noted that “the Committee created in 1955 cannot be 
considered as an organ of the United Nations within the meaning of Articles 7 and 22 of the Charter 
and therefore this Committee has no right to ask for advisory opinions of the Court in accordance 
with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter ... this Committee could not request opinions o f the 
Court, because any organ of the United Nations other than the General Assembly and the Security 
Council may be authorised to do so only ‘on legal questions arising within the scope of their 
activities’ (Art. 96, para. 2, of the Charter). But the Committee (which is not a permanent organ of 
the United Nations) has requested an advisory opinion not in the scope o f  its own activities but in the 
scope o f  the activities o f  another body- the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.” ICJ Rep., 
1973, pp. 298-9.
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29 and 68 of the Charter.63 This attitude will not only help these organs to achieve 
their functions but also facilitate the work of these organs when they need the legal 
advice of the Court between the sessions of their parent organs. It seems desirable 
that any tribunal that is established or may be established as a subsidiary organ of 
the UN should be authorised to refer important questions arising in the course of 
their proceedings to the ICJ for its opinion.64
In practice, subsidiary organs have requested advisory opinions of the ICJ on 
three occasions. All the requests were made by the Committee for Review of the 
Judgments of the UNAT.65
(iii) Specialised agencies
The term “specialised agency” is applied only to an organisation or international 
organ that has specific objectives and has a relationship agreement with the UN. 
This means that organisations that are not brought into relationship with the UN are 
not “specialised agencies” within the meaning of the Charter.66 The right of 
specialised agencies to request advisory opinion was raised for the first time before 
Committee IV/I, which concluded that these agencies have the right to request 
opinions of the ICJ after obtaining authorisation from the GA. No doubt granting 
this power to these agencies was considered to be a substantial modification of the 
relationship between the ICJ and the UN compared with the relationship between 
the PCIJ and the League of Nations.
Most of the specialised agencies have the power to request advisory opinions 
from the ICJ on any legal question arising within the scope of their activities. In
63 In the light of this conclusion it seems unreasonable to prevent the Commissions
established by the ECOSOC pursuant to Art. 68 of the Charter from being authorised to request 
advisory opinions of the ICJ (especially the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities). See Higgins, supra note 44, pp. 
569-70; Akhavan, P., “Enforcement of the Genocide Convention Through the Advisory Jurisdiction 
o f the International Court of Justice”, HRU, 12,1991, pp. 288-90.
64 Jenks, supra note 29, p. 13.
65 See Chapter Six below.
66 The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies provides
that the term “specialised agencies” means agencies specifically mentioned in the Convention and 
any other agency brought into relationship with the UN in accordance with Arts. 57 and 63 o f the 
Charter. See ICJYB, 1947-8, p. 121; Grabowska, G., “Les Avis Consultifs de la Cour Internationale 
de Justice”, PYBIL, XVIII, 1988, pp. 22-3.
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most cases they are authorised through the agreements concluded between each of 
them and the UN.67 In practice, the requesting agency refers to its resolution by 
which it requests an advisory opinion from the Court, which is based on Art. 95 of 
the Charter as well as the related articles in its constitution, in addition to the 
relevant articles in the agreement between this agency and the UN.68
Four requests for advisory opinions have been made by specialised agencies - 
one each by UNESCO69 and the IMO,70 and two by the WHO.71
3. Prerequisites for requesting an advisory opinion
The request for an advisory opinion is subject to the fulfilment of several 
conditions. These prerequisites are related to the competence of the requesting 
organ, the vote, the request for advisory proceedings and the subject-matter of the 
request.
For instance, Art. XVII of the FAO constitution; Art. V, para. 11, of the UNESCO 
constitution; Art. 22/2 of the UNIDO constitution; Art. 76 of the WHO constitution; Art. 66 o f the 
IMO constitution; and Art. XVII, para. B, of the IAEA constitution. See ICJYB, 1994-5, No. 49, 
pp. 73 ff. It is worth noting that the Universal Postal Union has a unique feature in that it is the sole 
specialised agency that has no authority to request advisory opinions.
68 For instance, in its request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion in the Legality o f  the Use by 
a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case, the WHO decided, “in accordance with Article 
96 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 76 of the Constitution of the World Health 
Organisation and Article X of the Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health 
Organisation approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 1947 in its 
Res. 124 (II), to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion.” ICJ Rep., 
1996, p. 3 (unpublished). In this regard, the Court stated that “where the WHO is concerned, the 
above-mentioned texts are reflected in two other provisions, to which World Health Assembly 
Resolution WHA 46.40 expressly refers in paragraph 1 of its operative part. There are, on the one 
hand, Article 76 of that Organisation’s Constitution, under which: ‘[u]pon authorisation by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations or upon authorisation in accordance with any agreement 
between the Organisation and the United Nations, the organisation may request the International 
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the competence o f the 
Organisation’. And on the other hand, paragraph 2 of Article X of the Agreement of 10 July 1948 
between United Nations and the WHO, under which: ‘the General Assembly authorises the World 
Health Organisation to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal 
questions arising within the scope of its competence other than questions concerning the mutual 
relationships of the organisation and the United Nations or other specialised agencies’. This 
agreement was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 November 1947 
(resolution 124 (II)) and by the World Health Assembly on 10 July 1948 (resolution [WHA1. 
102]).” See, ICJ Rep., ibid., p. 7.
69 ICJ Rep., 1956.
70 ICJ Rep., 1960.
71 ICJ Rep., 1980; ICJ Rep., 1996.
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3.1. The competence of the requesting organ
The study has already dealt with the organs that are authorised, either directly or 
indirectly, to request advisory opinions.72 The ICJ is the competent organ to decide 
whether the requesting organ is substantively entitled to request or not.
In this regard, several issues related to the competence of the requesting organ 
should be dealt with. These issues are: the limits of this competence, the effect of a 
request made by an organ upon the competence of other organs, the effect of the 
refusal to request by one organ upon the competence of other organs, and, finally, 
whether the competence to request extends to withdrawal of a request already 
submitted to the Court.
3.1.1. Limits upon the competence to request
Art. 96 of the Charter made a clear distinction between the GA and the SC, on the 
one hand, and the other organs and specialised agencies, on the other, regarding the 
power of request. Para. 1 entitles the GA and the SC to request advisory opinions 
regarding “any legal question”, while para. 2 entitles the other organs of the UN and 
its specialised agencies to request opinions regarding “legal questions arising within 
the scope of their activities”.73 Therefore, other UN organs and specialised agencies 
cannot request advisory opinions beyond the scope of their activities as expressly 
stated in their constituent instruments. This limit applies even if the GA welcomes 
or supports a request that is considered beyond the scope of their activities.74 In 
order to delineate the scope of activities or the area of competence, the Court must
See pp. 47 jf. above.
73 With regard to Art. 96/2, see note 7 above.
74 In the Legality o f the Use by a State o f  Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case (WHO 
request), the ICJ stated that “[n]or can the Court accept the argument that the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, as the source from which the WHO derives its power to request advisory 
opinions, has, in its resolution 49/75 K, confirmed the competence o f that organisation to request an 
opinion on the question submitted to the Court... the General Assembly clearly reflected the wish of 
a majority of States that the Assembly should lend its political support to the action taken by the 
WHO, which it welcomed. However, the Court does not consider that, in doing so, the General 
Assembly meant to pass upon the competence of the WHO to request an opinion on the question 
raised. Moreover, the General Assembly could evidently not have intended to disregard the limits 
within which Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter allows it to authorise the specialised agencies to 
request opinions from the Court - limits which were reaffirmed in Article X of the relationship 
agreement of 10 July 1948.” ICJ Rep., 1996 (WHO request), p. 16 (unpublished).
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examine the relevant rules of the organisation, in particular its constitution, where 
the objectives and functions of the organisation are spelled out. In practice the 
Court refused a request for an opinion by the WHO in the Legality o f the Use o f 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case because it found that the WHO’s 
functions did not have a sufficient connection with the question, which was not 
within the scope of the WHO’s activities as defined by its constitution.75 In this 
regard, the Court stated that:
“Indeed, the WHO is not empowered to seek an opinion on the interpretation of its 
constitution in relation to matters outside the scope of its function.”76
Further it concluded that:
“[T]he Court finds that an essential condition of founding its jurisdiction in the present 
case is absent and that it cannot, accordingly, give the opinion requested.”77
In addition to this limit it has been noted that the GA, being the organ with the 
power to authorise other organs and agencies, has an implied power to impose 
additional conditions whenever this authority is exercised.78 This is based on the 
report of the preparatory commission of the UN, which envisaged that when the GA 
authorises other organs it can impose conditions. In practice, the GA has imposed 
two procedural limits. First, these organs and agencies should notify the ECOSOC 
when they request an opinion from the Court. Second, these organs and agencies 
cannot request advisory opinions from the Court regarding their relationship with 
the UN or with other agencies because such a request can be made only by the 
ECOSOC, which has the function of co-ordinating the activities of specialised 
agencies brought into relationship with the UN.79 Accordingly, the Court has to 
examine not only whether the question asked falls within the scope of the activities
ICJ Rep., 1996 (WHOrequest), pp. (unpublished).
76 Ibid., p. 15.
77 Ibid., p. 16.
78 Dubisson, supra note 28, p. 289; Bowett, supra note 24, p. 230.
79 GA Res. 89 (I), 11 December 1946. In this regard, Hambro noted that “[t]he authority has
been given to request opinions only within the scope o f the specialised agency in question. This 
means that the organisation cannot ask for an opinion on any question whatsoever but has to limit 
itself to questions which are directly concerned with the powers of the organisation.” Hambro, E., 
“The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, RCADI, 76, 1950, p. 193.
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of the requesting agency, but also whether it concerns the mutual relationship of the 
agency and the UN or the agency with any other such agencies, because they are 
precluded from requesting opinions concerning these matters by the terms of their 
authorisations.
The question of the limits upon requesting organs has been extended to discuss 
whether the power of the GA and SC to request advisory opinions is absolute and 
without any limits. One view is that the power of both organs is absolute.80 This 
opinion is based on the permissive wording of para. 1 of Art. 96 of the Charter, 
which provides that both organs may request advisory opinions on “any legal 
question”. This wording is substantially different from para. 2 of the same article, 
which stipulates that other organs of the UN and specialised agencies may request 
advisory opinions on “legal questions arising within the scope of their activities”. 
This opinion was rejected by other lawyers who stated that both organs have limited 
power when requesting advisory opinions. In this regard, Kelsen noted that both 
organs can request advisory opinions only on legal questions which arise within the 
scope of their activities.81 Rosenne supported this view by stating that “[n]o organ, 
including the GA and the SC, can decide to request an advisory opinion except 
within the scope of its activities”.82
Although the above two views are not without their merits and persuasive 
arguments have been submitted on both sides, it can be argued that this question 
should not be approached from a “scope of activities” point of view, for the simple 
fact that both organs, especially the GA, enjoy a vast scope of activities, to the 
extent that it is hard to find any activity within the UN that falls outside their direct 
or indirect scope of its activities. This was affirmed by the Court in the Legality o f 
the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons case. In this case, it has been argued that the 
GA and SC are not entitled to request opinions on matters totally unrelated to their 
scope of activities. Therefore, it has been suggested that, as in the case of organs
80 Lenefsky, D., “A Successful Jurisprudence of Advisory Opinions for the International 
Court of Justice”, IYIA, 15-16, 1966-7, p. 39; Gerge, E., The International Court o f  Justice, 1971, p. 
77; Schwebel, supra note 53, p. 875; Bentwich, N., et al., A Commentary on the Charter o f  the 
United Nations, 1969, p. 456.
81 Kelsen, supra note 9, p. 546.
82 Rosenne, supra note 14, p. 660; Szasz, supra note 53, p. 526.
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and agencies acting under Article 96, para. 2, of the Charter, and notwithstanding 
the differences in the wording of this provision and that of para. 1 of the same 
Article, the GA and SC may request an advisory opinion on a legal question only 
within the scope of their activities.83 In its reply, the Court stated that:
“[T]he General Assembly has competence in any event to seize the Court. Indeed, Article 
10 of the Charter has conferred upon the General Assembly competence relating to 
‘any questions or any matters’ within the scope of the Charter. Article 11 has specifically 
provided it with a competence to ‘consider the general principles ... in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armament’. Lastly, according to Article 13, the General Assembly ‘shall 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose o f ... encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification’.”84
In addition, it concluded that:
“Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter cannot be read as limiting the ability of the 
Assembly to request an opinion only in those circumstances in which it can take binding 
decisions.”85
It seems clear that the Court has adopted a wide interpretation of Art. 96/1 
regarding the power of the GA and the SC to request advisory opinions. However, 
in the writer’s view, two limits upon the GA and the SC should be observed. First, 
in requesting advisory opinions, these organs should not exceed their competence as 
conferred by the Charter. Accordingly, they cannot, pursuant to Art. 2/7, request an 
opinion regarding an issue within the domestic jurisdiction of the member states 
because it is considered as a general limitation upon all UN organs, inter alia the 
GA and the SC, and should bemterpreted in anarrow.sense.„.In addition, pursuant 
to Art. 65/1 of the Charter, the Court is empowered to give opinions at the request 
of bodies authorised in accordance with the Charter.86 This limit was supported by 
the ICJ dictum in the Peace Treaties case. In this case, it was argued that the Court 
was not competent to give the requested opinion because the questions put to it fell 
within the domestic jurisdiction of certain states. The Court did not reject this
ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 8 (unpublished).
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 It should be noted also that the Court itself is precluded from dealing with any issue 
considered as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states. See p. 26 above.
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argument out of hand but dealt with it on its merits and pointed out that what was 
submitted to the Court was a question of treaty interpretation. It stated that such a 
matter could not be domestic.87 This means that the Court implicitly recognised the 
limit imposed by Art. 2/7 of the Charter in this regard.
A second limit emerged from the practice of the GA itself. In November 1992 
some member states (all the Latin American ones, plus Spain, Portugal and Iran) 
demanded that the GA request an advisory opinion from the ICJ regarding the 
dispute between Mexico and the USA as a consequence of the findings of the US 
Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain case.88 The sponsored states hoped that the 
breadth of the GA’s competence under Art. 96/1 to request an opinion “on any legal 
question” would have been sufficient. On the recommendation of the Sixth 
Committee this proposal was withdrawn.89 As noted by Higgins, this precedent 
gives an explicit indication that, although the phrase “any legal question” in para. 1 
of Art. 96 may be wider than the phrase of para. 2, it must at least refer to a legal 
question under consideration within the UN.90
Another question regarding the limits upon the GA and the SC to request 
opinions is whether the wording of para. 1 allows them to request advisory opinions 
about an act of the other organ. In other words, does it allow the GA to request an 
advisory opinion in respect of an action of the SC, and vice versa? This question 
has been neglected by international lawyers. It has been noted that neither organ 
can request an advisory opinion regarding a matter assigned to either body 
exclusively by the Charter.91 This opinion is based on the fact that there is an 
“invisible limit” upon each organ when it carries out its activities. This limitation
87 ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 70-1.
88 UN DOC. A/47/249/Add. 1/Corr. 1, 24 December 1992. This dispute related to the act of 
the Supreme Court of the USA, which found that the abduction o f Mr Alvarez-Machain (who was 
suspected of kidnapping, torture and murder of a US drug enforcement agent) from Mexico and his 
transfer to the USA to stand trial did not violate the extradition treaty between Mexico and the USA 
and render the US courts without jurisdiction. The draft resolution proposed for the request avoided 
mentioning Mr Alvarez-Machain and focused on the dispute between Mexico and the USA.
89 GA Res. 48/414, 9 December 1993.
90 • •Higgms, supra note 44, p. 580.
91 El-Rashidy, supra note 14, p. 88; Datlleir, P., “L’Article 96 de la Charte” in Cot, J-P., et 
al. (eds.), La Charte des Nations Unies, 1991, p. 1293; Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 122-5.
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relates to the distribution of functions among the UN organs. Others have noted 
that it is the task of the Court to determine whether Art. 96/1 does authorise the GA 
to ask for an advisory opinion on an action of the SC (and vice versa). According to 
this view, however, if the Court decides that the GA or the SC can do so, it has to 
take a second step to decide whether it wishes to exercise its discretion in the 
particular case.92
It can be argued that, according to the current wording of Art. 96/1, both 
organs, especially the GA, could request an opinion on an action of the other. This 
is based on the permissive wording of para. 1. If the drafters were against such a 
conclusion they would have clarified it, especially as they were aware of the 
relationship between the SC and the GA, as is clearly illustrated in the delimiting of 
their relationship pursuant to Art. 12/1 of the Charter. In addition, the possibility of 
such action might create a kind of control upon the acts of the GA and the SC, 
thereby helping to protect the institutional life of the organisation. Finally, this 
view seems to be more acceptable if such a request can be made by the GA. The 
GA has, pursuant to Art. 10, the power to discuss any matter within the scope of the 
present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organs, inter 
alia the SC, provided that it respects the limit indicated by Art. 12/1 of the Charter. 
This view is supported by the ICJ’s practice, viz. its willingness to render the 
opinion requested by the GA in the Conditions o f Admission o f a State to 
Membership in the United Nations case (1948)93 despite the fact that this case was 
related to the voting procedure in the SC and did not have the SC’s prior consent.94
3.1.2. The impact of a request for an opinion by one organ upon the 
competence of other organs
This point deals with the possibility of concurrent requests for an advisory opinion 
by two organs. A distinction should be made here between the GA and the SC on 
the one hand and the other organs and specialised agencies on the other hand.
92 Higgins, supra note 44, pp. 577-8.
93 Hereinafter the Admission case.
94 ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 60 ff.
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With regard to the other principal organs and specialised agencies of the UN, 
one may note, generally, that concurrent requests for an advisory opinion cannot 
take place because their powers to request are limited to the scope of their activities. 
Accordingly, it is not possible for one of these organs or agencies to request an 
opinion about a matter within the scope of the activities of another organ. In 
addition, if the matter is related to legal questions concerning the mutual 
relationship of the UN and the specialised agencies, it is only the ECOSOC that can 
request an opinion.95
This clear determination is not available with regard to the GA and the SC 
because they have a broad scope of power to request advisory opinions and because 
they have joint competencies in many fields, This might lead to a concurrent 
request either from them both or from one of them and another principal organ or 
specialised agency. As far as the relationship between the GA and SC is concerned, 
it can be concluded that there is no hindrance on either organ requesting an opinion 
from the Court about a question asked by the other organ. However, there is a 
limitation as regards requesting an opinion about a dispute or situation. According 
to Art. 12/1 of the Charter, the GA cannot deal with any dispute or situation before 
the SC.96 Accordingly, if the matter is still pending on the SC agenda, the GA 
cannot discuss the matter, including a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. 
If the GA acted in contravention of the article and requested an advisory opinion, 
the SC might well object to the Court’s giving of an opinion.
Turning to the possibility of a concurrent request by either the GA or the SC 
and one of the other organs and agencies of the UN, it could be argued that there is 
no obstacle to these organs posing questions about the same matter at the same time. 
In practice, there was no argument about the possibility of the GA and the WHO 
making concurrent requests for an advisory opinion regarding the use of nuclear 
weapons.97
It should be noted that the ECOSOC has no power to request an opinion regarding the 
internal organisation of these bodies. See Jenks, supra note 29, pp. 11-12.
96 For the wording o f Art. 12/1, see note 137, p. 38 above.
97 ICJ Rep., 1996 (the Legality o f  the Use by a State o f  Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict 
case and the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons case).
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3.1.3. The impact of the refusal to request by one organ upon the competence 
of other organs
Since the power to request advisory opinions has been granted to several organs of 
the UN, a question may arise about whether a request for an advisory opinion by 
one organ is permissible after the refusal of such action by another organ. There is 
no precedent in the UN in respect of this question, but this question was raised 
before the League of Nations in connection with the Vilna dispute between Poland 
and Lithuania in 1923. The Council refused to request an opinion from the PCIJ 
about this dispute, so the government of Lithuania turned to the Assembly of the 
League to request an opinion. There was discussion in the Assembly about the 
possibility of requesting an advisory opinion in spite of the Council’s refusal to do 
so. The Assembly - in this case - refused to request an opinion from the Court.98
Although such a case has never been raised within the UN, it could be argued 
that the refusal by one organ to request an advisory opinion does not affect the 
competence of another to do so on the same issue.99 This opinion is based upon the 
independence of each organ vis-a-vis the others and the fact that no organ is 
subordinate to the others. This view has important implications, especially if such a 
refusal was the result of the use of the veto by one of the SC’s permanent members. 
In this case, the party submitting the request might not be prevented from doing so 
through the GA, which does not require a unanimous vote provided that it respects 
the limitation imposed by Art. 12/1 of the Charter.
3.1.4. The power to withdraw a request
An interesting point that needs to be examined is whether the requesting organ can 
withdraw a request submitted to the ICJ.
It is necessary to mention that this has never happened in the UN, but it did 
happen before the PCIJ in respect of the Expulsion o f the Oecumenical Patriarch 
case. In this case, Greece submitted an application to the Council of the League of 
Nations to request an advisory opinion from the PCIJ in respect of its dispute with
98 Pomerance, M., The Advisory Function o f the International Court in the League and UN 
Eras, 1973, pp. 176-7.
99 Pratap, supra note 2, p. 57.
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Turkey regarding Turkey’s expulsion of the Oecumenical Patriarch. The Council 
adopted a resolution, dated 14 March 1925, by which it requested an advisory 
opinion from the PCIJ. While the Court was dealing with the question, Greece and 
Turkey reached an agreement in this dispute. Consequently, the matter was 
withdrawn from the Council’s agenda, and the Council informed the PCIJ that it no 
longer found it necessary to ask the Court to give an opinion. Accordingly, the 
PCIJ removed this request from its list by an administrative order.100
In the light of the above it could be concluded that the requesting organ can 
withdraw its request from the Court either before the opening of the oral 
proceedings or at any time prior to the delivery of the opinion.101 This is based on 
Art. 88 of the Court’s Rules, which allows the parties in contentious cases to 
withdraw and discontinue their cases at any time before the delivery of judgment if 
they conclude an agreement to settle their dispute. This article applies by analogy 
to the advisory jurisdiction when the requesting organ decides to withdraw the 
request by the required majority.
3.2. The vote
No request can be made to the Court for an advisory opinion unless the decision to 
make such a request is made by the necessary majority in the organ concerned. The 
voting procedures by which the UN organs or agencies can request an opinion are 
not expressly provided for either in the Charter or in the Court’s Statute. Therefore, 
the voting procedures for requesting an opinion of the Court must be determined in 
accordance with the general rules of voting of these organs or agencies, for example 
by simple majority or other majority either of the votes cast or of the total 
membership.102 Therefore, a decision by which the organ requests advisory opinions 
is doubtless equally applicable to voting on any other decisions. Despite this
100 Hudson, supra note 1, pp. 509-10.
101 Hudson, supra note 1, p. 509; Keith, supra note 1, p. 50.
102 Szasz, supra note 53, pp. 502, 504. It should be noted that a unanimous decision was
required for the Council and the Assembly of the League to request an advisory opinion from the
PCIJ. See McNair, A., “The Council’s Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Permanent Court 
of International Justice”, BYIL, 7, 1926, pp. 1 ff.
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conclusion there is still scope for controversy over the vote necessary for the 
adoption by the GA and by the SC of a request for an advisory opinion.
With regard to the GA, the voting procedure is regulated by Art. 18 of the 
Charter.103 It makes a distinction between the required vote in respect of “important 
questions” (para. 2) and “other questions” (para. 3). Pursuant to para. 2, the 
required vote for “important questions” - as enumerated and the other issues which 
will be decided by the GA according to para. 3 - is a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting. Pursuant to para. 3, the required vote for “other 
questions” is a simple majority of the members present and voting.
Because there is nothing in the Charter itself that would make a two-thirds 
majority mandatory when a decision is being made to request the Court for an 
advisory opinion, a question has been raised whether a decision to request an 
opinion is a decision on an important question which might be made by a two-thirds 
majority or a decision which may be made by a simple majority.
Before dealing with this question, it should be noted that the practice of the GA 
in this respect is ambiguous and cannot lead to a clear answer.104 For example, in 
1946 it adopted its decision to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ regarding 
the Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa by a two-thirds majority as an 
“important question”.105 The decision in 1949 to request an opinion from the ICJ
103 Art. 18 provides:
“2. Decisions of the GA on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the 
Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of 
members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86, the admission 
of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, 
the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and 
budgetary questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of 
questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members 
present and voting.”
104 Rosenne, supra note 14, pp. 661-6.
105 GAOR, 1st Sess., 2nd part, 52nd Plen. Mtg., 8 December 1946, pp. 1048-61. In addition, 
many of the GA’s resolutions posed to the Court for advisory opinions were adopted by a majority 
substantially in excess of two-thirds. For instance, Res. 113 B (II), 17 December 1947 (Admission 
case); Res. 258 (III), 3 December 1948 (Reparation fo r  Injuries Suffered in the Service o f the 
United Nations case); Res. 294 (IV), 22 October 1949 (Peace Treaties case); Res. 296 J (IV), 22 
November 1949 (Competence o f  the Assembly case); Res. 338 (IV), 6 December 1949 (South-West 
Africa case); Res. 478 (V), 16 November 1950 (Reservations case); Res. 785 A (VIII), 9 December
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regarding the international status of South Africa was considered to be a procedural 
matter.106 During the discussion leading to the adoption of a decision in this regard, 
the President of the GA referred to the action taken by the GA in 1946 as “an 
exceptional decision ... reached on the specific understanding that no precedent was 
to be established”, and he ruled that the request required a simple majority for 
adoption.107 Finally, the GA’s resolution by which it requested the Court to give an 
opinion regarding the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons was adopted 
by 78 votes to 43, with 38 abstentions viz. by a simple majority.108
There is no doubt that the recent practice of the GA in requesting an opinion 
regarding the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be upheld. In 
the writer’s view, the voting procedures in the decision to request an opinion should 
be regulated solely by para. 3 of Art. 18 as a non-important question which requires 
a simple majority. This view is based on several grounds: (i) the issue of requesting 
an advisory opinion is not enumerated with the other issues in para. 2; (ii) the GA 
has never decided categorically that all requests for an advisory opinion raise an 
“important question”; (iii) applying para. 3 would help to increase the number of 
requests for advisory opinions by the GA.
Similarly, with regard to the vote in the SC to request an opinion, two main 
questions regarding the application of Art. 27 might be raised:109 (i) is it a non­
1953 (UN Administrative Tribunal case); Res. 904 (IX), 23 November 1954 (South-West Africa 
case); Res. 942 (X), 3 December 1955 (South-West Africa case); Res. 1731 (XVI), 20 December 
1961 (Expenses case).
106 GA Res. 267 (III), 14 April 1949.
107 It should be noted that President’s view came as a result o f a proposal from the South 
African representative, who pointed out that the request for an advisory opinion is a matter of 
importance requiring a two-thirds majority. GAOR, 4th Sess., 269th Plen. Mtg., 6 December 1949, 
pp. 536-7.
108 GA Res. 49/75 K, 15 December 1995.
109 Art. 27 provides:
“ 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote 
of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in 
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting.”
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procedural question on which the veto is applicable; and (ii) if it is a non-procedural 
question, must a state party to the dispute abstain from voting?
The question whether the request for an advisory opinion is to be regarded as a 
decision on a procedural matter, which requires an affirmative vote of nine of the 
fifteen members, or a non-procedural matter which requires an affirmative vote of 
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, was 
referred by the GA to an Interim Committee for studying.110 The committee 
concluded that a request for an advisory opinion would be a procedural question and 
consequently it would not be subject to the veto,!,1-!' This view was not adopted by 1 
the GA in its Res. 267 (III), where it did not include the request for an advisory 
opinion in the list of decisions deemed procedural.112
As far as the practice of the SC is concerned there is only one precedent. When 
the SC requested an advisory opinion on Namibia in 1970, the request was adopted 
by Res. 284 of 19 July 1970, with the abstention of Poland and two permanent 
members (the Soviet Union and the UK). The Court rejected the objection put 
forward by the Government of South Africa that the resolution was invalid as a 
consequence of the abstention of the two permanent members. The Court held that 
a decision must be deemed validly adopted when it is passed in accordance with the 
rules of procedure of the body entitled to make it, and that practice under Art. 27 
had established “abstention by a permanent member (of the SC) as not constituting 
a bar to the adoption of the resolutions”.113
It has been noted that a request is not of itself procedural or non-procedural. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look at the subject-matter of the request. This opinion 
is based not only on Art. 27 of the Charter, but also on the difficulty of laying down 
a general rule in this regard.114
110 Report of the Interim Committee of the GA, 15 January - 5 August 1948, GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., Supp., No. 10, 1948, p. 14.
111 Ibid.
112 GA Res. 267 (III), 14 April 1949. Sloan, supra note 37, pp. 836-7; Rosenne, supra note 
14, p. 667.
113 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 22.
114 Keith, supra note 1, p. 47.
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The above suggestion of the Interim Committee is not without merit so long as 
the permanent members of the SC have the right of veto. The use of this right by 
the permanent members can hinder the adoption of a resolution containing a 
question to the Court for an opinion. Therefore, it seems clear that it is better for 
the SC to consider this request as a procedural matter for the purposes of Art. 27, so 
that a negative vote by a permanent member would not prevent that request being 
made.
The second question is whether a party to a dispute must abstain from voting. V 
According to Art. 27/3 of the Charter, a party to a dispute should abstain from j 
voting on any decision to be adopted under Chapter VI and under para. 3 of Art. 52.
It has been noted that the nature of the vote should be determined by the subject- 
matter of the request, and that no blanket determination should apply to all requests 
for advisory opinions. According to this view, the answer to the above question 
will vary: (i) if the request for an opinion is related to a procedural problem, the 
decision to make the request should be considered procedural and the veto should 
not be applicable; (ii) if the request concerns the peaceful settlement of an 
international dispute pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter, Art. 27/3 should be 
applied and consequently a party to a dispute should be required to abstain from 
voting on the request for an advisory opinion; (iii) if the request concerns the taking 
of enforcement action or other matter under Chapter VII, the unanimous vote of the 
permanent members including the party to a dispute would be required.115
3.3. The request for advisory proceedings
The ICJ has no power to give or to offer to give an advisory opinion proprio motu. 
Advisory proceedings are initiated by a written request for an opinion addressed to 
the Court and transmitted to it by the Secretary-General of the UN or, as the case 
may be, the chief administrative officer of the requesting agency authorised to make 
a request.116 Pursuant to Art. 65/2 of the ICJ’s Statute, the request should contain an
115 Sloan, supra note 37, p. 837; Pratap, supra note 2, p. 118.
116 According to Art. 104 of the Court’s Rules, this submission could be referred to the ICJ 
either directly by the head of the requesting organ or indirectly by the Secretary-General of the UN.
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“exact statement of the question upon which an advisory opinion is required”.117 It 
should also contain a comprehensive description of the matter in the text of the 
resolution. In addition, all documents likely to throw light upon the question should 
be attached.118 The request may contain more than one question, and may make the 
Court’s answer to a later question dependent upon the affirmative or negative 
answer to an earlier one.119
It should be noted in this regard that the ICJ is invariably obliged to define the 
exact scope of the question as a necessary preliminary to carrying out the judicial 
function of answering the request put before it.120 It also has the power to 
reformulate - where necessary - the question submitted to it for an opinion to clarify 
the real meaning of the question it has to answer.121 This power can be justified on 
several grounds. First, the requesting organs are of a political nature and they are 
composed of non-legal members. This could lead to questions referred to the ICJ 
being badly drafted. Second, this power facilitates the fullest exposition of the
117 It should be mentioned that the requirement contained in Art. 65 of the PCIJ’s Statute of 
the 1936 that the written request be signed by the President of the Council or by the Secretary- 
General of the League of Nations, under instruction from the Assembly or Council, has been 
dropped.
118 In this regard, it has been noted that application of Art. 65 o f the Statute has been liberal. 
Thus, documents can be transmitted to the Court at the same time as the request, or as soon as 
possible afterwards. This has been justified on the basis that, although this is a breach of the letter of 
the article, the documents are in fact supplied and there is no breach of the spirit of the provision. 
See Keith, supra note 1, p. 49.
119 Rosenne, supra note 14, p. 693.
120 For instance, in the Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons case, the Court 
dealt with difference between the English and French draft of the question. The English text reads: 
“[i]s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?” 
whereas the French text of the question is as follows: “[e]st-il permis en droit international de recurir 
a la menace ou h l’emploi d’armes nucl6aires en toute circonstance?”. This led some states to 
suggest that the Court was being asked by the GA whether it was permitted to have recourse to 
nuclear weapons in every circumstance, and it was contended that such a question would inevitably 
invite a simple negative answer. In its reply, the Court found “it unnecessary to pronounce on the 
possible divergence between the English and French texts of the question posed. Its real objective is 
clear: to determine the legality or illegality of the'threat or use of nuclear weapons.” ICJ Rep., 1996, 
p. 12 (unpublished).
121 It should be mentioned that the Court’s power to reformulate the question has two 
limitations. First, the Court cannot exceed the limitations of competence and functions entrusted to 
the requesting organ. If it were to do so, the Court might deal with issues that cannot be dealt with 
by the requesting organ. Second, the Court should bear in mind the intention of the requesting 
organ. See Abou-El-Wafa, A., “Comment on the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion 
in Case No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal”, REDI, 43, 1987, p. 210.
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Court’s reasoning and the appropriate development of relevant legal issues. Finally, 
pursuant to Art. 36/6 of the Statute, the Court is competent to decide its jurisdiction 
in order to reach a fair judgment. To achieve this purpose it could discuss the 
related issues of the case, inter alia the reformulating of the requested question.122
This power has been emphasised by the ICJ’s practice in several cases. For 
instance, in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service o f the United Nations 
case of (1949),123 the Court had to deal with a question referring to “an international 
claim against the responsible de jure or de facto Government”. The ICJ stated that 
it understood the question to be directed to claims against a state and that it would, 
therefore, in the opinion, use the expression “State” or “defendant State”.124 The ICJ 
thus brought the wording of the request into conformity with the principle that 
states, and not governments, are the subject of international law.
In the Certain Expenses o f the United Nations case (1962),125 the Court 
reformulated the question posed to it by the GA. The Court stated that:
“[Although the Court will examine Article 17 in itself and in its relation to the rest o f the 
Charter, it should be noted that at least three separate questions might arise in the 
interpretation o f Paragraph 2 of this Article ... It has been asked to answer a specific 
question related to certain identified expenditures which have actually been made, but the 
Court would not adequately discharge the obligation incumbent on it unless it examined 
in some detail various problems raised by the question which the General Assembly has 
asked.”126
A similar attitude was adopted in the Interpretation o f the Agreement o f 25 
March 1951 between WHO and Egypt case (1980).127 In this case, the ICJ found 
that, although the question was formulated only in terms of the provisions of section 
37 of the agreement on the requirement for negotiation and notice for the revision of 
the agreement, the true legal question submitted to the Court could be reformulated. 
The Court pointed out that “if it is to remain faithful to the requirements of its
122 With regard to the competence of the ICJ to determine its jurisdiction, see p. 98 below.
123 Hereinafter the Reparation case.
124 ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 177.
125 Hereinafter the Expenses case.
126 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 157-8.
127 Hereinafter the WHO and Egypt case.
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judicial character in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, it must ascertain what 
are the legal questions really in issue in questions formulated in a request”.128 The 
Court then proceeded to “consider its replies to the question formulated in the 
request on the basis that the true legal question submitted to the Court is: what are 
the legal principles and rules applicable to the question under which conditions and 
in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the regional office from Egypt may 
be effected”.129
In the Application for Review o f Judgment No. 273 o f the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal case (1982),130 the ICJ reformulated the question put by the 
Committee. It noted that the Committee adopted exactly the question formulated by 
the USA in its application to the Committee. The Court found that the question put 
to it was, on the face of it, infelicitously expressed and vague. It also found that the 
records and the report of the Committee cast some doubts on whether the question 
as framed really corresponded to the intentions of the Committee in seizing the 
Court. In the light of this conclusion, the Court interpreted and reformulated the 
question put to it in order to answer the question referred to it by the Committee.131
The Court’s practice in this regard has been criticised by some lawyers and 
regarded as undesirable.132 This criticism is based on the fact that this practice 
might make it difficult for the Court to answer the question intended to be put. This 
view was pronounced by the UK Government in 1951, when it asked the GA to 
consider the methods and procedures for dealing with the drafting of the questions. 
The UK noted that it is undesirable for the Court to be obliged to determine what a 
request means before it is able to answer, from both the point of view of the Court 
and the point of view of the GA, which must be in a position to ensure that the 
question answered by the Court is, in fact, the question that the Assembly wants the 
Court to address. Therefore, the UK concluded that “it can only be done by careful 
and considered drafting ... in the case of questions of a legal character ... it would, of
128 ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 88.
129 ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 89.
130 Hereinafter the Mortished case.
131 ICJ Rep., 1982, pp. 348 ff.
132 Rosenne, supra note 14, p. 695.
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course, be for the Assembly to determine whether the final version of the question 
corresponded to its intention”.133
Although it is desirable that the requesting organ should produce a sufficiently 
precise formulation of the question to ensure that the advisory opinion provides the 
necessary clarification, this does not deprive the ICJ as a judicial organ from 
establishing the object for which the question was put, or from establishing an 
interpretation of the question itself.134
Before leaving this point, an important question should be clarified: can the 
Court, when reformulating a question, go beyond the scope of the request 
interpreted in its ordinary sense? It might be argued that the Court enjoys such a 
power on the basis that it is necessary to enable it to be in a position to reply to the 
request. However, it will be hard to accept such an argument in the light of PCIJ’s 
dictum in the Greece-Turkish Agreement of 1926, where it stated that “[i]t is 
essential that it should determine what this question is and formulate an exact 
statement of it, in order more particularly to avoid dealing with points of law upon 
which it was not the intention of the Council or the Commission to obtain its 
opinion”.135 Accordingly, regardless of the scope of interpretation, the Court is 
limited by the basic elements of the question.
3.4. The subject-matter of the request
Pursuant to Art. 96 of the Charter and Art. 65 of the Statute, the requesting organ 
may ask only a “legal question”. The study will deal with the scope of the term 
“legal question”, and the distinction between legal and other questions.
133 GAOR, 6th Sess., Annexes, 63, 1951, p. 2 (A/1929). See GAOR, 6th Sess., 1951, pp. 26- 
63 for the discussion which culminated in Res. 597 (VI), 20 December 1951.
134 In this regard, Judge Read observed that the Court has invariably resorted to a liberal 
interpretation of the question when there is a possible discrepancy between the question as framed 
and the actual legal question as developed in the written and oral proceedings. ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 
148.
135 PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 16, 1928, p. 14.
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3.4.1. The scope of the term “legal question”
Pursuant to Art. 14 of the Covenant of the League, the scope of a request for an 
advisory opinion was related to “any legal dispute or question”.136 In accordance 
with this article, the PCIJ dealt with some requests for advisory opinions related to 
international disputes which were before the Council of the League137 (for instance,| j 
the Tunisia and Morocco Nationality Decrees case between France and the UK,1381 j 
and Danube Commission case between France, Italy, and the UK v. Rumania.)139 ^ 
Unlike the provision of Art. 14 of the Covenant, Art. 96 of the UN Charter and 
Art. 65/1 of the ICJ’s Statute authorises the UN organs and its specialised agencies 
to request advisory opinions only on a “legal question”. This new draft does not 
appear to have been discussed in any stage of the travaux preparatoires. Therefore, 
the reason for the new draft is not apparent.140 Consequently, it can be asked 
whether the omission of the term “dispute” from Art. 96 of the Charter and Art. 65 
of the Statute represents a limitation on requests for advisory opinions to only legal 
questions and excludes legal disputes. The opinion that the new draft excludes the 
possibility of requesting advisory opinions related to international disputes relies on 
the omission of the term “dispute” in Art. 96 of the UN Charter and Art. 65/1 of the 
Court’s Statute.141 According to this view, the phrase “any dispute or question” in 
Art. 14 of the Covenant offered an indirect method for settling international disputes 
without having the authority of a judgment and without obtaining the consent of the
136 This provision was confirmed by Art. 82 of the PCIJ’s Rules adopted in 1936. It provides 
that, “in proceeding in regard to advisory opinions, the Court shall, in addition to the provisions of 
chapter IV of the Statute of the Court, apply the provisions of the article hereinafter set out. It shall 
also be guided by the provisions of the present Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent 
to which it recognises them to be applicable, according as the advisory opinion for which the Court 
is asked relates, in the terms of Article 14 of the Covenant o f the League of Nations, to a ‘dispute’ or 
to a ‘question’.” See Hudson, supra note 1, pp. 494-8.
137 The PCIJ defined the term “dispute” as “a disagreement on point of law or fact, a conflict 
of legal views or of interests between two persons”. PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 2, 1923, p. 11.
138 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 1,1923.
139 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 14, 1927.
140 Pratap, supra note 2, p. 42.
141 Judge Azevedo observed in the Peace Treaties case that: “[a] mere comparison of the 
texts of the Covenant and the Charter suffices at once to reveal the restrictions which were placed on 
the Court’s advisory function.” ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 82. Similarly, Diss. Op. of Judge Krylov in the 
above case, pp. 1 0 6 ^
79
Chapter Two
interested parties, and, in order to forestall such consequences, the drafters of the 
Charter and the Statute limited the power of request to a “legal question” only. The 
advocates of this view referred also to the ICJ’s opinion in the Peace Treaties case, 
where the ICJ referred to this difference between the wording of Art. 14 of the 
League’s Covenant on the one hand, and the wording of Art. 96 of the Charter and 
Art. 65 of the Statute on the other hand, which places an explicit restriction upon the 
advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
The above view does not seem to be a persuasive one and it can be argued that 
the omission of the word “dispute” is without significance. The wording “legal 
question” is broad enough to include legal issues in dispute before the organs.142 
There was no intention in the travaux preparatoires of the Statute to preclude the 
requesting organ from asking any question related to an international dispute. In 
addition, the conclusion that the new draft is restricted to legal questions seems 
inconsistent with the meaning of Art. 68 of the Statute, which provides that the 
Court, in exercising its advisory opinion, shall further be guided by the provisions 
which apply in contentious cases “to the extent to which it recognises them to be 
applicable”, and also Art. 102/2 of the Court’s Rules, which provides that “for this 
purpose it shall above all consider whether the request for the advisory opinion 
relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more states”. This led 
Judge Winiarski to note that the powers and duties of the Court in connection with 
its advisory functions have remained substantially the same as those of the 
Permanent Court.143 Furthermore, Art. 102/3 provides that, if an opinion is 
requested in respect of a legal question actually pending between states, then Art. 31 
of the Statute - which relates to judges ad hoc - should apply.144 Moreover, the
142 Hambro, supra note 79, pp. 191-2; Sloan, supra note 37, p. 840; Philipe, K., Advisory 
Opinions and the Jurisprudence o f  the International Court o f  Justice, M.Phil. Thesis (University of 
London), 1970, pp. 78-80; Singh, N., The Role and Record o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 
1989, p. 93; Diss. Op. of Judge Winiarski in the Peace Treaties case, ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 91-2; 
Sugihara, T., “The Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice”, JAIL, 17, 1973, p. 50; 
Pratap, supra note 2, p. 89; Diss. Op. of Judge Zoricic in the Peace Treaties case, ICJ Rep., 1951, p. 
100; Olivares, G., Les Avis Consultatifs de la Cour de la Haye, Evolution et Aspects Recents - 
Analyse Doctrinale et Jurisprudentielle, 1992, pp. 29, 40; Szasz, supra note 53, pp. 499ff.
143 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 91.
144 Art. 102/3 of the Court’s Rules.
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Court’s opinion in the Peace Treaties and Reservations cases upheld this view. In 
both cases the Court rendered the requested question despite the allegation that the 
Court was not competent to deal with the request because it was related to a dispute 
and the litigant states had not consented.145
Finally, the dictum of the ICJ in the Western Sahara case affirms this view. 
This case was referred by the GA for an advisory opinion in respect of the legal 
status of the Western Sahara. Morocco requested the Court to appoint an ad hoc 
judge pursuant to Art. 31 of the Statute and Art. 89 of the Court’s Rules of 1972,146 
on the ground that the Assembly’s request related to a legal question actually 
pending between Spain on the one hand and Morocco as well as other states on the 
other hand, and also that the Court included upon the bench a judge of Spanish 
nationality.147 Having heard the observations on this matter, and decided the nature 
of the question as a legal question actually pending between two or more states, the 
ICJ entitled Morocco to choose a person to sit as judge ad hoc in that case pursuant
to Arts. 31 and 68 of the Statute and Art. 89 of its Rules.148 Accordingly, it seems 
clear that the ICJ recognised the power of the GA to request an advisory opinion 
relating to inter-states disputes.
To conclude, it would appear that the omission of the word “dispute” in Art. 96 
of the Charter and Art. 65 of the Statute does not affect the power of UN organs to 
request advisory opinions of the Court in respect of any inter-state dispute as long 
as the question is legal in nature.
Since it has been concluded that the main issue is the legality of the question, it 
seems appropriate to indicate the real extent of this term, namely whether it can
145 Keith, supra note 1, pp. 81 -2.
146 Currently Art. 102/3 of the Court’s Rules.
147 The same request was submitted by Mauritania. See ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 7-8.
148 Although the Court accepted Morocco’s request to nominate a judge ad hoc in this case, it
dismissed a similar request by Mauritania on the basis that there was no adversarial relation between
it and Spain. ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 7-8. Okere, B., “The Western Sahara Case”, ICLQ, 28, 1979, pp. 
299-301; Wooldridge, F., “The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the 
Western Sahara Case”, AALR, 8, 1979, pp. 91-2.
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relate to a political question, a question with political motivations or aspects, or a 
question of fact.
(i) Legal and political questions
Since the ICJ is a legal organ, it is a well-established principle that the organs and 
agencies of the UN cannot request opinions on purely political questions, which 
should be settled by political means. This principle is based on the fact that no great 
value could be achieved by trying to solve these questions by legal procedures.149 
And even if an organ did make such a request, the Court has no jurisdiction to reply 
and it should decline to give an opinion.150 The Court made it clear that a question 
is considered to be a legal one if it is by its nature susceptible of a reply based on 
law. It seems to be necessary for the organs and agencies of the UN to obtain 
opinions from the ICJ as to the legal principles to be applied to issues before them. 
This was confirmed by the Court on several occasions; for instance, the Admission 
case (1948),151 the Competence o f the General Assembly for the Admission o f a State 
to the United Nations case (1950),152 the Peace Treaties case (1950),153 the Western 
Sahara case (1975),154 the WHO and Egypt case (1980),155 the Legality o f the Use by 
a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case (1996),156 and, finally, in the
149 Hambro, E., “The Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the International Court of 
Justice”, ICLQ, 3, 1954, p. 19; Elias, T., The International Court o f  Justice and Some 
Contemporary Problems, 1983, p. 26; Elias, T., The United Nations and the World Court, 1989, p. 
80; Greig, D., “The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court and the Settlement of Disputes 
Between States”, ICLQ, 15, 1966, pp. 339-45.
150 In the Expenses case, the Court stated: “[t]he Court can give an advisory opinion only on 
a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must 
decline to give the opinion requested.” ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 155. Rosenne also noted that the concept 
o f a “legal question” applicable for a political organ is not necessarily the same as the concept of a 
legal question applicable for the Court - that the words “legal question” of Art. 96 of the Charter 
may not always carry the same implication as in Art. 65 of the Statute. See Rosenne, supra note 16, 
pp. 702-3; Elias (1983), supra note 149, p. 26; Elias (1989), supra note 149, p. 80; Greig, supra 
note 149, pp. 339-45.
151 ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 6 1 #
152 ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 6 #  (hereinafter the Second Admission case).
153 ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 6 5 #
154 ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 1 8 #
155 ICJ Rep., 1980, pp. 8 8 #
156 ICJ Rep., 1996, pp. 7-8 (unpublished).
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Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons case (1996).157 In all of these 
cases, the Court clarified that the question would have a legal character if it was 
framed in terms of law and raised problems of international law or was related to a 
breach of obligations under international law even if it had political aspects. 
Therefore, if the Court identifies that a question is decided in accordance with the 
rules of law it has to consider such a question as a legal one.158
(ii) The political implications or motives of the question
In many cases, the most stringent objection to the request for advisory opinions is 
that the question is not characterised as a “legal” one because it is based on political 
motives. This issue was dealt with by the ICJ as early as 1948, in the Admission 
case. In this case, the ICJ dismissed the argument that it should decline to give an 
answer to this question because there were “political motives and considerations 
and criteria which have guided many [United Nations] representatives in the 
discussion and voting on the admission of new Members to the United Nations”.159 
The Court observed that it was not concerned with any allegedly political motives 
that might have inspired the request for an advisory opinion by the GA. It also 
noted that the question before it involved the interpretation of a treaty provision and 
consequently it was a legal question.160 This dictum was confirmed by the Court in 
the Expenses case,161 as well as in the WHO and Egypt case, where it stated:
“That jurisprudence [the settled jurisprudence of the court] establishes that if, as in the 
present case, a question submitted in a request is one that otherwise falls within the 
normal exercise of its judicial process, the Court has not to deal with the motives which 
have inspired the request.”162
157 ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 9 (unpublished).
158 See Fitzmaurice, who observed that “if the question put [to the Court] is in itself a legal
question, ... the fact that it has a political element is irrelevant”. Fitzmaurice, G., The Law and
Procedure o f  the International Court o f  Justice, vol. 1, 1986, p. 116. The distinction between legal 
and political questions in the eyes of international lawyers will recur later in this study. See pp. 188 
ff. below.
159 ICJ Pled., 1947, p. 105.
160 ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 61-2; Penegar, K., “Relationship o f the Advisory Opinions o f the 
International Court of Justice to the Maintenance of World Minimum Order”, UPLR, 113, 1965, p. 
544.
161 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 155.
162 ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 87. In this case, see the Sep. Op. of Judge El-Erian, p. 95.
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Recently, in the Legality o f the Use by a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict case (1996) and in the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons 
case (1996), the Court has affirmed its jurisprudence in this regard. It stated that the 
political aspect of the question “does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a 
‘legal question’ and ‘to deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it 
by its Statute’”. In addition, the Court found that the political nature of the motives 
which may be said to have inspired the request and the political implications that 
the opinion given might have “are of no relevance in the establishment of its 
jurisdiction to give such an opinion”.163
Thus, it is not for the Court to delve into the motivation that leads a duly 
authorised organ to request an advisory opinion on a legal question falling within 
the jurisdiction of that organ even when that question relates to an issue that 
involves important political facts or is itself essentially political.164
(iii) Legal questions and questions of fact
The issue here is whether the ICJ can give an opinion on questions that embody 
factual elements or basis. It has been noted that the requesting organs, inter alia the 
GA and the SC, cannot request advisory opinions in respect of any question that 
primarily involves a determination of facts.165 This opinion is based on the dictum 
of the PCIJ in the Eastern Carelia case, where it concluded:
“The Court does not say that there is an absolute rule that the request for an advisory 
opinion may not involve some enquiry as to facts, but, under ordinary circumstances, it is 
certainly expedient that the facts upon which the opinion o f the Court is desired should 
not be in controversy, and it should not be left to the Court itself to ascertain what they
163 ICJ Rep., 1996 (WHO request), p. 8 (unpublished); ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 9 (unpublished).
164 In their dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case, Judges
Onyeama, Dillard, de Ar£chaga and Waldock noted that: “[fjew indeed would be the cases 
justiciable before the Court if a legal dispute were to be regarded as deprived of its legal character by 
reason of one or both parties being also influenced by political considerations. Neither in 
contentious cases nor in requests for advisory opinions has the Permanent Court or this Court ever at 
any time admitted the idea that an intrinsically legal issue could lose its legal character by reason of 
political considerations surrounding it.” ICJ Rep., 1974, p. 518.
165 Sloan, supra note 37, pp. 841-2.
166 PCIJ Ser. B„ No. 5, 1923, p. 28.
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The practice of the ICJ in many cases has gone against the above opinion. In 
the Admission case, the Court’s advisory jurisdiction was contended on the basis of 
the question’s lack of legal character,167 because it was essentially related to a 
political disagreement among UN members. In its reply, the Court concluded that 
the question was mainly related to interpretation of the treaty’s provisions, which 
was considered a legal question. In the Legal Consequences for States o f the 
Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 case (1970),168 the Court’s 
jurisdiction was contended on the basis of the non-legality of the question because it 
was related to factual elements. The Court concluded that the reference in Art. 96 to I 
a “legal question” cannot be interpreted as opposing legal to factual issues, and, 
normally, “to enable a Court to pronounce onJ.egal questions, it must also be 
acquainted^with, take into account iffld^ if necessary, make findings as to the 
relevant factual issues”.169 In other words, the factual elementsof a question do not 
alter its character as a legal question. Finally, in the Western Sahara case,170 the 
Court dismissed Spain’s objection that, according to Art. 96/1 of the UN Charter 
and Art. 65/1 of the Court’s Statute, the Court had to decline to give an opinion 
because the requested question had a factual character. The Court pointed out that, 
although some facts might have to be determined, it could answer the question 
posed by the GA because it was legal.171 It noted that there is nothing in the Charter 
or in the Statute limiting the competence of the GA to request advisory opinions or 
the competence of the Court to give opinions in respect of a legal question on the 
basis that there are some factual elements in the question as long as the question is
167 ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 61.
168 Hereinafter the Namibia case.
i
^  169 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 27.
170 In this case the GA requested the Court to give an opinion concerning the two following 
questions: “(i) Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakeit El Hamra) at the time of colonisation by 
Spain a territory belonging to no one (Terra Nullius). If the answer to the question is in the negative, 
(ii) What were the legal ties between this territory and Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritania 
entity?” ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 14. With regard to this case, see Janis, M., “The International Court of 
Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara”, H I D 17, 1976, pp. 609 ff.\ Riedel, E., 
“Confrontation in Western Sahara in the Light of the Advisory Opinions of the International Court 
o f Justice of 16 October 1975: A Critical Appraisal”, GYIL, 19, 1976, pp. 405 Jf.\ Shaw, M., “The 
Western Sahara Case”, BYIL, 49, 1978, pp. 121 jf.
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legal as deemed by the Court. It also observed that “a mixed question of law and 
fact is nonetheless a legal question”172 within the meaning of Art. 96 of the Charter 
and Art. 65 of the Statute. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the adoption of the 
Spanish view would limit the scope of the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction.173
3.4.3. Abstract questions
A related point to the determination of the term “legal question” is whether the 
requesting organ may ask a question that does not fall within the context of a 
concrete legal or factual situation involving a specific issue, or whether this 
question should be related to some definite issue or circumstance. Some lawyers 
have noted that the UN organs and agencies may ask abstract questions not directly 
related to a specific dispute.174 This view is based on the practice of the ICJ where it 
gave opinions related to abstract questions. For example, in the Reparation case, 
the abstractness of the question was mentioned in the pleadings before the Court.175 
Rosenne noted that the Court treated the question in an abstract fashion, without 
making any specific comment on the fact.176 In the Admission case, the Court stated 
that: “[i]t has also been contended that the Court should not deal with a question 
couched in abstract terms. That is a mere definition devoid of any justification. 
According to Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute, the Court may 
give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise.” In addition, 
the Court held that it is its “duty ... to envisage the question submitted to it only in 
the abstract form which has been given to it”.177 This dictum was reiterated in the
171 ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 19.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., pp. 19-20. Similarly, see the ICJ’s opinions in the Application fo r  Review o f 
Judgment No. 158 o f  the United Nations Administrative Tribunal case, ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 172; and 
its opinion in the Application fo r Review o f Judgment No. 333 o f  the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal case, ICJ Rep., 1987, pp. 29 ff.
174 Sloan, supra note 37, p. 841. In this regard Judge Azevedo pointed out that “it is quite 
fitting for an advisory body to give an answer in abstracto which may eventually be applied to 
several de facto  situations: minima circumstantia facti magnam diversitatem juris.” Sep. Op. of 
Judge Azevedo, ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 74.
175 ICJ Pled., 1948, pp. 24, 62, 64.
176 Rosenne, S., “The Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice”, RDISDP, 
1, 1952, p. 20.
177 ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 61.
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Reservations case.178 Recently, in the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear 
Weapons case, the Court refused to accept the argument of some states that the 
Assembly’s request was vague and abstract and the consequent argument that there 
existed no specific dispute on the subject-matter of the question. The Court stated 
that: “it is necessary to distinguish between requirements governing contentious 
procedure and those applicable to advisory opinions. The purpose of the advisory 
function is ... to offer legal advice to the organs and institutions requesting the 
opinion. The fact that the question put to the Court does not relate to a specific 
dispute should consequently not lead the Court to decline to give the opinion 
requested.”179 The Court also noted that “it is the clear position of the Court that to 
contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is ‘a mere 
affirmation devoid of any justification’ and that ‘the Court may give an advisory 
opinion on any legal questions abstract or otherwise’”180
In the light of the above it seems clear that the Court has adopted a broad 
interpretation of the term “legal question” in which it can be extended to abstract 
and theoretical questions by declaring that this does not prevent the question from 
being legal in character. The Court’s attitude in this regard might help to increase 
its role as an adviser, which will have an effect on the progressive development of 
international law and the law of the UN.
3.4.4. Legal questions related to disputes actually pending between states
When the GA and the SC request advisory opinions relating to a legal question 
within the constitutional or organisational framework, there is no need for the 
consent of the member states of the UN. But since it became an established 
principle that the GA and the SC could request advisory opinions relating to inter­
state disputes, it is possible for a state to propose a draft resolution in these two 
organs containing a question to be put to the ICJ for an opinion, and this question 
may directly relate to a situation or dispute between states. It is of interest here to 
note to what extent the consent of litigant states is necessary for the advisory
178 ICJ Rep, 1951, p. 21.
179 ICJ Rep, 1996, pp. 10-11 (unpublished).
180 Ibid, p. 11 (unpublished).
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proceedings. The importance of this point derives from the fact that the Court has 
no compulsory jurisdiction over states without their prior consent, and therefore no 
state can be compelled - without its consent - to submit its dispute with another state 
to international tribunals.181
Neither the Charter nor the Statute has offered an answer to this question. It 
has been noted by some lawyers that the GA and the SC cannot request advisory 
opinions from the ICJ concerning an international dispute without the consent of the 
disputant states, and the absence of this consent constitutes a condition that the 
Court cannot overlook.182 This view is justified on the basis that allowing UN 
organs to request an opinion relating to an international dispute without the consent 
of the litigant states means abolishing a well-established principle, namely, the 
necessity of the consent of the litigant states to refer their disputes to international 
adjudication. They also refer to Art. 68 of the Statute, which provides that when the 
Court exercises its advisory jurisdiction it shall be guided by the provisions that 
govern contentious cases, and Art. 31 of the Statute applies in respect of advisory 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the consent of the parties is a necessary condition because 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had been rejected. According to this view, 
allowing requests for an opinion without the consent of the states involved would 
mean introducing compulsory jurisdiction to the Court by the back door under the 
guise of advisory opinions, contrary to the Charter.183 In addition, advocates of this 
view referred to the PCIJ’s precedent in the Eastern Carelia case, where it 
observed, inter alia, that the question posed to it directly concerned the main point 
of the dispute between Finland and Russia and its reply to that question would be 
equivalent to its judgment.184 Consequently, the PCIJ concluded that, according to
181 See p. 1 7 0 ^  below.
182 Hudson, M., International Tribunals; Past and Future, 1944, p. 69; Rosenne, supra note 
16, vol. 2, p. 709; Simpson, L., et al., International Arbitration - Law and Practice, 1959, p. 274; 
Anand, R., Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f Justice, 1961, pp. 277-8; Diss. 
Op. of Judge Krylov in Peace Treaties case, ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 106-7. In addition, Judge Singh 
stressed in his address at the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the Court in 1986 that the 
“the Court is dependent upon the consent of States for the exercise not only of its contentious but 
also of its advisory jurisdiction”. ICJYB, 1985-6, No. 40, p. 178.
183 Diss. Op. of Judge Winiarski, ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 90-6.
184 The Eastern Carelia case grew out of a dispute between Finland, a member o f the 
League, and the Soviet Union, a non-member of the League. Arts. 12 to 16 of the Covenant laid
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the rules that governed its activities as an international court, it could not give an 
advisory opinion so long as there was no consent given by Russia.
This view must be examined in the light of several factors.185 First, it should be 
considered that the Court’s advisory jurisdiction does not settle disputes, but it 
assists the requesting organ to reach a solution or adopt a resolution. Second, there 
was no intention in the travaux preparatoires to restrict the Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction to purely non-contentious situations. Third, if the consent of litigant 
states is a required condition, this means that these states can hinder the interested 
organ from requesting an opinion from the ICJ and this would impede the work of 
this organ. Fourth, as Lauterpacht rightly noted, the members of the UN, by giving 
the Court the general power to render advisory opinions, agreed to its advisory 
jurisdiction on any legal question whether it involved their interests or not. In 
addition, he noted that there seems to be no decisive reason why the sovereignty of 
states should be protected from the procedure, which they have accepted in advance 
as members of the UN, of ascertaining the law through a pronouncement that is not
down procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes between members only. According to these 
articles, members that were parties to a dispute were required, in the absence of settlement by 
diplomatic means, arbitration or judicial decisions, to submit the matter to the Council o f the 
League. The Council, according to Art. 17 of the Covenant, had the power to adopt resolutions 
regarding disputes between member states of the League but not between members and non­
members, unless a non-member state accepted the Council’s intervention in the case and accepted 
the obligations of Arts. 12-16 of the Covenant. The Eastern Carelia case should be considered in 
the light of the above facts. The Finnish Government alleged that the Russian Government had 
failed to carry out its obligations under the peace treaty and under the declaration given by Russia. 
Accordingly, it sought inscription of its dispute with Russia on the Council’s agenda. The Council 
of the League adopted a resolution regarding its willingness “to consider the question with a view to 
arriving at a satisfactory conclusion if the two parties concerned agree”. On 1 February 1923, the 
Council was informed that Russia had rejected any invitation, claiming that this issue [Eastern 
Carelia] was a domestic matter. At the same meeting the Finnish Government suggested seeking an 
advisory opinion from the PCIJ regarding this matter since it embodied a treaty interpretation. Later 
on, the Council adopt a resolution by which the matter was refereed to the PCIJ for an opinion. 
Russia denied the PCIJ’s competence to deal with this request on the basis that this issue was a 
domestic issue. See Keith, supra note 1, pp. 93-4; PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1926, pp. 27-9; Lalonde, 
P., “The Death of the Eastern Carelia Doctrine: Has Compulsory Jurisdiction Arrived in the World 
Court”, FLRUT, 37, 1979, pp. 84-5; Gilmore, G., “The International Court of Justice”, YU , 55, 
1946, p. 1055; Hudson, M., “Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts”, HLR, 37, 
1924, pp. 995-6.
185 For more details, see Donner, R., International Adjudication: Using the International 
Court o f  Justice, With a Special Reference to Finland , 1988, p. 122; Szasz, supra note 53, pp. 499
f f -
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binding upon them.186 Fifth, some lawyers also rejected the PCIJ’s dictum in the 
Eastern Carelia case as an irrelevant precedent because the organisation of the 
international community has advanced since the time of this case, so that a non­
member of the UN cannot argue its non-membership as a challenge to the advisory 
jurisdiction of the Court.187 Finally, the Court’s dictum in several cases seems to 
support this view. It did not consider the consent of the litigant states to be a 
prerequisite to requesting an opinion from the Court by a UN organ.
The leading case in this respect was the Peace In this case, the
Court dismissed the contention of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria that the Court 
had no competence to give an opinion because their consents were absent.189 They 
based their argument on the precedent of the Eastern Carelia case and Arts. 36 and 
68 of the Court’s Statute. The Court concluded that their contention confused the 
rules governing the Court’s advisory jurisdiction with those governing its 
contentious jurisdiction. It also concluded that the absence of a state’s consent has 
no effect upon the Court’s advisory jurisdiction even when the request for an 
advisory opinion relates to an inter-state dispute. The Court based its view on the
186 Lauterpacht, H., The Development o f  International Law by the International Court, 1958, 
pp. 355-8.
187 Sloan, supra note 37, p. 847. As regards the examination o f the PCIJ’s jurisprudence in 
the Eastern Carelia case, see pp. 92 ff. below. In this regard, Bowett noted that “let us suppose a 
dispute exists in the following circumstances: (1) the dispute has been characterised by the Security 
Council as one the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security under 
Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. (2) The state, or states, involved have declined the 
Council’s recommendation under article 36(3) that they refer their dispute to the Court. (3) The 
Council is not itself able to recommend terms of settlement under article 37(2) without guidance 
from the Court as to the respective legal rights o f the parties. In those circumstances, why should 
Eastern Carelia override? Is the principle of consent so paramount that it must be respected, even 
though there is an incipient threat to peace, and the Council needs the Court’s advice to exercise its 
power under Art. 37(2)?” Bowett, D., “The Court’s Role in Relations to International Organisations” 
in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), Fifty Years o f the International Court o f  Justice, 1996, p. 184.
188 The facts of this case were related to the disputes procedures established in the peace 
treaties concluded between Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania on the one hand, and the Allied and 
Associated powers on the other. lhe-4gquest-e£4he~Austra1ian and, Bolivian Governments the 
question of the observance of human rightsJn~Hungarv and. Bulgaria-W-as-placed_on" tK ^ p i^ s n o f  
the GA. The special Political Committee of the Assembly decided that invitations be sent to the 
Governments of the two states, which were not then members of the United Nations, inviting them 
to participate in the debate without vote. The two governments, however, refused the invitation 
saying that the United Nations was not competent. Later on, the matter was inscribed on the agenda 
of the Fourth Session of the GA. The Assembly adopted a resolution requesting an opinion relating 
to the disputes procedure established by the treaties. Keith, supra note 1, p. 112. /
189 ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 71 ff.\ ICJ Pled., 1949, pp. 196-7, 203,204.
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nature of its advisory opinion, which has no binding force upon the interested states. 
Moreover, it pointed out that these opinions are given directly to the requesting 
organ and not to the states concerned. Finally, it stated that no state, whether a 
member or a non-member of the UN, can prevent the Court from replying to any 
request referred to it by a UN organ for whatever reason.190 This dictum was 
reiterated in the Reservations case where the Court concluded that the principle of 
the consent of the disputant parties is not relevant to its advisory jurisdiction and 
confirmed that a reply to a request for an advisory opinion should not be refused . 
according to this challenge.191 The ICJ extensively examined this issue in the 
Western Sahara case. In this case Spain argued that the ICJ was incompetent to 
deal with the matter because it did not give its consent to the Court, and because v 
both Morocco and Mauritania were using the advisory jurisdiction of the Court to 
circumvent the principle of consent to adjudication. It also argued that the subject 
of the questions raised in the request for the advisory opinion was substantially 
identical to the questions that it had refused to submit to the Court for resolution in 
contentious proceedings.192 The ICJ pointed out that in contrast to the Eastern 
Carelia case - where Russia was neither a member of the League nor in the PCIJ’s 
Statute - Spain, as a member of the UN, had accepted the Charter and the Statute, 
whereby it had in general given prior consent to the exercise by the Court of its 
advisory jurisdiction.193 Moreover, the Court noted that the question was related 
mainly to the possibility of the application of GA Res. 1514 (XV). Therefore, the 
Court stated that the aim of this question was to assist the Assembly in fulfilling its
190 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71; Fitzmaurice, G., “The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice: International Organisations and Tribunals”, BYIL, 29, 1952, pp. 42-3. With regard 
to the Court’s opinion in this case, it was noted by Rosenne that “[t]his ... opinion brings out one 
important factor. Owing to the new organic relation of the Court with the United Nations, the Court 
is under the duty of participating, within its competence, in the activities of the organisation, and no 
state can stop this participation.” Rosenne, supra note 176, p. 30.
191 ICJ Rep., 1951, p. 19.
192 In this regard, Spain argued that to give a reply to the request for an advisory opinion 
would “[b]e to allow the advisory procedure to be used as a means of bypassing the consent o f a 
State, which constitutes the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction”. ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 22-3; see also 
Okere, supra note 148, pp. 302-4.
193 ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 24 ff.
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functions, namely the decolonisation of the territories.194 Further, the Court found j 
that Spain, unlike the Soviet Union in the Eastern Carelia case, had actively j 
participated in the advisory opinion proceedings before the Court and “furnished \ 
very extensive documentary evidence of the facts”, so that there was no issue of i 
“inadequacy of the evidence”, as in Eastern Carelia, operating, “for reasons of f 
judicial propriety”, to prevent the Court from giving an opinion.”195 In the j 
Applicability o f Article VI, Section 22, o f the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities o f the United Nations case, the Court dismissed the Rumanian allegation 
that the UN could not refer the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion without its 
prior consent.196 The Court concluded that, since the purpose of its advisory 
jurisdiction is to guide the UN organs, the consent of the interested states is not a 
prerequisite for requesting advisory opinions. The Court based its opinion on the 
non-binding effect of its advisory opinions.197
It can be concluded that the consent of the litigant states is not considered by 
the Court to be an appropriate condition for requesting an advisory opinion from the 
ICJ with regard to inter-state disputes. Accordingly, UN organs may bring any 
matter relating to an existing dispute between states before the Court for an advisory 
opinion.
However, does the above dictum mean that the ICJ has abandoned the 
precedent of the Eastern Carelia case decided by its predecessor the PCIJ?198 It has 
been noted by some lawyers that the ICJ has abandoned the attitude of its 
predecessor, the PCIJ, which declined to give an opinion because of the absence of 
Russia’s consent to the Court’s exercising jurisdiction in the Eastern Carelia
199case.
This view cannot be easily accepted and should be reconsidered in the light of 
the PCIJ’s opinion in that case. It seems clear that the reason given by the PCIJ that
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid., p. 28.
196 ICJ Rep., 1989, p. 188.
197 Ibid., pp. 188-9.
198 For the facts of the Eastern Carelia case, see note 184.
199 Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 16, 157.
92
Chapter Two
“answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute 
between the parties” was an additional reason because its opinion was based mainly 
on the fact that non-participation by Russia in the proceedings before the Court 
would affect its ability to arrive at a judicial conclusion.200 In addition, the Court 
seems to have established that its competence to render an opinion depended upon 
its view of the competence of the Council of the League to consider the dispute 
because Russia was not then a member of the League of Nations and had not given 
its consent to the solution of the dispute according to the methods provided for in 
the Covenant.201 The Court found that the submission of a dispute between a state 
not a member of the League and a member state for solution according to the 
methods provided for in the Covenant could take place only by virtue of the consent 
of both states. The Court also found that such consent had never been given by 
Russia. It can be concluded that the Court’s refusal to reply to the request for an 
advisory opinion was based on the incompetence of the League of Nations’ Council 
to deal with the dispute. The Court did not state that it could not„giyean ppinjpn in 
the absence of consent by Russia; it stated that it had been asked for an opinion in 
the context of a dispute settlement procedure which had been improperly set in 
motion in the absence of the consent of Russia, which was not a member of the 
League. It should thus be stressed that the Court was not directly discussing its own 
settlement procedures but was concerned with the Council’s settlement procedures 
laid down in the Covenant.202 The statement by the PCIJ in this case affirms this 
conclusion:
“As concerns States not members of the League, the situation is quite different; they are 
not bound by the Covenant. The submission, therefore, of a dispute between them and a 
Member of the League for solution according to the methods provided for in the 
Covenant, could only take place only by virtue of their consent. Such consent, however,
200 In this regard, the PCIJ stated that “[t]he question whether Finland and Russia contracted 
on the terms of the Declaration as to the nature of the autonomy of Eastern Carelia is really one of 
fact. To answer it would involve the duty of ascertaining what evidence might throw light upon the 
contentions which have been put forward on this subject by Finland and Russia respectively, and of 
securing the attendance of such witnesses as might be necessary.” PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 5, 1923, p. 28.
201 Lauterpacht, supra note 186, p. 356, n. 50; Lalonde, supra note 184, p. 83; Koray, supra 
note 2, p. 368; Olivares, supra note 142, p. 44.
202 Keith, supra note 1, p. 94; Singh, supra note 142, pp. 88-9.
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has never been given by Russia ... The Court therefore finds it impossible to give its 
opinion on a dispute of this kind.”203
This means that the real reasons behind the Court’s refusal to give an advisory 
opinion were the following: (i) Russia’s refusal to give the Court the necessary \ 
documents; (ii) the lack of consent of one state, which rendered the Council j 
incompetent and the request invalid and thus, indirectly, affected the competence of ^  
the Court. Therefore, the Court found that if it acted and gave an opinion this u  
would be an ultra vires act. This conclusion was affirmed by the ICJ in the 
Namibia case, where it dismissed South Africa’s contention that, on the basis of the ^  
precedent of Eastern Carelia, it did not give its consent because the question was r 
related to the actual dispute between South Africa and the other states. The ICJ held ^ ’ 
that, in the Eastern Carelia case, one of the states concerned was not a member of j/ 
the League and did not appear before the Court. But in this case South Africa was a 
member of the UN and consequently was bound by Art. 96 of the Charter; 
moreover, it had participated throughout in any “dispute” over South West Africa.204 
This dictum was reiterated in the Western Sahara case, where the Court stressed 
that in the Eastern Carelia case one party was neither a member of the League nor a 
party to the Court’s Statute,205 and therefore Russia was not bound by any of the 
methods of peaceful settlement provided for in the Covenant, to which it did not 
give express consent.
To conclude, it seems clear that the ICJ establishes that, if a question submitted 
in a request falls within the normal exercise of its judicial task, the Court does not 
have to deal with the motives which may have inspired the request.206 It also seems 
clear that the Court is the only organ that can decide whether a question is legal or 
not. The Court has not adopted a restrictive interpretation of the term “any legal 
question” incorporated in Art. 96 of the Charter and Art. 65 of the Statute; on the
203 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, pp. 27-8.
204 ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 23-4. ^
205 ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 22 ff. N f
206 Elias, T., “How The International Court of Justice Deals with Requests for Advisory 
Opinion” in Makarczyk, J. (ed.), Essays in International Law in Honour o f Judge Manfred Lachs, 
1984, p. 373; Elian, supra note 35, pp. 80-1.
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contrary, it has adopted a comprehensive concept of this term. It has concluded that 
it has no concern with the motives or the considerations that inspire the GA or the 
SC when they request its opinion. Nor does it consider the factual elements of a 
question to be an obstacle to the request for an advisory opinion by these organs so 
long as the question is a legal one.
4. The obligation to request advisory opinions from the ICJ
Because the UN Charter and the Court’s Statute authorises the UN organs and its 
specialised agencies to request advisory opinions from the ICJ on any legal 
question, the question arises whether they are obliged to do so when they deal with 
a matter with a legal dimension.
From the outset, it should be noted that, under some international treaties 
concluded between the UN and other states or organisations, the UN is obliged to 
request an advisory opinion when any dispute regarding these treaties arises. For 
instance, the GA has to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ concerning any 
legal question that may arise in respect of the Immunities and Privileges of the 
United Nations Convention207 and the Headquarters Agreement between the United 
Nations and the United States of America.208 Since the obligation in these cases is 
derived from these agreements, the question remains unsettled in the case of the 
absence of such provision.
In the light of the silence of the Charter and the Statute it has been noted that 
UN organs are obliged to request advisory opinions from the ICJ with regard to any
207 Art. VIII in Section 30 provides: “[a]ll differences arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in 
any case it is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference 
arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall 
be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the 
Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted 
as decisive by the parties.”
208 Art. VIII of Section 21 provides:
“(b) The Secretary-General or the United States may ask the GA to request of the International 
Court of Justice an advisory opinion on any legal question arising in the course of such proceeding. 
Pending the receipt of the opinion of the Court, an interim decision o f the arbitral tribunal shall 
render a final decision, having regard to the opinion of the Court.”
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legal question arising before them, so long as the required conditions exist.209 This 
opinion is based on the view that the words “may request” in this context confer not 
a discretionary power but a mandatory power; that is, in some systems of law such 
as the Roman-Civil and the Anglo-American systems, the word “may” has been 
held to mean “shall” when used in connection with an act by an officer in the 
furtherance of justice.
This view has rightly been rejected by the majority of international lawyers, 
who have found that these organs are not bound to request an advisory opinion from 
the ICJ because this power was expressly provided to them as a faculty.210 
Therefore, these organs may - at their discretion - request advisory opinions of the 
Court on any legal question that may arise in the performance of their functions. 
This is based on the permissive wording of paras. 1 and 2 of Art. 96 of the Charter, 
which indicate that the GA and the SC and the other organs and specialised agencies 
“may”, and not “shall”, request advisory opinions of the ICJ.211 This is confirmed 
by the wording of Art. VIII, Section 30, of the Convention on the Immunities and 
Privileges of the United Nations, where the drafters used the term “shall”, which 
leaves the interested organs no discretion to request advisory opinions from the 
Court. In addition, the practice of the GA when it dealt with the issue of the 
“Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa” left no doubt in this respect. It 
rejected the claim of South Africa that it had the right to go to the Court for an 
opinion, and that the GA had a clear duty to assist it in securing such an opinion.212
In the light of the above it can be concluded that, unless there is an explicit 
obligation upon the UN organ to request an opinion from the Court, these organs
209 Kelsen, supra note 9, pp. 264-5. Whele, L., “The United Nations By-passes the 
International Court as the Council’s Adviser; A Study in Contrived Frustration”, UPLR, 98, 1949- 
50, p. 291; El-Goneme, M., International Organisations, 1974, p. 297; Abd El-Wanise, A., The 
Development o f  the Economic and Social Council, 1981, p. 198.
210 Abi-Saab, G., Les Exceptions Preliminaires dans la Procedure de la Cour Internationale, 
1967, p. 73; Elian, supra note 35, p. 78; Elias, 1989, supra note 149, p. 126; Dubisson, supra note 
28, p. 286; Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 51, 137-8; Brownlie, supra note 2, p. 699; Conforti, B., The 
Law and Practice o f  the United Nations, 1996, pp. 9,261.
211 In respect of the difference of meaning between the term “may” and the term “shall” see 
Kelsen, supra note 9, pp. 264-5.
212 Repertory of the Practice of the Organs of the UN, p. 46 (cited in Pratap, supra note 2, p.
59).
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and agencies are the ultimate authority to evaluate the appropriateness and 
usefulness of the requested opinion for their current and future work. If one of these 
organs or agencies decides to request an opinion, it is not for the Court to decide in 
place of that organ on the desirability or the appropriateness of the request or to 
overrule it when the requesting organ has already considered it desirable.
5. Is the ICJ under any obligation to give opinions?
Having explained the discretion of the UN organs and specialised agencies in 
requesting advisory opinions from the ICJ, the study now turns to discuss the 
discretion of the ICJ to give advisory opinions to requesting organs. From the 
outset, it is appropriate to note that discussion of this matter presupposes that all the 
required conditions stipulated in the Charter and the Statute are fulfilled by the 
requesting organ. If the Court finds that any of these conditions are not fulfilled, the 
Court has no discretion and has to decline to give the requested opinion on the 
ground of the absence of this condition. For instance, if the question involved in the 
request does not come within the scope of the activities of the organ or agency 
requesting an advisory opinion or the question is purely political and devoid of legal 
element, then the Court lacks jurisdiction and the question of the exercise of its 
discretionary power does not arise.213 This was confirmed by the ICJ in the 
Expenses case, where it stated that “if a question is not a legal one, the Court has no 
discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested”.214 In 
addition, in the Status o f South-West Africa case the Court concluded that “it is not 
for the Court to pronounce on the political or moral duties”.215 But, supposing that 
all the prerequisites are fulfilled, is the ICJ obliged to answer requests put to it? 
Before dealing with this question, an important point should be addressed regarding 
the Court’s power to decide its own jurisdiction.
213 In this regard Bowett noted that “[i]t would seem that when the Court is satisfied that the 
question posed is not a ‘legal question’, or is ultra vires the requesting organ (because unrelated to 
the scope of its activities), the Court is bound to refuse to give an opinion”. Bowett, supra note 187,
p. 186.
214 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 155.
215 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 140.
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5.1. The power of the Court to decide upon its own jurisdiction
It is a well-established principle that the ICJ, like any other international tribunal, 
has the right to determine its own jurisdiction (its Competence de la Competence) 
not only in contentious proceedings but also in its advisory jurisdiction.216 This 
principle was considered by international lawyers to be a necessary condition for the 
proper functioning of international courts.217 The application of this principle to the 
Court’s advisory jurisdiction finds its basis in Art. 68 of the Court’s Statute, which 
provides that the Court is guided in advisory cases by those provisions of the Statute 
that apply in contentious proceedings, to the extent to which it recognises them to 
be applicable. According to this principle, the ICJ may examine its jurisdiction ex 
officio, proprio motu.
In practice, the ICJ has referred to this principle in several cases. For instance, 
in the Peace Treaties case, the Court stated that it is the proper forum before which 
questions of competence ought to be brought. It confirmed that the proper course is 
to submit this matter to the tribunal itself as a preliminary objection to its 
jurisdiction.218 In its judgment in the Nottebohm case, it observed that it could 
practise this power without any express provision:
Art. 36/6 provides: “[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether the court has jurisdiction, the 
matter shall be settled by the decision of the court.” In this regard, it has been noted that it is not 
only the right of the Court to determine its jurisdiction, but also its duty. Therefore, Judge Cdrdova 
stated in the Administrative Tribunal o f the International Labour Organisation upon Complaints 
Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation case that “[I] 
believe that the first obligation of the Court - as of any judicial body - is to ascertain its own 
competence and, in order to do that, it has first to determine what is the nature of the case which is 
brought before it.” ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 163. In this regard see also Berlia, G., “La Jurisprudence des 
Tribunaux Intemationaux en ce qui Conceme Leur Competence”, RCADI, 88, 1955, pp. 122 ff.\ 
Shihata, I., The Power o f  the International Court to Determine Its Jurisdiction: Competence de la 
Competence, 1965, pp. 11-24; Simpson, et al., supra note 182, pp. 68 ff.\ Stone, supra note 25, pp. 
131-2; Mosler, supra note 53, p. 552.
217 The roots of this principle are to be found in the Alabama case between Britain and the 
United States of America (1876). Since then it has become an established principle and embodied in 
most international conventions (for instance, Art. 73 of the Second Hague Convention 1907, Art. 
36/4 of the Permanent Court of International Justice Statute, and Art. 36/6 of the ICJ’s Statute). See 
Fitzmaurice, G., “The Law and Procedure of the International Court 1951-54, Question of 
Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure”, BYIL, 34,1958, pp. 25-9; Shihata, supra note 216, pp. 11 
j f ;  Anand, supra note 182, pp. 259 ff.\ Vallat, F., “Law in the United Nations”, ARUNA, 1953, p. 
140; Crawford, J., “Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Court”, BYIL, 50, 1979, p. 69; Reisman, W., Systems o f Control in International Adjudication and 
Arbitration, 1992, pp. 17 jf.
218 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 72.
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“Paragraph 6 of Article 36 merely adopted, in respect of the Court, a rule consistently 
accepted by general international law in the matter of international arbitration. Since the 
Alabama case, it has been generally recognised, following the earlier precedents, that, in 
the absence of any agreement to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right to 
decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the 
instruments which govern that jurisdiction ... The judicial character of the Court and the 
rule of general international law referred to above are sufficient to establish that the Court 
is competent to adjudicate on its own jurisdiction in the present case.”219
The above opinion was reiterated by the Court in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
cases (1973), where jurisdiction was based on an agreement between the UK and 
Iceland. The ICJ established its jurisdiction by examining and rejecting various 
arguments concerned with the validity and scope of the treaty, before deciding the 
main dispute in the following year.220 In addition, in the Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions case (1988),221 it affirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to 
Art. 31 of the Pact of Bogota.222
In the light of the above, it seems obvious that the Court has the power to 
examine its jurisdiction and, if it finds that it has no jurisdiction because of the 
absence of the required conditions, it can abstain from giving an opinion.223 It 
should also be noted that the Court’s judgment on that matter, pursuant to Arts. 59 
and 60 of the Statute, is final and binding.224
219 ICJ Rep., 1953, pp. 119-20
220 ICJ Rep., 1973, pp. 8 jf.
221 Hereinafter the Border and Transborder case.
222 ICJ Rep., 1988, pp. 82 ff.
223 In this respect, Pratap noted that “it is not only the right of the Court to determine its 
jurisdiction, but it is also its duty”. See Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 117-18.
224 Art. 59 provides: “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case.”
Art. 60 provides: “[t]he judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the 
meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.”
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5.2. The discretionary power of the ICJ to give advisory opinions225
During the stage of the travaux preparatoires of the Charter, it was suggested by 
Belgium and some other states that the Court should have discretionary power with 
regard to its advisory jurisdiction,226 but the drafters did not embody a proposal.
The wording of Art. 65/1 of the Court’s Statute provides that the Court “may 
give” advice.227 Accordingly, it has been noted by some lawyers that the ICJ is not 
duty-bound to give legal advice to the requesting organ, even without mentioning 
the reasons behind that.228 This view is based on an abstract interpretation of Art. 
65/1 of the Court’s Statute, as well as the independent position of the ICJ vis-a-vis 
the other organs of the UN.229 Moreover, this view refers to the Court’s practice in 
many cases. In the Peace Treaties case, the Court affirmed the permissive wording 
of Art. 65 of the Statute, when it stated that:
In the League of Nations era there was disagreement among international lawyers 
regarding the discretion of the PCIJ to answer a request. The basis o f this disagreement was the 
difference between the wording of the English and French texts of Art. 14. Whereas the English text 
provided “[t]he Court may give advisory opinion”, the French text provided “elle [la Cour] donnera 
aussi des avis consultatifs sur tout diffcrend ou tout point, dont la saisira le Conseil ou 1’Assem ble.” 
Accordingly, some lawyers noted that the Court had discretion to give an opinion. This opinion was 
based on the permissive wording of Art. 14. Conversely, others noted that the wording of Art. 14 
entitled the Court to additional jurisdiction and did not mean that the Court had any discretion in that 
matter. According to this opinion, the article’s wording did not mean that the Court might refuse to 
give advisory opinions, but that the Council and the Assembly might or might not request them. 
This opinion was based on the French wording - which was equally authentic according to this text - 
that the Court had no discretion and was obliged to give an opinion to requesting organs. In this 
respect, see Read, H., “Advisory Opinions in International Justice”, CBR, 4, 1925, pp. 188 ff.\ 
N6gulesco, D., “L’Evolution de la Procedure des Avis Consultatifs de la Cour Permanente de Justice 
Internationale”, RCADI, 57,1936, p. 67.
In 1929 the French draft of Art. 14 was modified to become “[l]a Cour peut donner des avis 
consultatifs”. Therefore, most of the international lawyers who consider the jurisprudence of the 
PCIJ, such as Fachiri and Hudson, agreed that the PCIJ has a discretion in this regard. See Fachiri, 
A., The Permanent Court o f International Justice, 1932, p. 80; Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 6, 143-4; 
Keith, supra note 1, p. 14; El-Goneme, supra note 209,289.
226 See UNCIO, 14, 1945, p. 182.
227 In the French draft it is “La Cour peut donner”.
228««* Fitzmaurice, supra note 190, p. 50; Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 142-4; Elian, supra note 35, 
p. 81; Kelsen, supra note 9, p. 549; Goodrich, L., et al., Charter o f  the United Nations: 
Commentary and Documents, 1969, p. 567; Rosenne, S., The World Court - What It Is and How It 
Works, 1989, p. 105; Abi-Saab, supranott 210, p. 15; Elias, 1983, supra note 149, pp. 27-8.
Abi-Saab, supra note 210, p. 15; Elias, 1983, supra note 149, pp. 27-8.
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“Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine whether 
the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to decline to 
answer the request.”230
This dictum was reiterated by the Court in many cases, such as the Reservations 
case,231 the Judgments o f the Administrative Tribunal o f the ILO upon Complaints 
made against UNESCO case,232 the Expenses case,233 the Application for Review o f 
Judgment No. 158 o f the United Nations Administrative Tribunal case,234 the 
Western Sahara case235 and the Applicability o f Article VI, Section 22, o f  the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the United Nations case.236 And 
most recently, the issue of the Court’s discretionary power to refuse to give the 
requested opinion was discussed by the Court in the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f 
Nuclear Weapons. In this case, the Court concluded that “the Statute leaves a 
discretion as to whether or not it will give an advisory opinion that has been 
requested of it, once it has established its competence to do so”.237
Conversely, it has been noted that, in spite of the ambiguous wording of Art. 
65/1 of the ICJ’s Statute, the ICJ’s discretion is not absolute, but is circumscribed 
by the overriding principle of the Court’s duty.238 This opinion is based on the 
position of the ICJ within the UN as one of its principal organs, which should lead 
to the conclusion that it has no discretionary power with regard to its advisory 
jurisdiction. It has also been noted that, because the refusal of the ICJ to give a 
judgment in contentious cases is considered a “denial of justice”, this attribute, by 
analogy, should be extended and applied when the Court refuses to give an advisory 
opinion to the requesting organ since there is no difference between the two
230 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 72.
231 ICJ Rep., 1951, p. 19.
232 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 86 (hereinafter the UNESCO case).
233 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 155.
234 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 175 (hereinafter the Fasla case).
235 ICJ Rep., 1975. p. 21.
236 ICJ Rep., 1989, p. 1 8 9 ^  (hereinafter the Mazilu case).
237 ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 9 (unpublished).
238 Greig, supra note 149, pp. 337-8; Chehab, M., International Organisations, 1991, p. 354;
Olivares, supra note 142, p. 50; Diss. Op. of Judge Weeramantry in Legality o f  the Use by a State o f  
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case. ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 39 of his opinion (unpublished).
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jurisdictions. Finally, the advocates of this opinion point out that they cannot rely 
on the dictum of the PCIJ in the Eastern Carelia case as a precedent in this respect 
because there is a significant difference between the position of the PCIJ as a 
non-organ of the League of Nations and the position of the ICJ vis-a-vis the UN as 
its principal judicial organ.239 This is also based on the Court’s dictum in the Peace 
Treaties case when the ICJ itself remarked that “there are certain limits to the 
Court’s duty to reply to advisory opinions. It is not merely an organ of the ‘United 
Nations’, it is essentially the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the organisation.”240
To conclude, a distinction should be made between what exists and what 
should take place. There is no doubt that the current wording of Art. 65/1 of the 
Statute gives the Court a discretionary power to reply. But this wording seems 
inconsistent with the position of the Court within the framework of the UN, where 
its special position imposes upon it an obligation to co-operate with the UN organs 
and its specialised agencies. This obligation can be justified on the basis of the 
organic relationship between the Court and the UN whereby the Court is considered 
to be the judicial arm of the UN, and of the great importance of its opinions to UN 
organs by which it clarifies the legal norms in issues before them. Accordingly, the 
Court should not enjoy any discretion in this respect.241 This is also confirmed by 
the practice of the Court, which has never declined to render an advisory opinion so
In respect of the Court’s discretionary power in this regard, Conforti observe that “ [i]n 
our view, the idea of discretionary power, even if it is moderated by the safeguards, is puzzling. The 
textual argument on which it is based (the ‘may’ in Article 65 of the Statute) is very weak and 
should yield to the spirit of the provision on the advisory function which testifies to the obligatory 
co-operation o f  the Court with the UN organs in the solution of legal questions. It is clear that the 
most delicate point of the whole matter is that of the connection between the advisory function and 
contentious or binding jurisdiction. However, it is exactly on this point that the Court should, rather 
than quibbling as it has done up to now, once and for all say that the existence of a dispute does not 
limit in any way its competence to render an opinion. Why should the Court be authorised to 
sacrifice, at its discretion, the advisory function to the contentious function and therefore sacrifice 
co-operation between the organs to respect for the desire of an individual State to avoid the opinion 
(even the non-binding opinion!) of the judicial organ? Such a sacrifice could have been justified at 
the time of the League of Nations and the advisory function of the old Permanent Court, but it seems 
anachronistic today.” Conforti, supra note 210, p. 266.
240 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71.
241 It has been noted that “as a logical consequence of this special relationship, as far as it is 
consistent with its essentially judicial character, the International Court of Justice is bound to co­
operate with the organs of the United Nations and to act in conformity with the provisions of the 
Charter as well as those of its Statute”. See Nantwi, E., The Enforcement o f  International Judicial 
Decisions and Arbitral Awards in Public International Law, 1967, p. 14.
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long as the required conditions were fulfilled.242 Moreover, the Court has insisted in 
its precedents on mentioning that it considers itself to be under a duty to participate 
in the activities of the organisation and, in principle, should not refuse to give a 
requested opinion unless there are “compelling reasons” for such a refusal.243 This 
view was confirmed in several cases such as the Peace Treaties case,244 the 
UNESCO case,245 the Expenses case,246 the Namibia case,247 the Western Sahara 
case,248 the Mazilu case,249 and, recently, the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f 
Nuclear Weapons case.250 In all these cases, the Court expressly announced that it 
considers itself under a duty to reply to requests for an advisory opinion. It made it 
clear that it is strongly inclined towards answering a request for an opinion, and that 
it can refuse to give an opinion only if there are “compelling reasons”. The Court 
did not, however, identify in any of the cases what those reasons might be. It could 
therefore be argued that the Court might decline to give an advisory opinion for one 
of the following reasons:
(i) The Court finds that giving an opinion might complicate the matter or create 
difficulties for another part of the UN in carrying out its responsibilities.
(ii) The Court finds that giving an opinion would be contrary to its judicial 
character or affect its inherited capacity as a court of law, and might damage the
It worth noting that the only case where the Court refused to give a requested opinion was 
in the Legality o f  the Use by a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict case, 1996 (WHO 
request). The Court’s refusal was not based on its discretionary power to give advisory opinions, 
but was justified by the Court’s lack of jurisdiction in that case since it found that the WHO was not 
empowered to seek an opinion because the matter fell outside the scope of its activities. See ICJ 
Rep., 1996 (WHO request), p. 15 (unpublished).
243 Rosenne, supra note 14, p. 712; Schwebel, S., “Relations Between the International
Court of Justice and the United Nations” in Virally, M. (ed.), Le Droit International au Service de la
Paix, de la Justice et du Developpement, 1991, p. 437.
244 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 72.
245 ICJ Rep., 1956, pp. 86-7.
246 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 155-6.
247 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 27.
248 ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 21.
249 ICJ Rep., 1989, p. 191.
250 ICJ Rep., 1996, pp. 9-10 (unpublished).
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prestige of the Court - this was clearly demonstrated by the Court in the Northern 
Cameroon case (1964) and the Nuclear Tests cases (1973).
(iii) The Court finds that its opinion would be ineffective or without object. 
This finds its basis in the Northern Cameroon case and in the Nuclear Tests case. 
In the former case, the Court pointed out that “the function of the Court is to state 
the law, but it may pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases 
where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a 
conflict of legal interests between the parties. The Court’s judgment must have 
some practical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or 
obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations. No 
judgment on the merits in this case could satisfy these essentials of the judicial 
function.”251
(iv) The Court finds that giving an advisory opinion will infringe its judicial 
character (for example, if the Court finds that it has insufficient information, 
because - as a judicial body - it must be in possession of all relevant material, or if it 
finds that it is necessary to hold oral hearings in order to obtain the fullest possible 
arguments from the parties in cases related to the interest of individuals). This was 
confirmed by the ICJ in the UNESCO case, where, after deciding that the parties 
were in a position of equality, it stated that, although there were no oral 
proceedings, it was satisfied that adequate information had been made available to 
it.252
6. The legal effect of advisory opinions of the Court: Are they binding?
After the requested opinion has been rendered by the Court, is it possible for the 
requesting organ to act in contradiction of the Court’s opinion? This question was
251 ICJ Rep., 1963, pp. 33-4.
252 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 86. This was affirmed by the Fifth Committee of the GA when it 
considered the possibility of authorising the Committee for Review of the UN Administrative 
Tribunal, where it stated that “the Court itself would not give the opinion if it considered that one of 
the parties was at a disadvantage”. UN Doc. A/2909, 10 June 1955.
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raised as a consequence of the absence of a similar provision to Art. 94 with regard 
to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ.253
6.1. The non-binding effect as a consequence of the absence of an express 
provision
It has been noted by the majority of international lawyers that the advisory opinions 
of the ICJ under the provisions of the Charter, as was the case previously under the 
Covenant, are not binding upon the requested organs and consequently there is no 
obligation upon them to heed the Court’s advice.254 This opinion is based on the 
non-equivalent nature of the advisory opinions and the judgments of the ICJ. The 
nature of the Court’s opinion in this regard is “advisory”. That is, the binding effect 
is limited to the Court’s judgments, which are considered to be the original 
competence of the Court.255 In addition, Judge Cordova noted that this effect does 
not apply to the advisory jurisdiction because it is considered to be a secondary 
jurisdiction.256
Some advocates of this view argue that the non-binding effect of the advisory 
opinion does not mean that it is not devoid of any legal value; they argue that 
advisory opinions enjoy a “legal value and moral authority”.257 In their view, the
It should be noted that this point deals with the binding effect of the Court’s opinion upon 
the requesting organ, not with the enforcement of the advisory opinion according to Art. 94 o f the 
Charter. The applicability of this article is limited to the Court’s judgments in contentious cases. 
See Sloan, supra note 37, p. 854.
254 Elian, supra note 35, pp. 91-3; Lachs, M., “Perspectives pour la Fonction Consultative de 
la Cour Internationale de Justice” in Comunicazioni e Studi il Processo Internazionale Studi in 
Onore di Gaetano Morell /, 1975, p. 427; Elias, T., 1989, supra note 149, pp. 125-6; Goodrich, et 
al., supra note 228, pp. 569-70; Gross, L., “The International Court of Justice and the United 
Nations”, RCADl, 120, 1967, p. 419; Ferguson, J., Not Them but Us in Praise o f  the United Nations, 
1988, p. 47; Bacot, G., “Reflexions sur les Clauses qui Rendent Obligatoires les Avis Consultatifs 
de la PCIJ et de la CIJ”, RGDIP, LXXXIV, 1980, pp. 1027-30; Janis, M., “The International Court” 
in Janis, M., (ed.), International Courts for the Twenty-First Century, 1992, p. 29; Hudson, supra 
note 1, pp. 511-12; Rosenne, S., The International Court o f  Justice: An Essay in Political and Legal 
Theory, 1957, p. 441.
255 •Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement o f  Disputes Between States, Office of Legal Affairs, 
Codification Division, United Nations, 1992, p. 75; Koray, supra note 2, p. 345; Hudson, supra 
note 1, p. 511.
256 Diss. Op. of Judge Cdrdova in the UNESCO case, ICJ Rep., 1956, pp. 158-9.
257 Hudson noted that “[t]hey are advisory not legal advise in the ordinary sense, not views 
expressed by the counsel for the guidance of client, but pronouncements as to the law applicable in 
given situations formulated after deliberation by the court”. Hudson, M., “The Effect of Advisory 
Opinions of the World Court”, AJIL, 42, 1948, p. 630; see also Bustamante, S., et al., The World
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Court’s opinions, in practice, have the same value as the judgments because they are 
“pronouncements” ruled by the Court regarding the applicable law in specific 
issues. Accordingly, they conclude that the requesting organ would not be in a very 
good position before the world if it paid no attention to the Court’s opinion.
The above view has been challenged by some lawyers who note that the 
Court’s advisory opinions have a binding effect upon requesting organs. According 
to this view, the Court’s judgments and its advisory opinions are equivalent in 
nature, and the difference between them is no more than a difference of name.258 In 
both functions the ICJ presents legal conclusions concerning the situation being 
dealt with, and their weight is the same in both cases. Moreover, if advisory 
opinions were not binding, it would seem unnecessary to have judges ad hoc in 
respect of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction.259 Further, they rely on the opinion of 
the committee which was established by the PCIJ in 1927 to prepare a report 
concerning the extent of Art. 31 of the PCIJ’s Statute. The committee concluded 
that, so long as there was disagreement between the parties before the Court, the 
difference between the dual jurisdictions of the Court became a difference in name 
only. The advocates of this view also reject the view of the “moral value” of the 
advisory jurisdiction on the basis that the Court’s opinions depend on the rules of 
law not on moral considerations.260 Finally, it has been noted that the provisions of 
the resolutions concerning the internal judicial practice of the Court of 17 April
Cpurt, 1925, p. 264. Koray also notes that, “[although advisory opinions are thought not to be
binding in a technical and formal sense, their persuasive character and substantive authority are 
considerable. This is because they are judicial pronouncements of the highest international tribunal 
and statements of law contained in them are of the same high quality as those contained in 
judgments.” Koray, supra note 2, pp. 348-9.
258 Gros notes that “[t]he distinction habitually drawn between advisory opinions and 
judgments, whereby the former do not have the binding character of the latter, is not an absolute 
one”. Gros, A., “Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice” in Friedmann, 
W., et al. (eds.), Transitional Law in a Changing Society. Essays in Honour o f  Philip Jessup, 1972, 
p. 315; see also Diss. Op. of Judge Zoricic, in Peace Treaties case, ICJ Rep., 1950 p. 101; 
Hammarskjold, M. “The Permanent Court o f International Justice and Its Place in International 
Relations”, JRIIA, 9, 1930, p. 79 (cited in El-Rashidy, supra note 14, p. 276); Benvenuti, P., 
L ’accertamento del Diritto Mediante Pareri Consultativi della Corte Internazionale di Giustizia, 
1984 (cited in Ago, R., “‘Binding’ Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice”, AJIL, 
85, 1991, p. 441).
259 Hambro, supra note 149, p. 6.
260 Sloan, supra note 37, p. 853; Gros, supra note 258, p. 315.
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1976 apply - in accordance with Art. 10 - whether the proceedings before the Court 
are contentious or advisory.261
6.2. The obligatory effect of the advisory opinions in exceptional cases
The above disagreement among international lawyers is irrelevant in two cases. 
First, the binding effect of advisory opinions may be prescribed in advance by the 
international instrument concerned (other than the Charter and the Statute). Such 
provisions are known as “advisory arbitration”, or “advisory opinion with binding 
force”, or “compulsive effect” opinions. The common feature of these provisions is 
that they characterise the opinion requested of the Court as a “decision” in relation 
to the dispute at issue; that is, they confer “binding force” on the opinion for the 
parties to the dispute.262
In practice, numerous institutions within the UN system have adopted this 
provision in their instruments. For instance, Art. 12 of the Headquarters Agreement 
between the United Nations and the United States of America indicates that the 
Court’s opinion has a binding effect upon the requesting organ.263 In addition, Art. 
VIII, Section 30, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN 
provides that, if a difference arises between the UN on the one hand and a member 
on the other hand concerning the interpretation or application of the convention, 
“request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in 
accordance with Art. 96 of the Charter and Art. 65 of the Statute of the Court. The 
opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.”264 A
Donner, supra note 185, p. 119.
262 Keith, supra note 1, p. 196; Pratap, supra note 2, p. 47; Bowett, supra note 24, p. 280; 
Rosenne, supra note 14, p. 682; Ago, supra note 258, p. 1.
263 This convention was concluded on 26 June 1947. Similar provisions have been adopted 
in some headquarters agreements between international organisations within the framework o f the 
UN and the states on whose territory they carry out their activities. For instance, Art. XI, section 21, 
of the Agreement Regulating Conditions for Operation o f the Headquarters o f the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America, dated 16 February 1953, between UN and Chile; Art. XIII, section 
26, of the Agreement Relating to the Headquarters of the Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East, dated 26 May 1954, between UN and Thailand; Art. XVI, section 39, of the Agreement 
Establishing a Radio-isotope Centre in Cairo, dated 14 September 1967, between Egypt and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. For more details see Ago, supra note 258, p. 1.
264 This convention was concluded on 13 February 1946. Similar provisions have been 
adopted in some conventions on privileges and immunities; for instance, Art. XI, section 32, o f the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies, dated 21 November 1947;
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similar provision was embodied in Art. XII/1 of the Statute of the ILOAT, Section 
32 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies, 
and Art. 37/2 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation.265
Second, states may agree in advance that the Court’s advisory opinion with 
regard to a special matter will be binding upon them. So far there has been no 
instance of such agreement in the UN era. It occurred in the League era, when 
Britain and France agreed to submit their dispute regarding the French Nationality 
legislation in Tunisia and Morocco to the Council of the League, and requested it to 
refer the matter to the PCIJ for advice. They also agreed to consider the Court’s 
advice in that case as binding.266
In the above two cases, the Court’s opinions are binding upon the organisations 
and concerned states. This effect is based on the prior consent of the organisation or 
concerned states.
6.3. The non-binding effect of the advisory opinions in the ICJ’s jurisprudence
The question now is to which of these opinions did the Court hold? The ICJ has 
stated with the utmost finality that its opinions are not legally binding. In its 
opinion in the Peace Treaties case, the Court concluded that “the Court’s reply is 
only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force”.267 In the UNESCO 
case, it made the above statement more obvious when it referred to the differences 
between the legal effect of its advisory opinions according to Art. XII of the Statute 
of the Administrative Tribunal and the effect of its opinions according to the 
Charter and the Court’s Statute. It described the binding effect of its advisory 
opinion according to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal as going beyond the 
scope attributed by the Court to an advisory opinion.268 Therefore, it can be
Art. X, section 34, of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, of 1 July 1959.
265 Seyersted, F., “Settlement of Internal Disputes of Inter-governmental Organisations by 
Internal and External Courts”, ZaoRV, 1964,24, p. 113.
266 PCIJ, Ser. E., No. 4, pp. 7-8; Lissitzyn, O., The International Court o f  Justice, 1951, pp. 
84, 88; Gross, supra note 254, p. 420; Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 36-37; Hudson, supra note 257, p. 
631.
267 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71.
268 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 84.
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concluded that the Court’s dictum in this respect shows that it considers its 
advisory opinions as having a non-binding effect upon the UN organs.
6.4. Evaluation
The non-obligatory effect of the Court’s advisory opinions expressed by some 
lawyers and by the ICJ should be subject to examination. First, it is difficult to 
support the opinion of some lawyers that the Court’s opinion is obligatory on the 
basis of moral rather than legal principle because the Court’s opinion is an opinion 
of law and not an opinion of morals, and because the ICJ’s opinion has a judicial 
character and its findings are more accurately described as law than as advice.269
Second, the Court acts as a judicial body with regard to both its advisory and its 
contentious jurisdiction. Its procedures in advisory cases are in large measure the 
same as the contentious procedures. All interested states are given special notice of 
the request to the Court; all are given an equal opportunity to present documents, 
memorials, and counter-memorials; cases are heard in public; all parties can be 
represented by council or agents and have the right to present arguments and 
advance evidence in oral proceedings; and, finally, the Court’s composition is not 
different from that in contentious cases. Moreover, it applies the same rules of law, 
rules of voting, system of separate and dissenting opinions of the Court’s judges, 
and delivery of an opinion as it applies in its contentious jurisdiction.270 This is 
clearly indicated by Art. 65 of the Court’s Statute, which provides that cases before 
the Court in advisory proceedings should be treated with the same judicial 
guarantees as contentious cases. This has been confirmed by the ICJ in several 
cases. For instance, in the Constitution o f the Maritime Safety Committee o f the
269 It has been noted that the substance of the opinion is of the same high judicial quality as 
that of the judgments. See Pratap, supra note 2, p. 227; Sloan, supra note 37, p. 853.
270 For examples of applying the same procedures in both contentious and advisory cases, see 
the Peace Treaties case, the Reservations case and the UN Administrative Tribunal case. In this 
regard, Pratap notes that “the Court has applied the rules of the Statute relating to contentious cases 
in advisory proceedings wherever it has considered the application to be appropriate”. Pratap, supra 
note 2, pp. 45-6. Gros also notes that “when the Court replies to a request for an advisory opinion it 
does not transform itself into a Committee of fifteen legal consultants; it continues to be the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations”. Gros, supra note 258, p. 314. Moreover, Hambro 
notes that “the legal reasons behind the opinions carry the same weight and are invested with the 
same high authority as in the case of judgment”. Hambro, supra note 149, p. 5.
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Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation case (I960),271 it pointed 
out that “[t]he Court as a judicial body is ... bound, in the exercise of its advisory 
function to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character”.272 
Similarly, in the Northern Cameroon case, the Court pointed out that “the Court’s 
authority to give advisory opinions must be exercised as a judicial function”.273 
Accordingly, it seems clear that in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction the ICJ 
has been guided by provisions of its Statute that apply in contentious cases to the 
extent that it recognises them to be applicable and has evolved a definite procedure 
designed to safeguard the judicial nature of its function.
Third, the position of the Court as the principal judicial organ of the UN means 
that its opinions to the other organs must be respected, because frequent non- 
compliance with its advisory opinions by the UN organs would affect the position 
of the Court. In addition, accepting the idea that the UN organs have the power to 
accept or refuse the Court’s opinions might give them a similar power to that of an 
appellate tribunal over opinions rendered by the Court. In this regard, it has been 
noted that, if an organ is determined to assert its power to pursue a certain course of 
action regardless of the outcome of a request for an advisory opinion on whether or 
not it has such power, it would be better for it to refrain from making the request. 
Therefore, the rejection by the SC of a proposal requesting an advisory opinion 
regarding its competence in the Indonesian situation, and the refusal by the GA to 
consider requests regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa and regarding 
the problem of Palestine are considered by Lissitzyn to be sensible behaviour 
particularly if these organs were determined to act regardless of the opinion of the 
ICJ.274
Fourth, in the Western Sahara case, the Court permitted Morocco to appoint an 
ad hoc judge to participate to the advisory proceedings in the same way as in its
271 Hereinafter the IMCO case.
272 ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 153.
273 ICJ Rep., 1963, p. 30.
274 Lissitzyn, supra note 266, pp. 33, 94-5.
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contentious proceedings.275 It could be asked why it accepted Morocco’s request 
and allowed it to appoint an ad hoc judge if its opinion is not binding? If the 
Court’s opinion is not binding, it would seem unnecessary to have judges ad hoc. It 
seems clear that the Court has assimilated the rules and practice followed in its 
contentious jurisdiction into its practice in its advisory jurisdiction, and, 
consequently, it has realised the necessity to admit judges ad hoc. Needless to say, 
such an act is an indication that the advisory opinions are, in fact, much more than 
advisory.
Fifth, as noted by Judge Gros, “[a]s regards the reasoning, this, in both cases, 
represents the Court’s legal conclusion concerning the situation which is being dealt 
with, and its weight is the same in both cases: there are no two ways of declaring 
law”.276
Sixth, the Court’s dicta by which it observes that its advisory opinions are not 
binding are not a real proof because in all these cases it was not the binding effect of 
the Court’s opinion that was the subject of challenge but the possibility of giving 
opinions without obtaining the states’ consent. The Court in these cases was mainly 
dealing not with the legal effect of its opinions but rather with the possibility of 
practising its advisory jurisdiction in spite of the absence of the consent of the 
litigant states.
Finally, examining the response and practice of the requesting organs might be rj
I
helpful. Thus far the ICJ has delivered advisory opinions in twenty-three cases, and j
j
in no case has the requesting organ rejected the Court’s opinion or acted contrary to (
f j
its substance; on the contrary, the Court’s opinions have been received andjj 
respected by the organs.277 This attitude shows to what extent the Court’s opinions 
have an effect upon these organs. The Court’s opinion in the Admission case was 
noted by the GA, which recommended its members and each member of the SC to 
act in accordance with the opinion of the ICJ in exercising their vote on the
For the practice of the PCIJ to allow states to appoint judges ad hoc in advisory cases, see 
Gray C., Judicial Remedies in International Law, 1987, p. 114.
276 Gros, supra note 258, p. 315.
277 It should be mentioned that the PCIJ delivered twenty-seven advisory opinions. None of 
these opinions was ignored by the Council of the League. See Hudson, supra note 1, pp. 513 ff.\ 
Pratap, supra note 2, pp. 235 ffi; Nantwi, supra note 241, p. 72.
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admission of new members.278 The Court’s opinion in the Reparation case was 
accepted by GA Res. 365 (IV), of 1 December 1949, which authorised the 
Secretary-General to bring claims in accordance with proposals based on the 
opinion of the ICJ.279 In addition, the opinion in the Competence o f the GA for the 
Admission o f States in the UN case was mentioned by the GA in its Res. 620 (VII), 
of 21 December 1952, in which it established a Special Committee to study the 
admission of new members in the light of the advisory opinions on the subject.280 
The Court’s opinion in the Status o f South-West Africa case was accepted by the 
GA in its Fifth Session when it urged “the Government of the Union of South 
Africa to take the necessary steps to give effect to the opinion of the International 
Court of Justice, including the transmission of reports on the administration of the 
Territory of South-West Africa and of petitions from the communities or section of 
the population of the territory”.281 Several resolutions have been made in this 
regard, all of which are in accordance with the Court’s opinion, for instance 
Resolutions 449/A (V), 570 A (VI), 749 (VIII), 934 (X), 1047 (XI), and 1452/B 
(XIV).282 In the Peace Treaties case, the GA took note of the opinions in both 
phases of the case in its resolution of 3 November 1950, in which it condemned “the 
wilful refusal of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania to fulfil their 
obligations under the provisions of the peace treaties”.283 Moreover, the Court’s 
opinion in respect of the Reservations case was adopted by GA Res. 596, by which 
it recommended all states to determine their status according to the Court’s opinion 
and the Secretary-General was requested to make his practice conform to the 
advisory opinion in relation to reservations to the Genocide Convention.284 The
278 GA Res. 197 A (III), 8 December 1948. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 177th Plen. Mtg., 8 December 
1948, p. 800.
279 GA Res. 365 (IV), 1 December 1949. Further, the Secretary-General made numerous
references to this opinion in his report on injuries suffered in the service o f the UN. UN Doc.
A/959, 1949; GAOR, 4th Sess., 6th Committee, annexes, 1949, p. 19.
280 GA Res. 620 (VII), 21 December, 1952.
281 GA Res. 449/A and B (V), 13 December 1950, GAOR, 5th Sees., Supp. 20 (A/1775), pp. 
55-6; UNYB, 1950, pp. 806-22.
282 Keith, supra note 1, p. 212.
283 GA Res. 385 (V), 3 November 1950.
284 GA Res. 598 (VI), 12 January 1952.
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Assembly took “note” of the Court’s opinion in the UN Administrative Tribunal 
case, and provided for payments to discharged officials in accordance with the 
awards of the Tribunals.285 The Court’s opinion in the Voting Procedure on 
Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory o f South-West 
Africa case (1955),286 was followed by a resolution by the GA by which it accepted 
and endorsed the opinion.287 The Court’s opinion in the Admissibility o f Hearing o f 
Petitioners by the Committee on South-West Africa case (1956)288 was accepted and 
endorsed by the GA, which subsequently authorised the Committee on South-West 
Africa to grant a hearing to petitioners.289 In addition, the Court’s opinion in respect 
of the Expenses case was accepted and “tak[en] into account” by the GA, which 
adopted Res. 1854/A (XVII).290 The SC agreed with the Court’s opinion in the 
Namibia case and called for certain measures for its implementation.291
In addition to the acts of the political organs regarding the reception of ICJ 
advisory opinions, one may find additional support in respect of these opinions by 
the specialised agencies of the UN. The Court’s opinion in the UNESCO case was 
accepted by the Executive Board of UNESCO, which took note of the Court’s 
opinion and approved of a proposal by the Director-General regarding payment of 
the award granted by the ILO Administrative Tribunal. Further, the Court’s opinion 
in the IMCO case was considered by the Assembly to be authoritative in terms of 
the illegality of the action. The IMCO Assembly adopted a resolution by which it
285 GA Res. 888 (IX), 17 December 1954.
286 Hereinafter the South- West Africa (voting) case.
287 GA Res. 934 (X), 3 December 1955.
288 Hereinafter the South- West Africa (Committee) case.
289 GA Res. 1047 (XI), 23 January 1957.
290 GA Res. 1854 A (XVII), 19 December 1962.
291 SC Res. 301,20 October 1971. SCOR, 26th Year, special supp. No. 5, UN Doc. S/10330 
and Corr. 1 and Add. 1, Annex (1972). It should be noted that the GA subsequently “welcome[d]” it 
and “condemn[ed]” South Africa for its continued refusal to terminate its “illegal occupation and 
administration” and for the extension of apartheid to the territory, requested the Republic to 
“comply” with the pertinent SC and GA resolutions, called on states to “respect strictly” the 
advisory opinions and resolutions of the political organs of the UN, “invite[d]” the SC to take 
“effective” measures to secure the withdrawal of South Africa from the territory, and reaffirmed the 
responsibility of the organisation with regard to Namibia and called for and requested a number of 
other steps to achieve an independent state. See GA Res. 2871 (XXVI), 20 December 1971. UN 
Doc. A/PV. 2028,26th Sess., 20 December 1971, pp. 32-5.
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decided to dissolve the Maritime Safety Committee as elected in 1959, which the 
Court found had not been elected in conformity with the Constitution, and decided 
to establish a new committee in accordance with Art. 28 of the Constitution.
From the above survey, it seems clear that so far no organ has taken action 
directly contrary to any advisory opinion given by the ICJ. In addition, no organ 
has shown any disagreement with the legal authority of the Court in this respect.
Conclusion
The Court’s advisory jurisdiction was granted in order to give guidance to UN 
organs to enable them to determine their own future course of action in the light of 
the “authoritative legal guidance” rendered by the ICJ as a “legal counsel” to the 
UN. By giving opinions, the ICJ lends its assistance in the solution of problems 
confronting the UN and discharges its responsibilities as a member of the UN 
family.
The Court must first consider its competence to reply to a request, and it has to 
define whether there is any reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
The number of organs and agencies authorised to request advisory opinions is 
much larger now than it was in the case of the PCIJ, where this authority was 
restricted to the Assembly and the Council of the League. The ICJ may give 
advisory opinions at the request of nineteen organs and agencies on legal questions. 
The Secretary-General is the only principal organ of the UN that has not been 
authorised by the GA to request advisory opinions of the ICJ.
Unless there is an obligation upon the UN organ or agency to request advisory 
opinions pursuant to some international instruments, they generally are not obliged 
to request advisory opinions of the ICJ. Their power to request in this respect is 
optional. Since the establishment of the ICJ, the GA has requested the ICJ thirteen 
times for an advisory opinion, and the SC has made this request once, as has the 
ECOSOC. Of the twelve specialised agencies authorised by the GA to request 
advisory opinions of the ICJ, only three have so far done so (UNESCO, IMCO, and 
WHO).292 The two subsidiary organs that have this authority are the Committee on
It should be noted that the WHO has requested the Court for advisory opinions twice.
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Application of the Review the UNAT’s Judgments, which has requested advisory 
opinions from the Court only four times, and the Interim Committee of the GA, 
which has never requested an opinion.
The machinery provided for invoking the advisory jurisdiction of the Court is 
simple. There is no requirement of unanimity to request an advisory opinion, as 
was necessary in the League of Nations.
The Court has confirmed its relationship with the other organs of the UN in the 
performance of its advisory role by affirming that it should not “in principle” refuse 
to give opinions requested for the purposes of the work of the UN. Therefore, it has 
never declined to give the opinion requested by these organs. It has also adopted a 
broad concept of the term “legal questions” and has not found that political motives 
or even the drafting of the question in abstract terms limit its responsibility in this 
regard. Finally, the Court has affirmed that the consent of individual states that may 
be affected by a request for an opinion, or that may be involved in a dispute to 
whichthat request relates, is not necessaiytoenable.theCourt.tQ,giye an opinion,-
In practising its advisory jurisdiction, the Court has shown that it applies all the 
provisions relating to its contentious procedure whenever it has considered the 
application to be appropriate.
With regard to the binding effect of the advisory opinion, it is an established 
opinion that, unless there is a specific provision giving these opinions binding 
effect, the Court’s opinions, generally, are not binding. Despite the fact that 
practice has shown that the organs and agencies concerned have faithfully followed 
the opinions, it should be stressed that the refusal to respect an advisory opinion 
might impair and diminish the authority of the Court as a legal adviser in public 
opinion.
Finally, the practice of requesting advisory opinions of the ICJ seems to have 
the same as if not greater importance than cases brought by governments under the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Court. The ICJ has assisted the UN in resolving 
questions relating to its internal structure and the relationship among its political 
organs. It has also played an important role in assisting the UN organs to determine 
the proper route for achieving their objects, as will be shown in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
The Role of the International Court of Justice in Interpreting and 
Developing the Institutional Law of the United Nations
Introduction
Any international organisation is a functional entity established by states on the 
basis of an agreement. This instrument is called a constitution, treaty, or charter. 
The importance of this instrument is derived from the fact that it authorises the 
organisation to take legal actions. It also contains general rules on the distribution 
of competencies between the various organs and on the procedures under which 
they shall act.
The UN, like any other international organisation, is based on an institutional 
legal instrument, namely the Charter. This instrument specifies the purposes and 
principles which guide the UN organs and its member states. However, as with any 
legal instrument, there is always the difficult question of interpretation. This 
difficulty is derived from the fact that the Charter is drafted in a general and broad 
way to allow the organs of the UN to act flexibly in the light of the needs of the 
international community.
Courts in domestic fields have the power to interpret the rules of law and play a 
role in developing such rules. The question might arise regarding the role of the ICJ 
- as the principal judicial organ of the UN - and whether it can play a similar role in 
interpreting and developing the rules embodied in the Charter.
This chapter will, therefore, focus on the role of the ICJ in respect of the 
interpretation of the UN Charter and the extent to which the Court - through this 
role - has played a role in developing UN law. Because the fulfilment of such a role 
by the ICJ presupposes that it has the power to interpret the Charter, the study will, 
as a preliminary issue, throw light on the ICJ’s power in this regard. Then it will 
discuss the Court’s jurisprudence in interpreting the Charter’s provisions and its role 
in developing the competencies of the UN organs.
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From the outset, it should be noted that the Court’s role in this regard concerns 
the interpretation and application of existing rules, not the establishment of new 
rules. Hence, the term “developing” must be understood as referring to instances 
where the ICJ has clarified existing rules of the UN and its agencies.
1. The power of the ICJ to interpret the constitutional instrument
The study in this section will focus on the ICJ’s power to interpret the Charter in the 
light of the Charter provisions, international practice through the General 
Assembly’s resolutions, and the dicta of the Court itself. Before doing so, the legal 
nature of the Charter should be addressed.
1.1. The United Nations Charter: A treaty or a constitution?
The determination of the nature of the Charter as a constitution or as an 
international treaty has been a controversial issue since the early days of the UN. 
The view adopted by most of the Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War era 
was that the Charter has no constitutional nature but is a special treaty sui generis.'
This view should be examined because there is no reason to deny the 
constitutional character of the Charter on the ground that it is based on an agreement 
among its participants. For example, no one can deny the constitutional character of 
a federal constitution despite the fact that it is a treaty among its member states. 
The constitutional character of the Charter has been confirmed by the majority of 
international lawyers. In their opinions, whatever the name of this instrument - a 
constitution or a treaty - the UN Charter has certain basic features which distinguish 
it not only from bilateral treaties but from other multilateral treaties as well.2 This 
view is based on the following. First, it is a constituent instrument - like
In the Expenses case, Judge Winiarski described the Charter as “a multilateral treaty 
which was the result of prolonged and laborious negotiations, carefully created organs and 
determined their competence and means of action”. ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 230. A similar view was 
adopted by Judge Koretsky, ibid., p. 268; Macdonald, R., “The United Nations Charter: 
Constitution or Contract?” in Macdonald, R., The Structure and Process o f  International Law: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, 1983, pp. 889 jf.\ Ciobanu, D., “Impact of the 
Characteristics of the Charter upon its interpretation” in Cassese, A. (ed.), Current Problems o f  
International Law. Essays on UN Law and the Law o f  Armed Conflict, 1975, pp. 3 ff.
2 Sloan, B., “The United Nations Charter as a Constitution”, PUSLYIL, 1, 1989, pp. 116-17; 
Watson, G., “Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court”, H IU , 34,1993, p. 3.
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constitutions in domestic fields - defining the structure of the organisation and 
setting forth the powers and functions of its organs and the duties of its members. 
Second, it was intended to last not just for the present or for the foreseeable future, 
but for “succeeding generations”. Third, it is superior to all other treaties as a 
“higher law” according to Art. 103 of the Charter. Fourth, it has been noted that 
some of the Charter’s provisions foresee the possibility of the organisation taking 
measures with regard to non-member states. This attitude is considered to be in 
contradiction to the principle that treaties have no effect on third parties.3 Finally, 
the states that participated in its drafting are today outnumbered by new members. 
Only fifty states were represented at the San Francisco Conference, whereas the 
present membership is over three times this number. In this respect, Schachter has 
stated:
“The Charter is surely not to be construed like a lease of land or insurance policy; it is a 
constitutional instrument whose broad phrases were designed to meet changing 
circumstances for an undefined future.”4
In addition, Hambro noted that “[t]he Charter, like every written constitution, will 
be a living instrument”.5 Similarly, Judge de Visscher referred to the Charter of the 
United Nations as a treaty of a “Constitutional Character”.6
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the Charter has a special 
character. Despite the fact that the Charter has a treaty character, this does not alter 
its nature as a constitution of the UN. It has a constitutional character because it 
authorises the UN to make decisions binding upon the member states and to 
exercise jurisdiction over their territories. Therefore, it needs to be interpreted from 
time to time and to enable these organs to achieve their objectives. Here, the 
question is whether or not the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN has any 
role to play in this regard.
Conforti, B., The Law and Practice o f  the United Nations, 1996, p. 10.
4 Book Review, YU, 60, 1951, p. 193.
5 Pollux, “The Interpretation of the Charter”, BYIL, 23, 1946, p. 54.
6 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 187.
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1.2. The power of the ICJ to interpret the Charter 
1.2.1 The silence of the Charter
The issue of the ICJ’s power to interpret the Charter was raised in the San Francisco 
Conference. It was a moot point among the participant delegations whether this 
power should be given to one specific organ, either the GA or the ICJ, or to each 
organ of the UN as it was in the League of Nations era. The issue was referred to 
Committee IV/I, which refrained from setting the Court up as the exclusive organ to 
resolve all disputes relating to the interpretation of Charter itself; it concluded that 
the Court is one of several organs which have the right to interpret the Charter.7 It 
stated:
“In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the organisation, 
it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts o f the Charter as are applicable to 
its particular functions ... It will be manifested in the functioning of such a body as the 
General Assembly, the Security Council, or the International Court of Justice ... If two 
Member States are at variance concerning the correct interpretation of the Charter, they 
are of course free to submit the dispute to the International Court o f Justice as in the case 
of any other treaty. Similarly, it would always be open to the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, in appropriate circumstances, to ask the International Court of Justice 
for an advisory opinion concerning the meaning of a provision of the Charter.”8
Accordingly, the Charter was drafted without any reference to any organ 
authorised to interpret the Charter. Given the silence of the Charter, international 
lawyers have debated this issue.9 The view that the Court should not have the 
power to interpret the Charter is based on an analogy between the Supreme Court of 
the USA and the ICJ - the Supreme Court exercises self-denial in relation to some 
of the clauses of the Constitution. The ICJ should recognise the political character 
of the Charter’s articles and consequently should leave their interpretation to the 
other organs of the UN. Moreover, it has been noted also that a judicial
7 Pollux, supra note 5, p. 56; Vallat, F., “The Competence of the United Nations General 
Assembly”, RCADI, 97, 1959, pp. 208 ff.\ Sohn, L., “The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter 
for its Law” in Schachter, O., et al. (eds.), United Nations Legal Order, vol. 1, 1995, pp. 171 ff.\ 
Conforti, supra note 3, pp. 14-5.
8 See UNCIO, 13, pp. 653-4, 668-9, 687-8, 709-10, 719-20, 831-2.
9 Wright, Q., International Law and the United Nations, 1960, pp. 37-8; Sato, T., 
“Constituent Instruments of International Organisations and their Interpretative Framework: 
Introduction to the Principal Doctrines and Bibliography”, HJLP, 14,1986, pp. 2 ff.
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interpretation, with its authority, its precision, and the rationalisation inherent in the 
judicial process, would close the door to future development more than a political 
interpretation.
This view is rejected by the majority of international lawyers, who are in favour ) 
of empowering the ICJ with such a function.10 In their view, there are two kinds of I 
interpretation - political and legal. The first is made by the political organs of the 
UN, whereas the second should be made by the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of 
the UN. This view is based on the fact that the term “any legal question” in Art. 96 
of the Charter and Art. 65 of the Statute covers the issue of the Charter’s 
interpretation. In addition, it has been noted that there was no intention during the 
travaux preparatoires stage to prevent the Court from interpreting the Charter; on 
the contrary, the drafters insisted on empowering both the Court, as the judicial 
organ in the UN, and the other political organs with the right to exercise this 
function. Moreover, the Charter’s drafters, at San Francisco, recognised the Court’s 
role, concluding that the agencies of the UN, apart from the SC and the GA, would 
be able to request advisory opinions from the Court on questions relating to the 
interpretation of their constitutions or conventions within their fields.11 Finally, they 
noted that since international lawyers agree that the issue of the interpretation of 
treaties could be referred to the ICJ, and since the Charter is considered to be a 
multilateral treaty, the ICJ by analogy should have the right to interpret the Charter. 
The advocates of this view conclude that the Court can deal with the Charter’s 
interpretation through its contentious jurisdiction by states referring the matter, or 
through its advisory jurisdiction by a request of the UN organs and agencies.
1.2.2. The General Assembly’s resolutions
The power of the ICJ to interpret the Charter was discussed during the meetings of 
the GA to adopt its Res. 171 (III), 1947, which related to the role of the ICJ within
10 Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f  the International Court, 1985, pp. 44 ff.\ Simon, 
D., L ’Interpretation Judiciaire des Traites d ‘Organisations Internationales, 1981, p. 51; Keith, K., 
The Extent o f  the Advisory Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f  Justice, 1971, pp. 87-9; Lachs, 
M., “The Decision-Making Powers and the Judiciary within the United Nations” in Essays in 
Honour o f Prof Stephen Verosta, 1980, p. 395; Fakher, H., The Relationships Among the Principal 
Organs o f  the United Nations, 1951, p. 141.
11 See UNCIO, 9, pp. 163, 246-7; UNCIO, 13, pp. 436-9, 511.
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the UN. At this stage, it was suggested by some delegations that the Court has an 
affirmative power to interpret the Charter pursuant to the wording of Art. 96 of the 
Charter.12 According to this view, the Court is given jurisdiction over “any legal 
question” without specific restriction and this provision extends to the interpretation 
of the Charter. Consequently, UN organs can ask the Court any questions relating 
to the meaning of the Charter’s provisions. In addition, some advocates of this view 
referred to Art. 34/3 of the Court’s Statute as a basis of the Court’s power, whereby 
a request for the Charter’s interpretation can be submitted by states.
The above view and its basis did not persuade some delegations, which insisted 
that the Court has no power to interpret the Charter.13 This view was based on the 
fact that, because the constitution of many states stipulates that their internal courts 
may perform the interpretative function, no such power is expressly provided to the 
ICJ to interpret the Charter. Moreover, it was argued that granting the Court such a 
power would amount to placing it in a more favourable position vis-a-vis the other 
organs of the UN.14 Further, the term “any legal question”, which is incorporated in 
Arts. 92 and 96 of the Charter and Arts. 36/2 and 65 of the Court’s Statute, does not 
extend to the issue of the Charter’s interpretation. According to this view, the term 
“any legal question” refers only to certain specific legal disputes between member 
states. Finally, the power of the Court to interpret international treaties does not 
empower it to interpret the Charter because there is a substantial legal difference 
between international treaties and the Charter.15
The GA passed the projected resolution, which included a reference to the 
interpretation of the Charter as a function within the jurisdiction of the Court. In its
See GAOR, 2nd Sess., 6th Committee, 1947, Plen. mtgs., vol. II, pp. 865-7, 875-6, 886-7.
13 For the discussion of this issue, see UN Doc. A/459 and A/459 Corr. I, 1947; GAOR, 2nd 
Sess., 6 Committee, 1947, Plen. Mtgs., vol. II, pp. 862-5, 877-86.
14 In this regard, it was noted by Mr Lange of Poland that “we shall really establish the 
International Court of Justice in a special super-ordinate position within the structure of our 
organisation - a position which clearly was not intended by the Charter”. See, GAOR, ibid., pp. 
864-5.
15 In this regard, it was noted by Mr Vyshinsky of the Soviet Union that “we are then asked: 
‘is the Charter not a treaty?’ Of course, the Charter is a treaty in the broad, everyday meaning of the 
word, but in the legal sense there is difference, there would be no reason for speaking of Charter and 
of treaties separately. But such a difference does exist. If the Charter can be called a treaty, it is a 
treaty of a special kind, a treaty sui generis.” GAOR, ibid., pp. 881-2.
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Res. 171 (III), 1947, the GA adopted the first view. Because of the desirability of 
the interpretation of the Charter by the ICJ,16 the GA recommended other UN organs 
and its specialised agencies to refer any question regarding the Charter’s 
interpretation to the ICJ.17 It based its resolution on the “paramount importance” of 
interpreting the Charter on the basis of the recognised principles of international 
law. Again, in its Res. 3232 (XXIX) the GA recalled the above conclusion, 
recommending the UN organs and specialised agencies to seek the Court’s 
assistance in respect of any “legal question” that arises or will arise during their 
activities.18
Accordingly, it seems clear that the GA gave the term “any legal question” a 
broad meaning so that it embodies the issue of the Charter’s interpretation. It 
therefore affirmed the ICJ’s power to interpret the Charter’s provisions.
1.2.3. The practice of the ICJ: Confirmation of its interpretative power
Since 1948, the ICJ has been called upon several times to interpret the Charter. 
Through its jurisprudence, it seems clear that the Court did not hesitate to confirm 
its power in this regard either explicitly or implicitly.
The ICJ explicitly affirmed its power to interpret the Charter in the Admission 
case, where it dismissed the argument to the effect that the ICJ has no power either 
directly or indirectly to interpret the Charter on the following basis: (i) the PCIJ had 
no power to interpret the Covenant and it had never interpreted this instrument and, 
therefore, the PCIJ practice in this respect should be followed by its successor the 
ICJ; (ii) there was no provision in the Charter empowering the ICJ to interpret the 
Charter’s provisions; (iii) since the Charter is considered to be a constitutional
16 The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, which proposed the draft resolution, 
rejected the Polish amendment to the effect that all references in this resolution concerning the 
interpretation of the Charter be deleted on the ground that the Court has no competence to interpret 
the Charter. See UN Doc., A/459 and A/459 Corr I, 1947.
17 In this resolution, the GA stated that: “[c]onsidering: that the International Court of 
Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations ... Recommends: that Organs o f the 
United Nations and the specialised agencies should, from time to time, review the difficult and 
important points of law within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice which have arisen 
in the course of their activities and involve questions of principle it is desirable to have settled, 
including points of law relating the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations.”
18 GA Res. 3232 (XXIX), 12 November 1974.
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document and not an ordinary treaty, Art. 36 of the Court’s Statute does not extend 
to this instrument and the Court, according to this article, is empowered to interpret 
only treaties not constitutional instruments.19 This argument was examined 
extensively by the Court, which decided that it has the power to interpret the 
Charter because this function falls within the normal exercise of its judicial power. 
This dictum was based on the fact that, since the Court has the right to interpret 
treaties and since the Charter is considered to be a multilateral treaty, there is no 
doubt regarding its power to interpret the Charter. Moreover, it noted that there is 
no provision in the Charter precluding it, as a judicial organ of the UN, from 
exercising such a function.20
The above dictum has been recalled by the Court in several cases, for instance 
the Second Admission case, where it stated that, according to Art. 96 of the Charter 
and Art. 65 of the Statute, “it may give an opinion on any legal question and that 
there is no provision which prohibits it from exercising ... an interpretative 
function”.21
In addition, the ICJ implicitly affirmed its power to interpret the Charter in 
several cases. In the Reparation case, it interpreted the Charter as recognising the 
legal personality of the UN,22 and in the International Status o f South-West Africa 
case it interpreted the Charter as affirming the supervisory power of the GA with
19 ICJ Pled., 1947, pp. 29, 88-90, 110-11.
20 The Court observed: “[i]t has also been maintained that the Court cannot reply to the
question put because it involves an interpretation of the Charter. Nowhere is any provision to be 
found forbidding the Court, ‘the principal judicial organ of the United Nations’, to exercise in regard 
to Article 4 of the Charter, a multilateral treaty, an interpretative function which falls within the 
normal exercise of its judicial powers.” ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 61; Schwartz, W., “The International 
Court’s Role as an Advisor to the United Nations”, BULR, XXXVII, 1957, pp. 409-10.
21 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 6. In this case, Judge Alvarez pointed out in his dissenting opinion that 
“[f]irst of all, it must be made perfectly clear that the Court has competence to interpret the Charter 
of the United Nations like any other instrument, without any limitations whatever”. ICJ Rep., 1950, 
p. 15.
22 See p. 125 below. With regard to this case, it has been noted by Rosenne that “[ajlthough 
the Reparation case concerned par excellence the interpretation of the Charter as a whole, no 
question of competence was raised, either in the pleadings or in the opinion itself. The request 
actually defined the questions as ‘legal question’, a qualification accepted by the Court without 
further comment.” Rosenne, S., “The Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice”, 
RDISDP, 1, 1952, p. 21.
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regard to the administration of the territory of South-West Africa.23 In addition, the 
Court interpreted the Charter in the UN Administrative Tribunal case as confirming 
the Assembly’s right to establish a judicial tribunal.24 In the Expenses case, it 
interpreted the Charter as affirming the GA’s power in respect of the “expenses of 
the organisation”, and in respect of the maintenance of international peace and 
security.25 Finally, as noted by Sohn, in the Nicaragua case the Court interpreted 
the Charter by clarifying the link between the Charter and customary international 
law by noting that “[t]he Charter gave an expression in this field to principles 
already present in customary international law, and that law has in the subsequent 
four decades developed under the influence of the Charter, to such an extent that a 
number of rules contained in the Charter have acquired a status independent of it”.26 
The Court concluded that the essential consideration was that “both the Charter and 
the customary international law flow from a common fundamental principle 
outlawing the use of force in international relations”.27
To conclude, it seems clear that the Court has no doubt regarding its power to 
interpret the Charter. It affirms that it is not the only organ for interpreting the 
Charter, but this does not exclude it from exercising this function. This attitude of 
the ICJ should be upheld. There is no doubt that the Court is the most appropriate
organ to interpret the Charter. It is the principal judicial organ of the UN and it has
the power to give advisory opinion and decide contentious cases.
Having confirmed the Court’s power to interpret the provisions of the Charter, 
the study turns to focus on the role of the ICJ in interpreting and developing UN 
law.
2. The ICJ and the implied powers of the UN and its organs
The UN Charter - like any institutional instrument - indicates the general rules of 
the work of the organisation. As the UN has grown, the number of concerns has
23 See p. 127 below.
24 Seep. 130 below.
25 See pp. below.
26 ICJ, 1984, pp. 96-7.
27 Ibid.; Sohn, supra note 7, p. 176.
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increased considerably, arising from the new needs of the organisation in many 
fields. In order to deal with the new needs, the organisation is required to expand its 
role by giving an expanded interpretation to its constitutional instrument. This 
could be done through the day-to-day work of its organs or by the interpretation of 
its judicial body. In practice, the ICJ has recognised several implied powers of the 
UN and its organs to enable them to achieve their objectives.
2.1. The international legal personality of the UN
The Court, in the Reparation case, was seized of an issue that was destined to 
become a landmark in the progressive development of the legal status of the UN. 
This case was referred to the Court by the GA, which asked the Court whether or not 
the UN had the capacity to bring an international claim against a state responsible 
for an injury to a UN official on duty.28 The Court found that recognising this 
capacity requires first of all affirming the international legal personality of the UN. 
Therefore, it examined the Charter and found that, according to the Charter, the 
organisation was not “merely a centre for harmonising the actions” of its individual 
members. It stated that, “if the organisation is recognised as having that personality, 
it is an entity capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its 
members”.29 In the light of the absence of any express provisions in the Charter 
conferring such a capacity, the Court proceeded to inquire if such a capacity can be 
implied from the provisions of the Charter concerning the functions of the 
organisation. The Court expressly referred to the “needs of the community” and the 
influence of “the requirements of international life” upon the development of 
international law. In addition, it said that “fifty states, representing the vast majority 
of the members of international community, had the power, in conformity with 
international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international 
personality”.30
Z8 ICJ Rep., 1949, pp. 177-8.
29 Ibid., pp. 178-9,182.
30 It has been noted by Lauterpacht that “the International Court has made certain 
assumptions about personality in other contexts. For example in the various Judgments and 
Opinions bearing on Namibia (South-West Africa) the Court has accepted without discussion that 
the League of Nations as an international person has come to an end; that in some respects it has 
been replaced by the United Nations; and that in consequence certain powers in relation to Namibia
125
Chapter Three
It is therefore clear that the Court concluded that the organisation must be 
deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, 
are conferred upon it. It recognised for the first time in the international arena the 
legal personality of the UN - despite the silence of the Charter - as being an 
indispensable consequence of the achievement of the organisation’s objectives, 
functions, duties, and rights.31 This opinion led to the confirmation that the UN 
possesses an international juridical personality defined as the capacity of being a 
subject of legal duties and legal rights, of performing legal transactions and of suing 
and being sued at law.
This opinion is considered to be a milestone in the doctrine of international 
institutional law and specifically in the life of the UN.32 Such recognition is 
indispensable for the fulfilment of its purposes and functions. It is an 
acknowledgement that the UN is capable of exercising certain rights and being 
subject to certain duties. This opinion also has an effect in changing the orthodox 
doctrine of the concept of international legal personality. According to the 
traditional view, such a concept is restricted to states in the international community. 
The Court’s opinion has extended this concept to international organisations. The 
effect of this opinion is not restricted only to the UN. It has also affected other 
international organisations in the international community because they are 
recognised as subjects of international law. Accordingly, several powers have been 
recognised, such as their treaty-making power, which grants several privileges and 
immunities to these organisations, and their power to bring international claims, and
have devolved upon the United Nations. Again in such opinions as the Effect o f  Awards o f  the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal or the Application fo r Review o f  Judgment No. 158 o f  the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal the Court has proceeded on the basis that the United Nations 
is a person and is, within its special system, capable of being a party to litigation instituted by 
members of its staff. But neither of these decisions in terms casts any additional light on the content 
of the ‘international personality’ attributable to the organisation.” Lauterpacht, E., “The 
Development of the Law of International Organisation by the Decision of International Tribunal”, 
RCDAI, 152, 1976, p. 412.
31 Fitzmaurice, G., “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 
International Organisations and Tribunals”, BYIL, 29, 1952, p. 3; Martinez, M., National 
Sovereignty and International Organisations, 1996, pp. 82 ff.
32 For the legal position of the international organisations before this dictum, see 
Amerasinghe, C., Principles o f  the Institutional Law o f International Organisations, 1996, pp. 77 ff.
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finally they have convened international conferences of plenipotentiary 
representatives.
2.2. Supervisory competence over territories under the mandate system
The ICJ further developed the thesis of implied powers in connection with the 
supervisory powers of the UN over the territories which were under the mandate 
system of the League. The territory of South-West Africa was one of the German 
overseas possessions.33 After the First World War, this territory was placed under a 
mandate conferred upon the Union of South Africa, which was to have full power of 
administration and legislation over the territory as an integral part of the Union.34 
The Union Government exercised an international function of administration on 
behalf of the League. With the dissolution of the League of Nations and the 
establishment of the UN, the question arose whether or not the UN has succeeded to 
the supervisory powers over the League mandate territories. The League made no 
express transfer of such powers; nor did the Charter of the UN express an obligation 
for member states to convert their League mandates into UN trusteeship.35 The 
Union of South Africa alleged that the mandate had elapsed and sought the 
recognition of the UN of the integration of the territory of South-West Africa in the 
Union. It based its demand on the wishes of the vast majority of the inhabitants and 
therefore found itself unable to place the territory under the trusteeship system of 
the UN. The UN refused the allegation and invited the Union of South Africa to 
place the territory under trusteeship according to the provisions of Chapter XII of
Zacklin, R., “The Problem of Namibia in International Law”, RCADI, 171, 1981, pp. 234-
5.
34 For more details, see Rao, P., “South West Africa Case: Inconsistent Judgment from the 
International Court of Justice”, IJIL, 6, 1966, p. 383; Higgins, R., “The International Court and 
South West Africa. The Implications o f the Judgment”, Int.Ajf., 42, 1966, p. 572; Aboul-Enein, M., 
“The United Nations Reaches a Deadlock in Namibia”, REDI, 31, 1975, pp. 124-7; Zacklin, supra 
note 33, pp. 235-6.
35 Art. 77 of the Charter provides:
“1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be 
placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:
(a) territories now held under mandate;
(b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
(c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories 
will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.”
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the Charter.36 The Union of South Africa refused to comply with this invitation. 
Therefore, the GA requested the ICJ to give an opinion on the following question: 
“Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations under 
the Mandate for South-West Africa and, if so, what are those obligations?”37
Before the Court, South Africa argued, inter alia, that the mandate had 
dissolved with the disappearance of the League and it would no longer be under any 
international obligations. The Court had to consider whether or not the new 
international organisation created by the UN could exercise the supervisory power 
over the mandate that had previously been exercised by the League of Nations. The 
answer was in the affirmative. The Court found that the obligation incumbent upon 
the mandatory states to accept international supervision was an important part of the 
mandate system, designed to ensure the effective implementation of the “sacred 
trust of civilisation”. The Court also affirmed that the necessity for supervision 
continued despite the disappearance of the original supervisory organ, and therefore 
the obligation of each mandatory state to continue to submit to supervision also 
continued. The Court concluded that South Africa could not arbitrarily change the 
status of South-West Africa without the UN’s consent because the international 
trusteeship system of the UN was designed to meet the same necessity which led to 
the UN’s inheriting the power of supervision of mandate territory.
Having decided the continuity of supervision, the ICJ found that the GA is the 
only organ capable of operating the supervisory functions previously exercised by 
the League of Nations. The supervisory functions of the GA were based on the 
resolution of the League of Nations adopted on 18 April 1946, which stated that, 
although the League’s functions with respect to mandate territories were ending,
In 1946 and 1947 South Africa submitted reports on the territory that were examined by 
the Trusteeship Council at the request of the General Assembly. In 1948 South Africa took the 
position that the United Nations had no supervisory jurisdiction over the territory, that it was under 
no legal obligation to submit reports, and that the previous report had been submitted on a purely 
voluntary basis with the stipulation that this act should not be considered as a precedent or a 
commitment to further action. In the General Assembly, the South African view was not accepted 
and there was a view that South Africa was under a legal obligation to report to the Assembly on its 
administration of the territory and the situation that had prevailed in South Africa under the mandate 
system should not be changed pending the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement. See Goodrich, L. 
et al., Charter o f  the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 1969, p. 496; Rao, supra note 
34, p. 384.
37 GA Res. 338 (IV), 6 December 1949; ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 131.
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Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the UN Charter embodied principles corresponding to 
those set out in Art. 22 of the Covenant.38 The Court referred to Art. 10 of the 
Charter, which gives the GA very wide powers to discuss any question or any 
matters within the scope of the UN, inter alia the exercise of international 
supervision.39 In addition, Art. 80/1 of the Charter maintains the rights of states and 
the terms of existing international instruments until the territories in question are 
placed under the trusteeship system of the UN.40
In the light of the above, the Court found that this supervisory function could 
not be effectively exercised without a duty upon the Union of South Africa to render 
reports to the supervisory organs, and consequently the Union remained bound by 
the terms of Art. 22 of the League’s Covenant and the mandate system, and was 
under an obligation to transmit petitions from inhabitants of the territory to the 
UN.41
From this opinion, it seems clear that the Court has recognised that the mandate 
continued to exist despite the dissolution of the League of Nations. It recognised 
also that the obligation to submit to supervision will not disappear merely because
38 In 1946, when the League Assembly met in its final session, it took note of the “expressed 
intention” of the mandatory powers to continue to administer the territories under mandate in 
accordance with the obligations contained in the mandate agreement “until other arrangements have 
been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers”. LNOJ, Special 
Supp. 194, Annex 27, pp. 278-9; Goodrich, supra note 36, p. 496.
39 Makarczyk notes that: “[t]he Court has given a very large interpretation of this Article, 
sanctioning the competence of the plenary organ to discuss every case or question belonging to the 
tasks of the organisation and taking measures going as far as supervision over an agreement to 
which the UN was not a party.” Markarczyk, J., “International Court of Justice on the Implied 
Powers of Organisations” in Makarczyk, J. (ed.), Essays in International Law in Honour o f  Judge 
Manfred Lachs, 1984, p. 509.
40 This dictum was confirmed in several cases, for instance ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 26 ff.; ICJ 
Rep., 1971, pp. 34 ff.
41 ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 136 f f ;  Vallat, supra note 7, p. 284; Lauterpacht, H., The Function 
o f Law in the International Community, 1933, p. 437; Bastid, S., “La Jurisprudence de la Cour 
Internationale de Justice”, RCADI, 78, 1951, pp. 665-6; Rao, supra note 34, p. 385; Shihata, I., 
“The Problem of the South-West Africa in the United Nations”, Al-Syisa El-dawlia, 1, 1965, p. 60; 
Luard, E., The United Nations - How It Works and What It Does, 1979, p. 85; Zacklin, supra note 
33, pp. 253 ff.; Higgins, supra note 34, p. 574; Chiu, H., “Succession in International 
Organisations”, ICLQ, 14, 1965, pp. 103-5; Gross, L., “The Development of International Law 
through the United Nations” in Gross, L., Essays in International Law and Organisation, 1984, pp. 
221-2; Baehr, P., et al., The United Nations. Reality and Ideal, 1984, p. 128; Dore, I., The 
International Mandate System and Namibia, 1985, pp. 75-6; Brownlie, I., Principles o f Public 
International Law, 1990, p. 172.
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the supervisory organ has ceased to exist, because there exists another organ which 
is capable of performing a similar function. Further, the Court, despite the lack of 
any explicit transfer of the mandate to the UN, concluded that the GA is the 
competent authority to exercise such a function.
2.3. The creation of subsidiary judicial organs by political organs
In addition to the above, the ICJ also developed the notion of the implied powers of 
the internal law of the UN in the UN Administrative Tribunal case. The 
establishment of the UN Administrative Tribunal as a subsidiary organ of the GA 
arose as a consequence of the referral of a question whether or not the GA had the 
right to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by the tribunal.42 
The notion of implied powers was examined by the ICJ as a consequence of the 
argument in the GA about its power to establish a tribunal to render judgments 
binding upon the UN.43 It was argued before the Court, inter alia, that the GA had 
no power to establish a judicial organ with a “legal power” of rendering judgments 
that would “compel” the GA to a decision involving a “legal question” without the 
possibility of modification. Therefore, the GA must “rely upon policy grounds” to 
refuse to accept the awards.44
The Court admitted that there was no express provision regulating the 
establishment of judicial bodies by political organs. Nevertheless, there was no 
indication to the contrary. It concluded that the GA has the power to establish a
See p. 147 below.
43 This United Nations Administrative Tribunal was established by GA Res. 351 A (IV), 24 
November 1949, to hear and pass judgment upon an application alleging non-observance of 
contracts of employment of staff members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or of terms of 
appointment of such members. For details regarding the travaux preparatoires establishing this 
tribunal by the GA, see the written statement submitted by the UN Secretary-General to the ICJ in 
the UN Administrative Tribunal case, ICJ Pled., 1953, pp. 226 ff.\ Bastid, S., “United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal”, EPIL, 5, 1983, p. 281; Amerasinghe, C., The Law o f the International 
Civil Service, 1994, pp. 54-6; Amerasinghe, supra note 32, pp. 46-7; UN Doc. A/986, GAOR, 4th 
Sess., Fifth Committee, Annex, vol. 1, 1949.
44 ICJ Pled., 1953, pp. 155, 187; Gross, L., “Some Observations on the International Court 
o f Justice”, AJIL, 56, 1962, p. 56.
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subsidiary organ with judicial powers to see that justice is done between the 
organisation and the members of its staff.45 The Court stated:
“It would ... hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote 
freedom and justice for individuals ... that it should afford no judicial or arbitral 
remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it 
and them.”46
The Court referred to Art. 7/2, which authorises the UN organs to create subsidiary 
organs in general, and Art. 22 of the Charter, which empowers - specifically - the 
GA to establish subsidiary organs to perform its functions.47
To conclude, it seems clear that the ICJ affirmed that the powers of the UN and 
its organs are not limited to the express provisions, but extend to the sweeping 
panorama of the purposes of the organisation as contained in the Charter. The 
Court granted the effectiveness of the UN and its organs by affirming that their 
capacity proceeds not only from specific provisions of the Charter but also from all 
those implying any ancillary powers.
3. The determination of the relationship between the UN organs
Since the UN was established to fulfil several objectives, the drafters of the Charter 
felt that many organs and agencies had to be established to enable the parent 
organisation (the UN) to fulfil these objectives. In this regard, the Charter 
established many organs and distributed the functions among them. It also 
determined the relationship between them to avoid any overlap or disputes in 
achieving these objectives.48 In practice, each organ in the course of carrying out its 
activities faces specific problems and difficulties, which makes a certain exercise of 
power or function necessary to effectuate the general purposes for which it was 
created.
Markarczyk, supra note 39, p. 511; Gordon, E., “The World Court and the Interpretation 
of Constitutive Treaties. Some Observations on the Development of an International Constitutional 
Law”, AJIL, 59, 1965, p. 819; Martinez, supra note 30, pp. 86-7.
46 ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 57.
47 Ibid.
48 Amer, S., Law o f International Institutional General Theory, 3rd ed., 1984, pp. 367 ff.
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In many instances the issue of the relationship between UN organs, especially 
the GA and the SC, was referred to the ICJ. In the following, the study will focus 
on the role of the Court in determining the relationship among UN organs in respect 
of concurrent and joint functions.
3.1. Concurrent functions between the GA and SC in maintaining international 
peace and security49
Maintenance of international peace and security is considered to be one of the main 
objectives of the UN. The Charter entrusted the GA and the SC as political organs 
with the responsibility to achieve this objective.
The SC has primary responsibility to achieve this objective, and members have 
agreed that the Council acts on their behalf.50 The SC might act in accordance with 
Chapter VI, by which it can investigate any dispute or any situation which might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order to determine whether 
the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
intentional peace and security; recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment; establish whether the continuance of a dispute is in fact likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security for the purpose of 
deciding whether to act under Art. 36 or of making recommendations for 
appropriate terms of settlement; and call upon the parties to settle their disputes by 
the peaceful means listed in Art. 33/1, or make recommendations to them with a 
view to a pacific settlement of the dispute. In addition, the Council under Chapter 
VII is empowered to undertake a variety of actions if it affirms the existence of any 
threat to the peace or breach of the peace. In this event, the Council may make 
recommendations to a state or decide measures as stated by Arts. 41 and 42 of the 
Charter by which it can apply economic, diplomatic, and finally military 
sanctions.51
49 Concurrent jurisdiction means that the same function can be exercised by more than one 
organ with the same effect.
50 Art. 24/1 of the Charter.
51 Malinvemi, G., “The Settlement of Disputes within International Organisations” in 
Bedjaoui, M. (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991, p. 558; Bhuinya, N., 
International Organisations (A Critical Study o f League o f  Nations, United Nations, International 
Court o f  Justice), 1970, p. 82; White, N., The United Nations and the Maintenance o f  International
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The GA also has a role in achieving this objective. This power is based on Art. 
10, which confers a broad competence to discuss any questions or any matters 
within the scope of the Charter. Therefore, because the maintenance of 
international peace and security is the main issue of the Charter, the GA can deal 
with this matter. This is affirmed also by Art. 11, which deals specifically with the 
Assembly’s power in this field by empowering it to deal with any situation that 
might threaten the peace or breach it or be considered as an act of aggression. In 
addition, Art. 14 emphasis the Assembly’s power in regard to the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation which it deems is likely to impair the peace, general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations.52 This competence was confirmed by 
the practice of the GA as a consequence of its adoption of Res. 377 (V), of 3 
November 1950, entitled “Uniting for Peace”. This .resolution provides, inter alia,y )  PM
that if the SC, because of a lack of unanimity, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility in the maintenance of peace, a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression, the Assembly shall consider the matter immediately, with a view to 
making recommendations to members for collective measures, including, in the case 
of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the use of armed force when 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. The GA’s competence in 
this regard is restricted to the adoption of recommendations to restore international 
peace and security.
Peace and Security, 1990, pp. 62 ff.\ Sonnenfeld, R., Resolutions o f  the United Nations Security 
Council, 1988, p. 92.
52 This power was also confirmed by Art. 35, which enables both member and non-member 
states to bring any dispute or situation, o f the nature mentioned in Art. 34, to the attention of the SC 
or the GA. Para. 3 of this article indicates that the proceedings of the GA in respect of matters 
brought to its attention under this article will be subject to the provisions of Arts. 11 and 12. See 
Jenks, C., “Co-ordination: A New Problem of International Organisation - A Preliminary Survey of 
the Law and Practice of Inter-Organisational Relationship”, RCADI, 77, 1950, p. 161; Higgins, R., 
The Development o f International Law Through the Political Organs o f the United Nations, 1963, p. 
227; Higgins, R., “United Nations Peace-Keeping, Political and Financial Problems”, Wor.Tod., 21, 
1965, p. 325; Kelsen, H., Recent Trends in the Law o f  the United Nations (A Supplement to the Law 
o f the United Nations), 1964, pp. 952 ff.\ Baehr, et al., supra note 41, pp. 76-9; Kamel, M., 
National Security and Collective Security - Some Legal Aspects, Ph.D. Thesis (Cairo University), 
1986, pp. 519 ff.\ Chehab, M., International Organisations, 1991, pp. 261-2; Castafieda, J., “Valeur 
Juridique de Resolutions des Nations Unies”, RCADI, 129, 1970, pp. 258 ff.\ Hogg, F., “Peace- 
Keeping Costs and Charter Obligations - Implications of the International Court of Justice Decisions 
on Certain Expenses of the United Nations”, Col.LR, 62, 1962, p. 1234; Bailey, S., The General 
Assembly o f  the United Nations, 1964, p. 17.
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As a consequence of giving both organs the power to achieve the objective of 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and despite the existence of 
Art. 12/1 of the Charter which determines the relationship between the GA and the 
SC in this respect,53 a “positive conflict” between both organs in the fulfilment of 
this objective may occur.54 Such a conflict arose as a consequence of the GA’s I 
intervention in the Spanish problem following the failure of the SC to deal with the 
matter. Such intervention arose also in the dispute between Greece on the one hand 
and Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other hand, in the case of Korea and in 
the Suez crisis.55
In all the above cases the intervention of the GA was rejected by some states on 
the basis that the Assembly was breaching the limitations imposed upon it in its 
relationship with the SC in this regard. Here, the question might arise whether or 
not the ICJ had a role to interpret the common competence of the GA and the SC in 
maintaining international peace and security. In fact, this issue was referred to the 
ICJ to be dealt with in the Expenses case.
This case was referred by the GA to the ICJ as a consequence of the 
disagreement among the member states of the UN regarding the costs of the United 
Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) and United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(ONUC).56 The GA had attempted to fund these operations through normal
53 According to this article, the GA is barred from recommending on the given issue while 
the SC is exercising the functions assigned to it under the Charter. See Kosonen, A., The United 
Nations General Assembly and the Authority to Establish UN Forces, 1986, pp. 18 ff.
54 It should be noted that this conflict had its roots in the stage of the travaux preparatoires 
o f the Charter. During this stage, the big powers tried to deprive the Assembly of any real power, 
while the smaller states represented at San Francisco insisted that all the power should not be in the 
hands of the Council or, more specifically, in the hands of the veto-wielding powers. In this respect, 
see White, supra note 51, p. 95.
55 For more details regarding the practice of the GA and SC in the maintenance of peace, see 
White, supra note 51, pp. W'iff.', Alting von Geusau, F., “Financing United Nations Peace-Keeping 
Activities”, NILR, 12, 1965, pp. 289-91; Yoder, A., The Evaluation o f  the United Nations System, 
1993, pp. 40-1; Prandler, A., “Competence of the Security Council and the General Assembly” in 
Haraszti, G. (ed.), Questions o f  International Law, 1977, p. 154; Malinvemi, supra note 51, p. 563; 
Vallat, supra note 7, p. 251 ff:, Luard, E., A History o f The United Nations, vol. 1: The Years o f  
Western Domination, 1945-1955, 1982, pp. 229ff:, Kelsen, supra note 52, pp. 927ff.
56 The UNEF was established hv the p fl ,in 1Q££ as a consequence of the Suez crisis and the 
failure of the Security Council to take effective action. It was established to facilitate conditions of 
peace in the Middle East, under the United Nations command. Funding for the force was provided 
through a special account into which members were to pay their required assessment plus any 
voluntary contributions. The ONUC was established by the SC in 1960 as a consequence of the
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apportionment to all member states, but some of them refused to pay their assessed 
shares. Accordingly, the GA requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ as to its 
authority in respect of the organisation’s budget. Although the expenses of the UN 
were the main issue in this case, the Court found that it had to examine the power of 
the SC and the GA in respect of maintaining international peace and security and 
establishing such peace operations. It was argued before the Court that the 
maintenance of international peace and security is entrusted exclusively to the SC, 
and that the GA has no power to undertake any activities in this sphere.57 The Court 
examined the respective functions of maintaining international peace and security of 
both organs in the light of the Charter. It specifically examined Arts. 11/2, 14 and 
24 of the Charter, which cover the competence of both organs in this respect. The 
Court concluded that the GA has power in respect of the maintenance of 
international peace and security vis-a-vis the SC. It stated that the power of the SC 
in this respect does not preclude the GA from recommending measures or actions in 
this regard. The Court found that the word “primary” embodied in Art. 24 of the 
Charter means that the SC has a main but certainly not exclusive responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace.58 Consequently, it recognised that the GA 
might initiate measures provided that it respects the explicit limitation incorporated 
in Art. 12/1.59
outbreak of violence in the Congo. See Slonim, S., “The Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on Certain Expenses of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis”, H U , 10, 1964, pp. 
227-8; Cotton, J., “Financing Peacekeeping - Trouble Again”, CIU , 11, 1978, pp. 108-9; White, 
supra note 51, pp. 195 f f ;  Hogg, supra note 52, p. 1231; Alting von Geusau, supra note 55, pp. 294 
ff.; Simmonds, K., “The UN Assessments Advisory Opinion”, ICLQ, 13, 1964, pp. 858-860.
57 ICJ Pled., 1961, pp. 177-8, 399; ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 162.
58 The Court stated: “[t]he responsibility (conferred on the Security Council by article 24) is 
‘primary’, not exclusive ... The Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the General 
Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security ... Thus while it is the 
Security Council which, exclusively, may order coercive action, functions and powers conferred by 
the Charter on the General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of 
studies and the making of recommendations; they are not merely hortatory.” ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 
163 f f ;  see also Gross, L. “Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations” in Gross, 
L. (ed.), Essays on International Law and Organisation, 1984, pp. 770-1; Amerasinghe, C., “The 
United Nations Expenses Case - A Contribution to the Law of International Organisation”, IJIL, 4, 
1964, p. 198; Markarczyk, supra note 39, p. 515.
59 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 163-5, 172; Alting von Geusau, supra note 55, p. 287; Murphy, J., 
The United Nations and the Control o f  International Violence - A Legal and Political Analysis, 
1983, p. 116; Schermers, H., International Institutional Law, 1980, p. 595; Simmonds, supra note
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In the light of the above opinion, it can be concluded that the Court has played 
a significant role in confirming the powers and limits upon the GA and the SC in 
achieving one of the main purposes of the UN, namely the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
3.2. Joint competence of the political organs60
The UN Charter refers to some joint competencies between the SC and the GA. 
According to the Charter, several acts or decisions should be taken by one organ 
upon the recommendation of the other. These issues are related to the admission of 
new members, their suspension, or their expulsion from the organisation, the 
appointment of the Secretary-General, allowing a non-member state to the UN to be 
party to the Court’s Statute, and the determination of conditions under which a state 
which is a party to the statute but is not a member of the UN may participate in 
electing the members of the Court. The decisions in all these issues are taken by the 
GA upon recommendation of the SC.
The ICJ dealt with the determination of the relationship between the GA and 
the SC in respect of their joint competencies in the Second Admission case. This 
case was referred to the ICJ by the GA for an advisory opinion on whether or not 
the GA could admit a new member to the UN without a recommendation from the 
SC.61
It was argued before the Court that the GA could consider the absence of the 
Council’s recommendation as a “passive recommendation”.62 Accordingly, if the 
SC failed to decide in favour of a given application, the GA could decide to admit 
the applicant state, despite the lack of the Council’s recommendation. According to
56, p. 870; Tewary, I., The Peace-Keeping Power o f  the United Nations General Assembly, 1974, 
pp. 4 0 #
60 Joint competence means that the function of an organ can be effective only in conjunction 
with an act of the other organ.
61 During the early years of the UN it was suggested by some states that “application for 
membership should be placed first before the General Assembly”. GAOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, 
1946 II, p. 91. In addition, it was argued that: “[w]hatever the vote in the Security Council, whether 
with or without the veto, when a recommendation was not approved, whatever the reason might be, 
that decision must be transmitted to the General Assembly for final decision”. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 
part 1, ad hoc Political Committee, 1946, p. 121.
62 ICJ Pled., 1949, pp. 123-48.
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this view, the GA alone could adopt a decision to accept new members in the UN.63 
The Court had to interpret Art. 4/2 of the Charter, which provides that admission 
“will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation 
of the Security Council”.64 It rejected the above argument in toto. The Court found 
that it required two things to effect admission: a “recommendation” by the SC and a 
decision by the GA. “Both these acts”, said the Court, “are indispensable to form 
the judgment of the Organisation to which the previous paragraph of Article 4 
refers.”65 It concluded that the admission of a new state in the absence of the 
Council’s recommendation would virtually nullify the role of the SC in the exercise 
of one of its essential functions.
The above opinion emphasised the position of the SC vis-a-vis the GA with 
regard to the admission of new members as one of their joint competencies. This 
opinion was based on the fact that both the GA and the SC are equally principal 
organs of the structure of the UN. In addition, it noted that the words 
“recommendation” and “upon” implied that the recommendation of the SC was 
indispensable. In consequence, the Court concluded that the attempt to deprive the 
SC of an important power which had been entrusted to it by the Charter was 
rejected.66
Some international lawyers noted, correctly, that the Court, by this opinion, 
preserved the autonomy of the Assembly and Council in the exercise of the powers 
and responsibilities conferred upon them by the Charter.67
63 Fitzmaurice, supra note 31, p. 25.
64 It should be noted that the issue of admission of new members to the UN was a moot 
point during the travaux preparatoires stage of the Charter. Some participants suggested following 
the League’s system in this respect by which the admission of new members should be referred only 
to the Assembly. Conversely, other participants suggested that, since the maintenance of 
international peace and security is the main purpose of the UN, the SC should assume the initial 
responsibility of suggesting new members. See UNCIO, 7, p. 451; Goodrich, supra note 36, p. 93; 
Fakher, supra note 10, pp. 187-8.
65 ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 7-8; Khan, R., Implied Powers o f  the United Nations, 1970, pp. 146- 
7; Bastid, supra note 41, pp. 660-1; Schwarzenberger, G., International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, vol. Ill: International Constitutional Law, 1976, pp. 256-7; 
Gross, L., “Election of States to United Nations Membership” in Gross, L. Essays in International 
Law and Organisation, 1984, pp. 593-4.
66 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 9.
67 Gross, supra note 44, p. 56.
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4. The ICJ and the exercise of exclusive competence by the UN organs
The term “exclusive competence” means that each organ has a specific function and 
no other organ is competent to exercise this function. The UN Charter empowers 
each organ of the UN with such a competence. Since the jurisprudence of the ICJ in 
this regard is mainly related to the exclusive functions of the GA and the SC, the 
study will focus on the scope of their exclusive competencies and the role of the ICJ 
in affirming and interpreting these functions.
The GA, exclusively, has the right to discuss any questions or matters either 
within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs 
of the UN (Art. 10). It also has the competence to initiate studies and make 
recommendations to promote international political co-operation, the development 
and codification of international law, the realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in economic, social, cultural, 
educational and health fields (Art. 13). In addition to the above comprehensive 
competencies, the Charter empowers the GA with some determined competencies. 
For instance, it has the right to supervise the international trusteeship system and 
approve agreements for areas not designated as strategic (Arts. 16, 79, 83/1, and 
85/1), to supervise the ECOSOC (Art. 60), to approve the budget of the 
organisation, apportion the expenses among members and approve financial and 
budgetary arrangements (Art. 17), to approve agreements bringing the specialised 
agencies into relationship with the UN (Art. 63) and arrangements with specialised 
agencies, to authorise other organs of the UN, except the SC, and the specialised 
agencies to request advisory opinions and certain other matters relating to the Court 
(Arts. 93/2 of the Charter and Arts. 32, 33 and 69 of the Court’s Statute), and to 
elect the non-permanent members of the SC and the members of the Economic and 
Social Council (Art. 61/1).
The SC too is entrusted with some exclusive competencies. For instance, it has 
the right to adopt international sanctions according to Chapter VII of the Charter, 
restore the rights and privileges of a suspended member of the UN (Art. 5), 
formulate plans to be submitted to the members of the UN for the establishment of a 
system for the regulation of armaments (Art. 26), supervise the strategic areas in
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respect of the trusteeship system (Art. 83/1), enforce the ICJ’s judgments (Art. 94/1) 
and regulate the conditions under which the Court shall be open to other non-party 
states to the Statute (Art. 35/2 of the Court’s statute).
The study will now turn to focus on the role of the ICJ in interpreting and 
developing these exclusive competencies of the GA and SC.
4.1. Interpreting and developing the competencies of the GA
The ICJ played a considerable role through its jurisprudence in interpreting and 
developing the exclusive competencies of the GA in many aspects.
4.1.1. Protection of human rights
The ICJ dealt with the GA’s power with regard to the protection of human rights in 
the Peace Treaties case. The observance of human rights in Hungary and Bulgaria 
was discussed by the GA during the second part of its Third Session.68 A year later, 
some states addressed notes to Rumania, alleging its violation of the human rights 
provisions of the peace treaties. Given the failure of efforts to settle this matter 
according to the dispute-settlement procedure in these treaties, the GA adopted a 
resolution by which the matter was referred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion.69
In this case, it was argued that the GA had no power to deal with this matter 
and to request an advisory opinion, because the whole matter relates to actions 
carried out in their own territories and with reference to their own nationals.70 The 
Court dismissed this argument and affirmed the Assembly’s power in respect of the 
international protection of human rights. It based its opinion on the GA’s 
interpretation of Art. 55 of the Charter under which the GA dealt with the matter. 
According to the Court’s view, the question of human rights came within the scope 
of the specific provisions of the Charter, particularly Art. 55 which entitles the 
Assembly to promote universal respect for human rights. It is clear that, in the 
Court’s view, the question of human rights is one of the exclusive functions of the
68 This matter was raised by Australia and Bolivia as a consequence of the trials o f Church 
leaders in Hungary and Bulgaria. UN Doc. A/820 and A /821,16 and 19 March 1949.
69 ICJ Rep., 1950; Pomerance, M., The Advisory Function o f the International Court in the 
League and UN Eras, 1973, pp. 98-9.
70 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 70.
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GA. The Court not only affirmed the Assembly’s power in this respect vis-a-vis the 
member states of the UN, but went further in recognising such a power even in 
respect of non-member states of the UN.71
4.1.2. The power of the GA over international conventions concluded under its 
auspices
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was 
negotiated and adopted under the auspices of the GA and was opened for signature 
on 9 December 1948. According to this Convention, the Secretary-General was the 
depository of the ratification of the Convention, which would come into force upon 
ratification by the twentieth state. The Secretary-General, as a depository, was 
faced with a particular difficulty. As he noted, a number of states had ratified the 
Convention subject to specific reservations. Accordingly, he referred the matter to 
the GA to determine whether or not the reserving states were to be counted in the 
number required for the entry into force of the Convention.72 There was great 
disagreement among the delegations over this matter and the GA was not able to 
reach a conclusion. Thus, on 16 November 1950, the GA requested the ICJ to give 
an advisory opinion in this matter. The ICJ embodied the matter in its list as the 
Reservations case.
In this case, it was argued that the GA had no right to request an advisory 
opinion with regard to the Convention. According to this argument, the GA’s 
request was considered an inadmissible interference by the Assembly as a non-party 
to the Convention, only parties to it having the right to interpret it or to seek an 
interpretation of it pursuant to Art. IX of the Convention.73
71 Ibid., p. 70; De Ar^chaga, E., “The Work and the Jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice 1947-1986”, BYIL, LVIII, 1987, p. 3; Bastid, supra note 41, pp. 663-4.
72 UN. Doc. A/1372,20 September 1950.
73 Art. IX of the Convention provides: “[disputes between the Contracting Parties relating
to the interpretation, application, or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to 
the responsibility o f a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall 
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any parties to the dispute.”
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In its reply, the Court affirmed the GA’s right to deal with the matter and, 
consequently, to request an opinion with respect to the Convention.74 The Court 
pointed out that not only did the GA take the initiative in respect of the Genocide 
Convention, draw up its terms and open it for signature and accession by the states, 
but express provisions of the Convention (Arts. XI and XVI) associate the GA with 
the life of the Convention; also the GA had actually associated itself with it by 
certain actions it had taken.75 Finally, the Court noted that the power of the GA to 
request an opinion is concurrent with the right of the parties to the Convention; and 
invoking the contentious jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with the 
Convention does not impair their right to interpret it. The Court stated that:
“The existence of a procedure for the settlement of disputes, such as that provided by 
Article IX, does not in itself exclude the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, for Article 96 of 
the Charter confers upon the General Assembly and the Security Council in general 
terms the right to request this Court to give an advisory opinion ‘on any legal 
question’.”76
It seems clear that, contrary to the general principle of international law related 
to the position of the third party vis-a-vis international treaties, the ICJ recognised 
the role of the GA in respect of this Convention although it was not a party to it.
4.1.3. The exercise of supervisory competence over the territories under the 
trusteeship (mandate) system
As mentioned above, the ICJ has recognised the Assembly’s power in respect of the 
territories which were under the mandate system despite the absence of any explicit 
provision in the Charter to this effect.77 The Court’s role was not limited to this 
recognition but it dealt with several issues related to the exercise of this 
competence, as will be discussed below.
74 Akhavan, P., “Enforcement of the Genocide Convention through the Advisory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, H R U , 12, 1991, p. 293.
75 ICJ Rep., 1951, pp. 19-20; Bastid, supra note 41, pp. 664-5.
76 ICJ Rep., 1951, p. 20.
77 See p. 127 above.
141
Chapter Three
(i) The degree of supervision
As a consequence of the Court’s decision of 1950 - which affirmed the supervisory 
powers of the GA - the GA adopted what was called the “special Rule F” as regards 
the voting to be followed by the GA in taking decisions on questions relating to 
reports and petitions concerning South-West Africa. According to this rule, the 
GA’s decisions on this matter were to be “regarded as an important question within 
the meaning of Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations”. 
Before the GA it was argued that applying this rule would be contrary to the 
principle that in exercising its supervisory power the GA should not exceed the 
degree of supervision confirmed by the mandate system and followed by the 
Council of the League since it applied the unanimity rule when supervising the 
territory. Accordingly, the application of “Rule F” seemed to entail a greater 
“degree of supervision”. In the light of this argument, the GA decided to seek an 
opinion of the Court about whether or not a voting procedure according to “Rule F” 
is a correct interpretation of the Court’s opinion of 1950.78
The ICJ affirmed that the GA, in exercising its supervision of the discharge of 
the mandate for South-West Africa, has a right to apply its own voting procedure, 
and found that the GA of the UN was bound by its own institutional provisions. It 
concluded that the application of “Rule F” by the GA is a correct interpretation of 
the ICJ’s advisory opinion of 1950.79 This implied that the consent of the 
mandatory states was no longer indispensable for the adoption of a valid decision, a 
situation that was different from that applying to the League’s Covenant.
(ii) Maintenance of supervision
According to the League’s practice regarding the mandate system, the Permanent 
Mandate Commission had not granted an oral hearing to petitioners. As a 
consequence of the refusal of South-Africa to forward any information to the 
Committee of South-West Africa established by the GA, the GA considered it
78 Jennings, R., “The International Court of Justice on the Voting Procedure on Question 
Concerning South West Africa”, GS, 41, 1956, p. 85 ff/, ICJ Rep. 1955, pp. 70 f f
79 ICJ Rep., 1955, p. 78; Crawford, J., “The General Assembly, the International Court of 
Justice and Self-Determination” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), Fifty Years o f  the International Court o f  
Justice, 1996, p. 597.
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necessary to obtain such information by effective means, inter alia an oral hearing 
of petitioners. An argument regarding this means was raised because it constituted 
a different practice from that of the League of Nations. Accordingly, the GA 
requested an opinion of the Court on whether or not this procedure could be 
considered consistent with the Court’s opinion of 1950.80 The ICJ decided that it 
was consistent with its opinion of 1950 for the GA to authorise a procedure for 
granting an oral hearing by the Committee of South-West Africa to petitioners who 
had already submitted written petitions as long as the GA was satisfied that such a 
course was necessary for the maintenance of effective international supervision of 
the administration of the mandate territories.81
It is clear that the Court plays a bold role in respect of the GA’s exclusive 
competency to supervise territories under the mandate system. Although the GA 
was not a successor stricto sensu of the League of Nations in respect of its 
supervisory function over the mandated territories, and although there was no 
obligation on a mandatory state to bring a territory under the trusteeship system, the 
Court affirmed that the GA has the same supervisory power to continue controlling 
the territories which were under the mandate system as the Council of the League of 
Nations had. Indeed, it confirmed a higher degree of supervision. The Court found 
that the GA could not depart from its own voting rules, even though unanimity had 
been required under the League’s Council.
4.1.4. The relationship between the GA and the UN Administrative Tribunal
As mentioned above, the question posed to the Court in the UN Administrative 
Tribunal case mainly concerned the determination of the relationship between the 
GA, the parent organ, and the Administrative Tribunal as its subsidiary organ.82 The 
Court had to answer whether the GA was legally entitled to refuse to give effect to 
an award of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal.
In this case, it was argued that the GA had the power to review the judgments 
of the UNAT and consequently had the right to refuse to enforce them. This
80 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 24 ff.
81 Ibid.
82 See pp. 130 ff. above.
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argument was based on the fact that, since the GA by establishing this tribunal did 
not delegate the performance of its own functions in this regard, it was exercising its 
power. In addition, it was argued that no subordinate organ could bind its own 
parent body. Therefore, it was concluded that the Assembly had the right to review 
the judgments of the UNAT and could refuse to give effect to them.83 In its reply to 
the above argument, the Court stated:
“By establishing the Administrative Tribunal, the General Assembly was not delegating 
the performance of its own functions: it was exercising a power which it has under the 
Charter to regulate staff relations.”84
Therefore, having examined the Tribunal’s Statute, the Court concluded that 
the Administrative Tribunal is an independent and truly judicial body pronouncing 
final judgments that are not revisable by any organ. It found that the Administrative 
Tribunal is not an advisory or subordinate organ and, consequently, its awards have 
a binding force on the UN.85 Further, the Court observed that, although the Tribunal 
was created by the Assembly, its judgments are binding upon the GA, which has no 
right to refuse the execution of a decision issued by this Tribunal. The ICJ therefore 
advised the GA that, in the absence of a review procedure, there was no possible 
ground for the Assembly to refuse to abide by a judgment of the Tribunal. This 
opinion was based on the fact that the Administrative Tribunal is not a subordinate 
organ of the GA.86
It can be concluded that, despite the fact that the Court had recognised the 
power of the GA to establish a subsidiary judicial organ, its power does not extend 
to reviewing its judgments because the Tribunal has a separate entity from that of 
the GA.87
8J ICJ Rep., 1954.
84 Ibid., p. 61.
85 ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 53.
86 Vallat, supra note 7, p. 283.
87 Lachs, M., (1979) “La Cour Internationale de Justice, Organe Juriciaire principal des
Nations Unies” in Liber Amicorum Adolf Schnitzer, p. 279.
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4.1.5. Budgetary power of the GA
As mentioned above, pursuant to Art. 17 of the Charter the GA has an exclusive 
power regarding the budget of the UN.88 This exclusive power had given rise to 
questions related to the determination of the term “budget” of the organisation and 
to the authority of the GA in this respect. The ICJ through its jurisprudence dealt 
with the GA’s power in this regard, especially the above two issues.
(i) The scope of the term “budget”
The ICJ dealt with the scope of the term “budget” in the Expenses case. Despite the 
fact that this case was mainly related to the finance of the UNEF and ONUC, the 
Court had to deal with the budgetary power of the GA as a whole. In this case, it 
was argued that the term “budget” pursuant to Art. 17 applies strictly to the 
“administrative budget”. In addition, the term “expenses” stipulated in para. 2 
governs only the regular or administrative expenses of the organisation. 
Accordingly, expenses related to operations for the maintenance of international 
peace and security are not expenses of the organisation within the meaning of Art. 
17/2, because they cannot be described as administrative or regular expenses.89 
Further, it was argued that expenses concerning the maintenance of international 
peace and security fall within the exclusive competence of the SC, which has the 
power to decide how to finance such forces. Consequently, it was concluded that 
the GA has no right to decide an apportionment in this respect because its power is 
limited to discuss, consider, study, and recommend.90 To reach an opinion in this 
case, the Court felt that it had, first, to interpret the term “budget” in para. 1 and 
determine the meaning of the term “expenses” in para. 2, and, second, to examine 
the power of the GA with regard to the expenditure resulting from the operations to 
maintain international peace and security.
88 For the wording of Art. 17, see note 126, p. 36 above.
89 ICJ Pled., 1961, p. 273.
90 The Soviet Union argued that: “[t]he analysis o f the relevant provisions of the Charter
leaves no doubt that while Article 17 lays down a general rule, Article 43 contains a particular rule, a
lex specialis, which relates to expenditures for certain actions for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security. Such actions may be undertaken in pursuance o f a decision o f the 
Security Council.” ICJ Pled., 1961, p. 404; Padelford, N., “Financing Peace-keeping: Politics and 
Crisis”, Int.Org., X IX , 1965, p. 446.
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The Court rejected the above argument and decided that there is no restriction 
on the Assembly’s power in respect of the organisation’s budget.91 This opinion 
was based, inter alia, on Art. 17, which makes a distinction between the 
organisation’s budget (para. 1) and the administrative budget of the specialised 
agencies (para. 3), and if the Charter’s drafters had intended to limit the budgetary 
powers of the GA to administrative expenses they would have expressly mentioned 
this matter as was done in para. 3.92 The Court also noted that the adjective 
“administrative” in para. 3 with respect to the budget of the specialised agencies is 
proof that the omission of this adjective in the first two paragraphs was not an 
oversight by the Charter’s drafters.
Having decided the meaning of the term “budget”, the Court turned to 
determine the meaning of the term “expenses of the organisation”. It observed that 
the term “expenses” means all the expenses and not certain types of expenses. The 
Court based its opinion on the following: (i) Art. 17/2, which refers to the expenses 
of the organisation without any further explicit definition of such expenses, (ii) the 
practice of the organisation, whereby, from the beginning, it included in its budget 
items of a “non-administrative” character, (iii) other parts of the Charter, especially 
the provisions of Chapters IX and X, which envisage various kinds of expenses as 
in the field of economic and social co-operation, which have been incurred without 
any challenges.93
In its reply to the argument about the competence to apportion expenses on the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the Court concluded that it could 
find no basis for limiting the budgetary authority to the SC alone, noting that Art. 
17 is not limited by Art. 43. The Court also declared a general proposition to the 
effect that “the ‘expenses’ of any organisation are the amounts paid out to defray the
91 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 164 ff.\ Slonim, supra note 56, p. 232; Alting von Geusau, supra 
note 55, p. 282; Gross, supra note 58, p. 764; Roy, S., “The World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 20 
July 1962 on ‘Certain Expenses of the United Nations’”, OZOR, 15, 1965, p. 184; Khan, R. 
“Peace-Keeping Powers of the UN General Assembly: Advisory Opinion of the ICJ”, Int.Stu., 6, 
1964, pp. 322 ff.\ Castafieda, J., Legal Effects o f  United Nations Resolutions, (translated by Alba 
Amoia), 1969, pp. 40 f f
92 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 159.
93 Ibid., pp. 158, 161.
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cost of carrying out its purposes”.94 It found that the UNEF and ONUC operations 
were in execution of the UN’s purpose which relates to the maintenance of 
international peace and security pursuant to Art. 1 of the Charter.95
To conclude, it seems clear that the Court in the above opinion determined and 
enhanced the GA’s power with regard to the organisation’s budget. But does such 
an opinion mean that the GA has an absolute power in this regard by which it could 
approve or disapprove any item of the UN budget?
(ii) The limits upon the budgetary powers of the GA
In the UN Administrative Tribunal case, the ICJ dealt with the authority of the GA 
over the budget of the UN. It was argued before the GA that, because the GA is 
expressly authorised pursuant to Art. 17/1 of the Charter to “consider and approve 
the budget of the Organisation”, it has a discretionary power to delete or disapprove 
particular items in the budget. It was concluded that any interpretation limiting this 
power would abridge the Assembly’s approving authority under the above article.96 
This situation led the GA to adopt its Res. 785 (VIII), of 9 December 1953, whereby 
it requested the ICJ to give an opinion regarding its right to refuse to give effect to 
an award of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal.
In its opinion, the Court dismissed this argument on the basis that “the function 
of approving the budget does not mean that the General Assembly has an absolute 
power to approve or disapprove the expenditure proposed to it; for some part of that 
expenditure arises out of obligations already incurred by the Organisation, and to 
this extent the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these 
engagements”.97
It could be noted that the Court made a clear statement that the budgetary 
power of the GA is not absolute, and it has to honour the obligations already 
incurred by the organisation. This might be justified by the fact that, if the Court
94 Ibid., p. 158.
95 Ibid., pp. 164 ff.\ Amerasinghe, supra note 58, p. 179.
96 For the full discussion before the GA, see GAOR, 8th Sess., 420th mtg. of the 5th 
Committee, 3 December 1953, para. 38; ibid., 421st mtg. of 4 December 1953, paras. 28, 52; ibid., 
423rd mtg., o f 5 December 1953, paras. 14, 55; ibid., 425th mtg., of 7th December 1953, paras. 21, 
38; ibid., 427th mtg., of 8 December 1953, para. 29.
97 ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 59.
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would allow the GA to do so, it might impair the functioning of other organs of the 
UN and consequently might make it impossible for them to achieve the purposes of 
the UN.
4.1.6. The power to terminate mandate and trusteeship agreements (self- 
determination)
The ICJ dealt with the power of the GA to terminate mandate and trusteeship 
agreements and to confirm self-determination in several cases.
In the Northern Cameroon case, the Court confirmed the power of the GA to 
grant the self-determination of the people of Northern Cameroon, who had elected 
to join Nigeria. In this case, the Court affirmed the correctness of the GA’s 
termination of the Trusteeship Agreement according to Chapter XII of the Charter. 
The Court found that:
“Whatever the motivation of the General Assembly in reaching the conclusions contained 
in [Resolution 1608 XV], whether or not it was acting wholly on the political plane and 
without the Court finding it necessary to consider here whether or not the General 
Assembly based its action on a correct interpretation of the Trusteeship Agreement, 
there is no doubt... that the resolution had definitive legal effect.”98
Accordingly, it concluded, that the people of Northern Cameroon having elected to 
join Nigeria, the decision, approved by the GA, could not be reopened by raising 
legal issues relating to the earlier administration of the territory under trusteeship.99
The Court dealt extensively with the Assembly’s power in this regard in the 
Namibia case. In this case it was argued, inter alia, that the GA, by adopting Res. 
2145 (XXI), of 25 October 1966, had no right to terminate the mandate over South- 
West Africa. This argument was based on the absence of any provision in the 
mandate agreement relating to such termination.100 The Court dismissed this 
argument and affirmed the Assembly’s decision by which it terminated the mandate 
on the ground that South Africa had failed to fulfil its international obligations with 
respect to Namibia by refusing to comply with the rules covering the mandate and
98 ICJ Rep., 1963, p. 32
99 Crawford, supra note 79, p. 598.
100 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 47.
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refusing to submit reports to the Assembly.101 The Court based its opinion on the 
fact that a mandate agreement is no different from any other international treaty, and 
that the rules of the Vienna Convention apply to such agreements. Accordingly, the 
Court stated that the breach of a treaty by one of its parties entitles the other party to 
deem the breach of the treaty as a ground for its termination. Consequently, the 
Court assumed that because the GA was considered to be the successor of the 
Assembly of the League of Nations in respect of Namibia and had a supervisory 
competence over this territory, and because the Assembly had found two 
fundamental violations of South Africa’s international obligations relating to the 
mandate - its failure to report to the UN and its continued policy of apartheid - 
termination of the mandate by the GA was justified.102
Finally, in the Western Sahara case, the ICJ proceeded to a more detailed 
analysis of the principle of self-determination. The Court was, in this case, seized 
by a letter dated 17 December 1974 written by the Secretary-General of the UN, 
which came as a consequence of GA Res. 3292 (XXIX) adopted on 13 December 
1 9 7 4  103 gy the above resolution, the GA “reaffirmed the right of the population of 
the Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance with Resolution 1514 
(XV)”. The Court noted that the object of the request was to obtain from the Court 
an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper 
exercise of its functions concerning the decolonisation of the territory.104
101 Ibid.; Soni, S., “Regimes for Namibia’s Independence: A Comparative Study”, CJTL, 29, 
1991, p. 577; Cockram, G., South-West Africa Mandate, 1976, pp. 344 ff.; Brown, P., “The 1971 
ICJ Advisory Opinion on South-West Africa (Namibia)”, VJTL, 5, 1971, p. 217; Bollecker, B., 
“L’Avis Consultatif du 21 Juin 1971 dans 1’Affaire de la Namibie (Sud-Est Affique)”, AFDI, XVII, 
1971, pp. 300 ff.; Holder, W., “ 1971 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
Namibia (South-West Africa)”, FLR, 5, 1972, pp. 117 f f  ; Riphagen, W., “The Legal Consequences 
of Illegal Acts under Public International Law”, NILR, 20, 1973, pp. 27 f f ;  Heunis, J., United 
Nations Versus South Africa: A Legal Assessment o f United Nations and United Nations Related 
Activities in Respect o f  South Africa, 1986, pp. 523 ff.
102 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 47. In this regard, Crawford notes that “the court adopted a mode of 
co-operation with the political organs, and in particular the General Assembly, that has characterised 
its work in this field since ... the court has treated the ‘subsequent development of international law 
in regard to non-self governing territories’ as in large part resulting from the application o f Charter 
norms by the political organs, and in particular the General Assembly ... it has sought whenever 
possible to align ‘the corpus iuris gentium’ with the policies and practice of the Assembly.” 
Crawford, supra note 79, p. 591.
103 ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 6-7.
104 Ibid., p. 27.
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The Court concluded that the right of self-determination for non-self-governing 
territories had become a norm in international law. It examined the power of the 
GA in the process of the implementation of this right. The Court referred to Arts. 
1/2, 55 and 56 of the Charter “and their particular relevance for non-self-goveming 
territories, which are dealt with in Chapter XI of the Charter”. The Court also 
reviewed the practice of the GA through its resolutions on the question of self- 
determination and decolonisation, in particular GA Res. 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV) and 
2625 (XXV). It affirmed the Assembly’s power in respect of decolonisation and the 
granting of independence to colonial countries and people. Moreover, it expressed 
detailed views as to the method by which Res. 1514 (XV) had become part of 
general customary law. Furthermore, the Court stated that GA Res. 1514 (XV) 
provided the basis for the process of decolonisation, which has resulted since 1960 
in the creation of many states that are today members of the UN.105
The above Court’s opinions supported the Assembly’s power to ensure both the 
self-determination of peoples and the end of colonial situations.
4.1.7. The GA and disarmament
Although the maintenance of international peace and security is a primary purpose 
of the UN, the Charter places little emphasis on arms control and disarmament.106 
Art. 11/1 of the Charter provides that the GA “may consider the general principles 
of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the 
principles governing disarmament”. In this respect, the GA may make 
recommendations concerning such principles to member states and to the SC.107 In 
practice, the GA has several times discussed the issue of disarmament and has 
adopted several resolutions. As early as 1946, the GA underlined the connection
105 Ibid., pp. 31 ff.\ Franck, T., “The Settling of the Sahara”, AJIL, 70, 1976, p. 694; De 
Arechaga, supra note 71 , p. 5; Goldie, L., “International ‘Constitutionality’: State Sovereignty and 
the Problem of Consent” in Blackshield, A. (ed.), Legal Change: Essays in Honour o f  Julius Stone, 
1983, p. 322; Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., “Self-Determination” in Schachter, O., et al. (eds.), United 
Nations Legal Order, vol. 1, 1995, pp. 370-1.
106 It is worth noting that arms control is to be distinguished from disarmament. The object 
of disarmament is to abolish war-making capacity, whereas the purpose of arms control is to keep 
such capacity within certain bounds. See Shearer, I., Starke’s International Law, p. 516.
107 Murphy, J., “Force and Arms” in Schachter, O., et al. (eds.), United Nations Legal Order, 
vol. 1, 1995, p. 301; Goodrich, L, et al., The United Nations, 1959, p. 218.
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between disarmament and peace. It also organised several conferences and 
established many commissions, for instance the Conference on Disarmament, the 
First (Political and Security) Committee of the General Assembly and the 
Disarmament Commission. Moreover, it placed on its agenda an item entitled 
“[g]eneral and complete disarmament under effective international control”.108 In 
addition, the GA gave special attention to eliminating the use of nuclear and other 
mass destruction weapons.109
In the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons case, the power of the 
GA in respect of disarmament was challenged by some states. It was argued that 
the GA cannot request an opinion on this issue since it is unrelated to its duties.110 
In its reply, the Court confirmed the power of the GA in this regard. It based its 
opinion on Art. 10 of the Charter, which empowers the GA with a broad 
competence to deal with any matters or questions within the scope of the Charter. It 
also referred to Art. 11, which explicitly empowers the GA to “consider the general 
principles ... in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the 
principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armament”. Moreover, it 
noted that the GA has, pursuant to Art. 13 of the Charter, the power to “initiate 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification”.111 In addition to 
the above basis, the Court referred to GA activities relating to the threat or use of 
force in international relations, the disarmament process, and the progressive 
development of international law. It added:
“The General Assembly has a long-standing interest in these matters and in their relation 
to nuclear weapons. This interest has been manifested in the annual First Committee 
debates, and the Assembly resolutions on nuclear weapons; in the holding of three special 
sessions on disarmament (1978, 1982 and 1988) by the General Assembly, and the annual
108 For the GA’s activities in this regard, see Elaraby, N., “Some Reflections on 
Disarmament” in Tomuschat, C. (ed.), The United Nations at Age Fifty: A Legal Perspective, 1995, 
pp. 12 f f !; Baehr, P., et al., The United Nations in the 1990s, 1992, p. 95; Goodrich, et al., supra 
note 107, pp. 221, 224-8,232-4.
109 For the GA’s practice with regard to the disarmament, see White, supra note 51, pp. 143-
5.
110 ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 8 (unpublished).
111 Ibid.
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meetings of the Disarmament Commission since 1978; and also in the commissioning of 
studies on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons.”112
4.2. The role of the ICJ in respect of the Security Council’s competencies
4.2.1. Exclusive competence to act under Chapter VII
According to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC has the power to adopt 
enforcement actions in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression. Pursuant to Arts. 41 and 42, the SC may decide certain measures, 
which may or may not involve the use of air, sea or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, it is noticeable 
that the Charter refers to the SC having an exclusive competence. Accordingly, the 
question has arisen regarding the role of the ICJ in this respect.
In its opinion in the Expenses case, the Court affirmed the exclusive 
competence of the SC in the field of coercive or enforcement action according to 
Chapter VII with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security.113 
The Court concluded that only the SC can impose an obligation by a resolution in 
connection with the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to an 
aggressor.114 It said that:
“[I]t is the Security Council which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of 
compliance if for example it issues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter 
VII. It is only the Security Council which can require enforcement by coercive action 
against an aggressor.”115
Therefore, it can be concluded that, although the Court recognised the role of 
the GA in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security,116 it 
declared that the SC has the sole power to require enforcement by coercive action.117
112 Ibid.
113 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 163.
114 Verzijl, J., “International Court o f Justice: Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
(Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter)”, NILR, 10, 1963, p. 12; Amerasinghe, supra note 58, p. 
198.
115 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 163.
116 See pp. \32ff. above.
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4.2.2. Unlimited competence in maintaining international peace and security
Art. 43 of the Charter refers to a “special agreement or agreements” to enforce SC 
decisions against any state that infringes international peace and security. However, 
a question has arisen as to whether or not there is a limitation upon the SC when 
acting pursuant to Chapter VII. This matter was discussed by the ICJ in the 
Expenses case.
In this case, it was argued before the Court that Art. 43 of the Charter is 
considered as a lex specialis upon the Council’s powers in this regard. It refers to 
“agreements to be concluded between the SC and the Member States on the 
provision of armed forces and other assistance necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security”, which are the exclusive source of 
power for the conclusion of agreements for financing the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Accordingly, the SC cannot take measures to 
maintain international peace and security without such agreements.118
The Court rejected this argument and concluded that Art. 43 does not restrict 
the power of the Council. The SC is not limited to financing such measures through 
agreements concluded under Art. 43, because it can act under some other articles of 
the Charter.119 A restrictive interpretation would leave the SC impotent in the face 
of an emergency situation and would restrict its discretion through a lack of funds if 
these agreements, under Art. 43, have not been concluded because it is not possible 
to make arrangements in advance for all expenses of the peace-keeping forces.120 
The Court based its opinion on two main points. First, there is nothing in the text of 
Art. 43 indicating that the member states are bound to agree that they will bear the 
entire cost of the “assistance” provided. It will be borne by the organisation and the 
financing of these expenditures would be governed by Art. 17/2. Second, Art. 50 
provides that overburdened states, whether members of the UN or not, will consult
117 The Court observed: “[t]he ‘action’ which is solely within the province of the Security 
Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter namely ‘Action with 
respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 163.
118 ICJ Pled., 1961, pp. 167-8, 343,418.
119 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 166-7.
120 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 167; Rao, T. “The Expenses Judgment of the International Court of
Justice, A Critique”, IYIL, XII, 1963, p. 145.
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the SC with regard to the solution of any special economic problems preventing 
them from carrying out enforcement measures. These problems cannot be covered 
by negotiated agreements, and, if the SC decided to give an overburdened state 
financial assistance, that would fall outside Art. 43 and constitute part of the 
“expenses of the organisation” under Art. 17/2.121
Accordingly, the Court played an important role as regards the Council’s 
competencies in respect of its powers under Chapter VII. It adopted a wide scope of 
the SC’s competencies thus assisting the Council to fulfil its functions without any 
obstacle.122
5. Interpretation and application of agreements between the UN and its 
member states
Despite the fact that the UN Charter does not provide that the organisation shall 
have a treaty-making capacity, this power was deduced from a number of provisions 
of the Charter. This was clear from Art. 43 of the Charter, which stipulates the 
power to conclude agreements of an international character. In addition, Arts. 57-63 
provide the ECOSOC with the power to conclude agreements with any agency 
referred to in Art. 57 of the Charter. Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Charter 
affirms the UN’s capacity to conclude treaties with sovereign states regarding the 
trusteeship system. In addition, this capacity is confirmed by international lawyers 
who note that the UN and its specialised agencies have the right to conclude 
international treaties being parties to these treaties.123
The most obvious examples of agreements concluded between the UN and its 
specialised agencies on the one hand and the member states on the other are mainly 
concerned with the presence of the UN in the territories of the states. Known as
121 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 161 f f ;  Slonim, supra note 56, pp. 242 ff.; Cotton, supra note 56, p.
112.
122 Slonim, supra note 56, p. 244.
123 Abou-El-Wafa, A., Recherches sur les Traites Conclus par les Organisations 
Internationales inter se ou avec des Etats (Contribution a Vetude d ’une theorie de I ’acte), Ph.D. 
Thesis (University de Lyon III), 1981, pp. 65 ff.
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headquarters agreements, host agreements or seat agreements,124 these agreements 
regulate the diplomatic privileges and immunities of the employees of the 
organisation.125 In addition, these agreements might also regulate peace-keeping 
operations in the territory of the member states.
As with any international agreement, the interpretation and application of these 
agreements might lead to disagreements between the parties. The ICJ played a role 
with regard to the interpretation and application of some of the treaties that were 
concluded by the UN or one of its specialised agencies on the one hand and a 
member state on the other.
5.1. The Headquarters Agreement case between the UN and the USA
In 1947 the UN and USA concluded a Headquarters Agreement, which sets out the 
basic rights and obligations of each of the parties. Section II of the agreement 
obliges various authorities within the USA not to impose impediments to transit 
from or to the Headquarters District upon representative members, officials of the 
UN, experts performing missions, representatives of the press, representatives of 
non-governmental organisations recognised by the UN, and “other persons invited 
to the Headquarters District by the United Nations”.126 Section 21(a) of the 
agreement requires that any dispute between the USA and the UN concerning the 
interpretation and application of the agreement, “which is not settled by negotiation 
or other agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal 
of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General, one to be named by 
the Secretary of State of the United States, and the third to be chosen by the two, or 
if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the President of the International 
Court of Justice”.127 As a consequence of its establishment and recognition as a 
“permanent observer”, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was invited by
124 Muller, A., International Organisations and their Host States: Aspects o f  their Legal 
Relationship, 1995, p. 17.
125 For a survey of such agreements concluded by the UN and its specialised agencies on the 
one hand and the member states on the other hand, see Muller, ibid., pp. 31-2.
126 Agreement between the UN and the USA regarding the Headquarters o f the UN, o f 26 
June 1947.
127 Ibid.
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the GA to “participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the 
capacity of observer”.128 The PLO established an Observer Mission, and maintained 
a permanent office in New York.129 The US enactment in 1987 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorisation Act for Fiscal Years 1988-89 prohibited the PLO from 
establishing or maintaining any office or facility within the jurisdiction of the USA. 
The US Attorney General ruled in March 1988 that these measures required him to 
order the closure of the PLO office irrespective of any US obligations under the 
Headquarters Agreement. The Attorney General filed suit on 22 March 1988 in a 
US district court to compel compliance with the closure order. The US Government 
indicated that it would take no action to close the PLO Mission before the district 
court had rendered a decision. The UN failed to persuade the USA to co-operate in 
initiating arbitration in accordance with the agreement’s dispute resolution 
mechanism.130
As a consequence, the GA requested an advisory opinion on whether the USA 
was obliged to participate in arbitration as requested by the UN pursuant to the 
Headquarters Agreement’s dispute resolution clause.131 Before the Court, the USA 
argued that, because the matter was before the district court, it could not enter into 
the dispute settlement procedure laid down in Section 21(a).132
The ICJ dealt with the request and found that the UN had exhausted the 
possibility of negotiation as provided by the agreement. It affirmed also that the 
dispute between the USA and the UN was one “not settled by negotiation” within 
the meaning of Section 21(a) of the agreement. The Court concluded that the USA 
was bound to respect the obligation stipulated in Section 21 of the agreement. The 
Court based its opinion on “the fundamental principle of international law that 
international law prevails over domestic law”.133
128 GA Res. 3237, 1974.
129 It should be noted that the PLO is listed in UN publications as a member of a category of
“organisations which have received a standing invitation from the General Assembly to participate 
in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly as observer”. ICJ Rep., 1988, p. 15.
130 ICJ Rep., 1988, pp. 22 ff.
131 GA Res. 42/229 B, 2 March 1988.
132 ICJ Rep., 1988, p. 33.
133 Ibid., p. 34.
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5.2. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and 
Egypt
The WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean was established in 
Alexandria, Egypt, in 1951 pursuant to an agreement between the WHO and Egypt 
in 1951. In 1978, the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel led some 
Arab states to request the relocation of the Regional Office of the WHO to Amman, 
Jordan. The Assembly of the WHO was divided as to whether or not to allow this 
transfer. The question arose whether or not the transfer was governed by the 1951 
Agreement between Egypt and the WHO, in particular by Section 37, which 
provides:
“The present Agreement may be revised at the request of either party. In this event the 
two parties should consult each other concerning the modification to be made in its 
provisions. If the negotiations do not result in an understanding within one year, the 
present Agreement may be denounced by either party giving two years notice.”
Egypt contended that the WHO was bound by the above section to give two 
years’ notice if it wanted to move the Regional Office. Conversely, it was argued 
that a transfer of the Regional Office would result in termination of the 1951 
Agreement, and that Section 37 applied to a revision of the agreement but not to its 
termination.134 As a consequence of the disagreement regarding the interpretation of 
the convention, the WHO Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ to 
determine whether or not Section 37 of the agreement applied to the transfer and, if 
so, what the legal relationship between the WHO and Egypt should be during the 
two-year period between notice and termination required by Section 37.135
To deal with the case, the Court first considered a considerable number of host 
agreements of different kinds concluded by states with various international 
organisations and containing varying provisions regarding the revision, termination 
or denunciation of the agreements. It took the opportunity to observe in passing that 
in future close attention might with advantage be given to their drafting. It also
134 WHO Doc. A33/B/SR/6, p. 9; Al-Ashall, A., “The International Court of Justice’s 
Advisory Opinion in Interpreting the Agreement Between the WHO and Egypt”, REDI, 37, 1981, p. 
213; Gray, C., “The International Court’s Advisory Opinion on the WHO-Egypt Agreement of 
1951”, ICLQ, 32, 1983, p. 534.
135 ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 74.
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observed that those texts “must be presumed to reflect the views of organisations 
and host States as to the implication of the obligations in the contexts in which the 
provisions are intended to apply”.136 Then the Court turned to consider the history 
of the relationship between Egypt and the WHO, examined the agreement and 
discussed the different interpretations of its provisions. It also redrafted the , 
question posed by the WHO as follows: “What are the legal principles and rules 
applicable to the question, under what conditions and in accordance with what 
modalities a transfer of the regional office from Egypt may be effected?”137 The 
Court found that the contractual legal regime gave rise to mutual obligations of co­
operation and good office. It looked to general international law, the constitutions 
of international organisations and agreements between host states and organisations 
for the content of these mutual obligations, and managed to extract a number of 
duties, albeit of a general nature. In the light of the above, the Court found that both 
the WHO and Egypt were under a duty to consult together in good faith over the 
question under what conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer 
might be effected. The Court concluded that, if a transfer were decided on, then it 
should be done with a minimum of prejudice to the work of the organisation and the 
interest of Egypt. With regard to the period of time involved for transfer, the Court 
found that it was a matter for the parties to be decided in good faith in the light of 
the host agreements, including Section 37 of the 1951 Agreement, Art. 56 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and the corresponding article in the draft 
of the Convention on treaties between organisations and states.138
5.3. The application of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
UN
Art. VI, section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN 
specifies the privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the UN. There 
was a dispute between the ECOSOC and Rumania over the application of this 
section in the case of Mr Dumitru Mazilu. Mazilu was a special Rapporteur of the
136 Ibid., p. 94.
137 Ibid., pp. 9 4 #
138 Ibid.
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Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
and was asked to prepare a report on human rights and youth. When the sub­
committee session opened in August 1987 no report had been received from Mr 
Mazilu, nor was he present. Rumania submitted a letter in which it informed the 
UN Office in Geneva that Mazilu had suffered a heart attack and become seriously 
ill in May 1987, and that at that time he had not yet begun to draw up the report 
entrusted to him. The UN made various attempts to contact him and provide him 
with materials to conclude his report and invited him to visit Geneva, but these 
attempts failed. In a series of letters to the UN, Mazilu stated that he had been 
asked by the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to decline to submit his report 
to the Sub-Committee, but the authorities of his country refused to permit him to 
travel to Geneva, and finally he complained that strong pressure had been exerted 
on him and his family.139 Consequently, several efforts were made by the UN to 
solve the problem. In its response, the Rumanian Government argued that the case 
of Mr Mazilu was an internal matter between a citizen and his government. It also 
maintained that “the application of the General Convention does not arise in this 
case”, because it did not “equate Rapporteur, whose activities are only occasional, 
with experts of mission for the United Nations”. Its interpretation of the convention 
was that an expert enjoys privileges and immunities not in the country in which he 
has his permanent residence but only in the country in which he is on mission.140 
Therefore, ECOSOC adopted Res. 1989/75 to request an advisory opinion on the 
applicability of Art. VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the UN.141
In considering the request, the Court limited itself to the question of the 
applicability of the article. In the absence of any definition of “experts on mission”, 
the Court had to examine what is meant by this term as regards the applicability of 
Section 22. The Court found that the purpose of Section 22 is to “enable the United 
Nations to entrust missions to persons who do not have the status of an official of
139 ICJ Rep., 1989, pp. 180-1.
140 Ibid., pp. 184-5.
141 Gill, T., “Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations”, AJIL, 84,1990, pp. 742 ff.
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the organisation”, and to guarantee them the privileges and immunities necessary to 
carry out their functions independently.142 Having interpreted the section, the Court 
concluded that the section applies to experts who are not permanent officials of the 
UN. It also pointed out that the immunities are to ensure their independence from 
their own countries. Therefore, the Court concluded that Art. VI, Section 22, should 
be respected by all states, even the states of which the “experts on mission” are 
nationals so long as these states, do not register reservations in this regard.143
In the light of the above interpretation, it seems clear that the Court affirmed 
the application of Section 22 of the convention to Mazuli as a special Rapporteur of 
the Sub-Committee who had the right to enjoy the privileges and immunities 
provided by that convention.
To conclude, the Court played an important role in interpreting and providing 
guidance regarding the application of conventions concluded by the UN or its 
agencies, on the one hand, and the member states of these organisations, on the 
other hand.
6. The ICJ and the legal effect of the resolutions of the UN organs
The achievement of the organs’ objectives depends to a large degree on how their 
resolutions and decisions are carried out. It therefore seems appropriate to throw 
light on the Court’s role in respect of the legal effect of these resolutions.
6.1. The legal effect of the SC’s resolutions
Generally speaking, Art. 25 of the Charter deals with the legal effect of the 
Council’s resolutions. It provides that member states are bound to accept and carry 
out the Council’s resolutions.144 The extent of the application of this article was 
subject to disagreement about whether or not this article covers all the Council’s 
resolutions without any distinction, namely whether or not the Council’s use of
142 ICJ Rep., 1989, pp. 193-4.
143 Ibid.
144 Art. 25 provides: “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions o f the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”
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mandatory decisions is limited to Chapters VI, VII and VIII.145 In answering this 
question, it has been noted that Art. 25 does not extend to all the Council’s 
resolutions and consequently its binding effect is limited only to decisions adopted 
under Chapter VII.146 This opinion was based on the wording of the Charter’s 
provisions, which made a clear distinction between “decisions” and 
“recommendations” adopted by the SC. Conversely, it has been noted thafArt. 25 
extends to all the Council’s resolutions.147 This view was based on the wording of 
Art. 25, which refers to the Council’s resolutions without any distinction between 
them. In addition, the advocates of this view referred to the rejection of the Belgian 
proposal in the travaux preparatoires to limit the application of Art. 25 to decisions 
taken according to Chapters VI, VII and VIII.148 Furthermore, they note that Art. 25 
stands separately from both Chapter VI and Chapter VII. It follows directly Art. 
24/1, which confirms the SC’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In addition, para. 2 of Art. 24 states that the 
specific powers granted to the SC for the discharge of these duties are laid down in 
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. Therefore, if Art. 25 applies only to Chapter VII, it 
should have been located in Chapter VII. Finally, they conclude that the restricted 
view of the scope of Art. 25 as limited to the enforcement measures adopted 
pursuant to Arts. 41 and 42 means that Art. 25 would be superfluous because the 
effect of these articles is granted by Arts. 48 and 49. In this regard, Kelsen notes:
145 The extent of obligations under Art. 25 was a debated issue during the travaux 
preparatoires stage and has never been made clear. At San Francisco, the Belgian delegation 
suggested limiting this obligation to decisions taken by the Security Council according to Chapters j
VI, VII and VIII. But this proposal was rejected. See UNCIO, 6, pp. 393-5; Goodrich, supra note I
36,TT2l5if '
146 According to this opinion not all the resolutions according to Chapter VII are obligatory. 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons note that “[r]ecommendations by the Council under Article 39 are no 
more binding than recommendations under Chapter VI; but members are obliged to accept and 
carry out decisions by the Council calling for non-military or military measures in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42”. Goodrich et al., supra note 36, pp. 208-9; Bowett, D., The Law o f  
International Institutions, 1982, p. 36; Abou-El-Wafa, A., Law o f  International Organisations, 
1984, pp. 462-4; Chehab, supra note 52, pp. 298-9; Ganem, M., International Organisations, 1967, 
p. 214; Shaw, M., International Law, 1991, pp. 640, 702-3.
147 Kelsen, H., The Law o f  the United Nations, 1951, pp. 95-8; Rousseau, C., Droit , 
International Public, vol. I, 1970, p. 438; Higgins, R., “The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which 
UN Resolutions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?”, ICLQ, 21,1972, pp. 277-8.
148 See note 145 above.
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“The Charter characterises certain decisions of the Security Council in a way which 
permits the interpretation that they are not intended to be binding upon the Members as, 
for instance, ‘recommendations’ (Articles 36, 37, 38 and 39) or ‘plans’ (Article 26). 
Consequently, Article 25 may be interpreted to mean the Members are obliged to carry 
out all resolutions of the Charter to issue with the intention to bind the members at whom 
they are directed; that is to say, all resolutions which the Charter does not characterise in 
a way which permits the interpretation that they shall not have a binding force, such as 
‘recommendations’ or ‘plans’.”149
In the light of the above disagreement,150 one may turn to examine the Court’s 
role in determining the extent of Art. 25 of the Charter. In practice, the Court has 
dealt with the effect and the scope of the Council’s resolutions in two cases.
In the Namibia case, the argument of the restricted application of Art. 25 of the
7 — -----—  " "  "  ' > ■■■ !
Charter to the enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII (Arts. 41 and 42) 
was presented before the Court.151 The Court dismissed the argument of the 
restricted application of Art. 25 of the Charter and stated that it “[a]rticle 25 is not 
confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but it applies to ‘the decisions 
of the Security Council’ adopted in accordance with the Charter”.152 It based its 
opinion on the following: (i) Art. 25 is not placed in Chapter VII of the Charter but 
comes directly after Art. 24, which deals with the powers of the SC as a whole; (ii) 
if Art. 25 exclusively covers decisions on enforcement actions under Arts. 41 and 
42, it means that Art. 25 would be superfluous because Arts. 48 and 49 could secure 
the necessary effect.
Having determined the real scope of Art. 25, the Court turned to determine the 
scope of this article ratione persona. It concluded that the Council’s decisions 
adopted in accordance with the Charter will be binding on all UN member states 
who vote in favour of or against the adoption of a decision because they are obliged
149 Kelsen, supra note 147, pp. 95-6.
150 For the Council’s practice, see White, supra note 51, pp. 54-5.
151 ICJ Pled., 1970, vol. I, pp. 363-5 & vol. II, pp. 256-64; ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 52-3; 
Higgins, supra note 147, pp. 275-7.
152 ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 52-3; Aboul-Enein, supra note 34, p. 143; Mani, V., “The Advisory 
Opinion in Namibia Case: A Critique”, IJIL, 11, 1971, p. 477; Kooijmans, P., “The Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia of the International Court o f Justice”, NTIR, 20, 1973, p. 23; Zacklin, supra 
note 33, p. 292; Jacque, P., “L’Avis de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 21 Juin 1971”, RGDIP, 
16, 1972, pp. 1085-9; Bollecker, supra note 101, pp. 314-17; Sonnenfeld, supra note 51, pp. 141-2.
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to accept and carry it out. Furthermore, it concluded that the binding effect of these 
decisions extends also to non-member states of the UN.153
In the Lockerbie cases,154 the Court determined the rank of international 
obligations derived from the SC’s resolutions vis-a-vis obligations derived from 
international treaties or customary rules. In these cases, Libya referred to its rights 
under the Montreal Convention to enjoin the USA and the UK from taking any 
action through the SC to compel or coerce Libya that could prejudice its rights on 
the basis that they are bound to adhere to the provisions of the Montreal 
Convention.155
The Court declined to render the Libyan requested measures on the basis that 
both Libya on the one hand and the USA and the UK as members of the UN are 
obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC in accordance with Art. 25. 
This was based on its interpretation of Art. 103 of the Charter, whereby it concluded 
that obligations derived from the Council’s resolutions prevail over the obligations 
of the parties under any other international agreement, inter alia the Montreal 
Convention.156 The Court stated that:
“Whereas the Court, while thus not at this stage called upon to determine definitively the 
legal effect of Security Council resolution 748 (1992), considers that, whatever the 
situation previous to the adoption of that resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the 
Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the 
indication of provisional measures.”157
153 To affirm its opinion the Court recalled its opinion in the Reparation case, where it said: 
“[t]he Charter has not been content to make the Organisation created by it merely a centre ‘for 
harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends’ (Article 1, para. 4). It 
has equipped that Centre with organs, and has given it special tasks. It has defined the position of 
the Members in relation to the Organisation by requiring them to give it every assistance in any 
action undertaken by it (Article 2, para. 5), and to accept and carry out the decisions o f the Security 
Council (ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 178).” ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 53-4.
154 For the facts of this cases, see ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 115-18; Weller, M., “The Lockerbie 
Case: A Premature End to the ‘New World Order’?”, AJ1CL, 4,1992, pp. 302 ff.
155 ICJ Pled., 1992, p. 9. In this respect, Libya argued that: “[t]he Convention provides, in 
particular, that a State on whose territory the alleged perpetrator o f offences which the Agreement 
contemplates is found may, whether or not the offence has been committed on its territory, opt 
between submitting the case to its competent authorities for purposes of criminal prosecution, or 
extradite the alleged offender.” ICJ Pled., 1992 (unpublished).
156 Art. 103 provides that, “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations o f the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.
157 ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 126-7; Weller, supra note 154, pp. 321-2; McGinley, G., “The
I.C.J’s Decision in the Lockerbie Cases”, GJICL, 22, 1992, pp. 581-2; Gowlland-Debbas, V.,
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The above dicta illustrate to what extent the Court has played a significant role 
in clarifying the legal effect of the SC’s resolutions. In addition, it has clarified the 
position of states when they are faced with an obligation derived from a Council 
resolution and an obligation derived from other international instruments.
6.2. The legal effect of the GA’s resolutions
It is well known that the Assembly’s resolutions have, as a general rule, a 
recommendatory effect, except for some specific issues where its resolutions might 
have a binding effect; for instance, the approval of the expenses of the organisation 
and their apportionment among the member states, the consideration of reports, the 
approval of trusteeship agreements, the exercise of supervising functions, and the 
admission of states.158 In addition to these exceptional cases, resolutions have a 
binding effect if the states agree, explicitly, to accept the Assembly’s resolutions as 
binding.159
Despite this fact, some lawyers have noted that the recommendatory effect of 
the Assembly’s resolutions extends to all its resolutions and, should they have any 
effect, it will be merely moral or political.160 This opinion is based on the rejection 
of the Philippines’ proposal during the travaux preparatoires stage of the UN:
“Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility”, ICLQ, 43, 1994, pp. 89- 
90.
158 Schwarzenberger, G., A Manual o f International Law, 1967, p. 289; Tunkin, F., “The 
Legal Nature of the United Nations”, RCADI, 119, 1966, pp. 34-5; Sloan, F., “The Binding Force of 
Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, BYIL, 25, 1948, pp. 23-4; 
Johnson, D., “The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, BYIL, 32, 
1955-56, pp. 121-2; Land, R., “The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly” in Wood, R. (ed.), The Process o f International Organisations, 1971, p. 210; Higgins, 
supra note 147, pp. 272-3; Ashmon, O., “The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the General 
Assembly”, CJTL, 3, 1961-2, p. 220; Sep. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht in Voting Procedure on South 
Africa case, ICJ Rep., 1955, p. 115.
159 This occurred when the USA, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union failed to 
reach an agreement on the fate of the Italian colonies. They agreed that if, within one year from the 
entry into force of the peace treaty with Italy, they could not settle the matter, it would be referred to 
the GA of the UN, and they would accept the Assembly’s recommendation as binding. See 
Schwarzenberger, ibid., pp. 233-4.
160 Goodrich, L., et al., Charter o f the United Nations, 1949, pp. 151-2; Diss. Op. of Judge 
Winiarski in the Expenses case, ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 232ff.
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“The General Assembly should be vested with the legislative authority to enact rules of 
international law which should become effective and binding upon the members of the 
organisation.” 161
It was concluded that it is impossible to attribute a binding effect to any GA 
resolutions. Consequently, states cannot be held accountable if they refuse to 
comply with these resolutions.162 Conversely, it has been noted by some lawyers 
that all the Assembly’s resolutions are binding upon member states in a legislative 
sense.163
In view of this disagreement, it is appropriate to illustrate the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this regard. The ICJ dealt with the nature of the GA’s resolutions 
in several cases.
In the Expenses case, it was argued that the GA’s resolutions may make only 
recommendations, and any resolutions passed by it are only recommendatory under 
Art. 10. In consequence, these resolutions cannot create binding legal obligations 
upon the member states of the organisation, being of only a political and moral 
rather than a legal nature.164 Thus, financial resolutions related to peace-keeping 
operations can command no more authority than the original resolution.165 The 
Court noted that financial resolutions imposed by virtue of Art. 17/2 are binding 
upon all states once the GA has apportioned those expenses among them and they 
have to be shared even among those who voted against them. This opinion was 
based on the GA’s independent authority to apportion expenses.166
In the Namibia case, it was argued, inter alia, that the competence of the GA is 
constitutionally limited to making recommendations. Accordingly, Res. 2145 was 
not legally binding upon South Africa and the member states of the UN.167 The 
Court noted that when the GA adopted its resolution it was fully intended to be
161 See UNCIO, 9, p. 316.
162 Khan, R., “The Legal Status of the Resolutions of the UN General Assembly”, IJIL, 19, 
1979, p. 553.
163 Johnson, supra note 158, p. 106.
164 ICJ Pled., 1961, pp. 137, 207.
165 Ibid., pp. 131, 273-4; Slonim, supra note 56, p. 247.
166 Cotton, supra note 56, pp. 116-17.
167 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 49.
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binding on the members of the UN. Accordingly, it concluded that “[i]t would not
recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the 
framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have the 
operative design”.168 This opinion was based on several grounds: first, this 
resolution was not a finding on facts but the formulation of a legal situation; second, 
the Assembly’s resolutions relied on the Court’s decisions in 1962.169
In this regard it could be argued that the Court, by its use of the term “operative 
design”, recognised, tacitly, that not all of the GA’s resolutions are deprived from 
any binding nature. If all the Assembly’s resolutions are deprived from any binding 
nature upon the member states, they cannot have an operative effect.
In addition to these precedents, the Court also recognised the legal value of the 
non-binding resolutions of the UN. In the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear 
Weapons case, it was contended by some states that the GA’s resolutions which deal 
with nuclear weapons have no binding character on their own account. In its reply, 
the Court noted that, even if some GA resolutions have no binding effect in this
matter, they may have normative value. The C 
certain circumstances, provide evidence import
rule or the emergence of an opinio juris”. It a]
may show the gradual evolution of the opinio j  
a new rule”.170
To conclude, it seems clear that the Court’s opinion affirmed the Assembly’s 
mandatory powers to approve the budget and the apportionment of expenses. 
Therefore, it confirmed the fact that not all the GA’s resolutions have only a 
recommendatory effect, and that it considered that some resolutions have a binding 
effect and oblige the member states of the UN.
168 The Court stated: “it would not be correct to assume that, because the General Assembly
is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases
within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determination or have operative 
design.” ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 50; Zacklin, supra note 33, p. 296; Higgins, supra note 147, p. 273.
169 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 50.
170 ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 26 (unpublished).
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Conclusion
This chapter shows how, through its power to interpret the Charter, the ICJ has 
enabled a progressive development of the law of the UN and participated in 
achieving the activities of the organisation.
Through its jurisprudence the Court has developed the doctrine of implied 
powers of the UN. In applying this doctrine, the Court has recognised the 
international legal personality of the UN, which has also been reflected upon its 
specialised agencies. In addition, it has invested the UN and its organs with powers 
not explicitly provided in the Charter. It has affirmed the power of the UN to 
supervise the territories which were under the mandate system of the League of 
Nations. Furthermore, it has confirmed the power of the political organs of the UN 
to create judicial subsidiary organs.
The Court has played a significant role in determining the horizontal division of 
powers between the UN organs in the achievement of their functions. It has 
considered the concurrent jurisdiction of the GA and the SC with regard to 
international peace and security and it noted that the SC has primary but not 
exclusive responsibility. Accordingly, it has affirmed that the GA has a residual or 
secondary concern for world peace. If peace is imperilled and if the Council is 
blocked and consequently fails to act, the GA is entitled both to discuss the matter 
and to recommend enforcement measures. The Court has supported the work of the 
GA in the field of the supervision of territories and decolonization. It has also dealt 
with the joint function of the political organs by delineating the power of the organs 
imposed by the Charter in relation to fundamental functions and powers of each 
organ.
In addition, the Court has played an important role in respect of the vertical 
division of powers. It has interpreted and developed the exclusive competencies of 
the political organs of the UN. On the one hand it has dealt with the GA’s 
competencies and confirmed its powers to protect human rights and to deal with 
conventions concluded under its auspices. It has also confirmed the Assembly’s 
powers to exercise its supervisory competence over the territories under the 
trusteeship system. Further, the Court has defined and determined the limits of the
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budgetary powers of the GA. Finally, it has examined and confirmed the power of 
the Assembly to terminate the mandate system and to grant self-determination. On 
the other hand, the Court has defined the powers of the SC in achieving its 
responsibilities pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter and has also defined the 
limits of the SC in maintaining international peace and security.
The Court has expanded its role to interpret and determine the application of 
agreements concluded between the UN and its specialised agencies on the one hand 
and their member states. Finally, the Court has in many instances determined the 
legal effect of the decisions and resolutions of the UN organs because the actual 
achievement of their powers depends upon their enforcement.
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Chapter Four
The Role of the International Court of Justice in Facilitating the 
Realisation of the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations 
through Its Contentious Jurisdiction
Introduction
The purposes and principles of the UN are designed to provide a guide for the 
conduct of the UN organs as well as of its members. The Charter devotes two 
articles grouped together in the first chapter of the Charter to refer to these purposes 
and principles and it gives the impression that there is no clear-cut distinction 
between these purposes and principles.1 Art. 1 of the Charter provides that the 
central purpose of the organisation is the maintenance of international peace and 
security and sets out the means designed to achieve this purpose. It also provides 
that this purpose could be achieved through the development of friendly relations 
among nations, the achievement of international co-operation in dealing with 
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and 
harmonisation of the action of members.
Since the purposes of the UN are to be pursued in accordance with the 
principles embodied in the Charter, Art. 2 indicates the principles that direct the 
organisation’s activities and the conduct of its member states. Art. 2 expressly lays 
down the obligations of the UN and the member states to respect sovereign equality, 
to fulfil their obligations in good faith, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to give the UN every
Regarding the relationship between Arts. 1 and 2 of the Charter, Randelzhofer notes that, 
“[d]espite that partial overlap in the subject-matter, Art. 2 has considerable significance of its own, 
compared to Art. 1, the decisive difference between the two provisions being that Art. 1 does not 
give rise to a direct right or obligation, neither for the organisation nor for the member states”. 
Randelzhofer, A., “Article 2” in Simma, B., et al. (eds.), The Charter o f  the United Nations: A 
Commentary, 1994, p. 73.
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assistance in any action taken in accordance with the Charter, and finally not to 
intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states.
This chapter will discuss and examine the role of the ICJ in facilitating the 
achievement of these purposes and principles and its interpretation of any other 
relevant articles in the Charter. As a preliminary issue this chapter will discuss the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Court, its basis and limits.
1. The ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction:2 The necessity of the states’ consent
Neither the Charter nor the Statute provides for the direct compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ over all states as a result of being parties to the Court’s Statute.3 The ICJ’s 
jurisdiction is invariably based, as is that of all international tribunals, upon the 
consent of the disputant parties.4 This principle was affirmed by the ICJ in several 
cases.5 For instance, in the Peace Treaties case, the Court noted that: “[t]he consent 
of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in contentious 
cases.”6 In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, it noted that: “[t]he general rules 
laid down in Article 36 of the Statute ... are based on the principle that the 
jurisdiction of the Court to deal with and decide a case on the merits depends on the 
will of the parties. Unless the parties have conferred jurisdiction on the Court in
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term “jurisdiction” means “the administration of 
justice”, “legal authority”, “extent of power”, or “district over which any authorising extends”. In 
the opinion of international lawyers, the Court’s jurisdiction means its power or authority to render a 
binding decision on the substance or merits of a case placed before it.
3 At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, a majority of the delegations favoured 
obligatory jurisdiction, but the opposition of the Soviet Union and the USA led to the retention of 
the principle of jurisdiction based on the consent of the parties and of the “optional clause” in Article 
36 of the Charter. See UNCIO, 13, pp. 390-2, 557-9; Lissitzyn, O., The International Court o f  
Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance o f International Peace and Security, 1951, pp. 61-2.
4 Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f  the International Court, 1985, p. 313 ff:, Donner, 
R., International Adjudication: Using the International Court o f  Justice, with Special Reference to 
Finland, 1988, p. 16. In this regard, Fachiri noted that “there exists no superior power capable either 
in fact or law of creating a jurisdiction or imposing resort to it”. Fachiri, A., The Permanent Court 
o f  International Justice, 1932, p. 70.
5 The PCIJ confirmed this principle in many cases. For instance, in the Eastern Carelia 
case, it observed that “it is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, 
be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any 
kind of pacific settlement”. PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, p. 27.
6 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71.
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accordance with Article 36, the Court lacks such jurisdiction.”7 In the Monetary 
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 case (1954),8 the Court concluded that there is “a 
well-established principle of international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, 
namely, that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent.”9 
In the light of the above, it seems clear that the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction 
is entirely based on the consent of the states, which could be given in many ways.
1.1. The forms of the states’ consent
The states’ consent can be given either (i) by declaring the jurisdiction of the Court 
to be compulsory under the “optional clause” of Art. 36 of the Court’s Statute, or 
(ii) by an undertaking in any other form to recognise as compulsory the jurisdiction 
of the Court with respect to a class of existing or future disputes, or (iii) by an 
express or tacit agreement to submit a particular dispute to the Court. The Court’s 
jurisdiction can be obtained either prior to or after a dispute has arisen.
1.1.1. Ante hoc consent
The states’ consent could be given prior to the emergence of disputes either by 
adhering to an international convention or by accepting the Court’s jurisdiction as a 
compulsory ipso facto in relation to any other states accepting the same 
obligation.10
7 ICJ Rep., 1952, pp. 102-3.
8 Hereinafter the Monetary Gold case.
9 ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 32. This dictum was reiterated in the Aerial Incident case, where the
Court observed that: “[i]t should, as it said in the case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 
1943, be careful not to run counter to a well-established principle of international law embodied in 
the Court’s Statute, namely that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its 
consent.” ICJ Rep., 1959, p. 142.
10 Art. 36 of the Statute provides that:
“1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters 
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as compulsory 
ipso facto  and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation;
d. The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”
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(i) International conventions
Pursuant to para. 1 of Art. 36 of the Statute, the states’ consent could be provided by 
means of a compromissory clause in a treaty, either bilateral11 or multilateral.12 
Pursuant to this article, the Court’s jurisdiction applies over any dispute which may 
arise between parties in respect of the interpretation and application of that treaty.13 
In addition, this consent might be provided in a general or regional treaty on the 
organisation of dispute settlement among states. It could provide that disputes 
arising between or among its parties will be subject to certain procedures, including 
submission to the ICJ. For instance, the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes (Geneva General Act) of 26 September 1928, and the 
Revised Act of 28 April 1949; the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of 
Bogota) of 13 April 1948; the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes of 29 April 1957.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Court is competent to decide whether 
or not the convention referring to the Court’s jurisdiction is applicable to the 
dispute. This was demonstrated by the Court in the Application o f the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment o f Crime o f Genocide case (1996) between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia.14 Bosnia was a part of the territories of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia signed the Genocide 
Convention on 11 December 1948 and deposited its instrument of ratification,
11 For instance, Art. 49 of the Consular Convention concluded between the UK and France 
on 31 December 1951. See ICJYB, No. 47, 1992-3, pp. 113 ff.
12 For a list of these treaties, see ICJYB, ibid.
13 Szafarz notes that these clauses can be divided into three categories: first, clauses which 
explicitly and unambiguously provide for the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (for instance, 
Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 
December 1948, and Article 10 of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 20 
February 1957); second, clauses which explicitly and unambiguously provide for the non- 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (for instance, Art. 8 of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages of 10 December 1962, the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1 December 1959, and the Convention Against Discrimination in Education o f 15 
December 1960); third, clauses in which the type of jurisdiction is unclear (for instance, Section 30 
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations o f 13 February 1946, and 
Article 48 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 30 March 1961). Szafarz, R., The 
Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1993, pp. 26-9.
14 Hereinafter the Bosnia case.
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without reservation, on 29 August 1950.15 On 29 December 1992, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina transmitted to the Secretary-General of the UN, as a depository of the 
Genocide Convention, a notice of succession in the following terms:
“the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, having considered the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime of Genocide, of December 9, 
1948, to which the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a party, wishes to 
succeed to the same and undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations 
therein contained with effect from March 6, 1992, the date on which the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent.”16
On 18 March 1993, the Secretary-General communicated the following Depository 
Notification to the parties to the Genocide Convention: “[o]n 29 December 1992, 
the notification of succession by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
above-mentioned Convention was deposited with the Secretary-General, with effect 
from 6 March 1992, the date on which Bosnia and Herzegovina assumed 
responsibility for its international relations.”17
Bosnia-Herzegovina referred its dispute with Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) to the Court on the basis of Art. IX of the Genocide Convention.18 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) objected to the Court’s jurisdiction on several 
grounds, inter alia that Bosnia-Herzegovina had not become a state party to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant itself.19 It argued also that, if the 
notice given by Bosnia-Herzegovina on 29 December 1992 had to be interpreted as 
constituting an instrument of accession within the meaning of Art. IX of the 
Convention, it could have become effective, pursuant to Art. XIII of the 
Convention, only on the 90th day following its deposit, that is, on 29 March 1993.20
ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 17 (unpublished).
16 Ibid., p. 18.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 4.
19 Ibid., p. 12.
20 Ibid., p. 15.
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The Court considered the above objections and concluded that Bosnia- 
Herzegovina is a party to the Genocide Convention as a result of succession.21 Then 
the Court turned to examine the scope of the jurisdiction ratione temporis. It found 
that the Genocide Convention - in particular Article IX - does not contain any clause 
the object or effect of which is to limit in such manner the scope of its jurisdiction 
ratione temporis, and nor did the parties themselves make any reservation to that 
end, either to the Convention or on the occasion of the signature of the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement. The Court rejected Yugoslavia’s arguments in this regard and 
concluded that it had jurisdiction in this case to give effect to the Genocide 
Convention with regard to the relevant facts that had occurred since the beginning 
of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.22 
Conventions concluded prior to 1945
To preserve the conventions which conferred the jurisdiction of the PCIJ, Art. 37 of 
the Court’s Statute stipulates that “[wjhenever a treaty or convention in force 
provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to be instituted by the League of 
Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as 
between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of 
Justice”. This article was invoked by Belgium in the Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company, Limited case against Spain,23 and was examined by the ICJ in the 
Aegean Continental Shelf case.24 From the opinion of the Court in these two cases, 
the application of Art. 37 needs two conditions to be fulfilled. First, the treaty must 
be binding to the dispute at the moment of the submission of the dispute to the ICJ. 
Second, the parties of the dispute should be parties to the ICJ’s Statute. This 
condition was derived from the Court’s statement that the terms “parties to the
21 Ibid., p. 18.
22 Ibid., pp. 23-4.
23 Hereinafter the Barcelona Traction case. In this case, the ICJ clarified that Art. 37 
requires the respondent to be a party to the Court’s Statute without considering when it became a 
party to this instrument. It also stated that the purpose of Art. 37 is to preserve as many 
jurisdictional clauses as possible from becoming inoperative by reason of the prospective dissolution 
of the PCIJ. ICJ Rep., 1964, pp. 34-6.
24 ICJ Rep., 1978, p. 14 (hereinafter the Aegean case).
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present Statute” mean parties to the ICJ’s Statute at the time when proceedings are 
instituted before the Court.
(ii) The optional clause
The states’ consent might also be provided by a declaration under Art. 36/2 of the 
Court’s Statute. Pursuant to this article, a state may formulate a declaration 
unilaterally by which it accepts the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory ipso facto, 
and, without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation. This declaration is known as the “optional clause”, or “compulsory 
jurisdiction” of the Court.25 No previous agreement between the litigant states is 
required in order to refer the dispute to the ICJ.26 Any state accepting the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction can at any time submit to the Court an application 
instituting proceedings against another state accepting the Court’s jurisdiction.
Two points should be briefly examined regarding the application of the 
optional clause: the first relates to its entry into force, and the second deals with its 
termination.
(a) Entry into force
The setting of the date of these declarations coming into force is important to 
determine the date when the obligation to accept compulsory jurisdiction comes into 
effect. Some declarations are valid only for future disputes and most of these 
declarations contain a reservation as to the time for which they are valid.27 
Generally, the declaration comes into force from a date specified in the state’s
Lawson, R., “The Problem of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court”, AJIL, 46, 
1952, p. 221; Kebbon, N., “The World Court’s Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Clause - 
Past, Present and Future”, NJIL, 58, 1989, p. 258.
26 In practice, several cases were submitted to the ICJ on this basis. For instance, the Anglo- 
Norwegian Fisheries case, the Rights o f  Nationals o f the United States o f America in Morocco case, 
the Application o f  the Convention o f 1902 Governing the Guardianship o f Infants case, the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Co. case, the Certain Norwegian Loans case, the Interhandel case, the Aerial Incident o f
27 July 1955 case, the Nottebohm case, the Right o f Passage over Indian Territory case, the Temple 
o f Preah Vihear case, the Arbitral Award Made by the King o f Spain on 23 December 1906 case, the 
Nuclear Tests cases, the Military and Paramilitary in and against Nicaragua case, the 
Transboundary Armed Actions case, the Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and 
Jan Mayen case, the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case, the Arbitral Award o f  July 1989 case, 
the East Timor case, Maritime Boundary case, and the Passage through the Great Belt case.
27 Hambro, E., “Some Observations on the Compulsory Jurisdiction o f the International 
Court of Justice”, BYIL, 25, 1948, p. 140.
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declaration.28 If such a date is not specified, international lawyers have noted, and 
the Court has upheld, that the declaration is intended to take effect at the time of 
deposit to the Secretary-General.29 This is justified on the basis that this deposit is 
considered to be a part of the legal act of acceptance of the jurisdiction by the state, 
and without it the declaration might be considered to be incomplete. In addition, 
these declarations could be regarded like any international treaty which, pursuant to 
Art. 102/3, comes into force as soon as possible by registration in the Secretariat of 
the UN.
The ICJ confirmed this view in the Rights o f Passage over Indian Territory 
case (1957), where it pointed out that:
“It has been contended ... that as article 36 requires not only the deposit o f the 
declaration ... with the Secretary-General but also the transmission by the Secretary- 
General of a copy of the declaration to the Parties to the Statute, the declaration of 
acceptance does not become effective until the latter obligation has been discharged. 
However, it is only the first of these requirements that concerns the State making the 
declaration. The latter is not concerned with the duty of the Secretary General or the 
manner of its fulfilment. The legal effect o f a declaration does not depend upon 
subsequent action or inaction of the Secretary-General. Moreover, unlike some other 
instruments, Article 36 provides for no additional requirement, for instance, that the 
information transmitted by the Secretary-General must reach the Parties to the Statute, or 
that some period must elapse subsequent to the deposit o f the declaration before it can 
become effective.”30
The Court confirmed this dictum in the Nicaragua case, where it affirmed that the 
date of entry into force of a declaration is the date of its deposit with the Secretary- 
General, unless otherwise indicated.31
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that, in the absence of an express 
date of entry into force of these declarations, they will be enforced from the date of
28 For instance, the declaration of Liechtenstein specified the dates on which those states 
became bound by the ICJ Statute, 29 March 1950. See ICJYB, No. 48, 1993-4, pp. 85, 100.
29 Art. 36/4 of the Court’s Statute provides that these declarations “shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the 
Statute and the Registrar of the Court”. In this regard, see Hambro, supra note 27, p. 141; 
Farmanfarma, A., The Declarations o f the Members Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice (The Interpretation o f Article 36, Paragraph 2, o f  the Statute o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice), Ph.D. Thesis (University de Geneve), 1952, pp. 66-8.
30 This view was confirmed by the ICJ in ICJ Rep., 1957, p. 146.
31 ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 403-4.
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submission of these declarations to the Secretariat of the UN regardless of the date 
of signature or ratification.
(b) Termination of declaration
As these declarations are made unilaterally by states, it is a well-established 
principle among international lawyers that these declarations expire in accordance 
with the period stipulated therein. In that case, the state should respect the time 
limit indicated in its declaration.32 Difficulties arise in determining when this 
termination of declaration should take effect, in the event that the declaration makes 
no mention of the limit. For instance, could this declaration be terminated 
instantly? The ICJ answered this question in the Nicaragua case when it rejected 
the argument that such declarations are terminable instantly, and determined that 
they are terminable only on a reasonable period of notice.33 In addition, the Court 
affirmed that any determination does not affect the validity of proceedings instituted 
prior to the date on which the declaration ceased to be in force.”34 
Declarations made prior to 1945
To preserve declarations of acceptance made under Art. 36/2 of the PCIJ’s Statute, 
Art. 36/5 of the ICJ’s Statute provides for the possibility of transferring these 
declarations for periods of time which have not expired, and making them
32 This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua case 1984. In this case, the United Sates terminated its declaration without giving six 
months’ notice and made a new declaration containing a reservation which covered the Nicaraguan 
claim. Nicaragua argued that the US termination was inconsistent with its original declaration. The 
Court accepted this argument and concluded that: “the six months’ notice clause forms an important 
integral part of the United States declaration and it is a condition that must be complied with in case 
of either termination or modification.” ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 417-21.
33 In this regard the Court referred to Art. 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which requires twelve months’ notice to terminate treaties. Despite the fact that the Court 
did not say that twelve months would be a reasonable period of notice for termination of a 
declaration made pursuant Art. 36/2, it concluded that three days - which had elapsed between the 
attempts to terminate the United States declaration and Nicaragua’s application to the Court - would 
not be enough. See ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 415-21; Merrills, J., International Dispute Settlement, 1991, 
pp. 113-14; McDougal, M., “Presentation before the International Court of Justice: Nicaragua v. 
United States”, Wor.Aff., 148,1985, pp. 43-5.
34 For instance, in the Nottebohm case, the Court stated that “[a]n extrinsic fact such as 
subsequent lapse of the Declaration, by reason of the expiry of the period or by denunciation, cannot 
deprive the Court of the jurisdiction already established”. ICJ Rep., 1953, p. 123; Rosenne, S., The 
Law and Practice o f  the International Court, 1965, vol. 1, p. 322.
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applicable to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.35 Accordingly, the old declarations are on 
an equal footing with declarations deposited with the Secretary-General in 
accordance with Art. 36/2 of the ICJ’s Statute.36 The Court affirmed the 
applicability of this article in the Nicaragua case,37 where it found that “Nicaragua’s 
1929 declaration was valid at the moment when Nicaragua became a party to the 
Statute of the new Court; it had retained its potential effect because Nicaragua, 
which could have limited the duration of that effect, had expressly refrained from 
doing so”.38
It can be concluded that acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction might be given 
before a dispute arises, either by granting this jurisdiction by an international 
convention or by accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.
1.1.2. Post hoc consent
The Court’s jurisdiction might come into effect after a dispute has arisen between 
states. This could be done either by concluding an agreement between the disputant 
states to refer the case to the Court or by accepting the Court’s jurisdiction as 
implicit, as will be seen now.
35 Art. 36/5 provides: “[declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to 
the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.”
36 It should be noted that seven of the declarations made during the PCIJ era were still in 
force when the ICJ was established. These declarations were of Columbia, the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay. See ICJYB, 1946-7, pp. 207 ff.
37 This article was invoked by Israel as a basis for referring its dispute with Bulgaria to the 
ICJ in the Aerial Incident o f  27 July 1955 case. The Court did not accept Art. 36/5 o f the Statute as 
a basis of its jurisdiction on the ground that (i) the transformation ipso jure  could operate only as 
between the original signatories of the Charter, and partly on the basis of a more general analysis of 
the power of states represented at an international conference in relation to states not there 
represented; (ii) a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the PCIJ became devoid of object as soon 
as that court was no longer in existence, so that Art. 36/5 could not have effect in relation to a state 
which became a party to the Statute after that date, since the declaration would not be in force. As a 
consequence, it concluded that such an interpretation is consistent with the international legal 
principle that the Court can exercise jurisdiction over a state only with its consent. See ICJ Rep., 
1959, p. 138; Lizzi, M., “Delimiting the World Court’s Jurisdiction: Realism in the Interest of 
Progress”, NYLSJICL, 12, 1991, p. 225.
qo
ICJ Rep., 1984, p. 404; Pax, T., “Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of 
Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?”, BCICLR, 8,1985, pp. 485 ff.
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(i) Special agreement
Consent could be given by a special agreement between the litigant parties 
(compromis) conferring jurisdiction upon the Court for the purpose of settling an 
existing dispute.39 This method is considered to be a voluntary or ad hoc basis for 
the Court’s jurisdiction.40 This compromis is itself a treaty. Not only does it confer 
jurisdiction upon the Court, but it also defines precisely the legal questions to be set 
before the Court. The Court’s position in this respect will be similar to any court of 
arbitration. Accordingly, the Court is bound by the agreement’s terms; and it 
decides the case as it is put to it in the application.
In practice, many cases were referred to the ICJ upon this basis; for instance, 
the Asylum case (1950), the Minquiers and Ecrehos case (1953), the Sovereignty 
over Certain Frontier Land case (1959), the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
(1969), the Delimitation o f the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf o f Maine Area case 
(1982), the Continental Shelf between Libya and Malta case (1982), the Frontier 
Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali case (1986), the Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier case (1990), and the Territorial Dispute between Libya and Chad 
(1994).
(ii) Forum prorogatum
The consent of states might also be given implicitly by the conduct of the parties. A 
state that submits a dispute to the ICJ accepts for its part the Court’s jurisdiction to 
take binding decisions concerning its dispute with other states. If the other party to 
the dispute appears before the Court and does not raise an objection to the Court’s 
jurisdiction on the ground of the absence of its consent, this implies acceptance of 
the Court’s jurisdiction on its part.41 Consent by conduct may also be given by a
39 Art. 40/1 of the ICJ’s Statute provides: “[c]ases are brought before the Court, as the case 
may be, either by notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the 
Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated.”
40 Beckett, W., “Decisions of the Permanent Court of Justice on Points o f Law and 
Procedure of General Application”, BYIL, 11, 1930, p. 31; Donner, supra note 4, pp. 99-100.
41 See Anand, R., Compulsory Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f  Justice, 1961, pp. 
117 f f ;  Rosenne, supra note 34, pp. 344 ff.; Sep. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht in the Bosnia 
(Provisional measures) case, September 1993, pp. 416 ff.
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request for the appointment of a judge ad hoc.42 Such tacit consent may sometimes 
also be inferred from a declaration or an act of a state dating before the moment 
when the case was brought before the Court.
In practice, the Court relied on this basis in the Corfu Channel (preliminary 
objection) case, where the Court referred to the letter submitted to it by Albania in 
which it recognised and accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in this case.43 The Court 
held that the acceptance was effective as a voluntary and indisputable acceptance of 
the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court observed also that “neither the Statute nor the 
Rules require that this consent should be expressed in any particular form”.44 The 
same jurisprudence was adopted by the Court in the Haya de La Torre case.45
On the other hand, the Court refused to accept the argument submitted by the 
UK in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, where the UK argued that the Government of 
Iran had by its action conferred jurisdiction upon the Court on the basis of the 
principle offorum prorogatum. In its reply, the Court stated that:
“The principle of forum prorogatum, if it could be applied to the present case, would have 
to be based on some conduct or statement of the Government of Iran which involves an 
element of consent regarding the jurisdiction of the Court. But the Government o f Iran 
has consistently denied the jurisdiction of the Court.”46
The principle of forum prorogatum could be used not only to confer the 
jurisdiction of the Court ab initio, but also to cover questions that fall outside the 
scope of the compulsory jurisdiction clause under which the dispute had been 
brought before the Court. This was stated by the PCIJ in the Rights o f Minorities in 
Upper Silesia case between Germany and Poland. In this case the Court derived its 
jurisdiction from the fact that the respondent argued the merits and raised no
42 In this regard, it has been noted that if a state raises an objection to the Court’s jurisdiction 
in the written pleadings and the representatives of the governments participating in the oral 
proceedings pass in silence over this issue, they must be assumed to have tacitly accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction. See Rosenne, S., The International Court o f  Justice: An Essay in Political and 
Legal Theory, 1957, p. 481, note 1.
43 See pp. 206 ff. below.
44 ICJ Rep., 1947-8, pp. 26-7.
45 ICJ Rep., 1951, pp. 77 ff.\ Anand, supra note 41, pp. 117 ff.\ Rosenne, supra note 34, pp.
3 4 4 #
46 ICJ Rep., 1952, p. 114.
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objection to the jurisdiction; the objection was raised only in the rejoinder. The 
Court construed this conduct as an acceptance of its jurisdiction. It concluded that 
“[tjhere seems to be no doubt that the consent of a State to the submission of a 
dispute to the Court may not only result from an express declaration, but may also 
be inferred from acts conclusively establishing it. It seems hard to deny that the 
submission of arguments on the merits, without making reservations in regard to the 
question of jurisdiction, must be regarded as an unequivocal indication of the desire 
of a State to obtain a decision on the merits of the suit.”47
1.2. Limits upon the ICJ’s jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the ICJ to settle international disputes is not absolute. There are 
some limits upon its role. It is limited by the domestic jurisdiction of the litigant 
states, by the reservations indicated by states when they accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, and finally by the scope of its function, because it cannot 
deal with non-legal disputes. The first limitation was discussed in Chapter One of 
this study;48 the other two limits will be the subject of this section.
1.2.1. Reservations upon the ICJ’s jurisdiction
Declarations of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction are often made subject to 
reservations, which may have the result of limiting the scope of these declarations. 
This was provided by Art. 36/3 of the ICJ’s Statute, which indicated that unilateral 
acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction over disputes under the optional 
clause could be limited by reservations contained in these declarations.49 The right
47 PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 15, 1928, p. 24; Alexandrov, S., Reservations in Unilateral 
Declarations Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f Justice, p. 3.
48 See pp. 26 ff. above.
49 Art. 36/3 of the ICJ’s Statute provides: “[t]he declarations referred to above may be made 
unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain 
time”. In this regard, it should be noted that, as a consequence of the absence of an express 
provision similar to the article in the PCIJ’s Statute, some lawyers have expressed the view that the 
insertion of reservations in declarations of acceptance of the PCIJ’s compulsory jurisdiction was not 
permissible. See Higgins, A., British Acceptance o f Compulsory Arbitration under the Optional 
Clause and Its Implication, 1929, p. 6. This view has no ground regarding the reservations 
appended to declarations of acceptance o f the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction because the Statute 
clearly states that a state may recognise the jurisdiction of the Court either unconditionally or 
conditionally. According to this draft, any state can attach reservations to its declaration because the 
term “condition” is equivalent to the term “reservation”, as has been used interchangeably by the ICJ 
in several cases, for instance the Temple Preah Vihear case.
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to append reservations to declarations accepting the optional clause is justified on 
the basis that allowing states to indicate reservations to their declarations was a 
compromise between those who were in favour of entitling the ICJ to a true 
compulsory jurisdiction, and those who were in favour of retaining the exclusive 
consensus basis of the Court’s jurisdiction.50
Reservations can be classified according to their character into the following 
types: ratione temporis, ratione personae, and ratione materiae.
(i) Reservation ratione temporis
The aim of this reservation is to limit the Court’s jurisdiction to a dispute arising 
prior to or after a given date. This date could be a previous date, the date of deposit, 
the date of signature, the date of entry into force of their declarations, or a particular 
(exclusion) date.51 As indicated by Merrills, the objectives of this type of 
reservation are to prevent the litigation of stale disputes or the reopening of ancient
With regard to the reservations to the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 
international doctrine, see for example Crawford, J., “The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to 
the Jurisdiction of the International Court”, BYIL, 50, 1979, pp. 63 ff:, Ioannou, K., “Reservations to 
the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ - A Tabular Analysis of their Procedural 
Treatment”, HRIR, 1, 1980, pp. 4 1 5 ^
50 Sub-Committee IV/I/D of the San Francisco Conference adopted the following statement: 
“the question of reservation calls for an explanation. As is well known, the article has consistently 
been interpreted in the past as allowing states accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to subject their 
declarations to reservations. The Sub-Committee has considered such interpretation as being 
henceforth established. It has therefore been considered unnecessary to modify paragraph 3 in order 
to make express reference to the right of states to make such reservation.” UNCIO, 13, p. 559. This 
passage was included in the report of Committee IV/I, ibid., p. 391. In practice, the ICJ observed in 
the Nicaragua case that “[i]n making the declaration a State is equally free either to do so 
unconditionally ... or to qualify it with conditions or reservations”. ICJ Rep., 1984, p. 418; see also 
Waldock, C., “Decline of the Optional Clause”, BYIL, 32, 1955-6, pp. 248, 270; Briggs, H., 
“Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, 
RCADI, 93, 1958, p. 233; Anand, supra note 41, pp. 187 ff:, Rosenne, supra note 34, vol. 1, p. 391; 
Higgins, R., “International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes: 
General Course on Public International Law”, RCADI, 230, 1991, pp. 251-3; Oda, S. “The 
International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench (1976-1993)”, RCADI, 244, 1993, pp. 41 ff.
51 For instance, the declaration by Pakistan is limited to “[l]egal disputes arising after 24 
June 1948”. In addition, the Spanish acceptance excluded from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
“disputes arising prior to the date on which this declaration was deposited with the Secretary General 
of the United Nations or relating to events or situations which occurred prior to that date, even if 
such events or situations may continue to occur or to have effects thereafter”. See ICJYB, No. 47, 
1992-3, pp. 101, 106-7, respectively; Szafarz, supra note 13, p. 58; De Fumel, H., Les Reserves 
dans les Declarations d ’Acceptation de la Juridiction Obligatoire de la Cour Internationale de 
Justice, 1962, pp. 9-11.
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controversies, and to ensure that only future events that arise subsequent to the 
declaration can be the subject of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.52
In the event of dispute over the application of this reservation, the Court is 
required to consider the date of the dispute to affirm its jurisdiction in the light of 
this kind of reservation. This has been done by the ICJ in many cases.53
(ii) Reservation ratione personae
This reservation aims to exclude from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction disputes 
with regard to some other state or certain categories of states. This reservation is 
based on the principle of reciprocity between states, or particular relations between 
a determined group of states, as in disputes that arise in regional areas.54 It might 
also rely on a specified relationship among states.55 Finally, it might rely on non­
recognition or the absence of diplomatic relations.56
Merrills, J., “The Optional Clause Today”, BYIL, LI, 1979, pp. 96-7; Merrills, J., “The 
Optional Clause Revisited”, BYIL, LXIV, 1993, pp. 213-14.
53 For instance, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case between Iran and the UK, ICJ Rep., 1952, 
pp. 98, 105-7; the Interhandel case between Switzerland and the United States, ICJ Rep., 1959, pp. 
20-2; the Right o f Passage Over Indian Territory case between Portugal and India, ICJ Rep., 1960, 
p. 34. Generally, see Potter, B., “Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case”, AJIL, 47, 1953, pp. 114-15; Briggs, 
supra note 50, pp. 247,286-90.
54 For instance, the US reservation dated 6 April 1984 by which it excluded from the Court’s 
jurisdiction “its disputes with any Central American State or arising out of events in Central 
America, in which the disputes shall be settled in such a manner as the parties to them may agree”. 
See ICJYB., 1984-5, No. 39, pp. 99-100.
55 For instance, when the UK accepted the jurisdiction of the PCIJ in 1929, it excluded 
disputes with the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations. PCIJ, Ser. D., No. 6, pp. 
45-6. In 1955 the declarations of the seven Commonwealth parties to the optional clause all 
included such a reservation. See Merrills, 1993, supra note 52, pp. 221 ff.
56 For instance, Israel’s declaration deposited in 1956 incorporated a reservation designed to 
cover the institution of proceedings by an unfriendly state. This reservation covered “any dispute 
between the State of Israel and any other State whether or not a member of the United Nations which 
does not recognise Israel or which refuses to establish or maintain normal diplomatic relations with 
Israel and the absence or breach of normal relations precedes the dispute and exists independently of 
that dispute”. The Indian declaration of 1974 also indicated a reservation that excluded “disputes 
with the government of any States with which, on the date o f an application to bring a dispute before 
the Court, the Government of India has no diplomatic relations or which has not been recognised by 
die Government of India”. See Merrills, 1979, supra note 52, pp. 104-5.
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(iii) Reservation ratione materiae
This reservation aims at excluding from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ any 
dispute concerning particular cases as specified.57 It mainly relates to the following 
types of disputes: disputes relating to the domestic jurisdiction of the declaring 
state; disputes relating to hostilities, whereby states exclude disputes occurring 
during a period of hostilities, armed conflict, individual or collective actions taken 
in self-defence, or resistance to aggression;58 disputes related to state boundaries and 
territorial status;59 disputes arising under a multilateral treaty;60 disputes expressly 
excluded by other agreements; matters excluded by internal legislature, 
constitutional questions and the domestic jurisdiction of states;61 disputes related to 
the determination and delimitation of maritime boundaries; disputes related to the 
condition of islands, bays, gulfs, territorial sea, and the corresponding continental 
shelf and the resources thereof; disputes related to the pollution of the environment;
57 Szafarz, supra note 13, pp. 51-4; De Fumel, supra note 51, pp. 14 ff.\ Guechi, K., 
Reservations to the Acceptance o f  the Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 
Ph.D. Thesis (University of Glasgow), 1988, pp. 357-62; Rosenne, S., The World Court - What It Is 
and How It Works, 1995, p. 91.
58 For instance, El Salvador’s declaration of acceptance, o f 26 November 1973 indicates that 
it will not include “[disputes relating to or connected with facts or situations of hostilities, armed 
conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in self-defence, resistance to aggression, fulfilment 
of obligations imposed by international bodies, and other similar or related acts, disputes or situation 
in which El Salvador is, has been or at some time be involved”. The UK declaration of 2 June 1955 
excluded “disputes arising out of or having reference to any hostilities, war, state of war, or 
belligerent or military occupation in which the Government of the United Kingdom has been 
involved”. See Rosenne, S., Documents on the International Court o f Justice, 1974, p. 308; 
Guechi, supra note 57, pp. 350-6.
59 For instance, the Honduras’ reservation by which it excluded from the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction “disputes relating to territorial questions with regard to the sovereignty of 
islands, shoals and keys, internal water, bays, the territorial sea”. The declarations of Surinam, 
India, the Philippines and Poland included similar reservations. See ICJYB, 1992-3, No. 47, pp. 85- 
6, 108, 87-8, 102-3, 103-4, respectively.
60 In its declaration of 1946 the USA indicated a reservation by which it excluded “disputes 
arising under a multilateral treaty unless (i) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also 
parties to the case before the Court or (ii) the United States of America specially agrees to 
jurisdiction”. This reservation was called the “Vandenberg reservation”. The ICJ dealt with this 
reservation in the Nicaragua case. ICJ Rep., 1984, p. 392; ICJ Rep., 1986, pp. 32-8.
61 For instance, the US declaration excluded from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
disputes with regard to matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction as determined by 
themselves. The declarations of Canada, El Salvador, the Gambia, Honduras, Pakistan, Senegal, 
Swaziland, India, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, Cyprus, and Poland included similar reservations.
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disputes related to airspace supeijacent to its land and maritime territory; and, 
finally, disputes related to foreign liabilities or debts.62
(iv) Final remarks
Having mentioned reservations to states’ declarations as a limit upon the Court’s 
jurisdiction, two main points should be illustrated.
First, it is appropriate to note that, in the event of a dispute relating to the 
applicability of a specific reservation, the matter is settled by the decision of the 
Court pursuant to Art. 36/6 of its Statute on the basis of its power to determine its 
jurisdiction.63
Second, these reservations operate reciprocally.64 Accordingly, the Court has 
the jurisdiction to try a case between two litigants only insofar as their acceptances 
are reciprocal.65 In other words, if one party has made a reservation to the 
declaration, this can be relied on by the other party as well; this means any 
reservation made by one party can be invoked by the other on the basis of Art. 
36/2.66 One may conclude that the concept of reciprocity means that, in a dispute 
between two states, the state with the narrower grant of jurisdiction becomes the 
common denominator for both states.67 This principle could be justified on the
62 For instance, the declarations by India, Honduras, and Poland, respectively. ICJYB, 
1992-3, No. 47, pp. 8 5 #
63 For the dicta of the Court in this regard and international lawyers’ opinions, see p. 98 
above.
64 As Weiss notes: “[t]he condition of reciprocity in the optional clause was designed to 
ensure jurisdictional equality of the parties to a dispute before the Court.” Weiss, E., “Reciprocity 
and the Optional Clause” in Damrosch, L., The International Court o f  Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, 
p. 98.
65 In 1947, Jessup noted that: “[b]ecause of the reciprocal quality of declarations under 
Article 36 of the Statute, the US reservations may be utilised against us by any other States. Thus if 
we should take to the Court a case against the United Kingdom, for example, which has also 
deposited a declaration under Article 36, that government could bar the jurisdiction by asserting that 
the question was within its domestic jurisdiction.” Jessup, P., “The International Court of Justice 
and Legal Matters”, ILRNU, 42, 1947, p. 287; see also Jones, G., “Termination of Declarations 
under the Optional Clause: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua”, TILJ, 20, 
1985, p. 558.
66 In the Interhandel case, the ICJ observed that “[reciprocity enables the State which has 
made the wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely upon the reservations to the 
acceptance laid down by the other Party”. ICJ Rep., 1959, p. 23.
67 Weiss, supra note 64, p. 84; Gross, L., “Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional 
Clause” in Damrosch, L., (ed.), The International Court o f  Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, p. 28; 
Szafarz, supra note 13, pp. 44-5.
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basis that a state accepts obligatory jurisdiction only in relation to any state 
accepting the same obligation. This principle was confirmed by the ICJ in several 
cases.68 In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the ICJ observed that, “jurisdiction is 
conferred on the Court only to the extent to which the two Declarations coincide in 
conferring it. As the Iranian Declaration is more limited in scope than the United 
Kingdom Declaration, it is the Iranian Declaration on which the Court must base 
itself. This is common ground between the Parties.”69 The above dicta were 
recalled in the Certain Norwegian Loans case between France and Norway (1957),70 
where the Court accepted Norway’s reference to the “domestic jurisdiction” 
reservation in the French declaration.71 The ICJ also applied this principle in the 
Interhandel case, where it noted that reciprocity enables a party to invoke a 
condition or reservation by the other party that it has not expressed in its 
declaration.72 Finally, in Aegean case, the ICJ accepted the Turkish Government’s 
argument, which was based on the fact that the dispute was one that “relates to the 
territorial status of Greece” within the meaning of reservation (b) in the Greek 
instrument of accession to the General Act. Accordingly, it found that Turkey’s
68 The PCIJ dealt with the concept of reciprocity under the optional clause in two cases: the 
Phosphates in Morocco case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 74, 1938; the Electricity o f Sofia and Bulgaria 
case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 77,1939.
69 ICJ Rep., 1952, p. 103.
70 Hereinafter the Norwegian Loans case
71 The Court stated that “[t]he French declaration accepts the Court’s jurisdiction within 
narrower limits than the Norwegian declarations; consequently, the common will of the Parties, 
which is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, exists within these narrower limits indicated by the 
French reservation ... In accordance with the condition of reciprocity to which acceptance o f the 
compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in both Declarations and which is provided for in Article 36, 
paragraph 3, of the Statute, Norway, equally with France, is entitled to except from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood by Norway to be essentially within its national 
jurisdiction.” ICJ Rep., 1957, pp. 23-4; Iwanejko, M., “The International Court of Justice”, PWA, 7, 
1967, pp. 236-7; Hubbard, H., “Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Revised Role 
for the International Court of Justice”, SLR, 38,1985-6, p. 177.
72 The Court stated that “Switzerland, which has not expressed in its Declaration any 
reservation ratione temporis, while the United States has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f the 
Court only in respect of disputes subsequent to August 26th, 1946, might, if in the position of 
Respondent, invoke by virtue of reciprocity against the United States the American reservation if  the 
United States attempted to refer to the Court a dispute with Switzerland which had arisen before 
August 26th, 1946. This is the effect of reciprocity in this connection.” ICJ Rep., 1959, p. 23.
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invocation of the reservation on the basis of reciprocity had the effect of excluding 
the dispute from the application of Art. 17 of the Act.73
It should be noted that the ICJ did not extend the application of the concept to 
the formal conditions laid down in the declarations, inter alia the time limit 
embodied in states’ declarations.74 This was pointed out by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, where it dismissed the US argument that, since Nicaragua could 
have terminated its declaration with immediate effect, reciprocity required that the 
USA should enjoy the same right.75 The Court concluded that the US termination 
did not affect the Nicaraguan claim.76 In addition, the Court observed that:
“The notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope and substance o f the 
commitments entered into, including reservations, and not with the formal conditions of 
their creation, duration or extinction. It appears clearly that reciprocity cannot be 
invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms o f a State’s own declaration, 
whatever its scope, limitations or condition ... It is therefore clear that the United States is 
not in a position to invoke reciprocity as a basis for its action in making the 1984 
notification which purported to modify the content of the 1946 Declaration.”77
It is possible to conclude that the Court restricts the application of the words 
“condition to reciprocity” contained in Art. 36/3 to those conditions that affect the 
scope and substance of the declarations. That is, it does not apply this concept to 
the formal conditions of declarations, inter alia time-limits set by a declaration 
under Art. 36/2.
ICJ Rep., 1978, p. 37.
74 Briggs, supra note 50, p. 249; Kirgis, F., “Nicaragua v. United States as a Precedent”, 
AJIL, 79, 1985, p. 654; Shihata, I., The Power o f  the International Court to Determine Its Own 
Jurisdiction: Competence de la Competence, 1965, p. 151; Rosenne, supra note 34, p. 417; 
Szafarz, supra note 13, p. 46.
75 ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 398 ff. The possibility of the applicability of the principle of 
reciprocity to formal conditions laid down in declarations, namely those relating to the entry into 
force, modification and termination, is a subject of disagreement among lawyers. On the one hand, 
Waldock notes that “in regard to the time factor ... reciprocity primarily means that the duration of 
the mutual obligations - the juridical bond - between any two states under the optional clauses is 
limited to the joint period during which both declarations are in force”. On the other hand, the 
majority of lawyers note that the principle of reciprocity is not applicable to the formal conditions of 
declarations. Accordingly, every declaration must be treated individually. See Waldock, supra note 
50, p. 278; Anand, supra note 41, pp. 185-6; Briggs, supra note 50, pp. 249, 276-7; Kirgis, supra 
note 74, p. 654; Shihata, supra note 74, p. 151; Weiss supra note 64, p. 84; Rosenne, supra note 
34, p. 417; Szafarz, supra note 13, pp. 45-6; McDougal, supra note 33, p. 41-3.
76 ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 425-6.
77 Ibid., p. 419.
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1.2.2. Non-legal disputes
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “legal disputes”. This principle is derived 
from the express provision of Art. 36/2 of the Court’s Statute, which indicates that 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction may be accepted “in all legal disputes 
concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the 
existence of any fact, and the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the 
breach of an international obligation”. Therefore, “political disputes” in their 
entirety are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, and if such a dispute is referred 
to the Court it must decline to adjudicate. This is based on the fact that the normal 
function of a Court is to apply the law, which has the effect of preventing the ICJ 
from deciding disputes of a purely political character.78
(i) The division of disputes into legal and political disputes in international 
doctrine
The Court is required in each case to determine whether a dispute is justiciable or 
not; in other words, are there any criteria to distinguish between justiciable and non- 
justiciable disputes which might be adopted by the Court? The attempt to find 
criteria to distinguish legal from non-legal disputes is a classical one and can be 
traced back to the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1899 and 1907.79 These conventions recommended arbitration as a 
suitable means of settling disputes “in questions of a legal nature and specially in 
the interpretation and application of international treaties”. Following this attempt, 
a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties included a provision for the distinction 
between legal and political disputes. All of these conventions failed satisfactorily to 
define the term “legal disputes”. They used one of two methods to define legal
78 It has been noted by Mosler that the justification for this exclusion of such disputes has its 
origin in the constitutional law of states organised according to the principle of the separation of 
power. According to this principle, courts are not competent to exercise legislative or executive 
functions. These matters are attributed to other institutions o f government, the legislative and 
executive organs. They are co-ordinated, but each is limited to the scope of competence attributed 
to it by the constitution. Mosler, H., “Political and Justiciable Legal Disputes: Revival of an Old 
Controversy?” in Cheng, B., et al. (eds.), Contemporary Problems o f  International Law: Essays in 
Honour o f  George Schwarzenberger on his Eightieth Birthday, 1988, p. 228.
79 Lachs, M., The Law and the Peaceful Settlement o f  Disputes, Gilberto Amado Memorial 
Lecture, 1975, p. 4; Poeggel, W., et al., “Methods of Diplomatic Settlement” in Bedjaoui, M. (ed.), 
International Law: Achievement and Prospects, 1991, p. 525.
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disputes: either they enumerated legal disputes,80 or they indicated a more general 
definition of disputes of a legal nature.81 These methods failed to reach a 
satisfactory classification or a clear distinction between legal and political disputes.
The attempt by international lawyers to determine what disputes are included in 
the expression “legal dispute” or “justiciable dispute” has led to a vigorous debate 
and considerable difference of opinion as to the utility of drawing such a 
distinction.82 Many criteria have been presented to distinguish legal from non-legal 
disputes. It has been noted that this distinction might be based on objective criteria 
whereby a dispute can be considered to be legal if there are international legal 
norms by which the dispute could be settled, whereas it is a political dispute if it is 
to be settled by application of other norms.83 Alternatively, it has been suggested
80 For instance, Art. 36/2 of the I d ’s Statute provides for the Court’s jurisdiction in all legal 
disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.
81 This method was adopted by several conventions. For instance, the four arbitration 
treaties which form part of the Locarno Pact, 1925, provide for arbitration in the case of disputes as 
to “the respective rights” of the parties. The Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration, and Compulsory 
Adjudication between France and Germany stated in Part I, Art. 1, that “[a]ll disputes of every kind 
between Germany and France with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their respective 
rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, 
shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of Justice, as 
laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those 
mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League o f Nations.” See Habicht, M., Post-War 
Treaties fo r the Pacific Settlement o f International Disputes, 1931, p. 303; Hedges, R., “Justiciable 
Disputes”, AJIL, 22, 1928, p. 561.
82 For the distinction between legal and political disputes in international doctrine, see for 
example Murty, B., “Settlement of Disputes” in Sorensen, M., Manual o f  Public International Law, 
1968, pp. 677 ff.\ Wagner, W., “Is a Compulsory Adjudication of International Legal Disputes 
Possible”, NULR, 47, 1952, pp. 23-5; Merrills, J., “The Justiciability of International Disputes”, 
CBR, XLVII, 1969, pp. 240 j f ;  Verzijl, J., International Law in Historical Perspective, Part VIII 
(Inter-State Disputes and Their Settlement), 1976, pp. 5 ff.\ Azzam, I., “The Justiciability of 
International Disputes”, REDI, 16, 1960, pp. 52 j f ;  Gordon, E., “Legal Disputes Under Article 36 
(2) of the Statute” in Damrosch, L. (ed.), The International Court o f  Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, 
pp. 183 jf.
83 As early as 1873, Goldschmidt - in his report submitted to the first meeting of the Institute 
of International Law - restricted legal disputes to disputes that could be settled on the basis o f the 
existing rules of international law. He concluded that, according to this criterion, territorial claims 
and the interpretation of treaties are considered to be legal disputes whereas disputes over 
nationality, equality, or “supremacy”, determined by considerations of power, are excluded. See 
Annuaire de I'Institut de Droit International, 6, 1874, pp. 421-52 (cited in Briggs, H., The Law o f
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that the criterion is a subjective one by which the dispute can be considered to be a 
legal one if the litigant states declare that it is a legal dispute.84 Legal disputes are 
those disputes that the parties have decided to refer to the Court, and where they are 
demanding the application of existing rules. According to this view, states invoke 
“justiciability” not because a dispute is inherently unsusceptible to judicial or 
arbitral resolution, but because they prefer to have the dispute resolved politically. 
Another criterion is based on the existence of a method for solving disputes: 
disputes are legal if they could be solved by legal methods, and they are political if 
they could be decided by political methods.85
All the above attempts failed to come up with a general definition of a legal 
dispute and its distinction from other disputes. This conclusion might be justified - 
as will be illustrated by the ICJ - by the fact that each dispute has legal and political 
dimensions. But, before examining the Court’s attitude in respect of the definition 
of legal disputes, another aspect of the problem should be examined concerning the 
extent of justiciability of international disputes and the possibility of referring 
disputes that have a mixed character or involve the use of force to the Court.
It has been noted that the Court has no right to adjudge in respect of disputes 
involving alleged acts of aggression.86 This is based on the fact that the Charter
Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes, 1953, p. 1042). See also Bloomfield, L., “Law, Politics and 
International Disputes”, Int.Con., 516, 1958, pp. 261-3; Kelsen, H., The Law o f  the United Nations, 
1951, pp. 477-9; Schachter, O., “General Course in Public International Law”, RCADI, 178, 1982,
p. 211.
84 Ross, A., A Textbook o f International Law, General Part, 1947, p. 279; Oppenheim, L., 
International Law, vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 1952, pp. 3-4; David Davies Memorial 
Institute of International Studies, Report o f a Study Group on the Peaceful Settlement o f  
International Disputes, 1966, pp. 4-5; Rousseau, C., Droit International Public, 1968, p. 277; 
Khare, S., Use o f  Force under UN Charter, 1985, p. 204; Mosler, H., “The Area o f Justiciability: 
Some Cases of Agreed Delimitation in the Submission of Disputes to the International Court of 
Justice” in Makarczyk, J. (ed.), Essays in International Law in Honour o f  Judge Manfred Lachs, 
1984, p. 415; Hambro, E., “The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, RCADI, 76, 1950, 
p. 171.
85 Higgins, R., “Policy Consideration and the International Judicial Process”, ICLQ, 17, 
1968, pp. 6 3 #
86 Gross, L., “Sources of Universal International Law” in Gross, L. (ed.), Essays on 
International Law and Organisation, vol. 1, 1984, pp. 149-55; Kaplan, M., et al., The Political 
Foundation o f  International Law, 1961, p. 278; Kunz, J., The Changing Law o f Nations, 1968, pp. 
586-92; Stone, J., Legal Control o f  International Conflicts, 1959, pp. 146-52; De Visscher, C., 
“Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication”, AJIL, 50, 1956, pp. 467-8; 
Borchard, E., “The Place of Law and Courts in International Relations”, AJIL, 37, 1943, pp. 46, 55.
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nowhere mentions the Court’s role in this regard. According to the Charter and its 
travaux preparatoires, such disputes were entrusted exclusively to the SC pursuant 
to Chapter VII.87 In addition, the GA was granted a distinctly secondary role, and 
the Court none at all. Accordingly, even if the GA may have a role in Chapter VII 
disputes, it does not mean that the Court has such a role.88 In addition, it has been 
concluded that some disputes are not about legal rights, but involve political or 
economic interests.89 In this view, the law is not sufficient to resolve such disputes 
and they will remain unsolved until the underlying political and economic interests 
have been satisfied by agreement or force. Accordingly, only “pure disputes” 
between states that do not reflect underlying “tension” can be resolved by a judicial 
resolution, whereas, if the dispute involves a political struggle, it is considered to be 
a non-justiciable dispute.90
The above view has been rejected on the grounds that the Court should never 
refuse jurisdiction over a case because it is political, or even preponderantly 
political. According to this view, there are no inherent legal barriers to the 
adjudication by the Court of cases involving the use of force.91 For instance, 
Lauterpacht stated that:
87 Higgins, for example, in discussing the Council’s designation of the Rhodesian question 
as a “threat to the peace” under Article 39 of the Charter, indicates that the Court might properly 
have declined a request to review that determination on the ground that the Charter vests jurisdiction 
to make such determination exclusively in the Security Council. Higgins, supra note 85, p. 58. 
Similarly, Bowett observes that the Court should never decline a case because it is political but only 
because authority has been committed to another UN body, such as the Council or Assembly. 
Bowett, D., The Law o f  International Institutions, 1982, p. 278; see also Greig, D., “The Advisory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the Settlement of Disputes between States”, 
ICLQ, 15, 1966, p. 324; Gross, L., “Limitation upon the Judicial Function”, AJIL, 58, 1964, pp. 
415,430-1.
88 Norton, M., “The Nicaragua Case: Political Question before the International Court of 
Justice”, VJIL, 27, 1987, p. 469.
89 The advocates of this view observe that “[t]o view such disputes solely from a legal 
perspective is to see but one facet of a multifaceted phenomenon. To seek to resolve such a dispute 
solely on the basis of legal rights is an exercise in futility.” See Norton, supra note 88, p. 499.
90 Falk refers to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Vietnam war, and the status of Berlin as 
examples of such disputes. Falk, R., “Realistic Horizons for International Adjudication”, VJIL, 11, 
1971, pp. 314, 321; see also Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations. The Struggle fo r  Power and 
Peace, 1956, pp. 425-34.
91 Rosenne, supra note 34, p. 94; Bilder, R., “An Overview of International Dispute 
Settlement”, JIDR, 1, 1986, pp. 1, 7-11; Jennings, R., International Courts and International 
Politics, Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture, 1986, pp. 2-3; Schachter, O., “Disputes Involving the
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“There is no fixed limit to the possibilities of judicial settlement; that all conflicts in the 
sphere of international politics can be reduced to contests of a legal nature; and that the 
only decisive test of the justiciability of the dispute is the willingness o f the disputants to 
submit the conflict to the arbitrament of the law.”92
In addition, he maintained that the question of the right of recourse to war in self- 
defence is in itself capable of judicial decision, and it is only the determination of 
states to have questions of this nature decided by a foreign tribunal which may be 
non-justiciable.93 The same view was expressed by Charles De Visscher, who stated 
that:
“There is no firm criterion derived from the object or nature of the dispute by which to 
classify disputes a priori as political or legal, the attitude o f the parties is alone decisive 
on the procedural plane.”94
Thus, it can be concluded that, as the international lawyers failed to adopt any 
criteria to distinguish legal from political disputes, they also failed to agree 
regarding the possibility of settling disputes of a mixed character or disputes 
involving the use of force. Therefore, the Court’s dicta should be examined 
extensively.
(ii) The broad concept of “legal dispute” in the jurisprudence of the ICJ
The plea of the non-justiciability of a dispute has been raised in a number of cases. 
The Court has generally approached the question of whether a concrete dispute is 
legal or not by arguing that the case is not one that falls within one of the four 
categories as indicated in Art. 36/2 of the Statute, or that the dispute is one that 
cannot be decided by rules of law indicated by Art. 38 of the Statute.95
In its capacity to give advisory opinions, the Court dealt with the allegation of 
the non-legality of the questions in a number of cases.96
Use of Force” in Damrosch, L. (ed.), The International Court o f  Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, p. 
223; Schachter, O., “Self-defence and the Rule of Law”. AJIL, 83, 1989, p. 259.
92 Lauterpacht, H., The Function o f Law in the International Community, 1933, p. 164.
93 Ibid., pp. \19ff.
94 De Visscher, C., Theory and Reality in Public International Law, translated from the 
French by P. E. Corbett, 1968, p. 353.
95 Rosenne, supra note 4, pp. 375-6.
96 See pp. 82 ff. above.
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The allegation of “non-justiciability” was raised in several contentious cases as 
well. For instance, in the Aegean case, the Court’s jurisdiction was challenged by 
Turkey on the ground that its dispute with Greece was “of a highly political 
nature”.97 The Court had to decide whether the case might be said to concern a 
political rather than a legal dispute. It found that the parties were arguing that their 
dispute involved a conflict as to their respective rights. Therefore, it concluded that 
the dispute between the two states in respect of the delineation of their continental 
shelf was a legal dispute.98 Similarly, in the United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran case (1979)," Iran objected to the Court’s jurisdiction in its letters to 
the ICJ of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 on the ground that the dispute was 
non-justiciable. It argued that the legal point of its dispute with the USA had 
“marginal and secondary aspects of an overall problem”. It noted that it is not 
possible to study the case divorced from other elements concerning, inter alia, more 
than twenty-five years of continual interference by the USA in the internal affairs of 
Iran, the shameless exploitation of Iran, and numerous crimes perpetrated against 
the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and 
humanitarian norms. Iran insisted that the question of hostages was not a legal one 
concerning the interpretation or application of treaties, but resulted from “an overall 
situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements”. 
Accordingly, it concluded that the Court could not deal with the American 
application.100 The Court, having regard to the importance of the legal principle 
involved in the case, dismissed the argument that the case was to be considered as 
“secondary” or “marginal” and thus outside the Court’s jurisdiction, and found that 
the case fell within its jurisdiction. In addition, it dismissed the Iranian allegation 
that the Court could not deal with the case because of the mixed character of the 
dispute, and shared the perception of the USA that the dispute was justiciable. It
97 ICJ Rep., 1978, p. 13.
98 Ibid.
99 Hereinafter the Hostages case.
100 ICJ Rep., 1979, pp. 10-11; Gross, L., “The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures”, AJIL, 74, 1980, p. 396 ff.\ Al-Ashall, 
A., “American Hostages in Tehran Case before the International Court of Justice”, RED1, 36, 1980, 
pp. 236-7.
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based its opinion on the ground that there is no mention in the Statute or in its Rules 
that the ICJ should decline to deal with a case because that dispute has other 
aspects, however important. Consequently, the Court ordered interim measures of 
protection in favour of the United States.101 It recalled the above dictum in its 
judgment on the merits in 1980. It concluded that any contention intending to 
deprive the Court of its jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute is of a mixed 
character would be unacceptable. It based its opinion on the assumption that its 
duty is to decide legal questions and that to regard political considerations as an 
obstacle would be to abrogate the fundamental object for which it was created.102 
The Court reasoned its judgment on the basis that:
“Legal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in 
political contexts, and often from only one element in a wider and long-standing political 
dispute between the States concerned. Yet never has the view been put forward before 
that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect o f a political 
dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue 
between them ... if the Court were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a 
view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role o f the 
Court in the peaceful solution of international disputes.”103
In the Nicaragua case, Nicaragua claimed that US support of insurrection 
forces in Nicaragua, namely the Contras, was an unlawful use of armed force and an 
impermissible intervention in Nicaragua’s internal affairs. The USA responded that 
Nicaragua was supporting insurgency and terrorism in the territories of its Central 
American neighbours, and any support by the USA of the Contras was an exercise 
of the right of self-defence. It denied the competence of the ICJ to deal with the 
dispute on the basis that, inter alia, the application was inadmissible because 
Nicaragua was asking the Court to examine only certain issues involved in the
101 ICJ Rep., 1979, pp. 15-16; Rafat, A., “The Justiciability of Politicised Disputes”, 
RDISDP, 1, 1983, p. 6; Przetacznik, F., “The Rightness of the Decisions o f the International Court 
o f Justice in the American Diplomatic Case in Iran”, RDISDP, 61, 1983, pp. 253-4.
102 Some lawyers observed that the Court, by taking jurisdiction in this case, appears to have 
broken new ground with regard to the classic distinction between the legal, i.e. justiciable, dispute 
and the political, i.e. non-justiciable, dispute. It did so by notably narrowing the scope o f the latter. 
See Lavalle, R., “The Notion of International Legal Disputes and the Assumption of Jurisdiction by 
the International Court of Justice in the Hostages Case”, RHDI, 35-6, 1982-3, p. 109.
103 ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 20.
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Contadora process.104 It also alleged that it was inappropriate and inherently beyond 
the capability of the Court to resolve disputes involving the ongoing use of armed 
force. This is a matter committed by the Charter solely to the SC, not to the 
Court.105 The Court dismissed the non-justiciability argument, and concluded that 
Nicaragua’s claims were justiciable. It stated that it should not reject an essentially 
judicial task merely because the issues before the Court are intertwined with 
political questions. It based its opinion on the ground that the ongoing use of 
unlawful armed force was never contemplated by the drafters of the Charter to be 
encompassed by Art. 36/2 of the Statute. Moreover, it referred to the Corfu 
Channel case and the Aerial Incident case as examples of cases in which the Court 
was asked to adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties with respect to matters 
involving the use of force and armed attacks.106 Consequently, in January 1985, the 
US Government referred to the Court’s judgment of 26 November 1984 and 
informed the Court that it would not participate any further in the case, and declared 
that those proceedings constituted a “misuse of the Court for political purposes ... 
the Court lacks jurisdiction and competence over such a case. The Court’s decision 
of November 26, 1984, finding that it has jurisdiction, is contrary to law and fact.” 
Further, “[t]he conflict in Central America ... is not a narrow legal dispute; it is an 
inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution. The
104 In his oral argument before the Court, Sohn noted that “it was not the United States’ 
purpose to argue that the application must be dismissed because it presents a ‘Political’ question, as 
opposed to a Legal question”. ICJ Pled., CR. 84/18, p. 67.
105 ICJ Pled., Counter Memorial submitted by the USA, August 1984, pp. 183-5; ICJ Rep., 
1984, p. 436; Norton, supra note 88, pp. 459-60.
106 The Court observed that: “[t]he allegation, attributed by the United States to Nicaragua, of 
an ongoing conflict involving the use of armed force contrary to the Charter is said to be central to, 
and inseparable from, the application as a whole, and is one with which a court cannot deal 
effectively without overstepping proper judicial bounds. The resort to force during ongoing armed 
conflict lacks the attributes necessary for the application of the judicial process, namely a pattern of 
legally relevant facts discernible by the means available to the adjudicating tribunal, established in 
conformity with applicable norms of evidence and proof, and not subject to further material 
evolution during the course of, or subsequent to, the judicial proceedings. It is for reasons o f this 
nature that ongoing armed conflict must be entrusted to resolution by political processes.” ICJ Rep., 
1984, p. 436.
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conflict will be solved only by political and diplomatic means - not through a 
judicial tribunal.”107
In its reply, the Court - in its judgment of 27 June 1986 - did not uphold the US 
view that the issues raised were non-justiciable because they involved an evolution 
of political and military considerations, which the Court is not competent or 
equipped to determine. It noted that its determination that an armed attack had not 
occurred did not involve an evolution of a military or political matter beyond the 
Court’s competence. It considered that the United States did not argue that the 
dispute was not “a legal dispute” or that international law was not controlling in a 
dispute of this kind. It also stated that:
“The Court can at this stage confine itself to a finding that, in the circumstances of the 
present case, the issues raised of collective self-defence are issues which it has 
competence, and is equipped, to determine.”108
Similarly, in the Border and Transborder case, Honduras contended the 
Court’s jurisdiction on the basis that the political inspiration of the proceedings was 
inconsistent with the Court’s judicial function. The Court dismissed the allegation 
and affirmed that political aspects may be present in any legal dispute brought 
before it. It stated that:
“As regards the first aspect of this objection, the Court is aware that political 
aspects may be present in any legal dispute brought before it. The Court, as a judicial 
organ, is however only concerned to establish, first, that the dispute before it is a legal 
dispute, in the sense of a dispute capable of being settled by the application of principles 
and rules of international law, and secondly, that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with it, 
and that jurisdiction is not fettered by any circumstance rendering the application 
inadmissible. The purpose of recourse to the Court is the peaceful settlement o f such 
disputes; the Court’s judgment is a legal pronouncement, and it cannot concern itself with 
the political motivation which may lead a State at a particular time, or in particular 
circumstances, to choose judicial settlement. So far as the objection of Honduras is based 
on an alleged political inspiration of the proceedings, it therefore cannot be upheld.”109
107 Statement of Department of State on US withdrawal from Nicaragua proceedings, 18 
January 1985. See AJIL, 79, 1985, pp. 438,441.
108 ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 28. In this regard two separate dissenting opinions argued, for 
different reasons, that the Court should have rejected Nicaragua’s claim as non-justiciable. Judge 
Oda observed that the dispute was not justiciable because it was not a “legal” dispute. Ibid., pp. 219 
f f  Judge Schwebel also argued that the Court should have held the US plea of self-defence as 
non-justiciable. Ibid., pp. 259 ff.
109 ICJ Rep., 1988, p. 91.
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From the above dicta, one may conclude that, although the Court has failed to 
identify general criteria (rigid or flexible) capable of distinguishing legal from non- 
legal disputes, it has never rejected a case on the ground that it involved a non-legal 
issue. It is inclined to take a broad legal perspective of what constitutes a justiciable 
dispute and to narrow the scope of political disputes. Therefore, the political 
aspects of an international dispute are not a bar to classifying any dispute as a legal 
dispute, nor do they affect the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. The 
Court has affirmed that all legal disputes have a political dimension and once the 
Court finds that a dispute raises a legal issue then it considers that this dispute is 
within its jurisdiction and it is entitled to proceed regardless of the political aspects 
of the dispute and their weight.
Having referred to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction - its bases and limits - 
the study will turn to discuss how the Court through this jurisdiction played a role in 
facilitating the principles and purposes of the UN.
2. The role of the ICJ in maintaining international peace and security
The maintenance of international peace and security is considered to be one of the 
primary purposes of the UN. Art. 1 of the Charter calls upon UN members to 
“maintain international peace and security, and to that end: ... to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might 
lead to a breach of the peace”.110 However, the Charter does not ignore the fact that 
disputes are a constant factor in all facets of human life. It is also recognised that 
peace cannot be maintained only by forbidding the use of force. Therefore, the 
Charter provides for certain mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the settlement 
of disputes in order to maintain international peace and security. It is entrusted to 
the political organs of the UN, namely the SC and the GA, to secure this aim insofar
110 Since the adoption of the Charter, the principle of peaceful settlement of international 
disputes has been universally recognised and proclaimed in a series of multilateral international 
instruments; for instance, the Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945, the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance 1947, and the Charter of the Organisation o f African Unity, 1963. See Voitto, 
S., “Legal Aspects of the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes”, Nor.TIR, 35, 1965, pp. 73- 
4.
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as it can be achieved. In addition, it provides for an agency, the ICJ, whose 
principal function is to apply legal techniques in the resolution of international 
controversies and to secure the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security through the rule of law.111
The importance of the role of judicial settlement was realised by Committee 
IV/I, which noted that, “[o]n the basis of the texts proposed for the Charter and for 
the Statute, the First Committee ventures to foresee a significant role for the new 
Court in the international relations of the future. Therefore, the judicial process has 
a central place in the plan of the UN for the settlement of international disputes by 
peaceful means.”112 In this regard, Rosenne notes “the consequence which the San 
Francisco conference drew from the establishment of the Court as the principal 
organ of the United Nations, namely that this was evidence of a firm intention that 
an international court should play an important role in the new organisation of 
Nations for peace and security”.113
The settlement of international disputes by judicial means, inter alia the ICJ as 
the principal judicial organ of the UN, is confirmed by several provisions of the 
Charter. Art. 1 indicates that international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace should be settled in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law. Art. 2/3 provides an obligation upon all members of the UN 
to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not in danger”. These means are 
defined by Art. 33 of the UN Charter, which states that the parties to any dispute, 
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security, shall seek a solution by one of a number of peaceful means
111 In this regard, Lachs has expressed the view that, “in the total process of interaction 
between States with all its difficulties, conflicts and differences of opinions, the Court, as the 
principal organ of the United Nations, ought to play a real role”. Lachs, M., “La Cour Internationale 
de Justice, Organe Judiciaire Principal des Nations Unies” in Liber Amicorum Adolf Schnitzer, 1979, 
p. 284; see also Lauterpacht, H., The Development o f International Law by the International Court, 
1958, p. 3; Chimni, B., “The International Court of Justice and the Maintenance of Peace and 
Security: The Nicaragua Decision and the United States Response”, ICLQ, 35, 1986, p. 960.
112 SeeUNCIO, 13, p. 393.
113 Rosenne, S., “The Non Use of the Advisory Competence o f the International Court of 
Justice”, BYIL, 39, 1963, p. 32.
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listed in the article, inter alia judicial settlement. In addition, Art. 36/3 of the 
Charter calls for the settlement of legal disputes through referral to the ICJ.
The Court’s power in this regard has also been affirmed in a number of GA 
resolutions and declarations; for instance resolutions 2627 (XXV) of 24 October 
1970 and 2734 (XXV) of 16 December 1970. In its Res. 3283 (XXIX) on the 
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, the GA considered that “the 
International Court of Justice could settle or assist in settling many disputes ... by 
the full application of the provisions of the Charter and of the Statute of the Court”. 
It also recalled that “the international Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations and, as such, is available to Members for the settlement of 
legal disputes”.114 Finally, in Res. 44/23, of 17 November 1989, by which the UN 
Decade of International Law was proclaimed, the GA set out four purposes for the 
decade, inter alia the promotion of means and methods for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes between states, including resort to and full respect for the ICJ.115
All the above indicate that the Court has been granted an essential role, 
alongside the SC and the GA, in the maintenance of peace and security by providing 
a judicial method of settling disputes by peaceful means. This was based on the fact 
that the peaceful settlement of international disputes has been regarded as an 
essential condition of the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Moreover, unsettled disputes might endanger international peace and security and 
contribute to international friction. Finally, it should be noted that every successful 
settlement of a controversy by peaceful means strengthens the structure of 
international peace and security. Therefore, it could be concluded that the ICJ was 
envisaged as a mean of settling disputes by binding decisions.
2.1. The practice of the ICJ in settling international disputes
Through its role in settling international disputes, the ICJ has played an important 
part in maintaining international peace and security. From the outset, it should be 
noted that the ICJ’s power to settle disputes is unlikely to assist in establishing 
peace by solving conflicts of political importance and by assuming functions which
114 GA Res. 3283 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
115 GA Res. 44/23, 17 November 1989.
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are essentially of a legislative nature. Neither is it the business of the Court to 
prevent actual outbreaks of violence. Nevertheless, the role of the ICJ in the 
maintenance of peace may reveal itself in the settling of international disputes by 
which it creates an atmosphere of respect for law. From that point of view, the 
question as to the role of the Court in maintaining peace is almost tautologous.
From an overview of the practice of the ICJ with regard to the settlement of 
international disputes it can be concluded that the Court has reduced friction 
between states and enabled them to co-operate more effectively. Of the cases 
referred to the ICJ for judicial settlement, some involve questions of interpretation 
or application of treaties, such as the Asylum case between Colombia and Peru; the 
Rights o f Nationals o f the USA in Morocco case (1952) between France and the 
USA; the Ambatielos case (1953) between Greece and the UK; the Application o f 
the Convention o f1902 Governing the Guardianship o f Infants case (1958) between 
the Netherlands and Sweden; the Hostages case (1980) between the USA and Iran; 
the Bosnia case (1996) between Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand and 
Yugoslavia on the other.
The ICJ has dealt with cases relating to sovereignty over certain territories and 
frontier disputes; for instance, the Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land case 
between Belgium and the Netherlands (1959); the Temple o f Preah Vihear case 
between Cambodia and Thailand (1961); the Frontier Dispute between Burkina 
Faso and Mali (1986); the Land, Islands and Maritime Dispute between El Salvador 
and Honduras 1990.
It has also dealt with cases concerning maritime delimitation and other law of 
the sea disputes; for instance, the Fisheries case (1951) between the UK and 
Norway; the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) between Germany on the one 
hand and the UK and the Netherlands on the other; the Aegean case (1978) between 
Turkey and Greece; the Continental Shelf cose (1982) between Tunisia and Libya; 
the Delimitation o f the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf o f Maine Area case, between 
Canada and the USA; the Contentintal Shelf case (1985) between Libya and Malta.
In addition, the Court has dealt with disputes arising from the law of diplomatic 
protection of nationals abroad; for instance, the Nottebohm case (1955) between
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Liechtenstein and Guatemala; the Barcelona Traction case (1970) between Belgium 
and Spain; and the Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. case (1989) between the USA and Italy.
Finally, there are cases involving the enforcement of contracts and violation of 
certain principles of customary international law; for instance, the Corfu Channel 
case (1949) between Albania and the UK; the Rights o f Passage over Indian 
Territory case (1960) between Portugal and India; the Nicaragua case (1984) 
between Nicaragua and the USA.
2.2. The relationship between the ICJ and the political organs in settling 
international disputes
As noted above, the UN Charter established six principal organs, four of which are 
directly concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. The 
ICJ as a judicial organ and the GA, the SC and the Secretary-General as political 
organs assume major functions of a different nature, but with important 
interrelations. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to focus on their relationship inter 
se.
The study of the relationship of the ICJ with the other political organs of the 
UN requires a preliminary brief focus on the role of the political organs in 
maintaining peace and security.
2.2.1. The role of the political organs with regard to the settlement of 
international disputes
(i) The role of the GA and the SC
As mentioned above, the Charter empowers both organs to maintain international 
peace and security. The SC, pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter, deals with 
matters that only potentially could disturb the peace and with regard to a dispute or 
situation “which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security”. It also acts pursuant to Chapter VII when an international crisis 
constitutes a “threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression”. 
Similarly, the GA may discuss any question of a general nature regarding the
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maintenance of international peace and security. It exercises the same peaceful 
settlement function on the basis of Chapter VI of the Charter.116
(ii) The role of the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General’s role as head of the Secretariat is to render assistance and 
provide facilities to the other principal organs and all other institutions of the UN. 
In addition, he frequently offers his good offices or is called upon to act as mediator 
or conciliator to settle international disputes.117 His role is laid down in Arts. 98 and 
99 of the Charter.118 Art. 98 provides that the Secretary-General shall perform those 
functions given to him by the consultative organs, and this opens the possibility of 
the delegation of responsibilities in the settlement of disputes. It was on the basis of 
this article that the SC and the GA made the Secretary-General a central diplomatic 
figure in the UN settlement of disputes.119 Art. 99 also entrusts the Secretary- 
General with express powers with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes.120 
In the light of this article, various actions can be undertaken at the request of
116 See pp. 132 ff. above. For details, see White, N., The United Nations and the 
Maintenance o f International Peace and Security, 1990, pp. 60 ff. (for the powers of the SC), and 
pp. 95 ff. (for the powers of the GA); Shearer, I., Starke’s International Law, 1994, 572 ff .
117 In practice, when the SC was paralysed during the cold war era, the Secretary-General 
played an important role in peace-keeping by appointing special representatives, or holding 
consultations with the litigant parties to reach acceptable solutions. Nowadays, with the revival of 
the SC, the Secretary-General has been mandated by it with a leading role in organising, supervising 
and directing an unprecedented number of peace-keeping operations. With regard to the role o f the 
Secretary-General in respect of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, see Zacher, M., 
“The Secretary-General and the United Nations’ Function of Peaceful Settlement” in Wood, R. (ed.), 
The Process o f  International Organisation, 1971, pp. 255 f f
118 Art. 97 provides: “[t]he Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as 
the Organisation may require...”
119 The Secretary-General has been instructed by the GA on several occasions; for instance, 
China in 1955; Palestine in 1956; Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan since 1980. He has also been 
instructed by the SC to intervene in international disputes and called upon to use his good offices or 
to act as a mediator; for instance, India and Pakistan in 1965; the Middle East in 1967; the border 
dispute between Iraq and Iran in 1974; Western Sahara in 1975; Namibia in 1978.
120 Dag HammarskjOld noted that “[i]t is Article 99 more than any other which was 
considered by the drafters of the Charter to have transformed the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations from a purely administrative official to one with an explicit political responsibility ... legal 
scholars have observed that Article 99 only confers upon the Secretary-General a right to bring 
matters to the attention of the Security Council but that this right carries with it, by necessary 
implication, a broad discretion to conduct inquiries and to engage in informal diplomatic activity in 
regard to matters which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. Foote, 
W. (ed.), Servant o f  Peace: A Selection o f the Speeches and Statements o f  Dag Hammarskjold, 1962, 
p. 335.
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interested parties, or on the Secretary-General’s own initiative without authorisation 
from the SC ortheGA.121
This power was confirmed by para. 21 of the 1988 Declaration on the 
Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten 
International Peace and Security. This paragraph states that the Secretary-General 
“should consider approaching the states directly concerned with a dispute or 
situation in an effort to prevent it from becoming a threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security”.122 The Secretary-General does not need any 
further authorisation nor does he need to wait for a state to ask for his help. In 
addition, he may make full use of his good offices, including the sending of a 
representative or fact-finding mission to areas where a dispute or situation exists.123
2.2.2. The dimensions of the relationship between the ICJ and the political 
organs of the UN
As seen above, the Charter has entrusted both the political and legal organs to 
achieve the central purpose of the UN, namely the maintenance of international 
peace and security, through their power to settle international disputes. The point 
here is to examine the dimensions of the relationship between these different 
organs. There are two aspects to this relationship. First, the power of the political 
organs of the UN to refer disputes with legal aspects to the Court is examined, as 
well as the legal consequences of their decision or resolution to refer upon the 
disputant parties. Second, the relationship between the ICJ as a judicial organ and 
the other political organs in the event of the concurrent referral of a dispute to them
121 The Secretary-General has played a role on his own initiative pursuant to this article. For
instance, the agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the case concerning the Yemen (1963)
was proposed on the personal initiative of the Secretary-General. He exercised his negotiating 
capacity in the Korean crisis (1953). He used his investigative powers regarding the Suez Canal 
(1956). He offered his good offices and mediation in several disputes, for instance the dispute 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia in respect of West Iran. He was also entrusted by the SC in 
1974 with the mission aimed at reconciling Iran and Iraq. In 1986, he was invited by the SC to act 
over the Rainbow Warrior incident. See Malinvemi, G., “The Settlement of Disputes within 
International Organisations” in Bedjaoui, M. (ed.), International Law: Achievement and Prospects, 
1991, pp. 564-5; Amerasinghe, C., Principles o f  the Institutional Law o f  International 
Organisations, 1996, pp. 429-30.
122 GA Res. 43/51, Annex. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, 1988.
123 Lee, R., “A Case for Facilitation in the Settlement of Disputes”, GYIL, 34, 1991, pp. 161-
2 .
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is determined and the possibility of contradiction in the conclusions reached by the 
political and the judicial organs of the UN.
(i) The power of the political organs to refer disputes to the ICJ
The political organs of the UN entrusted with fulfilling the objective of the 
settlement of disputes may direct the litigant parties to refer their dispute to one of 
the means indicated by Art. 33 of the Charter, inter alia judicial settlement. Art. 
36/3 provides that “[i]n making recommendations under this Article the Security 
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general 
rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance 
with the provisions of the Statute of the Court”.124
Despite the fact that the Charter does not contain a provision to this effect in 
respect of the GA, it has been argued that the SC’s power is equally applicable to 
the GA.125 This is based on Art. 10, which provides the GA with a broad 
competence, and Art. 11/2, which enables the GA to make any recommendations to 
the states concerned that it considers appropriate when a dispute is referred to it. In 
addition, Art. 14 of the Charter gives the GA the power to recommend measures for 
peaceful adjustment in respect of matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
In addition to the SC and the GA, the Secretary-General of the UN, through his 
good offices and his intermediary and conciliatory functions, is able to suggest 
solutions to disputant parties, including the referral of disputes with a legal 
dimension to the ICJ for settlement and to clarify the legal norms that could apply to 
this dispute.
124 In this regard, it should be noted that there was no similar paragraph in Art. 36 o f the 
PCIJ’s Statute.
125 Sohn, L., “Step-by-Step of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, ASILP, 
58, 1964, pp. 135-6; Steinberger, H., “The International Court of Justice” in Judicial Settlement o f  
International Disputes, Max Plank Institute fo r Comparative Public Law and International Law; An 
International Symposium, 1974, p. 237; Weissberg, G., “The Role of the International Court of 
Justice in the United Nations System: The First Quarter Century” in Gross, L. (ed.), The Future o f  
the International Court o f  Justice, 1976, p. 168.
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(a) The practice of the political organs in referring disputes to the ICJ
Since the establishment of the UN, the SC has applied Art. 36/3 in only two cases:126 
first, the Corfu Channel case between the UK and Albania; and, second, the case 
concerning the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey.
The first case was raised as a consequence of the explosion of mines, which 
seriously damaged two British warships passing through the Corfu Channel.127 
This issue was referred by the UK to the SC. Albania was not, at that time, a 
member of the UN but it participated at the invitation of the SC pursuant to Art. 32. 
Albania’s participation was made conditional on its acceptance of the obligations of 
a member of the UN in a similar case.128 With the failure of the SC to adopt a 
decision as a consequence of the use of the right of veto by the Soviet Union,129 the 
Council adopted Res. 22 in which it concluded that “the United Kingdom and 
Albanian Governments should immediately refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court”. The 
president of the Council pointed out that, although Albania was not a member of the 
UN, it had accepted the obligations of membership as contained in the Council’s 
invitation to participate in the discussion of the case, and that consequently Albania
126 In 1970, Higgins justified the Council’s reluctance to suggest reference to the Court as 
follows: “[t]he communist nations have always refused to use the Court; the newer nations have 
been convinced, since the South Africa judgment of 1966, that the Court cannot help in the solution 
of their problems and the western nations find it impolitic to urge reference to the Court.” Higgins, 
R., “The Place o f International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the United Nations Security 
Council”, AJIL, 64, 1970, p. 4.
It is appropriate to note that on two occasions proposals were made in the Security Council to 
refer disputes to the ICJ but they both failed. First, in 1947, Belgium proposed that the dispute over 
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 be referred to the ICJ (SCOR, 2nd Year, No. 80, 189th mtg., 20 
August 1947, p. 2115); this was supported by the UK representative to the Security Council (SCOR, 
2nd year, No. 86, 198th mtg., 28 August 1947, pp. 2296 ff.). However, the Council’s resolution did 
not refer the matter to the ICJ because the Belgian proposal could not get a majority. Second, in 
1960 the US proposal that the Soviet Union’s complaint concerning violation of Soviet air space be 
referred to the ICJ was vetoed by the Soviet Union (SCOR, 15th year, 883rd mtg., 26 July 1960, p. 
39). See Khare, supra note 84, p. 204.
127 Munro, H., “The Case of the Corfu Minefield”, MLR, 10, 1947, p. 363 f f ;  Jones, M.,
“Corfu Channel Case - Jurisdiction”, GS, 35, 1950, p. 91; ElKind, J., Non-Appearance before the
International Court o f  Justice. Functional and Comparative Analysis, 1984, pp. 38-9.
128 SCOR, 2nd Year, No. 5, 95th mtg., 20 January 1947.
129 SCOR, 2nd Year, No. 1 9 ,122nd mtg., 25 March 1947.
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was “obliged to comply with the provisions of both the Charter and of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice”.130
The second case related to the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey. 
Greece complained that Turkey had violated the sovereign rights of Greece on its 
continental shelf in the Aegean, which created a dangerous situation threatening 
international peace and security. Accordingly, the Security Council adopted Res. 
395 on 25 August 1976, whereby, pursuant to para. 4, it invited “the Governments 
of Greece and Turkey in this respect to continue to take into account the 
contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of 
Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences 
which they may identify in connexion with their present dispute”.131
The GA also made a recommendation to Austria and Italy to refer their dispute 
to the ICJ pursuant to Arts. 33 and 36 of the Charter in respect of the Bolzano 
dispute (1960), but this recommendation was not so specific, because the parties had 
the option to employ other methods of their choice.132
(b) The legal effect of the decision on referral
The question now is: what is the legal force of resolutions which, in certain cases, 
might lead the parties to a dispute to refer it to the ICJ? Do they actually establish 
some kind of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ? Needless to say, such resolutions 
will have a binding effect if the litigant parties accept in advance to consider such 
recommendations by the Assembly or the Council as binding upon themselves.133 
The binding effect in this regard is derived from the agreement of the states.
In the absence of such prior agreement of the parties, it has been 
unanimously agreed that the effect by the GA’s resolutions in this regard cannot 
exceed the effect of its decisions in general, which is recommendatory. The 
Assembly’s decision to direct the parties of a dispute to refer the matter to the ICJ
130 SC Res. 22, of 9 April 1947; De Ar^chaga, E., Voting and the Handling o f  Disputes in 
the Security Council (United Nations Studies No. 5), 1950, pp. 100-3; Bailey, S., The Procedure o f  
the UN Security Council, 1988,, p. 285.
131 See Bailey, ibid., pp. 285-6; White, supra note 116, p. 75.
132 GA Res. 1497 (XV), 31 October 1960. Khare, supra note 84, p. 216.
133 Stemberger, supra note 125, pp. 237-8.
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has no obligatory effect upon the litigant states. The same view could also extend 
to the recommendation or suggestion of the Secretary-General to the disputant 
parties to refer the dispute to the Court.
There is no such unanimous view in respect of the SC’s resolutions.134 
Consequently, and because the only case which was referred to the Court on the 
basis of referral by the SC was the Corfu Channel case between the UK and 
Albania, the study will examine the Court’s attitude in this case and the opinion of 
international lawyers in this regard.
On 13 May 1947, the Government of the UK instituted proceedings against 
Albania and requested the Court to decide that Albania was internationally 
responsible for the consequences of the Corfu incident, and should make reparation 
or pay compensation. The UK based the Court’s jurisdiction, inter alia, on the 
Council’s Res. 22 of April 1947, since the Albanian Government had accepted the 
Council’s invitation under Art. 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussion of 
the dispute, and accepted the condition laid down by the SC when conveying the 
invitation that Albania should in the present case accept all the obligations of the 
UN. The UK referred to Art. 25 of the Charter, which indicates that the members of 
the UN agree to carry out the decisions of the SC.135 In a letter dated 23 July 1947, 
addressed to the Registrar of the ICJ, the Government of Albania challenged the 
claim that the ICJ possesses compulsory jurisdiction and termed the action of the 
UK in instituting the proceedings irregular because it had no right to bring the 
dispute before the Court by means of a unilateral application. It also noted that Art. 
25 of the Charter relates solely to decisions of the SC taken on the basis of the 
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter and does not apply to recommendations
It should be noted that the legal effect of the SC in this regard was discussed at the San 
Francisco Conference. For details, see UNCIO, 13, 279 f f  This matter was also discussed before 
the SC at various times. During the 127th mtg., the Australian delegate interpreted it as meaning 
that recommendations made by the Council are binding upon the parties, in accordance with Art. 25, 
according to which members have to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC (SCOR, 2nd year, 
No. 34, 1947, pp. 723, 726). Conversely, during the discussion of the Greek case, the interpretation 
of the delegates o f Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was that under Chapter VI, including Art. 34, 
the SC could not make decisions that are binding upon the parties but only recommendations. The 
Yugoslav delegate justified this view on the basis of Art. 2/7, from which he concluded that “the 
Charter restricts the sovereignty of states only in the case of the measures provided for in Chapter 
Vir (SCOR, 2nd year, 1947, No. 57, p. 1280; SCOR, ibid., No. 63, 1947, p. 1520).
135 ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 18-19.
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made by the Council with reference to the pacific settlement of disputes, since such 
recommendations are not binding and consequently cannot afford an indirect basis 
for the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Albania nevertheless informed the ICJ that 
it fully accepted the recommendation of the SC, and expressed its willingness to 
appear before the Court and, in effect, seemed to have submitted to its 
jurisdiction.136
This argument reiterated in Albania’s Counter-Memorial and in its oral 
pleadings before the Court. It argued that if the SC could really force states in 
dispute to appear before the Court, it would have enormous power. Moreover, it 
pointed out that the British Government itself, in its official commentary on the 
Charter of the UN, did not mention such an extraordinary power of the SC, nor had 
anyone in the United States spoken of such a power of the SC through a 
“combination pretendue” of Arts. 36 and 25 of the Charter. It argued that a 
recommendation could thus never be construed as a decision, if by a decision one 
meant an act, a “declaration de volonte”, that was binding and operative. In this 
regard, it noted that the Charter of the UN itself makes a distinction between the 
terms “recommendation” and “decision”. Art. 94, for instance, provides that if the 
SC deems it necessary it can “make recommendations or decide upon measures to 
be taken.” Arts. 39 and 40 make a similar distinction between the two terms.137 
Finally, it was noted by Albania that Art. 25 of the Charter, providing that “the 
Members ... agree to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council”, did 
not apply to the recommendation that the British Government contended was a 
decision of the SC. Albania referred to the San Francisco Conference where the 
Belgian delegate had asked the sponsoring powers if the provision of Art. 4 of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposal (Art. 25 of the present Charter) was a “carte blanche”, 
and proposed to limit the scope of the article to Chapter VII of the Charter. The 
Canadian delegate had subsequently asked whether or not the SC, under that article, 
could call upon a member to take military action not covered by a special agreement
136 Ibid.; Jones, supra note 127, pp. 91-2; Donner, supra note 4, p. 24.
137 ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 1 9 ^ ;  Sloan, F., “The World Court and the United Nations”, ILR, 4, 
1948, pp. 654 ff.; Staczyk, J., “The International Court of Justice on the Competence and Function 
of the Security Council”, PYBIL, 15, 1986, p. 195.
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to which the member would be a party under Chapter VIII, Section B (Art. 43 of the 
Charter). In this regard, it was emphasised by the US delegate that “[t]he Charter 
must be construed in its entirety and that no single paragraph could be separated 
from the rest of the documents. There were special provisions which would 
override the general provisions, and the answer to the question was a categorical 
‘no’.” Although the Belgian amendment was not adopted, everyone then 
understood that Art. 25 was not a “carte blanche”. Albania referred also to the 
Belgian question - during the travaux preparatoires - whether the term 
“recommend” in Chapter VIII, Section A (Chapter VI of the present Charter) 
comprised an obligation on states who were parties to disputes, or implied merely 
that the Council should offer advice, acceptance of which might be potential. The 
UK delegate, as well as the US delegates, again gave an assurance that no 
recommendation by the Security Council would in any way have binding force 
against the parties. The relevant Committee at the San Francisco Conference 
emphasised, especially with respect to Art. 36 of the Charter, that:
“Cet article, d’une fa$on definitive, ne comporte pas le principe de la competence 
obligatoire; de plus, il n’autorise le conseil de Securite k porter devant la Cour aucun 
differend justiciable.”138
In response, the British Government argued that the argument of the Albanian 
Government that Art. 25 was limited in its application to Chapter VII was 
untenable.139 It noted that nowhere in the Charter would a provision be found to 
such effect. On the contrary, Art. 24 refers to four specific chapters (VI, VII, VII 
and XII) under which the SC is granted definite powers to carry out duties in 
connection with the maintenance of peace on behalf of the members. Meanwhile, 
Chapter VII, under Arts. 40, 41, 48 and 49, creates its own obligations so far as 
decisions of the SC under that chapter are concerned. Moreover, the British 
Government argued that the Albanian observation about Art. 25 in reference to the 
travaux preparatoires was untrue. What in fact the Belgian representative had been 
saying was: “do not extend the obligation under this Article to everything that the
138 ICJ Pled., vol. 3, 1947, pp. 25 ff.\ Chung, Y., Legal Problems Involved in the Corfu 
Channel Incident, Ph.D. Thesis (University de Geneve), 1959, pp. 65 jf.
139 ICJ Pled., 1947, vol. 3, pp. 72, 76-7.
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SC does, but make it clear that it does not apply only to Chapter VII.” In reality, the 
question was, as the Canadian representative had asked, whether there would be 
military obligations under Art. 25 other than those that would arise under Art. 43, 
and the answer had, of course, been “no”. The point was that the Belgian 
amendment, intended as it was to restrict the scope of Art. 25, would nevertheless 
have made that article embargo Chapter VI as well as Chapter VII; even so it was 
rejected on the ground that it was too restrictive. In addition, it was argued that, 
since a decision of the Council is required in order to arrive at a recommendation, 
any recommendation is in that sense a decision, which members have agreed under 
Art. 25 to carry out. Furthermore, the British Government noted that the Charter 
itself does not make a rigid distinction between decisions and recommendations; 
Art. 18/2, for instance, which begins by employing the word “decision”, 
immediately afterwards refers to “recommendations” as being included under 
decisions. It therefore concluded that Art. 36/3 of the Charter, under which 
resolutions of the SC are adopted, is directly linked with Art. 36/1 of the Statute of 
the Court, and that the joint effect of the two articles would be that the Court has 
jurisdiction once there is a resolution by the SC recommending reference to the 
Court, and once that resolution has been acted upon by one of the parties. It was as 
if both parties had adhered to the optional clause for the purpose of the matter 
referred by the SC. Under Art. 24 of the Charter, the SC, in making 
recommendations with regard to the matter, had acted on behalf of the members of 
the UN, including the members who were parties to the dispute. Albania had 
accepted all the obligations of a member of the UN in a similar case when it 
accepted the invitation of the SC.140
In its judgment of March 1948 on the preliminary objection, the Court avoided 
dealing with the main point in this case, namely the effect of the Council’s 
resolution by which it directed the parties to refer their disputes to the ICJ. It 
established its jurisdiction by applying the principle offorum prorogatum. It noted 
that the Albanian communication of July 1947 agreeing to appear before the Court 
was prior to its challenge of the ICJ’s jurisdiction and constituted a waiver of the
140 ICJ Pled., 1947, vol. 3, pp. 7 2 # ;  Chung, supra note 138, p. 6 7 #
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right to raise a preliminary objection.141 Finally, the Court emphasised that there is 
no special form that the agreement of the parties must take and that the letter 
constituted a decisive and indisputable acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
Court observed that:
“While the consent of the parties confers jurisdiction on the Court, neither the Statute
nor the Rules require that this consent should be expressed in any particular form.”142
The silence of the Court regarding the binding effect of the Council’s resolution 
has led to significant disagreement among international lawyers. Some lawyers 
have noted that the Court’s jurisdiction might rely on an SC resolution taken 
pursuant to Art. 36/3 of the Charter. According to this view, if the SC concludes 
that a dispute constitutes a threat to international peace, it may take all measures 
necessary to settle it, including, of course, the transfer of the dispute to the ICJ. 
This view is based on the possibility of arguing that the word “decision” under Art. 
25 includes, or may include, a recommendation under Art. 36; and so, where a 
recommendation has been made, members to whom it is addressed are under an 
obligation to accept it and carry it out.143 Therefore, the advocates of this opinion 
find it important to consider the whole scheme of Chapter VI of the Charter in 
which Art. 36 is embodied. In their view, it is clear that the Council may, under that 
chapter, take a decision to investigate a dispute under Art. 34 or a decision whether 
to take action under Art. 36 or to recommend the terms of settlement. These 
decisions are, however, decisions of a purely formal or preliminary nature, and they 
must be covered by Art. 25. Art. 25 does not state which, precisely, are the
141 ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 26-7.
142 Ibid. p. 27. Hambro, supra note 27, p. 134; Hackworth, G., “The Court, Its Jurisdiction 
and Work”, ARUNA, 1949, pp. 256-9.
143 Jones, supra note 127, pp. 91 ff. De Ardchaga also noted, with regard to the power o f the 
Security Council in this respect, that “this role of the United Nations’ political organs constitutes the 
only compulsory method of peaceful settlement under general international law”. De Ar6chaga, J., 
“International Law in the Past Third of a Century”, RCADI, 159, 1978, p. 147; Ladyzhensky, A., et 
al., Mirrtye Seredstva Razreshsniya Sporov Mezhdu Gosudarstvami, 1962, p. 142; Iwanejko, M., 
Miedzynarodowy Tribunal Sprawiedilwosci, 1969, p. 34 (the last two references are cited in Szafarz, 
supra note 13, p. 4). In his opinion regarding whether the SC’s ability to adopt mandatory decisions 
is limited to Chapter VII, White notes that “[a] binding decision under Chapter VI may be rare 
because it is mainly concerned with recommendatory powers, although it is not impossible”. White, 
supra note 116, p. 53 (emphasis added).
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decisions referred to and made binding by that article, and prima facie it refers to all 
decisions, procedural and substantive. The general language of paras. 2 and 3 of 
Art. 27 strongly reinforces this conclusion. Seeing that Arts. 25 and 27 come close 
together in the same chapter dealing with the whole work of the SC, it would be 
most remarkable if the word “decision” did not bear the same meaning in both 
articles. In his comments on the separate opinions of the Court’s judges in the 
Corfu Channel case, Johnson notes that “this reasoning, however, seems singularly 
unconvincing. The fact that the form of recommendation is used is not decisive one 
way or the other.”144 In addition, Hambro notes that:
“This conception does not rule out the possibility that the United Nations in later practice 
will tend to obviate the distinction between recommendations and decisions, or that the 
practice will develop attributing binding legal force also to recommendations voted by 
the General Assembly.”145
Conversely, the majority of lawyers have noted that the Council’s resolution in 
this regard has no more than recommendatory effect and it is by no means 
considered compulsory jurisdiction.146 This view is based on the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the word “recommendation”, which clearly carries no 
implication of a binding legal obligation. Moreover, according to the general 
structure of the Charter and the Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction must be founded on 
the consent of states. Accordingly, seven of the fifteen judges of the ICJ noted in 
their separate opinion in the Corfu Channel case that “it appears impossible to us to 
accept an interpretation according to which this article, without explicitly saying so, 
has introduced, more or less surreptitiously, a new case of compulsory
144 Johnson, D., “The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, 
BYIL, 32, 1955-56, p. 108.
145 Hambro, supra note 84, p. 141.
146 Malinvemi, supra note 121, p. 561; Chung, supra note 138, p. 75; Bowett, D., “The 
United Nations and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” in International Disputes, the Legal Aspects. 
Report o f  a Study Group o f  the David Davies Memorial Institute o f  International Studies, 1972, pp. 
183-4; Vallat, F., “The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” in Cambridge Essays in International Law: 
Essays in Honour o f  Lord McNair, 1965, p. 161; Giustini, A., “Compulsory Adjudication in 
International Law: The Past, the Present, and Prospects for the Future”, FILL, 9, 1985-6, p. 231; 
White, supra note 116, pp. 71, 74-5; Bilder, R., “Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use o f Force”, 
VJIL, 31, 1991, p. 259; Szafarz, supra note 13, p. 4; Eagleton, C., “Law and Courts”, ARUNA, 
1954, p. 160.
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jurisdiction”.147 These judges clearly rejected the UK argument that Art. 36, paras. 1 
and 3, should be applied in conjunction with Art. 25. This view has been confirmed 
by some lawyers. For instance, Jessup notes that “this recommendation neither 
compels submission nor in, and of, itself gives the Court jurisdiction”.148 In 
addition, Schwarzenberger notes that:
“The Court resisted the temptation to extend its jurisdiction by way of the back door. 
Contrary to the clear distinction in the Charter between recommendations and decisions 
of the Security Council - the latter exclusively under Chapter VII o f the Charter - those 
responsible for the preparation of the British case allowed themselves to be persuaded to 
put forward a dubious proposition ... The World C ourt... found it unnecessary to consider 
their remarkable argument explicitly.”149
Finally, Kelsen, in his analyses of Art. 25 of the Charter, concludes that 
recommendations made by the SC under Chapter VI will be either binding, if Art. 
25 is interpreted as referring to all resolutions of the SC, or not binding if decisions 
under Art. 25 mean only resolutions by which binding norms are to be created; even 
in the latter case, however, if the SC, under Art. 39, considers non-compliance with 
a recommendation as a threat to peace and resorts to enforcement action against the 
recalcitrant state, then the recommendation may have the same character as a 
“decision”. Nevertheless he notes that:
“Since such a recommendation may not conform with the positive law, and thus imply 
an infringement upon the rights of one or the other party, the Security Council having ft 
the power to enforce its recommendations may create new law in the relations between j 
the contesting parties, a power which is not conferred upoiTthe principal organ o flh e  \  
United Nations, the International Court of Justice.”150
Although this view seems well founded, the fact remains, however, that one is 
left with the Court’s opinion in the Namibia case. In this case, the Court found the 
legal basis of the SC resolution in respect of South-West Africa (Namibia) not only
147 Sep. Op. of Judges Basdevant, Alvarez, Winiarski, Zoricic, de Visscher, Badawi and 
Krylov in the joint separate opinion, and Judge ad hoc Daxner, ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 31 jf. In this 
regard, Mme Bastid noted that: “Cette opinion n’est sans doute pas partie de T arret, mais 6mise par 
pr6s de la moitte des juges, elle serait sans doute la base de la jurisprudence de la Cour, si le 
probl&me se posait k nouveau devant elle.” Bastid, S., “La Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale 
de Justice”, RCADI, 78, 1951, p. 591.
148 Jessup, supra note 65, p. 285.
149 Schwarzenberger, G., “Trends in the Practice of the World Court”, CLP, 4, 1951, p. 23.
150 Kelsen, H., “Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council”, ILQ, 2, 1948, pp. 212-13.
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in action in the exercise of the primary responsibility for maintaining peace, but also 
in Art. 24 of the Charter, whose scope in its view extends to more than merely the 
specific powers mentioned in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. It noted that Art. 25 
is not restricted in its application to Chapter VII: “Article 25 of the Charter is notsjf 
confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but it applies to ‘the decisions 
o f the Security Council’ adopted in accordance with the Charter” (emphasis 
added).151 Further, it observed:
“The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before 
a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers 
under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be 
determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, 
the discussion leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all 
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of 
the Security Council.”152
In the light of the above, some international lawyers have noted - rightly - that 
an SC resolution aiming to direct the litigant parties to the ICJ is clearly not 
excluded, though care would have to be taken over its effectiveness. Therefore, the 
wording of the Council’s decisions plays a significant role in this regard. If the 
Council were only to “decide that the dispute shall be submitted to the ICJ, that 
would leave doubts as to the modalities of seizing the Court of the case”. On the 
other hand, the route to the Court might be effectively opened if the SC were to 
“decide that the dispute shall be referred to the ICJ for decision on the basis of an 
application to be submitted by the complainant state”.153 As noted by Judge 
Schwebel regarding the Court’s opinion in the Namibia case, “the Court gave a 
broad, and most important construction to Article 25 of the Charter, which provides 
that ‘the members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’, holding that it is not 
confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to the decisions of
151 ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 52-3; See pp. 160 ff. above.
152 ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 52-3.
153 Lauterpacht, E., Aspects o f the Administration o f  International Justice, 1991, pp. 53-4.
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the Security Council adopted in accordance with the Charter”.154 Moreover, Higgins 
notes:
“Both the travaux preparatoires and the wording of the chapter lead one in the direction 
that the application of Article 25 is not limited to Chapter VII resolutions, excluding 
Chapter VI resolutions ... the binding or non-binding nature of these resolutions turns not 
upon whether they are regarded as ‘Chapter VI’ or ‘Chapter VII’ resolutions (they are in 
some ways a curious hybrid) but upon whether the parties intended them to be ‘decisions’ 
or ‘recommendations’... But much the same ends could be achieved by looking to see 
whether a resolution was intended as a recommendation or decision, and avoiding the 
somewhat artificial designation of resolutions which recommend Article 41 type measures 
as Chapter VI resolutions.”155
Similarly, Rosenne notes that: “[i]t does not follow that the interpretation 
contained in this separate opinion, even were its principles later to be adopted by a 
majority of the Court, would exclude the possibility that the Security Council could 
use some other verb than ‘recommend’, and thereby reinforce the contentions that a 
new case of compulsory jurisdiction has been created.”156
According to the above dicta of the Court and international lawyers’ views, the 
legal effect of an SC resolution in this regard will depend on the interpretation of the 
Council’s resolution. If it is interpreted as a decision, the disputant parties will be 
obliged to carry it out pursuant to Art. 25. If the interpretation of the Council’s 
resolution leads to it being considered as a recommendation, for example if the 
Council uses the phrase “calls upon” or “urges” or generally seeks voluntary co­
operation or compliance, then the meaning of para. 3 of Art. 36 will not fall within 
the meaning attributed to Art. 25, and the resolution would be deprived of any 
binding effect.
154 Schwebel, S., “Relations between the International Court of Justice and the United 
Nations” in Virally, M. (ed.), Le Droit International au Service de la Paix, de la Justice et du 
Developpement, 1991, p. 440.
155 Higgins, R., “The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding 
under Article 25 of the Charter?”, ICLQ, 21, 1972, pp. 281-3. In addition, regarding her view of the 
ICJ’s opinion in the Namibia case, see Higgins, R., “Peace and Security Achievement and Failures”, 
EJIL, 6,1995, p. 446.
156 Rosenne, supra note 34, pp. 343-4. In addition it has been noted by Zuijdwijk that “[i]t 
now seems settled that the Security Council can indeed pass resolutions in addition to those passed 
under chapter VII of the Charter which will nevertheless be binding on member states. The binding 
character depends on the intention of the Security Council and must be determined on an ad hoc 
basis, according to whether the Security Council wanted its language to be recommendatory or 
mandatory.” Zuijdwijk, A., “The International Court and South West Africa: Latest Phase”, GJICL, 
3, 1973, pp. 338-9.
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(ii) The concurrent jurisdiction of the ICJ and political organs in settling 
international disputes
As a consequence of the Charter’s provisions entitling both the political organs as 
well as the ICJ to achieve the objective of settling international disputes, the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction between these organs may arise. A dispute 
might be referred to both the ICJ and the political organ by one or both of the 
parties.157
This matter was discussed by Turkey at the travaux preparatoires stage of the 
Charter. It suggested that a new paragraph should be added to Art. 36 of the 
Statute, to the effect that recommendations made by the SC - pursuant to Art. 36 of 
the Charter - should not interfere with the legal procedure in the case of a dispute 
that has already been submitted for judicial settlement. The aim of this suggestion 
- as illustrated by Turkey - was to ensure that the SC would not intervene in a case 
that was being heard by the ICJ.158 The US delegate observed that the American 
understanding was that there could not be any restrictions on the action of the SC in 
the case of a dispute that endangered the maintenance of international peace and 
security.159 Thus, Art. 36 of the Charter was adopted without incorporating the 
Turkish suggestion.160 The Charter has no provision regulating the relationship 
between the ICJ and the other political organs in settling international disputes. 
There needs to be an examination of the attitude of the Court and the political 
organs towards the submission of closely related or identical aspects of the same 
dispute to the jurisdiction of these organs. In other words, did the doctrine of
157 The allegation of litispendence between the PCIJ and the Council of the League arose in 
the Right o f  Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) case. The case was referred to the 
Council in March 1927, as well as to the PCIJ. Poland objected to the dispute being adjudicated by 
the Court on the ground of litispendence because it had already been settled by the resolution o f the 
Council. See PCIJ, Ser. C., No. 14-11, 1928, pp. 60-1, 78-9, 219. The Court did not uphold the 
above challenge of litispendence and observed that: “the jurisdiction possessed by the Council of the 
League of Nations ... to decide upon individual or collective petitions, is entirely distinct from, and 
in no respect restricts, the Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes between States.” PCIJ, 
Ser. A, No. 12,1928, p. 23; Rosenne, supra note 4, p. 83.
158 See UNCIO, 7, pp. 73-4.
159 Ibid., p. 74.
160 Art. 36/2 provides: “The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures 
for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.”
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litispendence have a significant effect on either the practice of the Court or that of 
the political organs?161
(a) The ICJ and the GA
The issue of South-West Africa was included on the agenda of the 15th Session of 
the GA and referred simultaneously to the ICJ. The Fourth Committee of the GA 
dealt with this question on 14 November 1960. The representative of the Union of 
South Africa argued before this Committee that “[i]n those circumstances the 
substance of the contentious proceeding was sub judice and should not be discussed 
by the Committee. According to the sub judice rule, a Court should not be 
hindered, in any way, in the impartial exercise of its functions while a case was 
pending.”162 This argument was dismissed by the above Committee, and 
consequently by the GA.163
In its opinion, the ICJ decided that the dispute couljLbe seen by the ICJ and any 
other organs of the UN, inter alia the GA. This opinion was based on the fact that 
the dispute had a legal and a political dimension. Accordingly, it could be 
discussed simultaneously by both the Court and any other organ that has a political 
nature.164
161 The term “litispendence” is derived from the Latin lis pendens, meaning “while the 
lawsuit is pending”. Branyon, R., Latin Phrases & Quotations, 1994, p. 111. In legal terms, the 
word “litispendence” means “an obsolete term for the time during which a lawsuit is going on”. 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 842. In practice, “litispendence” is used for a plea that another 
action is pending. Oxford Dictionary, 1961, p. 349. This term is also often used to indicate a 
situation in which concurrent jurisdiction exists between two courts, or a situation in which a case is 
simultaneously pending before two courts. This term is used by international lawyers to describe the 
concurrent jurisdiction between the ICJ and the other political organs o f the UN in dealing with the 
settlement of international disputes. In this regard, see Mabrouk, M., Les Exceptions de Procedure 
devant les Juridictions Internationales, 1966, pp. 88 ff.\ Ciobanu, D., “Litispendence between the 
International Court of Justice and the Political Organs of the United Nations” in Gross, L. (ed.), The 
Future o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1976, p. 224; El-Dakak, S., The Power o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice to Indicate Provisional Measures, 1977, pp. 45 ff:, Elsen, T., 
Litispendence Between the International Court o f Justice and the Security Council, 1986, p. 1; Gill, 
T., “Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power o f the UN Security Council to Exercise Its 
Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter”, NYIL, XXVI, 1995, p. 118.
162 GAOR, 15th Sess., 1048th mtg., 11 November 1960,4th Comm., pp. 296-7.
163 Rosenne, supra note 34, pp. 84-5; Ciobanu, supra note 161, p. 224; El-Dakak, supra 
note 161, pp. 45 ff.
164 ICJ Rep., 1962, pp. 344-5.
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The attitude of the GA and the Court’s opinion could lead to the conclusion that 
the practice of the political organ’s jurisdiction cannot be considered as an obstacle 
to the ICJ’s jurisdiction. The political organs deal with an issue from a political 
point of view, inter alia the political circumstances of the dispute, whereas the legal 
organ, the ICJ, deals with the matter from a legal point of view. As Rosenne notes: 
“it is clear that a dispute that is simultaneously being dealt with by the GA and by 
the Court is not in itself regarded in either organ as a bar to its further action.”165
(b) The ICJ and the SC
The concurrent jurisdiction of the ICJ and the SC over the same dispute has a 
special character because both organs have been granted a unique power of being 
able to make substantive decisions binding upon states when they are dealing with 
an international dispute. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Charter to 
regulate their relationship. On the contrary, Art. 92 of the Charter provides that the 
Court “shall be the principal organ of the United Nations” and “shall function in 
accordance with the annexed Statute”, which contains no specific provision for such 
a case. An interesting issue in this respect is the effect of the concurrent jurisdiction 
upon the competence of the SC and the ICJ. This issue can best be examined in the 
light of the practice of the ICJ and the SC. Several cases have been referred to both 
organs simultaneously,166 or nearly simultaneously.167 Before dealing with the 
practice of both organs in this regard, it seems appropriate to refer to the attempt of 
some states to prevent this kind of litispendence between the organs and to refer to 
the opinion of international lawyers in this regard.
1- Pre-emption of the ICJ
At the outset, it is worthwhile noting that some states anticipated the possibility of a 
conflict between the ICJ and the SC. Therefore, their declarations of jurisdiction in 
relation to the ICJ contain a condition that a dispute may not be submitted to the
165 Rosenne, supra note 4, p. 87.
166 An example of a case being referred to both organs at the same time is the Aegean 
Continental Shelf case.
167 A dispute could be referred nearly simultaneously either when a case or question is 
referred to the Court before it is brought before the Council (e.g. the Anglo-Iranian case and the 
Hostages case), or when recourse to the Court is sought after an attempt to bring the dispute before 
the Council (e.g. the Nicaragua case, the Lockerbie cases, and the Bosnia case).
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Court if it is before the SC. This implies that reference to the Council must first 
have been attempted.168 For instance, the Australian declaration contains a condition )j 
that the Court’s procedure should be suspended if the same dispute is before the 
SC.169 In the absence of an explicit condition, it might nevertheless be argued that 
the applicant state, if it has not previously tried to reach a solution of a dispute by 
referring it to the Council, has needlessly instituted proceedings before the Court 
and its action is inadmissible on that ground.
Here the question arises as to whether or not such a condition is acceptable in 
the light of the Charter’s provisions regulating the settlement of international 
disputes, especially Arts. 33/1 and 37 of the Charter. It can be argued that such a 
condition is contrary to the spirit of the Charter and specifically to the above 
articles. According to these articles, the litigant parties are obliged first o f all to 
seek a solution, inter alia judicial settlement, before referring the case to the SC.170 
In addition it seems to be contrary to GA Res. 3283 (XXIX), which, having referred 
to the powers of the SC, pursuant to Art. 24, and the ICJ in respect of the settlement
168 This condition found its roots in the statement made by the Third Committee of the Fifth 
Assembly of the League of Nations in which attention was drawn to the possibility of reserving from 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction “the right of laying disputes before the Council o f the League of 
Nations with a view to conciliation in accordance with paragraph 1-3 o f Article 15 of the Covenant 
with the provision that another party might, during the proceedings before the Council, take 
proceedings against the other in the Court”. LNOR, Fifth Assembly, Third Committee, p. 199; 
Guechi, supra note 57, pp. 332-3. During the League of Nations era, the UK’s signing of the 
optional clause in 1929, accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, was subject to, among 
others, “[t]he condition that His Majesty’s Government reserve the right to require that proceedings 
in the Court shall be suspended in respect of any dispute which has been submitted to and is under 
consideration by the Council of the League of  Nations, provided that the notice tosuspendTs’given j 
after ftieliisputeTias beeiTsubmitted to the Council and is given within ten days of the notification of 
the initiation of the proceedings in the Court, and provided also that such suspension shall be limited 
to a period of twelve months or such longer period as may be agreed by the parties to the dispute or 
determined by a decision of all the Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute”. 
PCIJ, Ser. E., No. 6, 1929-30, pp. 479-80; Hudson, M., The Permanent Court o f  International 
Justice 1920-1942, 1943, p. 470.
169 In its declaration of 1954, Australia accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
“provided that notice to suspend is given within ten days of the notification o f the initiation of the 
proceedings in the Court, and provided also that the suspension shall be limited to a period of twelve 
months or such longer period as may be agreed by the Parties to a dispute or determined by decision 
of the Security Council”. ICJYB, 1956-7, p. 209. This condition of an unnatural right of suspension 
of proceedings in the Court is found in the declarations of Austria, Belgium, the USA, Botswana, 
Cambodia, Canada, France, the Gambia, India, Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Sudan, Pakistan, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. See ICJYB, 
1976, No. 30, pp. 40,42.
170 Farmanfarma, supra note 29, pp. 132-3.
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of international disputes, states that it is “jmjindful also of the continuing threat by 
serious disputes of various kinds and the need for early action to resolve such 
disputes by resort in the first instance to the means recommended in Article 33 of 
the Charter”171 (emphasis added). Needless to say, one of these methods is to refer 
the dispute to the judicial tribunal exercised by the ICJ. Furthermore, this condition 
can be rejected on the basis that it would lead to the Council acting as a regular 
agency for settling international disputes, which is contrary to its designed function 
as a body generally entrusted with the function of conciliation and pacific settlement 
of disputes. The Council might get involved in every dispute, whether minor or 
major, which would interfere with its primary task of maintaining international 
peace and security. One may recall Lauterpachf s observation that one of the 
principal reasons for the failure of the League of Nations fully to develop the 
possibilities of Art. 24 of the Covenant was the preoccupation of the Council with 
matters of minor importance.172
Therefore, it has been noted that, even if a state’s reservation specifically seeks 
to preclude simultaneous jurisdiction, the Court still retains the inherent authority to 
interpret the scope of the matters covered by the reservation in light of its overriding 
duty to consider a matter of ju s cogens f 3
2- The impact of concurrent jurisdiction upon the ICJ and the SC in 
international doctrine
As a consequence of the absence of provisions regulating the relationship between 
the ICJ and the SC, some lawyers distinguish between the impact of this 
litispendence upon the ICJ and upon the SC. They note that concurrent reference to 
the ICJ and the SC does not affect the SC’s jurisdiction to deal with matters falling 
within its competence.174 Hence, the Council is not restricted in exercising its
171 GA Res. 3283 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
172 Lauterpacht, H., “The British Reservations to the Optional Clause”, Economica, 10, 1930, 
p. 156 (cited in Briggs, supra note 50, p. 299).
173 Scott, C., et al., “A Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the 
Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United Nations Security Council’s Arms Embargo on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina”, MJIL, 16, 1994, p. 78.
174 Ciobanu notes that: “[t]he Security Council or the General Assembly were not restricted 
from dealing with disputes falling under their jurisdiction for the sole reason that other means and 
procedures of peaceful settlement (among them the judicial settlement by the International Court of
220
Chapter Four
functions when the same dispute is the subject of judicial proceedings before the 
ICJ. This view is based on the travaux preparatoires of the San Francisco 
Conference and the subsequent practice of the political organs of the UN. However, 
the power of the ICJ could be affected if the SC decided to deal with the issue under 
Chapter VII. In this case the Council could put an end to the Court’s jurisdiction.175 
This opinion is based on the following: (i) the interpretation of the US delegation of 
the Turkish proposal to amend Art. 36/2 of the Charter; (ii) the substance of Art. 
24/1 of the Charter conferring primary responsibility upon the Council for the 
maintenance of peace and security; (iii) the nature of the powers that the SC 
possesses when acting to preserve peace and security under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.
Many lawyers rightly disagree with the above opinion and conclude that it 
cannot be easily accepted for several reasons.176 First, neither the Charter nor the 
Statute establishes the precedence of the SC over the Court. There is no provision 
in the Charter or the Statute to suspend proceedings before the ICJ while the same 
matter is before the SC. Second, the Court alone, pursuant to Art. 36/6 of its 
Statute, has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. Third, the above opinion 
would provide the means for one party to a dispute to suspend settlement 
procedures under an international convention by using the SC to decide the case and 
order sanctions. Fourth, there is no scope to apply the principle of litispendence in 
municipal law to the relationship between the Court and the Council of the UN. 
This principle is not a general principle of international law and is applicable only 
to cases with which organs of an identical or similar character are dealing 
simultaneously whereas the SC is a political organ and the ICJ is a judicial one.
Justice) had been adopted by the parties.” Ciobanu, D., Preliminary Objections Related to the 
Jurisdiction o f the United Nations Political Organs, 1975, pp. 54 ff., 121 ff.
175 In his opinion in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, Judge Alvarez stated that, “if a case 
submitted to the Court should constitute a threat to world peace, the Security Council may seize 
itself of the case and put an end to the Court’s jurisdiction”. ICJ Rep., 1952, p. 134; Gill, T., 
Litigation Strategy at the International Court. A Case Study o f the Nicaragua v. United States 
Dispute, 1989, pp. 27-8; Gill, supra note 161, p. 118.
176 McGinley, G., “The I.C.J.’s Decision in the Lockerbie Cases”, GJICL, 22, 1992, p. 587; 
Tomuschat, C., “The Lockerbie Case before the International Court o f Justice”, RICJ, 48, 1992, p. 
41; Scott et al., supra note 173, p. 77; Graefrath, B., “Leave to the Court What Belongs to the 
Court: The Libyan Case”, EJIL, 4, 1993, p. 184 .
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Finally, as will be mentioned later, the dicta of the Court do not support this 
opinion.
3- The practice of the ICJ and the SC
An examination of the practice of both the Council and the Court is required to 
reach a conclusion in this regard. Accordingly, the study has classified the 
precedents involving both relevant organs in a manner that elucidates the issue of 
concurrent jurisdiction. This classification is as follows:
(A) Cases dealt with by the ICJ and the SC simultaneously and suspended bv the
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (1951) was referred by the UK to the ICJ for 
interim measures as a consequence of the nationalisation of the company by the 
Iranian Government and its refusal to submit the dispute to arbitration in accordance 
with the concession agreement.177 Iran disputed the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis 
that the matter was within its domestic jurisdiction. The ICJ indicated the requested 
measures to prevent the rights of the parties from being prejudiced and the situation 
from being aggravated without rendering judgment on the Iranian objection of 
domestic jurisdiction.178 In view of the disregard of the Court’s order by Iran, the 
UK referred the matter to the SC.179 Iran disputed the Council’s jurisdiction on the 
basis that the matter was within its domestic jurisdiction. As a consequence of this 
argument and because Iran had submitted similar arguments on the merit of the case 
pending before the Court, some members of the SC were reluctant to accept the 
Council’s jurisdiction until the matter had been decided by the Court. Therefore, it 
was noted by some members that: “[i]t may not, therefore, be wise or proper for us 
to pronounce on this question while the same question is sub judice before the 
International Court of Justice.”180 In addition, it has been noted that it was not
177 Feliciano, P., “The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute”, PLJ, 26, 1951, pp. 55 ff.', Razwy, A., 
“The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute”, PH, 6,1953, pp. 76-7.
178 ICJ Rep., 1951, pp. 93-4.
179 SCOR, 559th mtg., 1 October 1951, p. 10 (UN Doc. S/2357).
180 For a detailed account, see ICJ Rep., 1951, pp. 93-4. For the details of this case before 
the SC, see SCOR, 559th mtg., 1 October 1951, p. 10 (Doc S/2357); SCOR, 561st mtg., 15 October 
1951, p. 17; SCOR, 565th mtg., 19 October 1951, pp. 2-3; UN Doc. S/PV. 565th mtg., 19 October
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necessary for the Council to go into the actual merits of the case against Iran, since 
it was sub judice before the ICJ. Therefore, it was proposed to adjourn the Council 
discussion on the issue until the Court had ruled on its own jurisdiction. The SC 
adjourned its discussion pending a final pronouncement by the ICJ on its own 
competence in the case submitted on 26 May by the UK against Iran. 181
Before the ICJ, Iran disputed the Court’s jurisdiction. It based its view, inter 
alia, on its reservation appended to its acceptance of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction by which it declared that “[t]he Imperial Government of Persia reserves 
the right to require that proceedings in the Court shall be suspended in respect of 
any dispute which has been submitted to the Council”. Therefore it concluded that 
the Court’s proceedings should be suspended so long as the Court and the Council 
were dealing with an identical issue. 182 Conversely, the UK argued that the matter 
referred to the SC and the case submitted before the Court were not identical 
because the SC was merely seized of the complaint of the Iranian non-compliance 
with the Court’s order, and, even if there is a chance of litispendence, it referred to 
the principle developed in the Silesia case, where the PCIJ did not consider the 
referring of the same issue to it and the Council of the League as a bar upon its 
jurisdiction. 183
The Court did not examine and elaborate the issue of litispendence raised 
before it because it decided that it had no jurisdiction in that case on different 
jurisdictional grounds. 184
1951, p. 1; ICJ Pled., 1952, pp. 367-8; ICJ Rep., 1952, pp. 114-15; Feliciano, supra note 177, pp. 
55 ff.\ Razwy, supra note 177, pp. 76-7.
181 SCOR, 565th mtg., 19 October 1951; UN Doc. S/PV. 565th mtg., 19 October. 1951. p. 1.
182 In this regard it should be noted that Iranian acceptance of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction was based on its acceptance of the PCIJ’s jurisdiction o f 2 October 1930. See PCIJ, Ser. 
E., No. 7, pp. 465-6; ICJ Pled., 1952, pp. 367-8,477-8.
183 ICJ Pled., 1951, pp. 367-8.
184 ICJ Rep., 1952, pp. 114-15; Fenwick, C., “The Order of the International Court of Justice 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case”, AJIL, 45, 1951, pp. 723 ff.', Bishop, W., “The Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company Case”, AJIL, 61, 1967, pp. 749 ff. It is appropriate to note that Judge Cameiro 
in his dissenting opinion observed that, “in any event, any further proceedings should be suspended 
until the further decision by the Security Council of the United Nations”. ICJ Rep., 1952, p. 171.
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(B) Cases dealt with by both organs simultaneously and not decided by the Court 
The Aegean case between Greece and Turkey is the only case referred 
simultaneously to the ICJ and the SC and not decided by the Court. 185
Greece filed proceedings in the Registry of the Court and subsequently 
requested an urgent meeting of the SC on the basis of Art. 35 of the Charter, “to 
avert the danger of disturbing the peace, which is being seriously threatened” . 186 
With the participation of both Greece and Turkey, the SC discussed the question on 
12, 13 and 25 August. Its decision No. 395 of 25 August 1976 appealed to the two 
governments to exercise restraint and to do all in their power to reduce tensions in 
the area and resume direct negotiations, and invited both parties to “take into 
consideration that appropriate judicial means, particularly the ICJ, are qualified to 
make to the settlement of their dispute” . 187
In a letter to the ICJ dated 25 August, Turkey alleged that Greece’s application 
was premature and that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to deal with the dispute on 
the ground that the same issue was before the SC, which has the responsibility to 
restore international peace and security and had adopted a decision in this respect. 
In its judgment dated 11 September 1976, the Court declined the Greek request for 
interim measures. It held that there was insufficient risk of irremediable prejudice 
to the applicant’s rights to justify the exercise of its power under Art. 41 of the 
Statute, the SC having met on the issue with the participation of Greece and Turkey 
and having recommended the parties to do anything in their power to reduce 
tensions in the area. 188
185 ICJ Rep., 1976; Deloukas, N., “The Controversy Between Greece and Turkey in the
Aegean Sea”, Issues and Studies, 16, 1980, pp. 74 ff.
186 UN Doc. S/PV. 1949,12 August 1976.
187 SC Res. 395,25 August 1976.
188 The Court observed that “both Greece and Turkey ... have expressly recognised the
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security ... it is 
not to be presumed that either State will fail to heed the recommendation of the Security Council”. 
ICJ Rep., 1976, p. 13; Bernhardt, J., “The Provisional Measures Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice through U.S. Staff in Tehran: Fiat Iustitia, Pereat Curia?”, VJIL, 20, 1980, pp. 589
f f
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(C) Cases dealt with by both organs simultaneously and decided by the Court 
Three cases have been dealt with by both the ICJ and the SC and decided by the 
Court.
The first is the Hostages case between the USA and Iran regarding the 
occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran and its Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz 
and the detention of the diplomatic staff. The USA referred the case to the SC on 9 
November 1979, on the ground that the Iranian action endangered the maintenance 
of international peace and security, and urgently requested action to obtain the 
release of the hostages. While the issue was before the SC, the USA, by its 
application dated 29 November 1979, referred the case to the ICJ for interim 
measures. 189 While the case was on the Court’s list, the SC adopted Res. 457 of 4 
December 1979, calling on Iran immediately to release the hostages unconditionally 
and without delay, as well as calling on both parties to exercise restraint and resolve 
their differences peacefully. The SC decided to remain actively seized of the 
matter. 190
On 10 December 1979, the ICJ dealt with the USA’s request relating to interim 
measures. Its president asked the US representative during his oral statement about 
the value of the SC decision and its effect from the US point of view. In his reply 
the US representative answered that the Council’s resolution did not represent an 
obstacle to peaceful efforts in the other organs of the UN and it had no effect upon 
the US request for interim measures. On 15 December 1979, the ICJ unanimously 
indicated the measures requested by the USA without addressing the issue of 
litispendence between itself and the SC. 191
On 22 December 1979 and while the case on merits was pending at Court, the 
USA called for a new meeting of the SC as a consequence of Iran’s failure to 
comply with the earlier Council’s resolutions and the Court’s order for interim
189 See ICJ Pled., 1979, vol. I, pp. 3-4; ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 15; Green, L., “The Tehran 
Embassy Incident - Legal Aspects”, Archiv des Volkerrechts, 19, 1980-81, pp. 6 ff.
190 Although the matter o f the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court and the Council was not 
considered before the Security Council, the US representative presented a statement to the Council 
following the adoption of this resolution, stating that: “adoption of this resolution is not intended to 
displace peaceful efforts in other organs. It should not have any prejudicial impact on the US request 
for provisional measures at the ICJ.” SC Res. 457, o f 4 December 1979.
191 ICJ Rep., 1979, pp. 20-1.
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measures. The USA requested the Council for an “enforcement action” under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. The SC adopted Res. 457 of 31 December 1979.
On 24 May 1980, the Court issued its judgment on merits and concluded that 
Iran had violated the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and 
Consular Law, and the bilateral Friendship, Consular, and Navigation treaty. The 
Court also called upon Iran to comply with the terms of the order of 15 December 
1979.192 In respect of its relationship with the SC, the Court observed that the fact 
that the dispute or tension is also simultaneously being handled by a political organ, 
the SC, is no bar to the action by the Court. In this regard, it stated that:
“It does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that there was or could 
be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions by the
I Q 'l
Court and the Security Council.”
The Court based its opinion on the following. First, there is no provision in 
either the Charter or the Statute that prevents the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over a matter in respect of which the SC is exercising its jurisdiction. 
To affirm this, the Court pointed out that if such prevention had been contemplated 
it would have been expressly made, as it is in Art. 12 of the Charter which expressly 
forbids the GA to make any recommendation with respect to any dispute or 
situation being considered by the SC. Second, the Court, as the principal judicial 
organ of the UN, is empowered to resolve any legal questions that may be at issue 
between the parties, and the SC, pursuant to Art. 36/3, is under an obligation to take 
into consideration the important and decisive role of the Court in promoting the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 194
The same dictum was adopted by the ICJ in respect of the Nicaragua case, 
which was referred by Nicaragua to both the Court and the SC. 195 Before the Court,
192 ICJ Rep., 1980, pp. A \ff.
193 Ibid., pp. 21-2.
194 Ibid.; Munson, V., “The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran”, CWIU, 11, 1981, pp. 558-9.
195 ICJ Rep., 1984; Johnson, D., “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua”, Syd.LR, 10, 1984, pp. 485 f f ;  Briggs, H., “Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility”, AJIL, 79, 1985, pp. 373 f f ;  Tama, N., “Nicaragua v. United States: The Power of
the International Court of Justice to Indicate Interim Measures in Political Disputes”, DJIL, 4, 1985,
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the USA argued, inter alia, that the application was inadmissible because 
Nicaragua’s allegation concerned an ongoing use of armed force, a matter 
committed by the Charter to the SC, which was already dealing with the matter. 
Moreover, under Art. 24 of the Charter, the SC has “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security” . 196 Nicaragua argued that the view 
of an exclusive competence for the SC, even in matters concerning peace and 
security, was groundless because the Council’s responsibilities in that area are 
primary and not exclusive. Nicaragua relied on the precedent of the PCIJ in the 
Minority Schools case, and on the ICJ’s precedent in the Hostages case. 197 
Moreover, it argued that the ICJ can and must contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security even though questions submitted to the Court are 
identical to those before the political bodies, because they are considered to be “two 
different disputes”. In its view, the Charter does not contain a provision similar to 
Art. 12/1 with regard to relations between the Court and the SC because both organs 
are operating on different planes. 198
The Court dismissed the US view and concluded that a matter being before the 
SC could not be considered as an obstacle to the Court’s jurisdiction, because “both 
proceedings could be pursued pari passu”. In addition to the Court’s basis given in 
the Hostages case, it noted that the SC’s competence in the maintenance of peace 
and security - pursuant to Art. 24 of the Charter - is “primary” not exclusive. 
Moreover, it pointed out that the Council has functions of a political nature assigned 
to it, whereas the Court exercises purely judicial functions. Consequently, in its 
view, both organs can perform their separate but complementary functions with 
respect to the same event. 199
pp. 69 ff:, Pax, supra note 38, pp. 473 ff:, Rowles, J., “Nicaragua versus the United States: Issues of 
Law and Policy”, The International Lawyer, 20, 1986, pp. 1249 ff.
196 Counter-Memorial of USA, 1984, pp. 1 8 6 ^
197 Memorial of Nicaragua, p. 1 0 6 ^
1QQ
Public sitting (10 October 1984), Verbatim Record, Doc. CR 84/15 (English translation),
pp. 30-1.
1 on
ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 433-5; Singh, N., The Role and Record o f  the International Court o f  
Justice, 1989, p. 61; Rowles, supra note 195, pp. 1263-4; Reisman, W., “Has the International 
Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction?”, AJIL, 80,1986, pp. 132-3.
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Finally, the ICJ affirmed this attitude in the Bosnia (Provisional measures) 
case, which was submitted to both the SC and the ICJ. The SC adopted its first 
resolution, No. 713, on 25 September 1991, announcing that it was acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. The SC went on to adopt several resolutions in this 
regard. On 20 March 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina filed an application to the ICJ 
requesting interim measures against the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), mainly in relation to the violation of the Genocide Convention. 
Before the ICJ, it was argued by Yugoslavia that it would be appropriate for the 
Court to decline to indicate the requested measures because the SC remained 
actively seized with the same question. It also argued that, contrary to the above 
precedents, the SC had been acting under Chapter VII of the Charter from the very 
beginning, with all its implications for all organs of the UN and for all states, 
whether or not members of the UN. Therefore, the Court must find that, when the 
SC is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the often-repeated view of the Court 
that Art. 41 of the Statute confers on the Court an “exceptional Power” should 
prevail, as the Court did before in respect of the Aegean case, 1976. Finally, it 
argued that, so long as the SC was actually acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
it would be premature and inappropriate for the Court to indicate the requested 
measures.200 Conversely, Bosnia-Herzegovina affirmed that the Court should feel 
no hesitation in acting on the request for provisional measures. This view was 
based on the fact that the Court has an independent responsibility under the terms of 
the Charter to grant the request and not to worry about an attempt being made at the 
SC to pre-empt the Court’s ability to exercise its power under the Charter.201
The Court dismissed Yugoslavia’s argument and recalled its precedent in the 
Nicaragua case. It asserted that simultaneous jurisdiction does not affect its 
competence and, consequently, it would deal with the dispute and rule a judgment 
in this respect. This dictum, generally, is based on analysis of the provisions of the 
Charter and the Court’s Statute, where there is no provision to prevent the Court
200 ICJ Pled., April 1993 (CR 93/13), pp. 19, 23, 34-6; ICJ Rep., April 1993, pp. 19-20.
201 ICJ Pled., April 1993 (CR 93/13), pp. 44-5.
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from dealing with any dispute before the SC.202 This attitude was confirmed by the 
Court’s indicating the second request for provisional measures submitted by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in September 1993.203 Recently, the Court confirmed its 
competence to adjudicate upon the case in the dispute over the applicability of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide both 
ratione personae and ratione materiae.204
(D) Cases pending before the ICJ
The Lockerbie cases between Libya on the one hand and the UK and the USA on 
the other were referred to the SC by the United States and the United Kingdom, and 
to the ICJ by a unilateral application filed by Libya.205 Despite Libya’s disputing 
the Council’s jurisdiction on the basis that this matter did not endanger the peace or 
give rise to any issue concerning the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and that the dispute was a legal one concerning the possible extradition 
and/or prosecution of two terrorist suspects in connection with the Lockerbie 
incident, the SC adopted Res. 731 of 21 January 1991.206 During the proceedings 
before the Court, the USA argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to indicate 
interim measures because the SC was dealing with the same matter.207 In addition, 
the UK asserted that Libya was apparently seeking to use the Court to interfere with 
the authority of the SC, in particular with the possibility of action being taken under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. Conversely, Libya argued, inter alia, that the 
concurrent action between the ICJ and the SC was legally permissible. It based its
202 ICJ Rep., April 1993, pp. 18-19; Mahmoud, M., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case o f  
Approved Genocide, the Legal Qualification o f the Position o f  the Security Council and the 
International Court o f Justice in the Case o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1993, pp. 65 ff.
203 ICJ Rep., September 1993, pp. 349-50.
204 ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 29 (unpublished).
205 The Lockerbie cases are considered to be the first precedent where each party refers its 
claim to the Council and the Court respectively. The USA and the UK were pressing their claims 
via the Security Council, while Libya referred to the Court to seek legal protection.
206 Letter from Libya to the Security Council of 29 November 1991, UN Doc. A/46/845,
1991; UN Doc. S/23417, 1991; Lowe, V., et al., “The Lockerbie Affairs”, ICIQ, 41, 1992, pp. 909-
10.
207 ICJ Pled., 1992 (CR 92/4), pp. 31 ff.
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opinion on the precedents of the ICJ in this respect.208 While the ICJ judgment was 
pending, the SC held a meeting on 31 March 1992. During this meeting, Libya 
referred to the resolution adopted by the foreign ministers of the Arab League in 
their session of 22 March 1992 in which they urged the Security Council “to avoid 
the adoption of any decision to take economic, military or diplomatic measures 
against Libya, to await a decision by the International Court of Justice”. In 
addition, it argued that:
“In accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, and particularly 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36, the Security Council should take into consideration any 
procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the 
parties. The Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes 
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice.”209
In addition, the representatives of Cape Verde, 210 Zimbabwe and India211 
insisted that in the present dispute the ICJ should be given the opportunity to make 
its ruling and the SC should wait until the Court had made a determination.212 
Venezuela, although supporting the resolution, stated that “[b]oth the Council and 
the ICJ are indented of each other, and that each of these organs in the UN system 
must exercise its jurisdiction autonomously” .213 Finally, some delegations thought
208 ICJ Pled., 1992 (CR 92/2), pp. 60 ff.\ ICJ Pled., 1992 (CR 92/3), pp. 72-4; Evans, S., 
“The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political 
Doctrine”, MJILT, 18, 1994, p. 55
209 UN Doc. S/PV. 3063,1992, pp. 3 ff.
210 He stated: “[w]e believe it to be very important that the judicial body of this Organisation 
- the International Court of Justice - have a role to play whenever a legal issue is at stake, as 
mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the Charter. It would be more appropriate if the Council 
were to act after the International Court of Justice - which is now seized of the matter - has decided 
on what is the applicable law, if any, as to the issue of jurisdiction.” UN Doc. S/PV. 3063, 1992, p. 
4.
211 He stated: “[i]n the present case, the judicial process has not yet run its full course. 
Because of the far-reaching potential of this case, the considered opinion of the International Court 
o f Justice on the legal aspects of the issues involved can only serve the cause of international law 
and peace. A little delay on that account in the Security Council’s moving on to the next stage of its 
action would, therefore, have merited positive consideration. It should be feasible for these two 
principal organs of the United Nations to function in tandem in a manner so as to reinforce and 
enhance each other’s efficacy and prestige in the cause of international peace and security.” UN 
Doc. S/PV. 3063, 1992, pp. 57-8.
212 In addition, see the comments of the representatives of Jordan, Iraq, Mauritania, and 
Uganda. UN Doc. S/PV. 3063,1992.
213 Ibid.
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that the action of the SC could lead to a major institutional crisis.214 The SC, in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted Res. 748 by which economic 
sanctions were applied against Libya. The UK representative, speaking after the 
adoption of the resolution, asserted that:
“One of Libya’s suggestions in recent days has been that compliance with the request in 
resolution 731 (1992) should await the outcome of the proceedings instituted by Libya in 
the International Court of Justice. As the United Kingdom representative stated to the 
Court, he believes that Libya’s application, while purporting to enjoin action by the 
United Kingdom against Libya, is in fact directed at interfering with the exercise by the 
Security Council o f its rightful functions and prerogatives under the United Nations 
Charter. We consider that the Security Council is fully entitled to concern itself with 
issues of terrorism and the measures needed to address acts o f terrorism in any particular 
case or to prevent it in the future. Any other view would undermine the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security conferred on the 
Council.”215
After the adoption of the above resolution, the Court called on the parties to 
make observations on the effect of this resolution.216 Libya argued, inter alia, that 
SC Res. 748 infringed its rights under the Montreal Convention. It noted that the 
risk of contradiction between Res. 748 and the interim measures requested of the 
Court by Libya did not render the Libyan request inadmissible, because there is no 
competition or hierarchy between the Court and the Council, both being equal 
organs of the UN, exercising their own competence.217
The Court declined to indicate the measures requested by Libya. It found that 
“the circumstances of the case” were not such as to require the exercise of its power 
under Art. 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures. Therefore, it stated 
that:
214 The representative of Zimbabwe stated: “[t]he dispute which is the subject o f the draft
resolution before us is also the subject of consideration at the International Court of Justice at the 
Hague. The Charter provides that disputes of a legal nature should, as a general rule, be referred by 
the parties to the International Court of Justice. While there is no specific provision in the Charter 
that precludes parallel consideration of the matter by these two principal organs of our organisation, 
Zimbabwe believes that the authors of the Charter intended the two bodies to complement each 
other’s efforts rather than proceed in a manner that could produce contradictory results ... We are 
convinced that it would have been interests of institutional tidiness for the Security Council to await 
the outcome of the judicial proceedings at the International Court of Justice.” UN Doc. S/PV. 3063, 
1992, p. 52-3.
215 UN Doc. S/PV. 3063,1992, pp. 68-9.
216 ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 125.
217 ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 125-6.
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“Whatever the situation previous to the adoption of that resolution, the rights claimed by 
Libya under the Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for 
protection by the indication of provisional measures.”218
These cases are still pending before the Court to be decided on merits. 
fE) Evaluation
Apart from the attitude of the SC in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. dispute, it is 
interesting to note that the doctrine of litispendence played no apparent role in either 
the Council’s or the Court’s handling of the disputes. Neither the Court nor the SC 
views the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous submission of interrelated or even 
identical aspects of the same dispute to them as a bar to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction within their sphere of activity. In addition, neither organ views any 
measures taken by the other organ as barring it from taking any measures that it 
feels are necessary and within its competence. This is because any dispute is 
viewed as having legal and political dimensions.
This conclusion has not been unanimously accepted by international lawyers, 
who argue that the Court’s dicta do not support such a conclusion. In their view, 
the Aegean case and the Lockerbie (Provisional measures) cases are clear examples 
of the Court declining to indicate the requested measures because the SC was 
handling the matter.
It has been argued that the Court based its opinion in the Aegean case on the 
rule electa una via,219 According to this view the Court practised self-restraint with 
a view to preventing conflicting resolutions on the same issue by two or more 
organs of the world organisation.220 This is hard to accept in the light of the Court’s
218 Ibid., pp. 126-7.
219 Rafat, A., “The Iran Hostages Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran”, DJILP, 10, 1980, p. 446; 
Coussirat, C., “Indication de Mesures Conservatoires dans l’Affaire de Personnel Diplomatique et 
Consulaire des Etats-Unis k Tehran”, AFDI, 25, 1979, pp. 297, 300.
220 In this case, Elias notes that, “[i]n the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, one of the 
important factors, indeed the most important factor, inducing the Court to decline to indicate interim 
measures was the earlier recommendation made by the Security Council that both parties should 
desist from taking action in furtherance of the disputes ... It would have been better if the Court had 
based its ruling squarely upon the Security Council’s prior determination in the matter rather than 
upon any absence of possible aggravation of the situation.” Elias, T., “The International Court of 
Justice and the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection” in Gilberto Amado Memorial 
Lecture, 7 June 1978, pp. 14-15. Sep. Op. of Judge Tarazi, ICJ Rep., 1976, pp. 33-4; Diss. Op. of 
Judge ad hoc Stassinopoulos, ICJ Rep., 1976, pp. 38-40; Rafat, supra note 219, p. 447.
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dictum. It did not base its rejection of Greece’s request for provisional measures on 
the fact that the SC was simultaneously seized of the issue or on the fact that the 
Council resolution precluded or restricted its authority to act upon Greece’s 
request.221 In addition, in no way did the SC indicate that the Court was precluded 
from further activities in the case or mention that the Court’s competence was 
limited by the fact that the Council was seized of the issue.222 On the contrary, the 
SC by its Res. 395 had, inter alia, “invited both parties to take the appropriate 
judicial means into account in the resolution of their differences” .223 The Court’s 
attitude in this regard might be justified only on the basis of the absence of a 
sufficient risk, which is considered to be an appropriate condition to indicate interim 
measures by the Court pursuant to Art. 41 of the Statute. In this case, the Court 
found, as illustrated above, that Greece’s rights would not be irreparably harmed by 
the presence and activity of the Turkish Government in the Aegean sea.224
The above argument by international lawyers was repeated as a consequence of 
the Court’s attitude in the Lockerbie cases, where the Court declined to indicate the 
measures requested by the plaintiff (Libya). Some lawyers noted that in this case 
the Court deferred to the SC in the exercise of a styled “concurrent jurisdiction” .225
221 Lachs, M., “Thoughts on the Recent Jurisprudence o f the International Court of Justice”, 
EILR, 4, 1990, p. 93.
222 In his comment on the Council’s resolution in this case, Leo Gross notes that: “[t]here is 
no doubt that it was quite proper for the Council to deal with the tension which had arisen in the 
Aegean but it is another altogether for the Council to make a recommendation which, if it has any 
meaning at all, invites certainly Greece, and to an extent Turkey, to withdraw the case from the 
Court.” He further notes that: “the Council should, as a general rule, encourage the parties to take 
legal disputes to the Court and not discourage them from so doing. But ‘discourage’ is precisely, in 
the specific circumstances of the Greek-Turkish dispute, what the Council appears to have done ... 
The Council has not contributed to the enhancement of the stature of the Court or the strengthening 
of its precarious position ... It is odd, indeed, for the Security Council to criticise a state, even though 
by indirection, for resorting to the Court on what it believed to be sufficient legal grounds and after 
extensive diplomatic efforts have proved fruitless in the search for the solution of legal problems of 
vital interest to it as well as to the other side.” Gross, L., “The Dispute between Greece and Turkey 
Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean”, AJIL, 71,1977, pp. 38-9.
223 SC Res. 395, 25 August 1976.
224 Gross, L., “Some Observations on Provisional Measures” in Dinstein, Y. (ed.), 
International Law at a Time o f Perplexity: Essays in Honour ofShabtai Rosenne, 1989, p. 311.
225 In this respect, Judge Bedjaoui was strongly critical of the Court for its reliance on Res. 
748. He viewed this as a matter extrinsic to the application and reliance on it cast doubt on the 
integrity of the judicial function. The Court’s order was not based on its discretionary power to 
refuse to indicate provisional measures, but appeared to be directly linked to the decision of the 
Security Council, which bore directly on the very subject-matter of the dispute. See ICJ Rep., 1992,
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A
In their view, the Court indicated that the exercise of its jurisdiction should be
limited to Chapter VII of the Charter.226 This view is difficult to accept in the light
of the Court’s judgment. The Court did not base its opinion on the fact that the SC
was dealing with the issue, or on the fact that the SC had adopted a decision j
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter. It declined to indicate the requested
measures because “the circumstances of the case” were not such as to require the
exercise of its power under Art. 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.
Therefore, the Court found that the rights claimed by Libya at that stage could not
be regarded as appropriate for protection by indicating interim measures.227 In
addition, the Court’s attitude might be understood in the light of its interpretation of f ; L
Arts. 25 and 103 of the Charter. One may rely here on the opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen, who found that the Court’s attitude was a result not of conflict /
between the SC and the ICJ, but rather of a conflict between the obligations of ^
Libya under the Charter and under the Convention.228 This attitude might also beA ; *' /
v  —  —    *
based on the fact that the Court in this case was trying to avoid a constitutional •
crisis regarding its powers vis-a-vis  the SC. This was illustrated by Judge Lachs,
who observed that both the organs of the UN with the power to render binding
decisions should act in harmony, although not in concert, without prejudicing the
exercise of power by the other. The failure of the Court to act, in his view, was not
an abdication of the Court’s powers, but rather a reflection of the system under
which the Court operates.229 At any rate, the refusal of the Court to indicate the
requested measures could not be interpreted in that case as resulting from the
adoption of a decision pursuant to Chapter VII.230 This was confirmed by the ICJ in A >  ; ^
A • «
p. 150; Diss. Op. of Judges Weeramantry (ibid., pp. 160 ff.) and Ajibola (ibid., pp. 183 ff.) and 
Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri, who thought that the Court could and should indicate interim measures 
despite Res. 748. Ibid., pp. 99 ff.
226 McWhinney, E., “The International Court as Emerging Constitutional Court and the Co­
ordinate UN Institutions (Especially the Security Council): Implications of the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie”, CYIL, XXX, 1992, p. 269.
227 ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 126-7.
228 Sep. Op. of Judge Shahabuddeen, ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 140 Jf.
229 Sep. Op. of Judge Lachs, ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 138 Jf.; the same view was adopted by 
Judge Ni in his declaration, ibid., p. 132.
230 Tomuschat, supra note 176, p. 41.
234
Chapter Four
the Bosnia case, where it twice indicated the measures requested by the plaintiff 
despite the fact that the SC had adopted several decisions on this case pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the Charter.231 Otherwise acceptance of such a view might give the 
SC the power to determine whether or not the Court could practise its functions. In 
this event, the Council, under the pressure of political considerations, could adopt a 
decision pursuant to Chapter VII by which to pre-empt Court’s role in an 
international disputes with considerable justiciability.
(c) The ICJ and the Secretariat
The only case dealt with by the ICJ and by the Secretary-General was the Hostages 
case. The Secretary-General was requested, pursuant to the Council’s Res. 479 of
1979, to lend his good offices for the immediate implementation of the resolution. 
SC Res. 461/1979 to the same effect was adopted on 31 December 1979. In 
consequence, the Secretary-General undertook a mediation effort in Iran in January
1980, and in February announced the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to 
undertake a fact-finding mission in Iran to seek an early solution of the crisis. The 
Court considered whether or not the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry by 
the Secretary-General might affect the subject of the case before it. The Court could 
“find no trace of any understanding on the part of either the United States or Iran 
that the establishment of the Commission might involve a postponement of all 
proceedings before the Court until the conclusion of the work of the Commission”. 
In addition the Court observed that:
“It was not set up by the Secretary-General as a tribunal empowered to decide the 
matters of fact or of law in dispute between Iran and the United States; nor was its setting 
up accepted by them on any such basis. On the contrary, he created the Commission 
rather as an organ or instrument for mediation, conciliation or negotiation to provide a 
means of easing the situation of crisis existing between the two countries; and this, 
clearly, was the basis on which Iran and the United States agreed to its being set up. The 
establishment of the Commission by the S-G with the agreement of the two states cannot, 
therefore, be considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the continuance of 
parallel proceedings before the Court.”232
231 See pp. 228-9 above.
232 ICJ Rep., 1980, pp. 22-3.
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In the light of the above, the Court found its adjudication was compatible with 
the Secretary-General’s exercise of his functions and with the work of the 
Commission established by him. It also found that the establishment of this 
Commission was not a bar to consideration of the same matter by the ICJ, and there 
was no inherent conflict between litigation and action by the Secretary-General.233
(d) The effect of the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICJ and the political organs
Having concluded that both the ICJ and the political organs are entitled to deal with 
the same case simultaneously, a question might arise as to the effect of the decision 
of these organs if the ICJ on the one hand and one of the political organs on the 
other hand reach contradictory conclusion.
The answer to this question is simple if these contradictory conclusions have 
been reached by the ICJ on the one hand and the GA or the Secretary-General on 
the other hand. These two political organs have recommendatory powers whereas 
the ICJ’s judgment has a binding effect and will, therefore, prevail. A difficulty 
might arise in the event of contradiction between the ICJ and the SC because the 
decisions of both organs are legally binding upon the parties to a dispute. This is 
not a hypothetical situation - it has occurred in several cases, most recently in the 
Lockerbie and Bosnia cases.
Rosenne notes that it would be sensible if, in principle, political organs 
refrained from placing on their agenda disputes for which they have recommended 
judicial settlement. Equally, states that have themselves instituted proceedings in 
the Court should not, subsequently, introduce the same dispute in a political organ 
while the judicial proceedings are pending.234 Other lawyers note that, unless 
otherwise provided, the objection of litispendence does not have a peremptory 
character in the law of the UN.235 For instance, Gross announces that the matter 
should be left to the good sense, restraint and tact of the political organs.236 
Although this might help to avoid contradictory conclusions by the SC and the ICJ,
233 Merrills, supra note 33, p. 195.
234 Rosenne, supra note 4, p. 87.
235 Ciobanu, supra note 161, p. 227.
236 Gross, L., “The International Court of Justice and the United Nations” in Gross, L. (ed.),
Essays on International Law and Organisations, 1984, pp. 852 ff.
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there is nothing in the Charter to make the political organs or the parties to the 
dispute follow this course of action. Therefore, should a dispute be submitted to 
both organs there is no reason for the Court to decline jurisdiction.237 In these 
circumstances, both of them might reach a different decision, so the question 
remains unsettled. But before attempting to answer this question, it seems 
appropriate to make an analysis of the Charter provisions relating the position of the 
ICJ vis-a-vis the SC in this regard.
Analysis of several provisions of the Charter leads to the conclusion that the 
drafters of the Charter preserved a special position for the ICJ vis-a-vis the SC in 
respect of the maintenance of international peace and security. Art. 33/1 of the 
Charter indicates that the parties to any dispute whose continuance is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first o f  all, seek 
a solution by peaceful means, inter alia judicial settlement. In this regard Bowett \'JL
notes, when dealing with the competence of the SC in light of Art. 33/1, that
rrecourse to the SC should be regarded as a secondary means of settlement, when the f v*.•* 
primary means, inter alia judicial settlement, have failed.238 Moreover, Art. 37/1 
imposes an obligation on the parties - if  they are unable to settle a dispute o f  the 
nature referred to in Art. 33 by the means indicated in that article - to refer such a 
dispute to the SC. In addition, Art. 36/3 indicates that the SC, when making a
r
recommendation under this article, should consider that legal disputes should,_as a 
general rule, be referred to the ICJ. Therefore, the reference of any dispute to the £
SC is permitted only after the exhaustion of other means of peaceful settlement.
One may now turn to the problem that a contradiction between the conclusion 
of the ICJ and that of the SC might lead to a constitutional crisis in the UN and 
endanger the means of preserving international peace and security. Neither the
237 Bilder, supra note 146, p. 265; Dinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1994, p.
308.
238 It should be noted that Bowett means secondary in time not in importance. Bowett, supra 
note 146, p. 180. In this regard, the Japanese representative before the GA noted that, “[b]y virtue 
of provisions of Article 2 and 33 of the Charter, states members of the United Nations are committed 
to the principle of settling international disputes by peaceful settlement. The International Court of 
Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations represents the international means of 
assuring the realisation of this principle in relation to international disputes of legal character. The 
Court, therefore, occupies a place of vital importance in the Community of nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” UN Doc. A/8382, 15 September 1971, pp. 10-11.
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Charter nor the Court’s jurisprudence offers a solution for this situation, so one is 
left with the spirit of the Charter. Before trying to reach an answer in this regard, let 
us suppose the following situation. A territorial dispute between states X and Y 
takes place as a consequence of an act by state X. State Y claims that state X by its 
act has violated its international legal obligations. One of these states, or any other 
state, refers this dispute to the SC on the basis that the dispute is endangering 
international peace and security. If the same or another party refers the dispute to 
the ICJ simultaneously or nearly simultaneously, both organs are eligible to deal 
with the dispute. Here a distinction needs to be made in terms of whether or not the 
dispute is endangering peace and security.
O n  e hand, if the SC finds that the dispute is not likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, it should suspend its proceedings 
until the ICJ judgment is rendered.239 This opinion is based not only on 
considerations of co-ordination among the organs of the UN and the need to avoid a 
constitutional crisis, but also on the fact that the scope of the SC’s activity is limited 
to disputes, “the continuity of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security”. In addition, Art. 36/2 provides that “the Security 
Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the 
disputes which have already been adopted by the parties”. There is no similar 
provision to limit the Court’s jurisdiction if a dispute is before the political organs 
of the UN. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the Council suspended its 
proceedings until the Court had decided upon the case because the issue was not 
considered to be endangering international peace and security.240 However, as stated 
above, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case was unique.
On the other hand, if the SC finds that the dispute is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the Council has a priority to
239 One may recall the Iraqi view with regard to the question raised by the GA concerning the 
role of the ICJ and its effectiveness. According to this view, the prohibition of force in the Charter 
emphasises the absolute necessity of seeking peaceful solutions to international disputes. They 
observed that “if, however, such solution could not be reached by means other than judicial 
settlement, then the latter must be used, since leaving a dispute unresolved would be tantamount to 
favouring the status quo and the states which benefit from it”. UN Doc. A/8382, 15 September
1971, p. 13.
240 See pp. 222-3 above.
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preserve international peace and security by acting quickly. In this respect, the 
Council can adopt a decision pursuant to Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter, 
saying that state X has violated international obligations regarding the territory with 
state Y. If the Court also exercises its jurisdiction and reaches a judgment 
confirming the measures taken by the Council, there is no problem. If, however, the 
Court’s judgment is contrary to the measures taken by the Council and concludes 
that state X has not violated its obligations under international law, then the two f /  
states and the other states of the international community are faced with 
different decisions each of which has a binding effect. Itxould.be argued that the \
SC should review its decision and make the appropriate amendments to it to make it 
compatible with the Court’s judgment. This not an attempt to create a hierarchy in 
the relationship between the Court and the Council, but is based on the immediate 
avoidance of war and the resolution of the long-term issues that have brought the 
nations to the brink of war. It is based also on the fact that international disputes 
have a legal element that can be settled only by an international tribunal.
Some additional points to note are:
* The Council, as a political organ, is not restricted, as is the Court, to the 
consideration of proofs, facts, circumstances and laws and in most cases has to act 
immediately to deal with an urgent threat prima facie and not as a court of law.
Therefore, the decisions reached by the Council may in some cases be inconsistent 
with existing rules of international law. Moreover, the Council is a political organ 
that is influenced by political motives. The members of the Council take positions 
in accordance with their conception of national interest. Also, because Art. 39 of 
the Charter can be invoked at any time, if there is an affirmative vote by the 
permanent members of the Council, it may be feared that further relations between 
states will be based on political power rather than on the law.241
* The power of the SC relates, essentially, to procedures and methods of ^  
adjustment rather than to the terms of settlement. The ICJ is the only organ of the
UN empowered by the Charter and the Statute to adopt decisions on the terms of
W , /  $  '■
  ^
241 Schick, F., “Council and Court of the United Nations”, Mod.LR, 9, 1946, pp. 99-100. See 
also the statement by Brazil before the Security Council in the discussion of the Corfu Channel case.
SCOR, 2nd year, 1947, No. 32, p. 687 ff.
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settlement binding on the parties to the dispute, decisions that it adopts in /  ^
accordance with international law.242
* It could be argued that such a situation would never arise, and even if it did
?the predominance of SC resolutions might lead to justice being sacrificed for peace^L 
especially^when peace is being threatened by powerful states.243 In this regard one 
may^ask whether the UN should prefer legal or political settlement. The insertion of 
the words “justice” and “international law” in Arts. 1/1 and 2/3 of the Charter as 
limitations upon the discretion of the SC and other organs in making decisions or 
recommendations for the settlement of disputes offers the answer that legal ^  
settlement is preferable to political settlement. McNair notes that the Preamble of 
the UN Charter expressly asserts the importance of maintaining justice and respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties of international law. He concludes that the 
UN is based on law.244
* The Council’s role is the preservation of peace and not the settlement of 
international disputes, which is considered to be the main role of the ICJ. The 
Council’s role should be limited to the restoration of peace, but, as noted by 
Dinsstein, “the measures taken by the Council are not necessarily the last word on 
the subject. The final judgment is left to the Court.” 245
* The Court is open to all states, which appear before it on an equal footing. 
There is no possibility of a veto or a blocking of the Court’s activities by one party, 
as could happen before the Council by the permanent members. The ICJ can make 
binding decisions by a simple majority vote, without the veto, and without the 
requirement of a predetermined number of judges in favour of the decision.246
* Art. 41 of the Court’s Statute indicates that the Court’s interim measures
242 Bem&rdez, S., “Some Considerations on the Respective Roles of the Security Council and 
the International Court of Justice with Respect to the ‘Prevention of Aggravation o f Dispute’ in the 
Domain of the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes or Situations”, paper presented to the 
Doha Conference on International Legal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade of 
International Law, 1994, p. 4.
243 Wright, Q., International Law and the United Nations, 1960, p. 44.
244 McNair, A., The Development o f  International Justice, 1953, p. 34.
245 Dinstein, supra note 237, p. 307.
246 Rosenne, supra note 4, p. 74.
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should be communicated to the SC. It seems clear that the aim of this provision is 
to give the SC notification of the Court’s measures so that it can act in the light of 
this opinion. Otherwise, communication to the SC becomes meaningless.
* A settlement by the ICJ offers a guarantee that the legitimate claim of one 
party is not left to the mercy of the other party and, in addition, its binding and final 
judgments contribute to the elimination of future international friction between the 
parties. The political, economic or military strengths of the respective parties are 
irrelevant injudicial proceedings.
* Once a judgment, or an opinion, is handed down, the political situation is no 
longer the same. A party to a dispute that has an ICJ judgment in its favour is, to 
say the least, in a better position than it was. The existence of an authoritative and 
reasoned decision on what is the correct legal position is politically, as well as 
legally, a very different matter from a situation in which each side claims to be in 
accord with the law.247
* The stability of the international community requires only one decision, either 
from the Council or from the Court. The decision of the Court should prevail. 
Pursuant to Art. 60 of the Statute, the Court’s judgments are final, which means that 
they cannot be reversed or reviewed by the SC. Moreover, pursuant to Art. 94/2, 
the SC is expected to take measures to implement these judgments. Therefore, one 
may ask how the SC could adopt and enforce the Court’s decision if it is different 
from the Council’s decision on the same issue.
* Although the political organs, inter alia the SC, are regarded as satisfactory 
organs for the settlement of political disputes, they are not qualified to settle legal 
issues. These issues are clearly more suitable for the principal judicial organ of the 
UN, the ICJ. The report of the Secretary-General to the GA notes that:
“Another deficiency in the working of the system of collective security is the insufficient 
use of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of 
Justice. Many international disputes are justiciable; even those which seem entirely 
political (as the Iraq-Kuwait dispute prior to invasion) have a clearly legal component. If, 
for any reason, the parties fail to refer the matter to the Court, the process of achieving a 
fair and objectively commendable settlement and thus defusing an international crisis 
situation would be facilitated by obtaining the Court’s advisory opinion.”248
247 ICJYB, 1991-2, No. 46, p. 216.
248 UN Doc. A/46/1, p. 8.
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* It is hard to counter this argument by stating that the SC has a primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, when, despite 
this fact, the ICJ is the organ designed to promote justice and to apply the law in a 
given issue.
* International lawyers’ opinions, when considering the functions of the UN’s 
political organs, inter alia the SC and the GA, may be of assistance in this regard. 
Higgins notes that the ICJ settles disputes by discovering the better legal position of 
the parties before it, drawing upon accepted sources of international law. The SC 
settles disputes by encouraging the parties to agree among themselves, or by 
recommending solutions itself. She also affirms that the SC faces a myriad of 
difficulties when seeking to settle disputes in accordance with international law. Ini 
consequence, she states that die use of law by the SC is very different from that of' 
the International Court.249
Fakher observes that, once a dispute has been referred to the ICJ and a 
judgment is rendered, the dispute no longer exists. Therefore, any recommendation 
of the SC should not change the substance of the dispute. The judgment of the ICJ 
is binding, not only upon the parties to the dispute but also upon the UN itself.250 
Moreover, we can recall Sir Francis Vallat’s comment that, “[e]ven if the SC and 
the GA are regarded as satisfactory organs for the settlement of the political issues 
involved in a dispute, they are not good organs for the settlement of the legal issue. 
This is clearly more suitable for the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, 
the International Court of Justice.”251 In addition he notes: “Nations need peace ... 
peace needs law. Law needs the Court.”252
Anand states that, “[ajlthough peace under law has always been an unattainable 
ideal, peace without law is unimaginable”.253
249 Higgins, supra note 126, pp. 15. 1!L-
250 F akherJH^TTie^Relationship Among the Principal Organs o f  the United Nations, 1951, p.
68.
251 Vallat, supra note 146, p. 160.
252 Ibid., p. 177.
253 Anand, R., “The Role of International Adjudication” in Gross, L. (ed.), The Future o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice, vol. 1, 1976, p. 1.
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Lauterpacht also notes that “peace cannot, in the long run, be preserved if law is 
flouted in reliance on the rule that members of the community are legally in the 
position to deny to others the opportunity of having disputed legal rights settled 
through an impartial determination by a judicial authority”.254
Gross notes that “no minimal world order, no workable international system is 
conceivable without a tribunal... it is suggested that without a Court there can be no 
stability, and no predictability in international relations. There can be no 
expectation that disputes will be decided on the basis of law and justice rather than 
on the basis of power.”255
Finally, Judge Lachs notes that “the Court’s decision in contentious cases 
declares the law between the parties, so that the obligation imposed is different in 
nature from that flowing from directives of the other organs”.256
3. The role of the ICJ with regard to other purposes and principles of the UN
In addition to its role in achieving the principle of the settlement of international 
disputes, the Court has played a role in achieving the other purposes and principles 
of the UN. It should be noted that the Court has played a significant role in defining 
these purposes and principles through its advisory jurisdiction. In this section, the 
Court’s role in achieving and facilitating these purposes and principles will be 
examined in the light of its contentious jurisdiction.
3.1 Prohibiting the threat or use of force
It is not just war that is prohibited by the Charter, but the use of force in general. 
Furthermore, the prohibition is not confined to the actual use of force, but extends 
to the mere threat of force. This is clear from the wording of Art. 2/4 of the Charter, 
which provides that:
254 Lauterpacht, H., Foreword to Lissitzyn, O., The International Court o f Justice: Its Role in 
the Maintenance o f International Peace and Security, 1951.
255 Gross, L., “The International Court of Justice”, MLR, 9, 1967, p. 19.
256 Lachs, M., “The Decision-Making Powers and the Judiciary within the United Nations” in 
Essays in Honour o f Professor Stephen Verosta, 1980, p. 394.
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“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use o f force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
The determination of the precise scope and meaning of this article has been a 
most controversial point among international lawyers.257 Different views have been 
expressed regarding the permissible limit for a state to use force or the threat of 
force in the conduct of its international relations with other states. One view is that 
each great power can exercise a right of collective self-defence on behalf of each of 
the contesting states it prefers to support, and that the language of this article 
permits an aggressor state to do so.258 Another view is that “Article 2(4) was part 
and parcel of a complex collective security system” and that the collapse of the 
system undermined the original understanding behind the sub-section. In addition, 
it has been noted that the use of force must be regarded as permissible under Article 
2(4) in order to redress the flagrant violation of fundamental rights, which the state 
assailed has committed or is about to commit.259 Against all these and other views, 
one may ask whether the ICJ has played any role in clarifying and determining the 
meaning and the scope of the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force as indicated in the Charter.
The ICJ has offered strong evidence in favour of a^iberaHnterpretation of the 
above article. It also affirms the obligation of states pursuant to Art. 2/4 of the 
Charter to abstain from the use of force in international relations. The Corfu 
Channel (Merits) case, 1949, between the UK and Albania arose from the explosion 
of mines laid in Albanian territorial waters which caused serious damage to some 
British vessels and loss of life to those on board. As a result, the British Navy 
carried out a minesweeping operation in Albanian territorial waters without the
257 For more details see Franck, T., “Who Killed Article 2(4)?”, AJIL, 64, 1970, pp. 809 ff:, 
Reisman, W., “Correction and Self-determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)”, AJIL, 78, 1984, 
pp. 642 ff:, Elias, T., “Scope and Meaning of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter” in Cgeng, 
B., et al. (eds.), Contemporary Problems o f  International Law: Essays in Honour o f  George 
Schwarzenberger on his Eightieth Birthday, 1988, pp. 70 ff:, Schachter, O., “The Legality o f Pro- 
Democratic Invasion”, AJIL, 78, 1984, pp. 642 ff:, Brownlie, I., “International Law and the 
Activities o f Armed Bands”, ICLQ, 7, 1958, pp. 712 ff:, Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use 
o f  Force by States, 1963.
258 Franck, supra note 257, p. 809.
D’Amato, A., “Israel’s Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor”, AJIL, 77, 1983, p. 584.
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consent of Albania, which considered the operation contrary to international law. 
As seen above, the matter was referred to the SC and the ICJ. The ICJ having 
confirmed its jurisdiction over the case, the UK argued that this type of 
minesweeping operation did not constitute a breach of the principle of the non-use 
or non-threat of force in international relations, within the meaning of Art. 2/4 of the 
Charter of the UN, because it jeopardised neither the territorial integrity nor the 
political independence of Albania. It argued also that Albania had suffered no 
territorial loss and that its political independence had remained unaffected.260 In 
addition, it alleged that a certain degree of reciprocity was necessary in the 
observance of the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and that, 
consequently, Albania could not invoke that rule against the UK when it had itself 
twice used force against the UK. The UK referred to the rights of self-defence and 
“self-help” and, with regard to the latter, maintained that, even if the Charter had 
subjected the principle to some retractions, it could nevertheless be exercised when 
it was urgently necessary to preserve evidence required for the administration of 
justice. Conversely, Albania argued that the minesweeping was a breach of 
Albanian sovereignty because no state was entitled to use its armed forces to carry 
out an operation in the territorial waters of another state that not only had not been 
requested by the latter but had not been undertaken without its consent and even 
against its will. It based its argument on Art. 2/4 of the Charter.261
The Court affirmed that the threat or use of force for alleged purposes of 
“judicial” intervention, that is, to further the administration of international justice, 
is prohibited.262 Therefore, it declared that the minesweeping operation had been 
illegal and constituted a breach of Albanian sovereignty.263
In the Nicaragua case, the Court dealt extensively with the principle of the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force by states. In this case, the Court applied the
260 ICJ Pled., 1950, vol. 3, p. 296.
261 Ibid., p. 405.
262 ICJ Rep., 1949, pp. 30 ff..
263 The Court stated that “[t]o ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, 
the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian 
sovereignty”. Ibid., p. 35.
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“multilateral treaty reservation” contained in proviso (c) to the declaration of 
acceptance of jurisdiction made under Art. 36/2 of the Statute of the Court by the 
Government of the USA. Thus the Court was precluded from applying Art. 2/4 to 
the case inasmuch as it forms part of the Charter of the UN. Despite that, the Court 
did not consider itself prevented from interpreting and applying the principle of the 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations as a matter of customary 
international law.264 The Court deemed that an opinio juris had in fact crystallised 
as to the binding character of that prohibition given that both parties had 
acknowledged that the rule embodied in Art. 2/4 of the Charter corresponded 
essentially to prevailing customary international law.
The Court said that such an opinio juris could be deduced, inter alia, from the 
attitude of the parties to the case and the attitude of states towards certain GA 
resolutions, particularly Res. 2625 (XXV) entitled “Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.265 The resolution had to be 
interpreted as an acceptance by the international community of the validity of the 
rule or set of rules it contained.266 The principles enumerated in the resolution 
included the prohibition of the threat or use of force, which is articulated in extenso 
over ten paragraphs. The Court noted: “[a]s regards the United States in particular, 
the weight of expression of opinio juris can similarly be attached to its support of 
the resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American States condemning 
aggression and ratification of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States, Article 11 of which imposes the obligation not to recognise territorial 
acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force.” The Court 
noted also the USA’s acceptance of prevailing principles regulating inter-states 
relations. Established at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co­
operation in Europe, these principles required states to abstain from the threat or use
264 ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 99.
265 Ibid., p. 100; Gray, C., “The Principle of Non-use of Force” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), The 
United Nations and the Principles o f  International Law: Essays in Memory o f  Michael Akehurst, 
1994, pp. 41 ff.
266 ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 100.
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of force “in their international relations in general”.267 Finally, the Court noted that 
Nicaragua had maintained in its Memorial on the merits that the prohibition 
enshrined in Art. 2/4 of the United Nations Charter had been recognised as a 
principle of jus cognes.26* The Court further stated that “the essential consideration 
is that both the Charter and the customary international law flow from a common 
fundamental principle outlawing the use of force in international relations”.269
3.2. The duty of non-intervention
Despite the fact that the duty of non-intervention is not spelled out among the 
purposes and principles enumerated in the Charter, the fact is that the principle 
stems from the principle of the equality of state sovereignty,270 which requires the 
member states to respect sovereignty by refraining from intervening in matters 
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of another state. In addition, this duty is 
derived from Art. 2/4 of the Charter, which requires all members to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN and Art. 2/7 of the Charter which prevent intervention in 
matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state by the UN and its 
members.271 This duty has been explicitly recognised by the UN through its 
practice. For instance, the GA adopted its declaration on the “Inadmissibility of
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid., pp. 100-1.
269 Ibid., p. 107. In addition to these precedents, the Court defined the principle o f the
prohibition o f use of force in its opinion regarding the Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear 
Weapons case, where it stated: “[t]he notion of ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force under Article 2, paragraph 
4, of the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal - 
for whatever reason - the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be 
lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with 
the Charter.” It also stated: “the use of force, and the threat to use it, would be unlawful under the 
law of the Charter.” ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 19 (unpublished).
270 Article 2/1 of the Charter provides that “[t]he Organisation is based on the principle o f the 
sovereign equality of all of its Members”. In this regard, it has been noted that “[t]he equality of 
rights and obligations is, unless otherwise expressly provided, a fundamental feature of the Charter”. 
Diss. Op. o f Judges Lauterpacht, Wellington and Spender in the Aerial Incident case between Israel 
and Bulgaria. ICJ Rep., 1959, p. 177.
271 Lowe, V., “The Principle of Non-Intervention: Use of Force” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), 
The United Nations and the Principles o f International Law. Essays in Memory o f  Michael Akehurst, 
1994, p. 68.
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Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and 
Sovereignty” of 21 December 1965,272 and the declaration on “Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” of 24 October 1970.273
The ICJ has dealt with the issue of forbidding states from intervening in the 
internal or external affairs of other states in two cases. In the Corfu Channel case, 
the UK argued that it had swept for mines where the explosions had occurred 
because it suspected that mines had been laid deliberately and such sweeping was 
necessary to prevent the disappearance of any evidence that might justify those 
suspicions.274 It asserted that the minesweeping was legally justified inasmuch as:
“There is recognised in international law the right of a State, when a state o f affairs 
involving a serious and flagrant breach of the law has been brought about by another State 
or has been permitted to come about, to intervene by direct action. The purpose o f such 
intervention may be to prevent the continuance of the situation which is in breach of the 
law, or, where the intervening State has suffered any injury of a nature capable of being 
referred, to further the administration of international justice by preventing the removal 
of the evidence.”275
The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that it could regard the alleged 
right of intervention only as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in 
the past, given rise to very serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever the present 
defects in international organisation, find a place in international law. It stated also 
that “[intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would 
take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful 
States, and might easily lead to preventing the administration of international justice 
itself’.276
It seems clear that the Court found that the duty of non-intervention prohibits a 
state from acting, whether diplomatically or militarily, to impose its will on the 
internal or external affairs of another state. It seems also that the Court considered 
the principle of non-intervention to have become embodied in international law.
272 UN Doc. A/Res./2131/ Rev. 1, 1966.
273 UN Doc. A/8028, 1970.
274 ICJ Pled., 1950, vol. 3, pp. 280-1.
275 Ibid., p. 282.
276 ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 35.
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The Court dealt extensively with this matter in the Nicaragua (Merits) case 
where the USA maintained that international law permits intervention in many 
circumstances, especially to protect national interests or citizens abroad. 
Conversely, it was argued by the Latin American countries that international law 
prohibits any interference whatsoever within the domestic jurisdiction of states. 
The Court dismissed the US view and accepted the Latin American view, stating 
that:
“The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct 
its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle 
are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international 
law.”277
The Court also found that the element of coercion “defines, and indeed forms the 
very essence of, prohibited intervention”. It further noted that “[a] prohibited 
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is 
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely”.278 One of these is 
the choice of political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of 
foreign policy.279 Therefore, the Court refused to find a “general right” of 
intervention “in support of an internal opposition in another state” whose cause 
appeared particularly worthy by reason of the political and moral values with which 
it was identified.280
3.3. The right of self-defence
A related issue to the principles of prohibition of the threat or use of force and the 
duty of non-intervention is to define the scope of the right of self-defence as 
indicated by Art. 51 of the Charter, which is considered to be an exception to the 
above principles.281 Actions involving prima facie violation of these foregoing
277 ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 106; McGoldrick, D., “The Principle of Non-Intervention: Human 
Rights” in Lowe, V , et al. (eds.), The United Nations and the Principles o f  International Law. 
Essays in Memory o f  Michael Akehurst, 1994, pp. 91 ff.
278 ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 108.
279 Ibid.
280 Ibid, pp. 108-9.
281 Art. 51 provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
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prohibitions may nonetheless be lawful if they can be justified as being undertaken 
in the exercise of the right of self-defence.
The scope of this right was determined by the Court in the Nicaragua {Merits) 
case. In this case, the USA justified its assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Cost Rica in defence against Nicaraguan aggression. It argued that it had acted in 
accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as well 
as in conformity with the Inter-American Treaty on self-defence.282
To define the concept and the scope of the term “armed attack”, the Court 
stated that the Charter in Art. 51 refers to pre-existing international law, as it 
mentions the “inherent right” of individual or collective self-defence. The Court 
had to interpret Art. 51 in the light of customary international law. It stated:
“Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or 
‘inherent’ right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a 
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the 
Charter. Moreover, the Charter, having itself recognised the existence o f this right, does 
not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain 
any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in 
customary international law.”283
Having examined Art. 51 of the Charter, the Court concluded that the above article 
extends not only to the right of individual states to act in self-defence, but also to 
the right of collective self-defence. To define the action of states in response to an 
armed attack, the Court referred to Art. 3, para. G, of the definition of aggression 
annexed to General Assembly Res. 3314 (XXIX), which reflects customary 
international law.284 The Court stated that:
“The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks 
may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory o f another State, if 
such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
282 ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 87.
283 Ibid., p. 94.
284 Ibid., p. 103.
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attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed 
forces.”285
The Court has gone on to conclude that this concept must be understood as 
including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, 
but also “the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to”, inter alia, an actual armed attack conducted by regular 
forces, “or its substantial involvement therein”. The Court went further to define 
the concept of “armed attack” by stating that neither small-scale attacks by armed 
bands nor “assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical 
or other support” constitute grounds for invoking this right.286 The Court concluded 
that, “if self-defence is advanced as a justification for measures which would 
otherwise be in breach both of the principle of customary international law and of 
that conditioned in the Charter, it is to be expected that the conditions of the Charter 
should be respected”.287
The Court also clarified that the Charter requires that “measures taken by States 
in exercise of [the] right of individual or collective self-defence must be 
‘immediately reported’ to the Security Council”. It also stated that “the absence of 
a report must be one of the factors indicating whether the State in question was 
itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence”.288
With respect to the Court’s view regarding the determination of the state which 
could invoke the principle of self-defence, the Court stated that “it is the State 
which is a victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it 
has been so attacked”. It also stated that a state is not entitled “to exercise the right 
of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the situation”, but 
has to wait until “the State for whose benefit [the right of collective self-defence] is
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid., p. 104.
287 Ibid., p. 105.
288 Ibid., p. 105. This jurisprudence was repeated by the Court in its advisory opinion
regarding the Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons case. It stated: “Article 51
specifically requires that measures taken by States in the exercise of the right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council.” ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 18 (unpublished).
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invoked” has “declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack ... and has 
expressly requested assistance”.289
It seems clear that the Court interpreted the term “armed attack” as the sending 
of regular troops across a border or of armed bands which commit acts grave 
enough to amount to an armed attack. In other words, the Court has restricted the 
term “self-defence” to the response to an actual deployment of armed forces that 
cross a frontier with offensive intentions.
In addition to its interpretation and determination of the scope of this right, the 
Court made a clear statement that the right of self-defence has become part of 
customary international law, a jus cogens binding on all states. Therefore, it has 
been noted by Mullerson that the Court has “contributed significantly to a strong 
normative definition of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force”.290
3.4. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
Self-determination is the right of all peoples to govern themselves. This principle is 
embodied in the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 1/2 of the Charter 
stipulates that one of the UN’s purposes is to “develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”. Art. 55 of the Charter affirms this purpose in the context of friendly 
relations among nations and in conjunction with the “equal rights” of peoples.291 As 
noted above,292 this purpose was adopted in GA Res. 1514 (XV), entitled
289 ICJ Rep., pp. 103-5; Sohn, L., “The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of Its Law” 
in Schachter, O., United Nations Legal Order, vol. 1, 1995, p. 180.
290 Mtlllerson, R., “The Principle of Non-Threat and Non-Use of Force in the Modem 
World”, 26 Coexistence: A Review o f  East-West and Development Issues 29, 1984, p. 32 (cited in 
Sohn, supra note 289, p. 180).
291 Thomberry, P., “The Principle of Self-Determination” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), The 
United Nations and the Principles o f  International Law. Essays in Memory o f  Michael Akehurst, 
1994, p. 177.
292 See p. 150 above. In addition, the principle of self-determination is associated with 
human rights under Art. 1 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Para 1 of the above article states: “[a]ll peoples have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Para 3 of the above article also 
states the universal scope of self-determination by mandating states, ‘including those having 
responsibility for Non-Self-Goveming and Trust territories’, to promote and respect self- 
determination. Thomberry, supra note 291, pp. 178-9.
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“Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples” .293 The scope and content of this right have nevertheless been the subject 
of considerable debate among international lawyers.294 But, as noted in Chapter 
Two,295 the ICJ has dealt with the principle of self-determination in many cases. It 
described the scope of this principle precisely as follows:
“The validity of the principle of self determination, defined as the need to pay regard 
to the freely expressed will o f peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases 
the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants 
of a given territory. Those instance were based either on the consideration that a certain 
population did not constitute a “people” entitled to self determination or on the 
conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special 
circumstances.”296
In addition to this jurisprudence, the Court dealt with this principle in the East 
Timor case between Portugal and Australia.297 In this case, Portugal argued that the 
conduct of Australia in negotiating, concluding and initiating the performance of the 
1989 Treaty with Indonesia constituted a breach of its obligation to treat East Timor 
as a non-self-goveming territory.298 It also argued that the rights which Australia 
breached were rights erga omnes and that accordingly Portugal could require it to 
respect them regardless of whether another state (Indonesia) had conducted a 
similarly unlawful act.299 In this regard, the Court stated that:
“Portugal’s assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from 
the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is 
irreproachable. The principle of self-determination of peoples has been recognised by 
the United Nations Charter ... it is one of the essential principles o f contemporary 
international law.”300
293 GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 16, 14 December 1960.
294 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., “Self-Determination” in Schachter, O., et al. (eds.), United Nations
Legal Order, vol. 1, 1995, pp. 351.
295 See p. 148 above.
296 ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 33.
297 In this case, Portugal requested the Court to adjudicate and declare “the rights o f the 
people of East Timor to self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity and to permanent 
sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources”. ICJ Rep., 1995, p. 94.
298 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
300 Ibid., p. 102.
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This jurisprudence shows that the Court did not only affirm or interpret one of 
the UN principles, namely the principle of self-determination, but it also considered 
that this principle has an erga omnes character.
3.5. The principle of good faith
The principle of good faith was adopted by the drafters of the Charter as one of the 
purposes and principles of the UN. Art. 2/2 of the Charter indicates that “[a]ll 
members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from 
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them” .301 This 
principle was recognised by both the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969 
and the 1978 Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. It was also 
recognised by some GA resolutions, for instance Res. 1803 (XVII) on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which states that “[fjoreign investment 
agreements freely entered into by, or between, sovereign states shall be observed in 
good faith” .302
There is no clear definition of the nature, scope and function of this principle in 
international doctrine.303 Therefore, it can be said that this principle applies to treaty 
relations and the exercise of rights by states in the international arena. The ICJ dealt 
with the principle of good faith through its precedents.304
The Court’s jurisprudence may help to clarify the nature, scope and function of 
the principle. In the Rights o f Nationals o f the United States o f America in Morocco 
case, the Court referred to the necessity of exercising a power in good faith. The 
Court announced that it was the duty of the customs authorities in the French Zone,
301 It should be noted that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal made no mention of good faith. 
The inclusion of this principle among the principles of the UN was proposed by Colombia. This 
proposal met with strong support from other states. See UNCIO, 6, pp. 71-8, 332-3; White, G., 
“The Principle of Good Faith” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), The United Nations and the Principles o f 
International Law. Essays in Memory o f Michael Akehurst, 1994, p. 230.
302 For more examples, see White, ibid., p. 232.
303 O’Connor, J., Good Faith in International Law, 1991, p. 36.
304 Since the scope of this chapter is to examine the role of the ICJ in facilitating the 
principles and purposes of the UN through its contentious cases, the study will be restricted to 
illustrating the Court’s role through this jurisdiction. However, it should be noted that the 
application of the principle of good faith has been dealt with by the Court in various advisory cases, 
for instance the Admission case (ICJ Rep., 1948, pp. 57 ff.) and the Peace Treaties case (ICJ Rep., 
1950, pp. 2 2 1 # ).
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in fixing the valuation of imported goods, to have regard, inter alia, to 
reasonableness and good faith. It considered that a legal power that is exercised 
unreasonably and in bad faith must surely constitute an abus du droit30S
In the Right o f Passage over Indian Territory case, Portugal argued that India 
must exercise its power of regulation and control in good faith.306 The Court 
affirmed the Portuguese argument by stating that “it is made clear that passage 
remains subject to the regulation and control of India, which must be exercised in 
good faith” .307
In the Temple o f Preah Vihear case, the Court applied the principle of good 
faith extensively. The facts of this case were based on the 1904 convention between 
France (as a protector of Cambodia) and Siam (later Thailand) to determine the 
boundary in the area of Preah Vihear. The treaty provided that the boundary was to 
follow the watershed line and that the details were to be worked out by a mixed 
Franco-Siamese Commission. This Commission drew a map on which the temple 
was placed in Cambodia. Cambodia based its claim upon this map. Thailand 
argued, inter alia, that the map embodied a material error in that it did not follow 
the watershed lines as provided for in the treaty. The Court rejected this argument 
and stated that:
“It is an established rule that the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating 
consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have 
avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of possible
,,308error.
As noted by O’Connor, “at the time the case was decided, the rule as stated by the 
Court was only to be found as a deduction from doctrines variously referred to in 
international and municipal law as ‘estoppel’, ‘preclusion’, ‘forclusion’, 
‘acquiescence’ or ‘recognition’ ” .309 He also noted that the majority of the Court 
believed that this was a situation where good faith (however designated) required
305 ICJ Rep., 1952, p. 212.
306 ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 12.
307 Ibid, p. 28.
308 ICJ Rep, 1962, p. 26.
309 O’Connor, supra note 303, p. 93.
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that Thailand should not be permitted to resile from the clear and unequivocal 
representations it had made to Cambodia that accepted the map (and the 
consequences therefrom) . 310
The Court applied the principle of good faith in the Nicaragua case, where it 
held that Nicaragua’s reliance on the Optional Clause accepting the jurisdiction of 
the Court was in no way contrary to good faith or equity, so the invocation of 
estoppel by the USA could not be said to apply to Nicaragua.311
The ICJ extended the applicability of the principle of good faith to the 
negotiation phase. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, it stated that the UK and 
Iceland must “in good faith pay reasonable regard to the legal rights of the other in 
the waters around Iceland outside the 12 mile limit, thus bringing about an equitable 
apportionment of the fishing resources based on the facts of the particular situation 
and having regard to the interests of other states which have established fishing 
rights in the area” .312 It also stated in the case between Germany and Iceland that 
negotiations in good faith “involve in the circumstances of the case an obligation 
upon the Parties to pay reasonable regard to each other’s rights and to conservation 
requirements pending the conclusion of the negotiations. ” 313 Finally, in the 
Delimitation o f the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf o f Maine Area case, the Court 
concluded that the parties were under a duty to negotiate “and to do so in good faith, 
with a genuine intention to achieve a positive result” .314
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the court played a significant 
role to in affirming the applicability of one of the principles of the UN namely, the 
principle of good faith. It also adopted an extended analysis of the inherent 
obligation to perform the undertaking of good faith in pre-contractual 
negotiations.315 Therefore, Thirlway correctly noted that “[w]here an obligation,
310 Ibid., p. 93.
311 ICJ Rep., 1984, pp. 414-15.
312 ICJ Rep., 1974, p. 33.
313 Ibid., p. 202.
314 ICJ Rep., 1984, p. 299.
315 The Court’s attitude was confirmed in the Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear 
Weapons case. In this case the Court appreciated the full importance of the recognition by Article 
VI o f the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons o f an obligation to negotiate nuclear
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legal or conventional, is defined by specific words, good faith requires respect not 
only for the words but also for the spirit; but to negotiate otherwise than in good 
faith is surely not to negotiate at all.” 316
Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the role of the Court in facilitating the purposes and 
principles of the UN through its contentious jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is based 
on consensus, whereby a state gives its consent to its case being referred to the 
Court either prior to a dispute arising or after its emergence. It might be concluded 
that the ICJ cannot act unless the parties agree to submit their disputes to it.
The ICJ actively services and participates in achieving and accomplishing the 
purposes and principles of the UN. It plays an important role in achieving the 
central purpose of the UN, namely, the maintenance of international peace and 
security, through its constructive contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
A fundamental point in this regard concerns the relationship between the Court as 
the principal judicial organs of the UN and the other political organs of the UN in 
dealing with issues related to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. This 
point was analysed by elaborating the practice of these organs. The ICJ has made it 
clear that, as a principal organ of the UN, it has a duty to deal with any dispute 
submitted to it even if one of the political organs of the UN is dealing with the 
political aspects of that dispute. The Court has also confirmed that it is not 
subordinate to any other UN organ, concluding that the exercise by the political 
organs of their respective functions does not affect its own role because it works as 
a judicial organ, acting in accordance with the principles of law and equity.
Having examined the Court’s role in achieving the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the study turned to discuss the Court’s role in achieving the 
other purposes and principles of the UN as indicated by the Charter. The Court
disarmament in good faith. The Court stated: “[t]he legal import of that obligation goes beyond that 
of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise 
result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, 
the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.” ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 33 (unpublished).
316 Thirlway, H., “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 1960-1989”, 
BYIL, 60, 1989, p. 25.
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delineated the scope and content of the principle of the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force in its jurisprudence, where it declared that such conduct is considered to 
be illegal whatever the justification of states. In confirming this principle the Court 
had to refer to this principle in the general principles of international law and in 
customary rules as well as in the UN Charter.
The Court’s role in preserving the duty of non-intervention is derived from the 
principle of the sovereign equality of states and from the principle of the non-threat 
or non-use of force in the international arena. Through its jurisprudence the Court 
has affirmed that, according to this duty, states are prohibited from acting to impose 
their will in the internal or external affairs of other states.
The Court has stated that the right of self-determination as an exception to the 
principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the duty of states not to 
intervene in the affairs of other states could be used as a response to armed attack. 
It has extensively defined the terms “armed attack” and “self-defence”. Finally, the 
Court has dealt with the principle of good faith in international law, playing a role 
in clarifying the definition, nature, scope and function of this principle.
In the light of the above it seems clear that the Court has made a constructive 
contribution to facilitating the purposes and principles of the UN as a guide to the 
organisation and its members.
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Chapter Five
The International Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court: 
The Question of Judicial Review
Introduction
Any legal community is governed by law. This means that the government does not 
have unlimited powers, but on the contrary is subject to the law. This concept is 
known as the rule of law, which has developed over the centuries to be applied in 
most states in the international community. This concept aims to delineate the 
powers of government in relation to the rights and freedoms of the individual and 
regulate the functions and duties of the government. The rule of law in the domestic 
domain can be made effective only if judicial procedures are made available by 
which it is possible to control the observance by government of the legal rules laid 
down either by an act of government itself or by the parliament. The legal 
procedures to control the legality of governmental action not only serve to protect 
the interest of individuals against the government, but also serve the public interest 
in the maintenance of the legal order, as well as the interest of the government 
itself. 1
The UN, like any legal community, is governed by law. The present chapter 
will focus on the possibility of the ICJ, as the principal judicial organ of the UN, 
playing a similar role to that of the constitutional courts in the domestic domain as a 
guardian of the law applied within the UN by providing judicial review2 of the acts
Brewer-Carias, A., Judicial Review in Comparative Law, 1989, pp. 7 ff.\ Dijk, P., 
Judicial Review o f  Governmental Action and the Requirement o f  an Interest to Sue, 1980, pp. 1 ff.\ 
Tate, C., “Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy: Concepts and Overview” in Jackson, D., 
et al. (eds.), Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy, 1992, p. 4.
2 It should be noted that the draft resolution 888 (IX) proposed by the Fifth Committee was 
further amended to replace the words “appeal against” by the word “review o f ’. Supporters o f this 
amendment expressed the opinion that the word “review” was a broader term which would include 
appeals and other judicial procedures. Certain other representatives, in accepting the amendment, 
emphasised that they considered that the word “review” could mean only an appellate consideration 
of judgments of the Tribunal on the appeal of the parties concerned. See GAOR, 10th Sess., 
Annexes X, 49, 1955, p. 4.
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of the organisation. The importance of the examination of this point derives from 
the fact that the acts of the UN may have a direct effect on its members, which 
raises the question of the possibility of these states challenging the acts of the 
organisation and/or its organs if these acts are considered, in their view, 
incompatible with the objects and purposes of the UN, or contrary to the express 
provisions of its constitution.3
In this chapter the power of the ICJ to supervise the legality of the UN organs’ 
action is discussed. The discussion focuses on the rule of law within the UN 
system, the concept of judicial review in the domestic and the international domain, 
whether the ICJ has the power to play such a role, the judicial procedures, and 
finally the limits upon the ICJ’s power to review the acts of the organisation.
1. The rule of law in the UN
The examination of the role of the ICJ as a constitutional court within the 
framework of the UN requires discussion of a preliminary issue related to 
determining whether the UN is governed by law, namely is there any place for the 
rule of law in the UN? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, what are 
the sources of law in the UN?
1.1. Are the UN organs above the law?
The UN is essentially a political and dynamic institution. As a consequence, it is 
noted by international lawyers that the practice of their functions by its organs is 
influenced, if not actually guided, by strong political pressures and considerations.4 
This raises an important question nowadays among international lawyers as to 
whether the UN organs are above the law when dealing with any matter.
Osieke, E., “Ultra Vires Acts in International Organisations - The Experience o f the 
International Labour Organisation”, BYIL, 48, 1976-7, pp. 273-4.
4 In this respect, Schachter notes that members of the UN “will, of course, exhibit 
partisanship and interest in varying degree. Governments are expected to take positions in the 
political organs in accordance with their conceptions of national interest and it is apparent that these 
conceptions will embrace considerations based on ties of alliance, friendship or political 
bargaining.” Schachter, O., “The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly”, AJIL, 58, 1964, p. 962; see also Vallat, F., “The Peaceful Settlement o f Disputes” in 
Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour o f Lord McNair, 1965, p. 159.
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Some international lawyers have answered this question in the affirmative. 
They note that the UN organs, especially the Security Council, are above the law 
when practising their functions. In this regard, John Foster Dulles stated that “[t]he 
Security Council is not a body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a law unto 
itself. If it considers any situation as a threat to the peace, it may decide what 
measures shall be taken. No principles of law are laid down to guide.” 5 In addition, 
it is noted by Kelsen that the restoration of peace, as an essential mission of the 
Council, is not the same as the restoration of the law. In his view, the Council may 
wish to “enforce a decision which is considered to be just though not in conformity 
with existing [international] law”. Accordingly, he concludes that the Council’s 
decisions “may create new law for the concrete case” .6
These views should be examined in the light of the Charter’s provisions, which 
leave no doubt that its drafters intended the acts of the political organs of the UN to 
be limited by the rules of international law and adopted in accordance with the 
purposes and principles provided in the Charter. Generally speaking, Art. 1/1 of the 
Charter provides that the UN organs should respect international law, and 
consequently international disputes must be resolved “in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law” .7 In addition, Art. 2 of the Charter 
provides that the “principles” of the UN shall bind “the organisation and its 
members”. Finally, para. 7 of this article imposes a general limitation upon the UN
Dulles, J., War or Peace, 1950, pp. 194-5.
6 Kelsen, H., The Law o f  the United Nations, 1951, pp. 294-5.
7 It should be noted that the initial draft presented at Dumbarton Oaks o f Art. 1 (the 
provision that now qualifies the manner in which international peace and security are to be 
maintained) did not include the phrase “in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law”. This phrase was added at the initiative of the Chinese delegation in response to fears 
concerning the enormous powers that might be wielded by the Security Council. See Russell, R., A 
History o f  the United Nations Charter: The Role o f the United States 1940-45, 1958, p. 665; Scott, 
C., et al., “A Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of 
the Maintenance o f the United Nations Security Council’s Arms Embargo on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, MJIL, 16, 1994, pp. 119 ff.\ Cassan, H., “Article 24, Paragraphes 1 et 2” in Cot, J., et 
al. (eds.), La Charte des Nations Unies, 1991, pp. 462-3. With regard to Art. 1/1 o f the Charter, 
Judge Weeramantry noted that “a clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s powers 
is that those powers must be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of 
international law. It is true this limitation must be restrictively interpreted and is confined only to 
the principles and objects which appear in Chapter I of the Charter.” ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 175.
261
Chapter Five
organs under which they must not “intervene” in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.8
In addition to these general provisions, the Charter has some specific articles to 
limit the powers of the GA and the SC, which have a wide range of competencies 
according to the Charter. The GA’s powers are limited by Art. 12 of the Charter, 
under which it cannot make any recommendation to maintain international peace 
and security if the same dispute or situation is before the SC.9 Similarly, the SC is 
under various limitations when fulfilling its functions as provided by the Charter. 
Pursuant to Art. 24 the SC must discharge its duties in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the UN. 10 In addition, Art. 25 stipulates an implied limit upon the 
SC when acting on behalf of member states because the acceptance and carrying out 
of its decisions depend on its acting in accordance with the Charter, otherwise these 
decisions will be deprived of any binding effect. 11 Moreover, the Council’s powers 
under Chapters VI and VII are limited to disputes whose continuance might 
endanger international peace and security (Art. 33), and the SC can order sanctions 
or use military measures only in the case of the existence of “any threat to the peace,
It should be noted that, pursuant to this article, the principle of non-intervention in the 
domestic jurisdiction of states shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. With regard to the scope of this exception and its interpretation in 
practice, see White, N., The United Nations and the Maintenance o f International Peace and 
Security, 1990, pp. 50-2; Gilmour, D., “Article 2/7 of the United Nations and the Practice of 
Permanent Members o f the Security Council”, A YIL, 61, 1967, p. 156; Sonnenfeld, R., Resolutions 
o f the United Nations Security Council, 1988, p. 92.
9 These limitations were confirmed by the ICJ in the Expenses case, see p. 135 above; 
White, supra note 8, pp. 103-5.
10 Kahng, T., Law, Politics, and the Security Council An Inquiry into the Handling o f  Legal 
Questions Involving International Disputes and Situations, 1964, pp. 71 ff.\ Gill, T., “Legal and 
Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise Its Enforcement 
Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter”, NYIL, XXVI, 1995, pp. 68 ff.
11 In this regard, the ICJ noted in the Namibia case that, “when the Security Council adopts a 
decision under Article 25 in accordance with the Charter. it is for the member States to comply with 
that decision” (emphasis added). ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 54. Bowett also notes that “ [i]n conferring on 
the Council ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, the 
members of the Organisation agree that it ‘acts on their behalf. The Council thus acts as the agent 
o f all the members and not independently of their wishes; it is, moreover, bound by the purposes and 
principles of the organisation, so that it cannot, in principle, act arbitrarily and unfettered by any 
restraints. At the same time, when it does act intra vires, the members of the organisation are bound 
by its actions and, under Article 25, they ‘agree to accept and carry out the decisions o f the Security 
Council in accordance with the present Charter’.” Bowett, D., The Law o f International Institutions, 
1982, p. 33.
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or act of aggression” (Arts. 38 and 39) . 12 Finally, if the Council decides to use 
force, it should use it as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security (Art. 42). Therefore, the Council’s exercise of its competencies is 
bound by all these conditions, otherwise it should refrain from taking any action. 13 
In addition to these explicit provisions, international lawyers have noted that several 
other limitations should be respected by the SC. Art. 52/2 of the Charter has been 
referred to as imposing a limit upon the SC. According to this article, the Council is 
under an obligation to encourage settlement of local disputes through regional 
arrangements. 14 Finally, it has been observed that Art. 107 also limits the Council’s 
competence. Bowett notes that this article affected the SC in the Berlin case (1948) 
when the Soviet Union denied competence on this ground and vetoed any 
resolution. 15
The limited powers of the UN organs have been confirmed by many other 
international lawyers, who agree that the freedom entrusted in the UN organs is not 
absolute. In this regard, Fitzmaurice notes that the limits on the powers of the SC 
“are necessary because of the all too great ease with which any acutely 
controversial international situation can be represented as involving a latent threat 
to peace and security, even where it is really too remote genuinely to constitute one.
12 Bilder, R., “Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use of Force”, VJIL, 31, 1991, p. 258.
13 In this regard, it has been noted by Brownlie that: “[e]ven if the political organs have a 
wide margin of appreciation in determining that they have competence by virtue o f Chapter VI or 
Chapter VII, and further, in making dispositions to maintain or restore international peace and 
security, it does not follow that the selection of the modalities of implementation is unconstrained by 
legality.” Brownlie, I., “The Decision of Political Organs of the United Nations and the Rule of 
Law” in Macdonald, R. (ed.), Essays in Honour o f Wang Tieya, 1994, p. 102.
14 Papadopoulos, A., “The Maintenance of International Peace and the United Nations. A 
Legal Analysis”, IRR, 5, 1975, p. 806; Acevedo, D., “Disputes under Consideration by the U.N. 
Security Council or Regional Bodies” in Damrosch, L. (ed.), International Court o f  Justice at a 
Crossroads, 1987, p. 248.
15 Bowett, D., “The United Nations and Peaceful Settlement” in International Disputes, the 
Legal Aspects. Report o f  a Study Group o f the David Davies Memorial Institute o f  International 
Studies, 1972, p. 181; Acevedo, supra note 14, p. 248, note 23. In this regard, see UN Doc. S/1020 
and Add. I, SCOR, 361st mtg., 3rd year, No. 113,4 October 1948, pp. 9-30; SCOR, 361st mtg. ibid., 
pp. 10-14, 24, 28-9; SCOR, 362nd mtg., 3rd year, No. 114, 5 October 1948, pp. %ff. In addition, 
Higgins notes that the Council is not empowered to interpret the legal situation of states in a binding 
manner without their consent. Higgins, R., “The Place of International Law in the Settlement of 
Disputes by the United Nations Security Council”, AJILy 64, 1970, p. 5.
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Without these limitations, the functions of the Security Council could be used for 
purposes never originally intended.” 16 Similarly, Alvarez notes:
“I consider that in virtue of the law of social interdependence this condemnation o f the
misuse of a right should be transported into international law. For in that law the
unlimited exercise of a right by a state, as a consequence of its absolute sovereignty, may 
sometimes cause disturbances or even conflicts which are a danger to peace.”17
Bedjaoui observes that the political organs of the UN are under an obligation to 
respect the Charter and the rules of international law. He bases his view, inter alia, 
on the fact that the founding states did not invest these organs with any functions 
that are similar or even close to those of an international legislator or creator of new 
rules. He notes also that even the GA, which has the power to encourage the
prospective development of international law and its codification by states, may 
only recommend and offer a framework and stimulus to the conclusion of 
international conventions, but it is the states that produce law by ratifying such 
conventions and bringing them into force. 18 Moreover, Brownlie notes that “[t]he 
conclusion must be that the Security Council is subject to the test of legality in 
terms of its designated institutional competence” . 19 He also notes that “[i]n the case 
of the Security Council there is no reason to assume a tension between effectiveness 
and the legality. Common sense would suggest that the authority of a political 
organ must depend on respect for the Rule of Law and that there is an essential link 
between operational efficacy and legality.” 20 Finally, it has been noted by Lissitzyn 
that “the long-range purposes and policies in the Charter must be given protection 
against the possible short-range aberrations of the political organs. Power without 
law is despotism.” 21
The view that the powers of the political organs when exercising their functions 
are limited according to the Charter was upheld by the ICJ in the early years of the
16 Diss. Op. of Judge Fitzmaurice, ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 294.
17 Sep. Op. of Judge Alvarez, ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 48.
18 Bedjaoui, M., The New World Order and the Security Council Testing the Legality o f  Its
Acts, 1994, pp. 32-5.
19 Brownlie I., supra note 13, p. 95.
20 Ibid., p. 101.
21 Lissitzyn, O., The International Court o f  Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance o f
International Peace and Security, 1951, p. 97.
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UN in the Admission case. In this case, it was argued that, pursuant to Art. 4 of the 
Charter, the SC as well as the GA has “complete freedom of appreciation in 
connection with the admission of new Members”. In its reply, the Court pointed out 
that: “[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of 
the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on 
its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ has freedom 
of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its constitution.” 22 
To conclude, the view expressed by some lawyers that the powers of the UN 
organs are unlimited has no ground in the light of the Charter and in the opinion of 
the majority of international lawyers. These organs, especially the GA and the SC, 
are obliged to adhere to the principles of international law and justice, are not 
absolved from the duty to observe the limitations and must not be permitted to 
derogate from the fundamental legal norms indicated by the Charter.23 It also seems 
clear that the law and justice have an important place in the Charter and, 
consequently, in the life of the organisation. This conclusion leads to the question 
whether the UN organs are governed only by the provisions of the Charter or 
whether any other rules could regulate their exercise of their functions. The 
discussion will throw light on the sources of law in the UN.
1.2. Sources of law in the UN legal system
1.2.1. The Charter
As mentioned above, the UN Charter is considered to be the basic instrument of the 
organisation. Its provisions are the primary source of the UN practice. It provides
ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 64; Lauterpacht, E., “The Development of the Law of International 
Organisations by the Decisions of International Tribunals”, RCADI, 152, 1976, p. 391.
Also, in the Peace Treaties and Reservations cases, issues relating to the ultra vires acts o f the 
GA arose. In these cases the Court did not deal with this matter specifically, and it found that it 
suffices to determine that these allegations are inapplicable in the cases under discussion. See 
Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f the International Court, 1985, p. 715.
23 In this regard, El-Erian notes that, “[wjhatever the legal nature of the powers attributed to 
an international institution, they are specific in the sense that they may be exercised only with 
respect to certain subject-matters prescribed by the constituent instrument”. El-Erian, A., “The 
Legal Organisation o f International Society” in Sorensen, M. (ed.), Manual o f  Public International 
Law, 1968, p. 75; Scott, et al., supra note 7, p. 128; Lachs, M., “The Decision-Making Powers and 
the Judiciary within the United Nations” in Essays in Honour o f  Stephen Verosta, 1980, p. 397.
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the general rules and limits which direct the organs and agencies of the UN 
whenever they act. No organ or agency can exceed these rules and limits.
Does this mean that - apart from the Charter - there are no other rules to govern 
the acts of the organs? The answer is that there are two additional sources of law 
within the UN: first, the rules of procedure and, second, the general rules of 
international law.
1.2.2. Rules of procedure
As mentioned above, the constitutional instrument of the organisation (the Charter) 
consists of general rules and principles. It rarely refers to the rules of procedure 
needed to regulate the daily work of its organs. Therefore, it was felt that these 
rules should be a separate instrument which could either be drafted by the 
organisation itself as general rules to apply to all organs or be drafted by each organ.
These rules mainly regulate the meetings of the organs, the right of 
participation, the presidency of the organs, the language, the secretaryship of the 
organs, the discussion of issues and the rules of voting, and the budgetary and 
administrative issues of the organs. They also determine the rules of the subsidiary 
organs.
1.2.3. Rules of international law and general principles of law
In addition to the Charter’s provisions and the rules of procedure which regulate the 
practice of the functions of UN organs, the question has been raised whether these 
organs, when practising their functions, are under any obligation to respect the rules 
of international law and the general principles of law.
From the outset it should be noted that these general rules and principles 
determine the obligation to carry out international agreements, the duty to make 
reparation for breaches of obligation, the rule of good faith in carrying out 
international obligations, and the rule of abuse of right. Since these rules are 
applicable to all international legal persons, the question is whether or not these 
rules could regulate the activities of the UN organs.
The question can be answered in the affirmative on the following grounds. 
First, these rules have become an integral part of international law, which applies
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not only to relations between states but also to relations between all international 
legal persons. Therefore, since the UN is considered to be an international legal 
person, these rules should cover its activities. Second, the drafters of the Charter 
and the Court’s Statute confirmed the importance of these principles. This is 
recognised by Art. 1/1 of the Charter, which provides that the settlement of 
international disputes should be in conformity with international law. In addition, 
the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations as a primary source of 
international law are expressly provided by the Charter pursuant to Art. 38/1 (c). 
Third, the application of these rules to the UN cannot be rejected on the basis that 
they were established before it came into existence. These rules apply to any state 
or international legal entity from the date of recognition of their status.
The applicability of these rules to the UN organs has been affirmed by 
international doctrine. For instance, Fitzmaurice, when dealing with SC resolutions 
concerning South Africa’s rights under its mandate to administer the territory of 
South Africa, notes that the powers of the SC are limited by principles of 
international law. He states that:
“Even when acting under Chapter VII of the Charter itself, the Security Council has no 
power to abrogate or alter territorial rights, whether of sovereignty or administration ... 
This is a principle of international law that is as well-established as any there can be,- 
and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the United Nations is itself a subject 
of international law) as any of its individual member States are.”24
In addition, Judge de Castro notes that “the Court, as a legal organ, cannot co­
operate with a resolution which is clearly void, contrary to the rules of the Charter, 
or contrary to the principles of law” .25
The applicability of these rules to the UN organs was affirmed by the ICJ itself 
in the Namibia case. In this case, it was argued by South Africa that a right of 
termination, in response to breach, does not arise in the absence of a specific treaty 
provision to this effect. The Court dismissed this argument and held that such a 
view would imply that the intention of the League had been to exempt the mandate 
system from general principles of law. The Court said:
24 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 294.
25 Ibid., p. 180.
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“The silence of a treaty as to the existence of such a right [termination for misconduct] 
cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion of a right which has its source outside of 
the treaty ... the general principle of law according to which a power of termination on 
account of breach, even if unexpressed, must be presumed to exist as inherent in any 
mandate, as indeed in any agreement.”26
This dictum was confirmed by the Court in the WHO and Egypt case. It 
affirmed that international organisations, like any international legal person, should 
be confined by the obligations imposed by the general principles of law.27
It seems clear that, as noted by international lawyers and confirmed by the 
ICJ’s jurisprudence, the general principles of law and the principles of international 
law are considered to govern the UN organs’ acts whenever they exercise their 
functions.
To conclude, it could be said that the powers of UN organs are not absolute and 
should be restricted by various rules. These rules are provided in the Charter (as the 
constitutional instrument of the UN), the rules of procedure, and finally the general 
principles of law and the rules of international law. The question is: who ultimately 
guarantees that these rules are respected by the UN organs? Can the ICJ play a 
similar role within the UN as do constitutional courts in most domestic legal 
systems? Before examining this question the study will consider the judicial review 
in the national and international domains.
2. Judicial review in the national and international domains
Discussion of the role of the ICJ in the review of the legality of the UN organs first 
requires defining the term “judicial review” and then throwing light on this concept 
in national and other international domains that seem appropriate for providing a 
comprehensive view of the application of this concept.
2.1. What is meant by the term “judicial review”?
Judicial review in this context means that a judicial body within a legal system of 
the community reviews the legality of the decisions and acts of the executive and
ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 47-8; Hervener, N., “The South-West African Opinion. A New
International Juridical Philosophy”, ICLQ, 24, 1975, p. 802.
27 ICJ Rep., 1980, pp. 89-90.
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legislative organs in the light of the existing rules of law and the provisions of the 
constitution that regulate their functions either directly or indirectly.28 If illegality is 
found, it is the function of the court to annul it, amend it, or substitute its own 
decisions. The main objective of the practice of review by a legal organ is to 
determine the legal rights and interests of the applicant vis-a-vis the government so 
that legal order is maintained in the public interest.
2.2. Judicial review by domestic courts29
As mentioned above, it is a well-established principle nowadays that all states’ 
bodies are required to adhere to the law of the state. This means that the legislative 
and administrative powers of states are obliged to respect the rules of law and be 
subject to these rules. This principle is known as the “etat de droit” or “principle of 
legality” or “rule of law” .30 The constitutional court in the domestic field is the 
ultimate guarantee by reviewing the legality of the acts of states’ bodies. It operates 
to nullify ultra vires acts that are not in accordance with the existing constitution or 
superior norms.
Despite the fact that “judicial review” by constitutional courts has become a 
recognised principle in most domestic legal systems, the means of providing this 
procedure differ from one state to another. For example, in one country this power 
could be practised by all the courts, whereas others permit review only by the 
supreme court or by a court specially created for that purpose.31 There are several
28 The term “judicial review” differs from the term “judicial appeal”; the latter procedure is 
carried out by a court of appeal, which is enabled to review the correctness of the judgments 
rendered by lower courts. See p. 3 \6 ff. below.
29 It should be mentioned that in dealing with this subject some references are needed 
concerning domestic jurisdiction. I have used these references not in the belief that they are in any 
way authoritative, but because they do help point up and illuminate some of the problems which the 
Court faces in this matter.
30 The International Commission of Jurists has defined the term ‘rule of law’ as being “a 
convenient term to summarise a combination on one hand of certain fundamental ideals concerning 
the purposes of organised society and on the other of practical experience in terms of legal 
institutions, procedures and traditions, by which these ideals may be given effect”. The Rule o f  Law 
in Free Society: A Report on the International Congress o f  Jurists, 1959, p. 191 (cited in Gunn, A., 
“Council and Court: Prospects in Lockerbie for an International Rule of Law”, FLRUT, 52, 1993, p. 
221, note 77.
31 Cappelletti, M., Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, 1971, p. 45; Brewer-Carias, 
supra note 1, pp. 91-3; Dijk, supra note 1, pp. 35 ff.
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other points of difference: (i) the moment at which control of constitutionality is 
performed could be prior to review of the formal enactment of the particular act, or 
after the act has come into effect; (ii) the methods of judicial review vary from 
allowing the review to be incidental to another litigious issue to allowing it to be an 
independent action; (iii) the extent of the legal effects of the decision resulting from 
review could be in casu et inter partes, whereby it affects only the parties in a 
concrete process, or an erga omnes effect, whereby it is applicable to all members 
of the society; (iv) finally, the date of the effectiveness of the court’s decision of 
non-legality is considered by some systems as ex tunc, pro praeterito, whereby it is 
considered that the acts have never existed and have never been valid, whereas other 
systems consider it as ex nunc, procfuturo, whereby the act is considered to have 
produced its effect until its annulment by the court.
In the light of the above, it could be argued that judicial review by 
constitutional courts of the acts of the political organs of government has had to be 
accepted by all legal systems as a necessary price for a predictable judicial process.
2.3. The practice of judicial review by international courts
The principle of “judicial review” was recognised in the international domain by 
several treaties in the pre-World War II period; for instance, the Treaty of 
Versailles, which provided an appeals procedure by the PCIJ against the decisions 
of the Office for Auditing and Compensations Regarding Payment and Recovery of 
Enemy Debts,32 the Barcelona Convention of 1921 on shipping routes, the 
Convention of 23 July 1921 on the status of the Danube, the Convention of 22 
February 1922 regarding the Elbe Statute, and the German-Polish Convention of 15 
May 1922 on Upper Silesia. All of these conventions stipulate the possibility of 
referring international decisions to an international tribunal in the event of the 
provisions of the conventions being violated or if a particular matter did not fall 
within the terms of reference of the body in question.33
Arts. 386,416, 417,418 and annex to Art. 296, No. 2.
33 Tsoutsos, A., “Judicial Supervision of International Legality”, RHDI, 16, 1963, p. 271; 
Sohn, L., “Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and Application of Treaties”, 
RCADI, 150, 1976, pp. 244 ff.
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Following World War II, and as a consequence of the proliferation of 
international organisations and of the wide powers of their organs to fulfil important 
functions in legislation and administration, it was strongly felt that judicial review 
procedures over the organs affiliated to these institutions were needed.
Within the European Communities this possibility has been provided for to a 
large extent. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has clear power to review the 
legality of the acts of the Community institutions.34 The Treaty of Paris which 
established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) provides in Arts. 33 
and 38 the possibility of judicial review by the ECJ.35 Pursuant to these articles, the 
Court has the power to ensure respect for the law in the interpretation and 
application of that treaty and its rules of execution. It also has the competence to 
annul the decisions and recommendations of the High Authority on the request of 
any member or of the Council. The request should be made within one month of 
the publication or notification of a challenged decision.36 Similarly, the treaty of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) authorises, pursuant to Art. 173/1, the ECJ 
with the power to annul any act of the Council and the Commission upon the 
request of any member states, the Council, the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the European Central Bank, and natural and legal persons. In addition, 
Art. 146/1 of the European Atomic Energy (Euratom) treaty empowers the ECJ with 
the jurisdiction to annul any decision of the Council and the Commission.37 The 
request for annulment should be submitted within two months of the publication or 
notification of the challenged decision.38
The grounds of illegality that may be put forward are: lack of competence, 
infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the relevant
34 Creally, E., Judicial Review o f Safeguard Measures in the European Community, Ph.D. 
Thesis (University of Edinburgh), 1991, pp. 11 ff.\ Schermers, H., Judicial Protection in the 
European Community, 1987, pp. 139 ff.
35 Lauterpacht, E., “The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations” in 
Cambridge Essays in International Law. Essays in Honour o f Lord McNair, 1965, p. 96; Dijk, 
supra note 1, pp. 244-5.
36 Art. 38/2 of the treaty.
37 Brown, L., et al., The Court o f  Justice o f the European Communities, 1994, pp. 125 ff.\ 
Bowett, supra note 11, p. 306
38 Art. 173/2 o f the EEC treaty, Art. 146/2 of the Euratom treaty.
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Community treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, and misuse.39 If 
the Court finds that the request is well founded, it may annul only the challenged 
act; it cannot modify or replace it or order that a specific decision be taken.40 All the 
above institutions are obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with 
judgments of the Court.41
To conclude, it seems clear that these institutions are based on the rule of law, 
granting rights to their members. They explicitly provide for the possibility of 
judicial review of the legality of acts of Community institutions. There is no doubt 
that the adoption of this principle in the field of international institutions is 
considered to be an important right to the member states as regards the acts of the 
organs of international organisations.
3. Judicial review by the ICJ in the framework of the UN
In dealing with the power of the ICJ to review UN acts, a distinction should be 
made between the specialised agencies of the UN and its political organs.
3.1. Judicial review of the acts of the specialised agencies
3.1.1. Constitutional provisions
The principle of judicial review was adopted in the constitutions of some 
specialised agencies that have an interrelationship with the UN. The constitution of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), both the original one of 1919 and the 
revised one of 1946, stipulates that a government refusing to accept 
recommendations made by the ILO, or a Commission of Inquiry constituted by it, 
must, within three months after publication of the report and the recommendations, 
inform the Director General “whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the 
International Court of Justice” .42
Art. 33/1 of the ECSC treaty, Art. 173/1 of the EEC treaty, Art. 146/1 o f the Euratom
treaty.
40 Dijk, supra note 1, pp. 245-6.
41 Art. 34 o f the ECSC treaty, Art. 176 of the EEC treaty, Art. 149 of the Euratom treaty.
42 Art. 29.
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Art. 84 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO) also 
stipulates that “any disagreement” between two or more contracting parties that is 
not settled by negotiation shall, “on the application of any state concerned in the 
dispute”, be decided by the Council of the ICAO. Appeal may be made after 
Council action “to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to 
the dispute” or, if the parties have accepted the Statute of the International Court, to 
that Court.43
3.1.2. The jurisprudence of the ICJ as a constitutional court
The ICJ has exercised its power of judicial review over the acts of the specialised 
agencies in two cases.
The first case was the IMCO case.44 The question posed to the Court was:
“Is the Maritime Safety Committee o f the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organisation, which was elected on 15 January 1959, constituted in accordance with the 
Convention for the Establishment of the Organisation?”45
The Court was clearly being asked to determine whether the Assembly had acted 
constitutionally when it elected the members of the Maritime Safety Committee. 
Before referring to the Court’s opinion it seems appropriate to note that Art. 12 of 
the Convention establishing IMCO provides that one of the organs of the 
organisation shall be the Maritime Safety Committee. Art. 28 of the Convention 
governs the membership of the Committee. At the first IMCO Assembly in 1959, 
the members proceeded to hold an “election”, adopting as the basis of voting a list 
of the names of member states in order of total gross registered tonnage. On this list 
Liberia was third and Panama eighth. In electing the eight members, which had to 
be the largest ship-owning nations, however, the Assembly elected neither Liberia 
nor Panama.
43 In addition to these conventions, Art. 96 of the International Trade Organisation stipulates 
the possibility for reference to the ICJ for judicial review by request of an advisory opinion on any 
decision of the Trade Conference, at the simple request of a member state wronged by the decision. 
See Rubin, S., “The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade Organisation”, HLR, 63, 
1949, p. 7 8 #
44 Now the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
45 ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 151.
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This election led to a debate over the interpretation of Art. 28 of the 
Convention, as the result of which the above question was referred to the Court. 
Before the Court it was contended that the Assembly was entitled to refuse to elect 
Liberia and Panama because it had discretionary power to determine which 
members of the organisation have an important interest in maritime safety. It was 
also argued that the Assembly had discretionary power to determine which were the 
largest ship-owning nations.46 The Court first examined the term “elected” in the 
light of the drafts of the 1946 United Maritime Consultative Council and the 1948 
United Nations Maritime Conference. It then examined the meaning of the phrase 
“the largest ship-owning nations”. The Court concluded that the decision taken by 
the Assembly could not be justified by reference to the basic instrument of the 
organisation and decided the unconstitutionality of the election to be an unlawful 
act because it had failed to comply with Art. 28 of the Convention. It stated that:
“the Maritime Safety Committee of Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organisation which was elected on January 15, 1959, is not constituted in accordance 
with the Convention for the establishment of the organisation.”47
The second case referred to the ICJ as a constitutional court was the Appeal 
Relating to the Jurisdiction o f the ICAO Council case (1972).48 The case arose from 
the suspension by India of overflights of Indian territory by Pakistani civil aircraft, 
following an incident involving the diversion of an Indian aircraft to Pakistan. 
Pakistan had brought the matter to the Council of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), the UN specialised agency regulating international civil 
aviation, which was established under the Chicago Convention of 1944. The 
Council of the ICAO assumed jurisdiction and adopted a decision on 29 July 1971 
regarding the matter. India challenged this decision as a non-constitutional act 
because the Council had no jurisdiction and it requested the Court to declare that the 
Council’s decision was illegal, null and void.49 India argued that the Chicago
46 ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 165 ff.\ Lauterpacht, supra note 35, pp. 100-1.
47 ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 171.
48 Hereinafter the ICAO case.
49 ICJ Rep., 1972, pp. 49 jf.\ Fitzgerald, G., “The Judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction o f the ICAO Council”, CYIL, 12, 1974, pp. 153-63;
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Convention and the other international agreement on which the Council jurisdiction 
was based had been terminated or suspended between India and Pakistan. It 
contended that the parties had adopted a special agreement (Transit Agreement) on 
the resumption of overflights across each other’s territory. Therefore it concluded 
that “no question of a disagreement... relating to the interpretation or application of 
the Chicago Convention and its annexes” could arise. The ICJ first had to interpret 
the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, which provide judicial recourse 
by way of appeal to the Court against decisions of the Council.50 It concluded that 
its supervision of the validity of the Council’s acts made no distinction between 
supervision as to jurisdiction and supervision as to merits.51 Having reached this 
conclusion, the Court decided that the Council of the ICAO was competent to 
entertain the application and consequently its act and subsequent resolutions were 
lawful and in accordance with the constitutional instrument.52
In the light of these two precedents, it can be concluded that the ICJ does
( i / ^ypractise its power of judicial review of the acts of specialised agencies. Its
  * Vdecisions in these two cases as to the legality of the acts of the organs affirm that the *. h,1 \  r
Court is capable of playing an important role as a constitutional court and thereby is
able to preserve the rule of law within the framework of the UN. , i '
3.2. Judicial review by the ICJ of the acts of the political organs of the UN /  V-
Having referred to the constructive role of the ICJ in reviewing the constitutionality 
of the organs of the specialised agencies, the question is whether the ICJ has a 
similar role to play as regards the acts of the principal organs of the UN.53 The
Rosenne, S., “The International Court of Justice and International Arbitration”, U IL , 6, 1993, pp. 
313-18.
50 ICJ Rep., 1972, p. 55.
51 Ibid., p. 60-1.
52 Ibid., p. 70.
53 It should be noted that this question is restricted to the ICJ’s power to examine the legality 
of the UN organs’ acts. This means that it has no power to declare a provision of the Charter invalid 
or void in the way that federal and some unitary constitutions expressly empower their supreme
courts to declare invalid not only the organic laws but also the constitutional provisions themselves.
In this regard, Elias observes that “the nature of the organisation and of its operation would not seem 
to be such as to invite the inclusion in the Charter of any provision of this nature”. Elias, T., New 
Horizons in International Law, 1979, pp. 89, 91.
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importance of this question derives from the fact that, according to the Charter, 
these organs have wide powers to achieve the objectives of the UN. These powers 
may take various forms - from deliberations, recommendations and initiation of 
studies to the adoption of binding decisions.54 In addition, these organs are under 
several limitations when they exercise their functions according to the Charter, their 
rules and the principles of international law.55
Against this background, it is a matter of no small importance to ask whether or 
not the ICJ possesses the capacity to condemn acts of the UN organs as ultra vires. 
Such questions might arise despite the assertion by international lawyers and the 
ICJ in several cases that the resolutions of UN organs must enjoy an initial 
presumption of validity.56 However, it could be argued that an act adopted by a 
political organ of the UN is manifestly ultra vires if it breaches the law or exceeds 
its powers. For instance, the GA could adopt a decision regarding an important 
question by a simple majority, contrary to the provision of Art. 18 of the Charter. 
The SC might also adopt a decision regarding an international dispute under 
Chapter VI when a party to this dispute has participated in the voting, or a decision 
that represents a miscarriage of justice, or a decision contrary to the objects and 
purposes of the UN. It can be asked what the legal consequences are if these acts 
are perceived by the majority of states to be unconstitutional. Considerations of 
justice and fairness prevent these acts from being accepted as immune from 
scrutiny, and indeed require them to be reviewed. Could the ICJ be considered 
capable of fulfilling this role?
'i r
54 S ee A rts . 4 , 5 , 6 , 17, 18, 19, 2 5 , 4 1 , 52  a n d  63 o f  th e  C h a rte r .
55 S ee p p . 2 6 5  Jf. ab o v e .
56 In  th e  Expenses case , th e  IC J n o te d  th a t “ w h e n  th e  O rg a n isa tio n  ta k e s  a c tio n  w h ic h
w a rran ts  th a t it w a s  a p p ro p ria te  fo r  th e  fu lf ilm e n t o f  o n e  o f  th e  s ta te d  p u rp o se s  o f  th e  U n ited  
N a tio n s , th e  p re su m p tio a is - J J ia t  su c h  a c tio n  is n o t ultra vires th e  o rg a n is a tio n ” . IC J R ep ., 1962, p. 
168. T h is  v iew  w a s  su b seq u e n tly  a ffirm e d  b y  th e  C o u rt in  tfieFTamibia c ase  in  th e  fo llo w in g  te rm s: 
“ [a] re so lu tio n  o f  a  p ro p e rly  c o n s titu ted  o rg a n  o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  w h ic h  is p a sse d  in a c c o rd a n c e  
w ith  th a t o rg a n ’s ru le s  o f  p ro c ed u re , an d  is d e c la re d  b y  its p re s id e n t to  h av e  b e en  so  p a sse d  m u s t  be  
p re su m ed  to  h a v e  b e e n  v a lid ly  a d o p te d .” IC J R ep ., 1971, p. 10. L a u te rp a c h t a d d re sse s  This p o in t 
w h e in ie l io t e s lE a P l [tRe TCJ] d id  n o t seek  to  a v o id  th e  p ro p o s itio n  th a t e v e ry  a c t m u s t b e  ju s t if ie d  b y  
re fe re n ce  to  th e  p o w e rs  o f  th e  O rg a n isa tio n . In stead , it s ta te d  m e re ly  th a t  th e re  is a  p re su m p tio n  th a t 
an  a c t is w ith in  th e  p o w e rs  o f  th e  O rg a n isa tio n  i f  it is d o n e  fo r  th e  p u rp o se s  o f  th e  O rg a n isa tio n  ... 
T h is  p re su m p tio n  is n o t an  irreb u ttab le  o n e .” L au te rp ach t, supra n o te  3 5 , pp . 88 , 110, 117.
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From the outset, it should be noted that, despite the emergence of this issue in 
the travauxpreparatoires stage, the Charter and the Court’s Statute are silent in this 
respect. This silence has led to great disagreement among lawyers regarding the 
Court’s power to exercise judicial review over the acts of the political organs. In 
order to form an opinion, the study considers first the discussion of this issue during 
the travaux preparatoires of the Charter, then the opinion of international lawyers, 
and finally the Court’s attitude.
3.2.1. Judicial review of the political organs’ acts in the travaux preparatoires
The question of review of the legality of the UN political organs was raised at the 
UN Conference at San Francisco. At this stage, the Belgian delegate in the 
Commission dealing with the question of the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes by the SC proposed an amendment that would give any state that is party to 
a dispute and up for discussion before the Council the right to request “an advisory 
opinion from the Court as to whether the decision respected its independence and 
vital rights”. According to this amendment, if the Court decides that such rights 
have been violated or threatened, the Council would either reconsider the issue or 
refer it to the GA.57 This view was upheld by Colombia, which argued that 
“confidence” in the SC “should not exclude confidence in the International Court of 
Justice”.58
p
These proposals were rejected by some delegations on the basis that thejj 
working drafts already required the SC to act “in accordance with the purposes and j j
jprinciples of the Organisation” and “with due regard to principles of justice and i\
international law”.59 Specifically, it was noted by the Soviet Union that “thejj 
Security Council should receive the full confidence” of members of the 
organisation, and that “there should be no question in the minds of any delegates 
that the Security Council might wish in any way to infringe the rights of a sovereign
See UNCIO, 3, pp. 331, 332-6
58 See UNCIO, 12, pp. 47, 48.
59 Caflisch, L., “Is the International Court Entitled to Review Security Council Resolutions 
Adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter?” in Al-Nauimi, N., et al. (eds.), 
International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade o f  International Law, 1995, pp. 
651-2.
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state”. Consequently, it concluded that the Belgian amendment would “weaken” 
the Council, which might even be made a “defendant before the Court”.60 The USA 
also noted that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal already permitted states to appeal “on 
any matter which might properly go before the Court”. It concluded that for both 
reasons the amendment was unnecessary.61 Finally, the UK rejected the proposals 
on the basis that this would involve the Court in political questions, not legal ones. 
According to this view, these proposals would cause delay at times when prompt 
action by the Council was required and, hence, be prejudicial to the success of the 
organisation.62
As a consequence, the proposal was withdrawn by Belgium when it became 
apparent that it was not going to get majority support.63 Therefore, the Charter was 
adopted without any reference to the Court’s power as a constitutional court in the 
UN system. Nor did the Court’s Statute refer in any of its provisions to the Court’s 
role in reviewing the validity of other organs’ acts.64
3.2.2. Judicial review of the political organs’ acts in international doctrine
Discussion of the power of the ICJ to act as a constitutional court within the UN has 
its roots in the early days of the UN. The question nonetheless remains unsettled 
and is considered to be one of the most controversial issues in international 
doctrine. It has been noted by some lawyers that the ICJ cannot act as a
60 See UNCIO, 12, pp. 47,48; Kelsen, supra note 6, pp. 446-7, note 8.
61 See UNCIO, 12, p. 49.
62 Ibid., p. 65.
63 Franck, T., “Remarks by Professor Thomas Franck” in UN Checks and Balances: The 
Roles o f  the ICJ and the Security Council. ASIL/NVIR Proceedings (Contemporary International 
Law Issues: Opportunities at a Time o f Momentous Change - Proceedings o f  the Second Joint 
Conference held in the Hague, The Netherlands: July 22-24, 1993), p. 282; Watson, G., 
“Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court”, HILJ, 34, 1993, pp. 4-5.
64 In 1947, the Australian delegation presented a proposal for a resolution that the
International Court of Justice be changed into an institution that would control the activity o f the 
organs of the United Nations. The Legal Committee approved three proposals for resolutions. The 
General Assembly endorsed the resolution recommending that the organs of the United Nations and 
the special institutions “revise from time to time the difficult and grave questions falling under the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, that originated in the course of their activity, 
concerning the principal question which it is desirable to settle, including questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations or also its special institutions”. See Azud, J., The 
Peaceful Settlement o f  Disputes and the United Nations, 1970, p. 140.
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constitutional court in the UN. In other words, it is not the “guardian of the 
Charter” in the way federal constitutional courts are “guardians of the constitution” 
in some federal systems.65 According to this view, once a decision is adopted by 
any political organ of the UN it will be immune from judicial review by the ICJ.66 
This opinion is based on the following grounds. First, a constitutional role is not 
needed within the UN system because the Charter gives its organs discretionary 
power to act. For instance, if the Council determines that it has to take action under 
Chapter VII and decides by a qualified majority to do so, this is considered to be a 
political decision and not a legal one. Therefore, this act should not be hampered by 
the Court’s procedures. Second, empowering the ICJ with such power would 
clearly be dangerous. As noted by the Australian delegation before the SC in the 
discussion of the Indonesian question: “in every case that has come before the 
Council, this question of competence or jurisdiction has been raised. If we decide 
on every occasion to refer a question to the International Court before we decide to 
take any action whatever, the result would be that we would never take any 
action.”67 Third, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers in the 
domestic domain, judicial review is explicitly given to domestic courts as judicial 
bodies because the exercise of this power by them is considered to be an exception 
to the above principle. By analogy, this principle should be applied to UN law and, 
therefore, the Court should be deprived of any power in this regard because there is 
no express provision entitling it to possess the power of judicial review. Fourth, it 
is noted that the Charter itself imposes sufficient constitutional limitations upon
Rosenne, S., The World Court - What It Is and How It Works, 1995, p. 36; Evans, S., 
“The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political 
Doctrine”, MJILT, 18, 1994, pp. 35-6; Koskenniemi, M., “The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice 
and the United Nations: A Dialectical View”, EJIL, 6, 1995, pp. 341-2.
66 Judge Petren noted: “a political organ is entitled to take a decision upon grounds which 
are admittedly of a legal nature, but the validity of which cannot be examined by the Court once the 
political organ has taken its decision within its proper sphere of competence.” ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 
132-3. In this respect, see Lissitzyn, O., “International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia”, 
CJTL, 11, 1972, p. 50; Falk, R., Reviving the World Court, 1986, p. 162; Walferum, R., “The 
Security Council: Its Authority and Legitimacy”, ASILP, 87, 1993, p. 320; Gill, T., “Remarks by 
Terry Gill” in UN Checks and Balances: The Roles o f the ICJ and the Security Council ASIL/NVIR 
Proceedings (Contemporary International Law Issues: Opportunities at a Time o f  Momentous 
Change - Proceedings o f  the Second Joint Conference held in the Hague, The Netherlands: July 22- 
24, 1993), pp. 2 8 4 #
67 SC 19th mtg., 25 August 1947.
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these organs’ conduct to obviate the need for any judicial role in most 
circumstances. For instance, the expansion of the number of non-permanent seats 
on the Council in 1963 from six to ten shows that these political checks and balance 
are an adequate constraint on Council conduct.68
The above view is rejected by a number of lawyers who consider that the ICJ is 
the “guardian of the Charter” because there is no reason to believe that the Court 
cannot fulfil this role.69 This view is based on the following grounds. First, the 
withdrawal of the Belgian proposal can hardly be interpreted as an indication that 
the drafters declined to give the Court the power of judicial review. On the 
contrary, it simply reflects Belgium’s realisation that judicial review of the SC 
recommendations taken under what is now Chapter VI was unnecessary because 
those recommendations would not be binding anyway. Withdrawal of that proposal 
had nothing to do with the acceptability of judicial review for binding SC decisions, 
such as those taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.70 Second, there is no 
provision in the Charter that would hinder the Court from exercising such a 
jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Charter’s draft and its text are indeed vital to 
claims that the Court enjoys a robust power to review the validity of UN acts’ 
formal or substantive legality.71 Third, the Court’s power to review the acts of the 
UN organs is granted as a consequence of the Charter and the Statute empowering it 
to give advisory opinions. Elias stresses this point and considers it to be a very 
important basis for the Court’s role in this regard. He asserts that it would often
68 Reisman, W., “Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations”, AJIL, 81, 1993, p. 83. It also 
has been noted by White that “the veto operates as a safeguard against the adoption o f ultra vires 
resolutions”. White, supra note 8, p. 109.
69 Gros, A., “The Problem of Redress Against the Decision of International Organisations”, 
GS, 36, 1951, p. 30; Lachs, supra note 23, pp. 399-400; Graefrath, B., “Leave to the Court What 
Belongs to the Court: The Libyan Case”, EJIL, 4, 1993, pp. 200-1, 203; Tomuschat, C., “The 
Lockerbie Case before the International Court of Justice”, RICJ, 48, 1992, p. 48; Kennedy, R., 
“Libya v. United States: The International Court of Justice and the Power of Judicial Review”, VJIL, 
33, 1993, pp. 909 ff.
70 Watson, supra note 63, p. 11.
71 In this regard, it has been noted by Schlochauer that the Court “occupies a special position 
in relation to the other five principal organs, into whose hierarchic structure it is not integrated”. 
Schlochauer, H., “International Court of Justice”, EPIL, 1, 1981, pp. 73-4; see also Gunn, supra 
note 30, p. 239; Kooijmans, P., “The Advisory Opinion on Namibia of the International Court of 
Justice”, NTIR, 20, 1973, p. 25.
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seem to be overlooked by those opposed to the Court’s exercise of its judicial 
review.72 Fourth, it has been said that there should be no fear of entitling the ICJ to 
play such a role because it will be directed by the main purposes of the UN. Fifth, 
the Court’s function of legitimisation should not be seen as undermining the 
effectiveness of the actions adopted by the political organs of the UN. Indeed, the 
function of the institution might well be undermined if it is not recognised as 
legitimate by those who are called upon to implement its decisions.73 Sixth, the fear 
that the role of the political organs, especially the SC, would be obstructed as a 
consequence of judicial review by the Court is overdone. There is no question of 
referring to the Court any action whatever the Council takes in the course of its day- 
to-day business. This view is based on the report of Committee IV/I, which 
accepted the idea that each organ is entitled to interpret the Charter’s provisions 
relevant to its own routine. Thus only important questions, ones that raise very 
delicate points or affect the obligations of states, would be referred to the Court for 
an interpretation of the relevant texts.74 Seventh, it would be contrary to the rule of 
law for the political organs to be completely insulated from legal scrutiny. These 
organs are not infallible and, when they err, the Court, as the guardian of the legality 
of the UN system, must not decline to make a legal judgment. Accordingly, if 
member states cannot turn to the Court when their essential rights have been 
breached by the political organs’ actions, then there is no “rule of law” within the 
UN system and these states can refuse to co-operate with the organisation.75 In this 
regard, White states:
“Arguably one of the most important elements of the concept of the rule of law is to have 
a legal method of reviewing the actions of government, particularly the executive branch. 
If one sees the UN as a nascent form of world government with the Council as the 
executive body, then for the Rule of Law ideal to be established there needs to be judicial 
review, just as the Supreme Court of the United States can review the actions of 
government.”76
72 Elias, supra note 53, p. 89.
73 Gowlland-Debbas, V., “The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and 
the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case”, AJIL, 88, 1994, p. 677.
74 Bedjaoui, supra note 18, pp. 16-17.
75 Weller, M., “The Lockerbie Case: A Premature End to the ‘New World Order’?”, AJICL, 
4, 1992, p. 324; Scott, et al., supra note 7, pp. 83, 128.
76 White, N., “The Security Council and the Rule of Law”, ILACC, 1, 1995, p. 29.
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Eighth, in reply to the argument that the political checks and balances of the SC are 
the guardian of the Council’s acts, the advocates of this view note that this opinion 
is premised on the existence of a Charter-mandated circle of freedom within which 
the SC’s authority is (or should be) unfettered by external sources. There is no 
general hierarchical structure in the Charter as between the Council and the Court, 
because the operative principle is one of concurrent rather than exclusive authority. 
If such a system is to be effective, then by definition the checks and balances that 
set the bounds of each organ’s authority cannot be exclusively internal to each 
organ. This is one of the necessary components of inter-institutional comity and the 
“fruitful interaction”.77 Ninth, it has been noted that the Council comprises the 
representatives of fifteen member states (five permanent members with ten 
additional members normally elected by the GA for two-year periods). It is said to 
be a political rather than a judicial organ because its members are not independent. 
The Court, by contrast, is composed of fifteen judges elected by the Assembly and 
the Council irrespective of their nationalities. Therefore, apart from the Secretariat, 
the Court is the only principal organ of the UN not composed of representatives of 
governments. The Court’s judges are independent and are granted diplomatic 
privileges and immunities during their term of office. Hence, it has been argued 
that the impartiality of the Court is a recommendation for the organ’s competence to 
review the validity of SC resolutions.78 Tenth, the ICJ’s power of judicial review is 
also based on the notion of fairness in international law. It has been noted that “the 
Court may have to be the last-resort defender of the system’s legitimacy if the UN is 
to continue to enjoy the adherence of its members. This seems to be tacitly 
acknowledged judicial common ground, and is an elementary prerequisite of 
fairness in the Council’s exercise of its newly ebullient powers.”79 In the same 
direction, Alain Pellet stressed before the ILC that the Court should always satisfy 
itself that any given decision of the SC is legally correct, and that SC decisions must 
at least comply with the norms of jus cogens and certainly should not be contrary to
Scott, et al., supra note 7, p. 91.
78 Gunn, supra note 30, p. 240.
79 Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 1995, p. 244.
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the Charter itself, which is definitely superior to the SC.80 Finally, several ICJ 
judges have referred to the basic judicial function of the Court as a ground for 
justifying its power of judicial review over the acts of the political organs. For 
instance, Judge Spender noted that:
“The question of the constitutionality of action taken by the General Assembly or the 
Security Council will rarely call for consideration except within the United Nations itself, 
where a majority rule prevails. In practice this may enable action to be taken which is 
beyond power. When, however, the Court is called upon to pronounce upon a 
question whether a certain authority exercised by an organ of the Organisation is within 
the power of that organ, only legal considerations may be invoked and de facto  extension 
of the Charter must be disregarded.”81
Judge Morelli also stressed that:
“It is exclusively for the Court to decide, in the process o f its reasoning, what are the 
questions which have to be solved in order to answer the question submitted to it ... the 
organ requesting the opinion is quite free as regards the formulation of the question to be 
submitted to the Court; it cannot, once that question has been defined, place any 
limitations on the Court as regards the logical processes to be followed in answering i t ... 
Any limitation of this kind would be unacceptable because it would prevent the Court 
from performing its task in a logically correct way.
The Court would therefore be obliged to consider either the question of the conformity 
of the resolutions with the Charter, or the question of the validity of the resolutions, 
should it recognise that it is necessary to dispose of one or other of these questions in 
order to answer the question of characterisation of the expenditures. Should the Court on 
the contrary not recognise any such necessity, it should refrain from considering the 
questions.” 2
Moreover, Judge Onyeama noted that:
“I do not conceive it as compatible with the judicial function that the Court will proceed 
to state the consequences of acts whose validity is assumed, without itself testing the
83lawfulness of the origin of those acts.”
Finally, Judge Dillard noted that:
“But when these organs do see fit to ask for an advisory opinion, they must expect the 
Court to act in strict accordance with its judicial function. This function precludes it from 
accepting, without any enquiry whatever, a legal conclusion which itself conditions the 
nature and the scope of the legal consequences flowing from it.”84
80 UN Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 2257, 16, 8 May 1992.
81 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 197.
82 Ibid., pp. 217-18.
83 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 144.
84 Ibid., p. 151.
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Despite the persuasive grounds of this view, it seems appropriate also to 
examine carefully the jurisprudence of the ICJ with regard to its power of judicial 
review to see how the ICJ has exercised its function of judicial review.85
3.2.3. The ICJ’s jurisprudence: Recognition of its power of judicial review
The allegation of the acts of the political organs being ultra vires has been raised in 
several cases before the Court since the early days of its existence. The Court’s 
jurisprudence in this respect can be classified as explicitly and implicitly 
recognising its power of judicial review.
(i) Explicit recognition of judicial review
The Court has explicitly recognised its power of judicial review in several cases 
where it made express opinions regarding the legality and constitutionality of the
O' JA
acts of UN political organs.
i \K|(i \ s
V\.In the Admission case, the Court was asked to give an opinion as a consequence n
of Russia conditioning its assent to the admission of Italy and Finland to the United 
Nations on the simultaneous admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Russia 
contended before the SC that, under the Potsdam Agreement and the Paris Peace 
Treaties, these five ex-enemy states should be admitted together.86 On the other
hand, Art. 4 of the Charter exclusively enumerated the conditions of admission.
J7 p r  j
Therefore, the GA requested the ICJ to give an opinion regarding the vote of a
I f
member when the GA and the SC are dealing with an application for admission to 
the UN. The Court concluded that the enumeration of conditions in Art. 4 is 
exhaustive and that, if a member make its consent to the admission of a state 
dependent on the admission of other states, it would be introducing an extraneous 
condition in violation of the Charter.87
The Court’s examination of the constitutionality of the acts of UN organs was 
manifestly illustrated in the Court’s opinion regarding the Second Admission case.
85 Note that there would seem to have been no cases of judicial review undertaken by the 
PCIJ. The absence of any organic link between the League and the PCIJ made it unthinkable that 
the PCIJ should review the structure and competence of the League Council and the League 
Assembly if such questions were ever referred to it. See Elias, supra note 53, pp. 87-8.
86
87
UN Doc. S/P.V. 204, 25 September 1947.
ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 62
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This case was referred to the Court because of the difficulties encountered in the SC 
in effectuating the admission of new members.88 Therefore, the GA adopted a
i
resolution requesting the Court to give an opinion on the question: “Can the 
admission of a state to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 4, 
paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the General Assembly 
when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of 
the candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a 
permanent member upon a resolution so to recommend? ” 89 The Court answered the 
question in the negative when it stated that under Art. 4/2 of the Charter both 
“recommendation” by the SC and a “decision” by the GA are required to effect the 
admission of a state to the UN. Further, the Court pointed out that the language of 
Art. 4/2 is clear and unambiguous and the recommendation of the SC is 
indispensable.90
In addition to the above cases, the Court’s practice in the Expenses case is the 
best example of its understanding of its role as a constitutional court.91 A proposal 
was made by France to request the ICJ to give an opinion on the question whether 
or not GA expenses relating to operations were “decided on in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter”. It seems clear that this proposal was directed at enabling 
the Court to review the legality of the Assembly’s act. This proposal was rejected 
by the Assembly, which adopted a resolution to request an opinion from the Court 
to determine whether certain expenditures had been validly authorised by a series of 
GA resolutions as the “expenses of the organisation within the meaning of Article 
17/2 of the Charter of the United Nations” .92 It could be noted that substantially 
there is no great difference between the final draft of the resolution and the French 
proposal. This fact was affirmed by the practice of the Court and its opinion, as will 
be illustrated below.
88 See pp. \36 ff. above.
89 ICJ Rep., 1950, p. I f f .
90 Ibid.
91 For the facts of this case, see pp. 134.#! above.
92 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 152.
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Before the Court, it was argued that the GA cannot impose financial obligations 
as a consequence of an ultra vires act.93 In addition, it was argued that it is 
universally recognised in international law that none of the parties to a treaty is 
obliged to bear more responsibility than was assumed by it according to the treaty. 
Because the UNEF was set up in violation of the Charter, it was concluded that: “it 
is beyond any shadow of doubt that the problem of financial obligations is closely 
connected with that of the legality of corresponding measures under the terms of the 
Charter.”94 Moreover, it was contended that “the financial implications o f all 
operations undertaken by the United Nations are inseparably linked with the legal 
basis on which each of the operations undertaken by it rests”.95 It was also argued 
that “where steps are validly taken by the organisation for the maintenance of 
international peace and security ... the [General Assembly] is competent under 
Article 17/1 of the Charter to authorise the necessary expenditure”.96 Finally, the 
Attorney-General of the UK expressly announced before the Court that there was no 
power to apportion expenditure arising out of ultra vires actions.97 It seems clear 
from these arguments that the legality of the GA resolution was a subject of 
consideration before the Court and had to be decided by it.98
Despite the Court’s reference in its opinion that, under the UN Charter, no 
procedure exists for determining the validity of an organ’s act and its statement that 
each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction, the Court 
concluded that the rejection of the French proposal by the Assembly did not 
preclude it from deciding whether the expenditures were “decided on in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter, if the Court finds such consideration 
appropriate”. It added that “it must have full liberty to consider all relevant data 
available to it for an advisory opinion”.99
ICJ Pled., 1961, pp. 132-4.
94 Ibid., pp. 397, 402.
95 Ibid., p. 177.
96 Ibid., p. 242.
97 Ibid., p. 336.
98 Lauterpacht, supra note 35, p. 107.
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The Court rejected the argument that these operations were unconstitutional 
because they encroached on the SC’s monopoly of the use of armed forces. The 
Court made a distinction between enforcement action under Chapter VII, which is a 
monopoly of the SC, and peace-keeping operations not amounting to enforcement 
action. It also held that:
“The Court does not perceive any basis for challenging the legality of the settled 
practice of including such expenses as these in the budgetary amounts which the 
General Assembly apportions among the Members in accordance with the authority 
which is given to it by Article 17, paragraph 2.”100
Further, it said that:
“When the Organisation takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires.”m
By this opinion the Court granted the constitutionality of the Assembly’s act. 102 It is 
clear that the Court examined the act of the GA and expressly decided its legality in 
the light of the objects and purposes of the UN as provided in Art. 1 of the Charter. 
This opinion also clarified the Court’s attitude towards examining the legality of the 
political organs’ acts even without an express request by the UN organ to that 
effect. 103 —
This express practice of judicial review was exercised by the Court in the 
Namibia case. 104 In the debates preceding the making of the request, some members 
of the SC denied the Court’s power to pass comment upon the validity or otherwise 
of the various resolutions of the SC and the GA.
Before the Court, the validity of the GA and the SC resolutions was challenged 
on two grounds. First, the formal validity of these acts was challenged by some
100 Ibid., p. 162.
101 Ibid., p. 168.
102 In this regard, Higgins notes that, “[i]n 1962, the International Court of Justice confirmed 
the legality of such peace-keeping action, both in Suez and in the Congo”. Higgins, R., “Peace and 
Security Achievements and Failures”, EJIL, 6, 1995, p. 448.
103 Watson, supra note 63, pp. 15, 17; De Ar6chaga, E., “The Work and the Jurisprudence of 
the International Court of Justice 1947-1986”, BYIL, 58, 1987, p. 3.
104 In respect of the facts of this case, see pp. 148 ff. above.
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states. It was noted that, pursuant to Art. 32 of the Charter, any member of the UN 
that is a party to a dispute and is not a member of the Council should be invited to 
participate, without a vote, in the discussion of the Council relating to the dispute. 
It was argued that, because South Africa had not been invited to participate in the 
deliberations of the SC concerning the revocation of the mandate, the provision of 
this article had been violated. Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 27 of the Charter, non­
procedural decisions of the SC should be made by an affirmative vote of nine 
members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. It was 
contended that the resolution containing the request for an advisory opinion had 
been adopted despite the abstention of some permanent members of the Council. 
Moreover, these states rejected the declaration adopted by some UN organs that 
abstention is regarded as equivalent to concurring, and that Art. 27 has accordingly 
become modified by conduct. It was noted that the Charter can be amended only in 
a manner expressly provided for in the Charter. Further, it was contended that, even 
if some modifications had taken place, the countries that abstained made it clear in 
their contemporaneous statements that they were not concurring, and thus these 
abstentions could not possibly be regarded as compliance with the requirements of 
the Article.
Second, it was argued that the GA had acted ultra vires in adopting Res. 2145 
(XXI), which consequently was considered to be invalid. 105 It was equally argued 
that the SC’s Res. 276 was invalid and void because its very raison d'etre was the 
aforesaid invalid GA resolution. In addition, it was argued that in adopting this 
resolution the SC was not acting under any provision of the Charter, and that a 
detailed analysis of the relevant chapters of the Charter would show that the SC 
exceeded the limits placed upon its power. 106
105 It was argued by France that “nowhere in the text setting forth the functions of the 
General Assembly ... can any mention be found of a competence enabling that organ to ‘decide’ 
whether this or that territory belongs to this or that State ... The General Assembly has behaved as if 
it considered itself invested with legislative power on a universal scale, one which empowers it not 
only to formulate binding legal rules for all, even if they add to the Charter or modify it, but also to 
attach a power of sanction to those rules ... Thus we are faced with a decision o f the General 
Assembly which was taken ultra vires” ICJ Pled., 1970, vol. I, pp. 367-8.
106 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 45; Wyk, J., “The Request for an Advisory Opinion on South West 
Africa, The Legal Issues”, Acta Juridica, 1970, p. 229.
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Therefore, the legality and validity of the political organs’ acts were matters to 
be decided by the Court. From the outset, it should be noted that the Court pointed 
out that “[undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or j 
appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned”.1071: 
Despite this statement, the Court in practice considered the validity of these acts. It 
reviewed the above resolutions and devoted a considerable part of its opinion to this 
matter. 108
The Court noted that “[i]n examining this action of the GA it is appropriate to 
have regard to the general principles of the international law” . 109 It also observed ^  
that: “[t]he Court has therefore reached the conclusion that the decisions made by j\
the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 of the resolution 276 (1970), as related j
|
to paragraph 3 of the resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of resolution 269 j 
(1969), were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles o f the Charter j 
and in accordance with its Arts. 24 and 25”110 (emphasis added).
In examining the SC’s actions in this case, the Court concluded that the 
language of Art. 32 is mandatory and consequently dismissed South Africa’s claim 
on the grounds that, before a state is invited to participate in the Council’s 
deliberations, the Council must first make a determination as to the existence of a 
dispute. It noted also that the matter was embodied in the agenda of the SC as a 
situation and no member had made any suggestion or proposal that the matter was a 
dispute. 111 The Court rejected South Africa’s argument that the SC resolution 
seeking an advisory opinion was procedurally invalid because two permanent 
members had abstained and therefore had not cast “concurring votes” as required by 
the Charter. The Court based this opinion on the Council’s general practice by
107 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 45.
108 It has been noted by some lawyers that “[t]his is a strange approach. The Court denied 
having powers to review the resolutions and at the same time examined their legality.” See 
Zuijdwijk, A., “The International Court and the South-West Africa: Latest Phase”, GJICL, 3, 1973, 
p. 326; Bos, M., “The Interpretation of Decisions of International Organisations”, NILR, 33, 1981, 
pp. 7-8.
109 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 46.
110 Ibid., p. 53.
111 Ibid., pp. 22-3.
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which it treated an abstention as a concurring vote, and thus the resolution was 
validly adopted. 112 Having said that, the Court moved on to the argument relating to 
the legality of the SC’s action in the light of Art. 27/3 of the Charter. It pointed out 
that the proviso also requires for its application the prior determination by the SC 
that a dispute exists and that certain members of the SC are involved as parties to 
the dispute. It rejected the arguments that the resolution was invalid because South 
Africa was not invited to participate in the debate and because parties to the dispute 
did not abstain from voting.
In addition, the Court considered the arguments regarding the validity of the SC 
and GA resolutions. It examined the merits of the objections to the Assembly’s 
resolution on the termination of the mandate for South-West Africa and to the 
subsequent SC resolution on the same subject. The Court explicitly concluded that 
the GA had acted intra vires.113 It also affirmed that the resolutions of the SC were 
valid because that body had acted in the exercise of its “primary responsibilities” of 
maintaining peace and security, and that the resolutions were therefore binding on 
members of the UN in accordance with Arts. 24 and 25 of the Charter.
It seems clear that the ICJ considered itself competent to pronounce on the 
validity of the GA and SC resolutions. The Court held that the GA had not 
overstepped the bounds of its authority by declaring South Africa’s presence illegal 
and by terminating the mandate. 114 It also held that the SC resolutions endorsing the 
Assembly’s actions were in accordance with the Charter. Therefore, some lawyers j
j
have rightly noted that, despite the fact that the Court had announced that it does not'
possess the power of judicial review or appeal in respect of decisions taken by the! i
1 iUN organs, it plainly considered the legality of the revocation of the mandate by the \ j
JlGA and the subsequent SC resolutions - a practice that is inconsistent with the view 
that the Court has no power to review. 115
112 Ibid., pp. 21-2.
113 Ibid., pp. 4 5 #
114 Ibid.
115 In the Lockerbie cases (1992), Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri noted that the ICJ in the Namibia 
case “exercised the important function of ascertaining that the resolutions in question had been taken
in conformity with the rules of the Charter”. ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 207. Crawford notes that “it is
sometimes said that the Court has no power of ‘judicial review’ of resolutions of political organs,
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Having considered the opinions of the Court in the above cases, especially the 
Expenses case and the Namibia case, one may conclude that the ICJ’s opinions lend 
strong additional support to its power to review the validity ofcertain-actions of the 
political organs of the UN.
(ii) Implied recognition of judicial review
In addition to the express recognition and practice of the ICJ with regard to the 
examination of the legality of SC and GA acts, the Court implicitly recognised this 
power in several cases.
In the Northern Cameroon case, Cameroon alleged that the UK had failed to 
respect certain obligations directly or indirectly flowing from the Trusteeship 
Agreement for the territory of Cameroon under British administration, which was 
approved by the GA of the UN on 13 December 1946. This case was based on the 
fact that the GA had adopted three decisions. GA Res. 1350 (XIII), adopted on 13 
March 1959, recommended that the Administering Authority, in consultation with 
the UN Plebiscite Commissioner, organise under the supervision of the UN separate 
plebiscites in the northern and southern parts of British Cameroon “in order to 
ascertain the wishes of the Territory concerning their future”. In southern 
Cameroon, the plebiscite was held and registered a decision “to achieve 
independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon”. In northern 
Cameroon a first plebiscite was held; the vote was in favour of deciding their future 
at a later date. GA Res. 1437 (XIV), of 12 December 1959, recommended that a 
second plebiscite be held in northern Cameroon in which the people would be asked 
whether they wished “to achieve independence” by joining the independent 
Republic of Cameroon or by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria. Res. 
1608 (XV) included, inter alia, that the people of northern Cameroon had voted to
and in the sense of ‘judicial reviewI^as-a separate oopeciaLinstitutiQn,this j s of coursejrue. But it 
provides no ground for thinking that the legal basis of resolutions of the SC and the GA is somehow 
privileged and immune from scrutiny, or that the ‘presumption’ of validity is more than 
presumption.” Crawford, J., “The General Assembly, the International Court of Justice and Self- 
Determination” in Lowe, V., et al. (eds.), Fifty Years o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 1996, p. 
590. For the same view, see Watson, supra note 63, p. 20; De Ar£chaga, J., “United Nations 
Security Council”, EPIL, 5, 1983, pp. 345, 347; Zuijdwijk, supra note 108, p. 326.
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join the independent Federation of Nigeria; and decided that the Trusteeship 
Agreement of 13 December 1946 should be terminated. 116 _
The Counter-Memorial presented by the UK stated, inter alia, that the real 
dispute was between Cameroon and the GA, and, further, that it was not intended in 
the scheme of the Charter of the UN that decisions of political organs - the GA and 
the Trusteeship Council in this case - should be subjected to judicial review at the 
instance of individual members of the UN. 117 The Court pointed out that, whatever 
the motivation of the GA in reaching its conclusions, and whether or not it was 
acting wholly on the political plane, it was necessary for the Court to consider 
whether or not the General Assembly had based its actions on a correct 
interpretation of the Trusteeship Agreement, and there was no doubt - and indeed no 
controversy - that the resolution had definitive legal effect. With regard to the 
legality and validity of the Assembly’s resolution, the Court noted that “[t]he 
Applicant here has expressly said that it does not ask the Court to revise or to 
reverse those conclusions of the General Assembly or those decisions as such” . 118 
This means that the only reason behind the refusal of the Court to practise its power 
of judicial review of the legality of the GA’s acts was the lack of a request by the 
applicant and the non-consequent jurisdiction of the Court.
This attitude by the Court can be interpreted as being for rather than against 
judicial review because a simpler reply by the Court could have been that it lacked 
such a power. But since it stated that it was not requested to give its opinion in a 
matter that clearly relates to judicial review, one may consider such an attitude to be 
an implied recognition of judicial review.
In the Lockerbie cases, Libya contended that the SC’s resolutions were ultra 
vires and therefore invalid, on the ground that these decisions violated the 
fundamental principle of international law by which a state cannot be forced to
116 ICJ Rep., 1963, pp. 21-3.
117 ICJ Pled., 1961, pp. 59-63; Diss. Op. of Judge Bustamante, ICJ Rep., 1963, pp. 154 ff.\ 
Brownlie, I., “The Justiciability of Disputes and Issue in International Relations”, BYIL, 42, 1967, p. 
126.
118 ICJ Rep., 1963, p. 32.
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extradite its own nationals. 119 Moreover, Libya argued that the Court is empowered 
to examine the legality of SC resolutions. It asked the Court to declare that the SC’s 
resolutions were “contrary to international law” and that “the Council has employed 
its power to characterise the situation for purposes of Chapter VII simply as a 
pretext to avoid applying the Montreal Convention”.
Despite the refusal of the Court to indicate the interim measures requested by 
Libya or to mention the validity of the Council’s resolutions, 120 it did not declare 
itself incompetent to review the legality of the Council’s action. This led some 
lawyers to note that the Court had left room to consider this matter on its merits. 121 
Judges Shahabuddeen and Bedjaoui held that Res. 748 must be taken at face value, 
at least “at the present stage of a request for provisional measures” - a qualification 
that would reserve the Court’s power to examine the legality of the resolution in the 
proceedings on the merits. 122
119 •Libya argued that, “by its resolution, the Security Council infringed, or threatened to 
infringe, the enjoyment and the exercise of the rights conferred on Libya by the Montreal 
Convention and its economic, commercial and diplomatic rights”. ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 13-14.
120 In this respect, Franck observes that the Court’s majority found that since no sufficient 
case of mala fides or ultra vires had been established by Libya at this preliminary stage, there were 
no grounds upon which the Court could order such interim relief. Franck, T., “The ‘Power of 
Appreciation’: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?”, AJIL, 86, 1992, p. 521. It has been 
noted also by McWhinney that the “Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, went significantly beyond the 
classical separation-of-powers argument where no direct conflict or competition was in fact involved 
between the different UN organs; for it put the Court in the position - if it were to grant the applicant 
state’s request for what amounted to an injunctive form of relief against the respondent United 
Kingdom and United States - of directly challenging the Security Council. The Court, if it had taken 
that step, would very clearly have crossed the constitutional Rubicon and established itself, de facto, 
as a special Constitutional Court ... with the legal competence to exercise judicial review and 
constitutional control over the acts of the co-ordinate United Nations institutions, the Security 
Council and General Assembly, so as to ensure their conformity to the United Nations Charter. As 
one reads the official opinion of the Court and supporting Special Opinions in Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie, that was simply one constitutional bridge too far at this particular political moment in 
time, without any prior intellectual-legal canvassing or operation.” McWhinney, E., “The 
International Court as Constitutional Court and the Blurring of the Arbitral/Judicial Processes”, 
U IL , 6, 1993, pp. 286-7.
121 Watson, supra note 63, p. 25; Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 73, p. 669.
122 Diss. Op. of Judge Shahabuddeen, ICJ Rep., 1992 pp. 140 ff.\ Diss. Op. of Judge 
Bedjaoui, ICJ Rep., 1992, pp. 143 ff. In his analysis of the Lockerbie cases, Alvarez notes that, 
“[a]part from whether the Court or individual judges were threatening to issue a decision that finds 
the Council’s action illegal, the Court Orders in Lockerbie warned the Council to exercise care in 
undertaking similar action in the future, particularly any action contrary to international legal 
obligations that it may take in the face of the Court’s consideration of a pending case.” Alvarez, J., 
“Judging the Security Council”, AJIL, 90, 1996, p. 30.
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In the same direction, some lawyers have analysed this case and reached the 
conclusion that the international trend is to move to entitle the Court to exercise the 
power of judicial review. For instance, Watson notes:
“The Libya decision marked the first time a significant portion of the World Court 
intimated it could exercise a power of judicial review in contentious cases ... The 
decision implies that the international community is moving toward a broader acceptance 
of judicial review than the framers of the UN Charter perhaps envisioned - that the 
subsequent practice under the Charter may have altered its interpretation.”123
Frank also notes that:
“The legality of actions by any UN organ must be judged by reference to the Charter as 
a ‘constitution’ of delegated powers. In extreme cases, the Court may have to be the last- 
resort defender of the System’s legitimacy if the United Nations is to continue to enjoy 
the adherence of its members. This seems to be tacitly acknowledged judicial common 
ground.”124
Therefore, it seems clear that neither the Court nor the lawyers who have 
analysed the Court’s judgment in the Lockerbie cases have rejected the Court’s 
power to practise judicial review of the Council’s acts. This conclusion was 
affirmed by the Court in the Bosnia (.Provisional measures) case. In their first 
application for provisional measures, of 20 March 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
contended that they had a sovereign right under Art. 51 of the Charter and 
customary international law to individual and collective self-defence, including the 
right to defend themselves by immediately obtaining weapons and troops from other 
states. They therefore argued that Res. 713 and subsequent resolutions by the SC 
imposing an arms embargo upon the former Yugoslavia were contrary to Art. 51 
and the rules of customary international law. 125 In the second request for provisional 
measures in the same case, filed in the Registry on 27 July 1993, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina reiterated this argument. 126 They challenged the validity of the SC
Watson, supra note 63, p. 27.
124 Franck, supra note 120, pp. 519, 523.
125 ICJ Rep., 1993, p. 6.
126 ICJ Rep., 1993, p. 345.
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action in imposing and seeking to implement a binding arms embargo against 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as included in the former Yugoslavia. 127
Despite the Court’s judgment in these two requests, whereby it rendered the 
requested measures, it did not consider the issue of judicial review of the Council’s 
acts either in its first order of 8  April 1993, or in the second order of 13 September 
1993. If the Court found that it had no such power it would have declared that it 
was not competent to review the legality of the Council’s action.
3.3. Evaluation
Having explained the opposing opinions of international lawyers and the attitude of 
the Court in this respect, it can be argued that observance of the principles of the 
UN Charter is a necessary precondition of the effectiveness of the UN. If the UN 
organs fail to respect the limits imposed upon them and the general spirit of the 
Charter they might encourage member states to ignore acts that they consider to be 
ultra vires. This conclusion results from the fact that, in the international legal 
system, supervision of the lawfulness of acts is not impossible. This applies equally 
to the UN as part of the present international system nowadays. Having accepted 
this conclusion, an important question arises: which organ within the UN system is 
eligible to review these acts?
The possibilities are as follows: it might be left to the organ whose acts have 
been impugned; it might be left to the unilateral decision of member states; or it 
might be given to an independent and impartial organ to be the judicial organ within 
the structure of the organisation. Before reaching a conclusion in this regard an 
examination of these possibilities is required.
It seems unacceptable to conclude that the political organs have the competence 
to make such determination. Entitling the organ itself to do so might be contrary to 
the general legal principle nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. This view was 
affirmed by Judge Fitzmaurice in the Namibia case:
“In the institutional field, the justification for the act of some organ or body may turn 
upon considerations of a political or technical character, or of professional conduct or 
discipline, and if so, the political, technical or professional organ or body concerned will,
127 Rashkow, B., “Remarks by Bruce C. Rashkow” in the Security Council: Its Authority and  
Legitimacy, ASILP, 87, 1993, p. 315.
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in principle, be competent to make the necessary determination. But where the matter 
turns, and turns exclusively, on considerations of a legal character, a political organ, even 
if it is competent to take any resulting action, is not itself competent to make the 
necessary legal determinations on which the justification for such action must rest. This 
can only be done by a legal organ competent to make such determinations.”128
It is similarly unacceptable to leave the member states to make a unilateral 
decision on the legality of acts. 129 This possibility would be tantamount to making 
the members judges in their own cases, a situation that would be similar to entitling 
the organs to make the decision. 130 Consequently, it is difficult to accept the opinion 
announced by Judge Winiarski in the Expenses case:
“It is the State which regards itself as the injured party which itself rejects a legal 
instrument vitiated, in its opinion, by such defects as to render it a nullity ... A refusal to 
pay, as in the case before the Court, may be regarded by a Member State, loyal and indeed 
devoted to the Organisation, as the only means of protesting against a resolution o f the 
majority which, in its opinion, disregards the true meaning of the Charter and adopts in 
connection with it a decision which is legally invalid.”131
This view was examined by Judge Morelli, who rightly noted that:
“It is not possible to suppose that the Charter leaves it open to any State Member to 
claim at any time that an Assembly resolution authorising a particular expense has 
never had any legal effect whatever, on the ground that the resolution is based on a wrong 
interpretation of the Charter or an incorrect ascertainment of situations of fact or of 
law.”132
128 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 299.
129 An example of this was the Egyptian Government’s refusal to comply with the Security 
Council resolution of 1951 which requested the reopening of the Suez canal to Israeli navigation. 
Egypt argued that the Security Council resolution was invalid because it had acted beyond its 
powers according to the Charter and adopted a resolution in a dispute that had a legal character.
130 In this regard, it has been noted by Louis B. Sohn that “[t]he major issue is to make 
certain that grave objections to the constitutionality or legality of various decisions are properly 
considered and are not disposed of by the same body whose powers are in question. Thus, if a group 
of, for instance, 15 States should object to a proposed decision of the General Assembly on the 
ground that it constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, such objection should be 
referred by the General Assembly to some other body for a preliminary decision. As a minimum, 
the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the head of the Office of Legal Affairs in the UN 
Secretariat, should be requested to present a statement of relevant precedents and his views on their 
applicability to the case in question. Whenever possible such a question should be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Should there be a need for speedy action a 
special committee of eminent jurists might be asked for guidance.” Sohn, L., “Due Process in the 
United Nations”, AJIL, 69, 1975, p. 621. In addition, it has been noted by Koskenniemi that “[t]he 
right ‘o f last resort’ of member states to decide, for themselves, on whether an act has been ultra 
vires is difficult to reject despite the evident problems it causes to the credibility o f the collective 
system”. Koskenniemi, supra note 65, p. 342.
131 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 232.
132 Ibid., p. 224.
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In the light of the above, and because the review of the acts of the political 
organs is considered to be a legal task, it could be argued that this power should be 
exercised only by a legal organ within the international organisation. The 
conclusion that the ICJ is the only suitable organ to examine the legality of the acts 
of the political organs is based, in addition to the justifications indicated by the 
lawyers in favour of judicial review by the ICJ, on several grounds:
* The nature of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN gives it a 
unique position to carry out reviews. This did not arise in the case of the PCIJ 
because it was not an organ of the League of Nations.
* The power of the ICJ to review the legality of the political organs’ acts is a 
natural extension of its established power to interpret the Charter. It is difficult and 
often impossible to draw a line between interpretation and revision because, at the 
end of the day, the revision of acts still entails interpretation.
* The travaux preparatoires of the Charter did not close the door to judicial 
review. The San Francisco statement explained: “under unitary forms of national 
government the determination of such a question [constitutional disputes] may be 
vested in the highest court or in some other national authority. However, the nature 
of the organisation and of its operation would not seem to be such as to invite the 
inclusion in the Charter of any provision of this nature.” 133
* The principle of the “separation of powers” cannot be claimed to prevent the 
Court from practising judicial review because it is not an absolute and rigid 
principle in the domestic field. In addition, it cannot be fully applied to 
international organisations because the attribution of their powers is not strictly 
divided into legislative, executive and judicial; their objectives are more limited and 
their functions cannot be separated as clearly as those performed by state organs.
* Because the principle of judicial review has been universally recognised in 
the municipal law of modem and civilised nations, the Court could - by analogy - 
have based its power on the “general principles of law”, as indicated by Art. 38/1 of
133 See UNCIO, 13, p. 709; Sloan, B., “United Nations Charter as a Constitution”, PUSLYIL, 
1, 1989, pp. 73-4.
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its Statute. 134 In this regard, Judge Weeramantry noted that the means by which the 
Charter fulfils the common purposes and principles of the UN system resemble the 
constitutional framework of many domestic jurisdictions. 135 The ICJ affirmed the 
debt of international law to municipal law in the Barcelona Traction case, where it 
acknowledged its duty to consider and refer to municipal notions of shareholder and 
corporate law. 136 In this regard, Judge Fitzmaurice described international law as 
seeking to apply private law principles on the international plane. 137
* The Court’s power of judicial review of the acts of the political organs is 
considered to be within its jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 36/2/B of the Statute. 
According to this article, this function is a question of international law. Therefore, 
if a state contends before the Court that a decision is contrary to international law, 
the Court should settle this issue.
* The majority rule - either simple or two-thirds - as a basis for the adoption of 
the political organs’ decisions justifies the power of judicial review. The 
application of this rule does not provide adequate safeguards for minority states, 
which could be faced with an act or decision with which they have to comply but 
that they deem to be illegal. 138 Therefore, the existence of a judicial organ to
134 In respect of the influence of municipal law on international law, see Kaplan, M., et al., 
The Political Foundations o f  International Law, 1961, p. 239; Jenks, C., The Common Law o f  
Mankind, 1958, p. 107; Lauterpacht, H., Private Law Sources and Analogies o f International Law, 
with Special Reference to International Arbitration, 1927, pp. 5 ff.\ Thirlway, H., “The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 1960-1989”, BYIL, 60, 1989, pp. 127-8.
135 ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 165.
136 ICJ Rep., 1970, p. 37.
137 Ibid., p. 72.
138 With respect to judicial review within the national field, Hans Kelsen noted that, “ [i]f one 
sees the essence of democracy, not in the all powerful majority, but in the constant compromises 
between the groups represented in Parliament by the majority and the minority, and consequently in 
the social peace, constitutional justice appears as a means particularly proper for the achievement of 
this idea. This simple threat of an action to be brought before the Constitutional Court can be an 
adequate instrument in the hands of the minorities for preventing unconstitutional violations of 
juridically protected interests by the majority, and consequently being able to oppose the majority 
dictatorship, which is not less dangerous to social peace than the minority one.” Kelsen, H., “La 
Garantie Juridictionelle de la Constitution (La Justice Constitutionnelle)”, Revue du Droit Public et 
de la Science Politique en France et a TEtranger, Paris, 1928, p. 253 (cited in Brewer-Carias, supra 
note 1, p. 117). It has been also noted by Favoreu that “when the majority and the opposition 
conflict on important issues without having recourse to an electoral decision, it is evident that 
recourse to a constitutional judge to decide upon the law adopted by the majority, has the virtue of 
calming the debate and transforming it more serenely. In many cases, when the decision of the 
constitutional judge has been adopted, the controversy is extinguished.” See Favoreu, L., Le
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determine the legality or unconstitutionally of these acts seems appropriate to 
protect the minority states or convince them to accept and implement these 
decisions. It also seems important to avoid a rapid decline in the constitutional 
balance adopted by the Charter, because the acts approved by the majority could be 
submitted for review by the Court in order to determine which could be enacted 
according to the law, and which require a review. It is well known that member 
states act as decision-makers and at the same time may be the object of the decision 
in question. Thus a state might find itself among those having voted against a 
decision addressed to a group of states to which it belongs, or even to itself alone. 
Yet, by virtue of the constitutional provisions of the Charter and the powers of the 
organ in question, it may be bound by that decision qua member of the organisation.
* Judicial review by the Court is considered to be a safeguard for the member 
states and the organisational structure of the UN. On the one hand, it is considered 
to protect states from a threat to their interests by a decision of the political organs 
of the UN. In addition, the practice of judicial power by the ICJ might help to 
clarify the limits of these organs in the light of the Charter and thus protect their 
interests.
On the other hand, this procedure protects the structure of the UN by 
controlling the system of distribution of powers adopted by the Charter. In this 
regard, Kelsen pointed out that:
“A Constitution without guarantees against unconstitutional acts is not completely 
obligatory in a technical sense ... A Constitution in which unconstitutional acts and, 
particularly, unconstitutional laws, remain valid because their unconstitutionality cannot 
lead to their annulment, is more or less equivalent, from a judicial point of view, to a 
desire without obligatory force.”139
In addition, this judicial review’s procedure might play a big role in improving 
the procedures actually used by the political organs, and it might also help to 
enlarge rather than to restrain the competencies of the political organs. Finally, 
judicial review by the Court might support the acts of the political organs. That is,
Contrdle Juridictionnel des Lois et sa Legitimite, p. 36 (cited in Brewer-Carias, supra note 1, p. 
122).
1*?Q Kelsen, supra note 138, p. 124.
299
Chapter Five
if the Court finds that the acts brought into question before it are in accordance with 
the Charter (law), these acts enjoy supplementary authority.
Finally, the requirements of justice, fairness, necessity, and the interests of the 
UN demand a judicial organ with the power of judicial review. The existence of 
such an organ would encourage the member states to trust the UN, because they 
would then be in a position to protect their own interests by applying for the 
annulment by the Court of any decisions that are deemed to be ultra vires. The 
existence of such an organ may also have the advantage of increasing the 
effectiveness of the Charter and of the organs’ decisions. In contrast, saying that the 
ICJ has no power to review the political organs’ acts would lead to the dangerous 
conclusion that the idea of the rule of law in the UN would be undermined.
In the light of the above, it could be argued that, in the interests of the UN in 
the first place and in the interests of its member states, the political organs’ acts 
should be revisable. The most appropriate organ within the UN system to do this is 
the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN. This conclusion leads to a 
question about the means of referring acts for judicial review to the ICJ and the 
limits upon its power in this regard.
4. The means of referring acts to the Court
Recognition of the ICJ’s power as a constitutional court has no value without 
clarification of the means by which the judicial review can take place. There is no 
established procedure for judicial review in the structure of the UN, so one has to 
refer to the municipal and international systems. One of the following methods 
could be used: first, the Court could deal with this issue proprio motu; second, a 
state may have direct recourse against an act of an international organisation; third, 
the Court’s advisory jurisdiction could be sought; finally, the Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction could be used. The question is, which of these methods can the ICJ use 
to deal with an ultra vires act?
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4.1. Proprio motu
This method allows an automatic review by the Court of the decisions of the 
political organs. The question is, can the ICJ review the acts of the UN organs 
proprio motu?
First, if there is no case before the Court, it cannot review the acts of the UN 
organs proprio motu.140 The Court may act only at the request of an organ or a state 
whose rights or interests are infringed by a particular act. In other words, it has no 
competence to exercise abstract control over the legality of the organs’ acts.
Second, if there is a case before the Court, on the basis of either its contentious 
or its advisory jurisdiction, it could be argued that the Court may review the organs’ 
acts without a request for review by any state party to the case, or by the organ in 
the case of a request for an advisory opinion, provided that a review is needed in 
order to render an opinion or to reach a judgment. This view is based on the Court’s 
practice in the Expenses case. There the Court reviewed the legality of the GA 
resolutions regarding the apportionment of the budget without a specific request to 
do so by the Assembly. 141 In addition, this method could be justified on the 
following grounds. First, the judicial character of the Court may require such a 
direct review, 142 in that in some cases the Court cannot decide a case or render an 
opinion without determining the validity of the acts of the organs. Second, entitling 
the Court with this power is logical because it should be given the possibility of 
determining the best way to reach an opinion or judgment without any obstacles, 
otherwise it would be difficult for the Court to reach a correct and logical 
conclusion. 143 Third, direct intervention by the Court might help to protect the 
interests of the minority states in the UN because the majority could abuse the rights 
of the minority by wording the request for an advisory opinion without referring to 
the examination of the legality of the related acts.
140 Graeffath, supra note 69, p. 204.
141 See pp. 285 ff. above.
142 In Namibia case, Judge Onyeama observed that “I do not conceive it as compatible with 
the judicial function that the Court will proceed to state the consequences of acts whose validity is 
assumed, without itself testing the lawfulness of the origin of those acts”. ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 144.
143 See the Sep. Op. of Judge Morelli in the Expenses case, ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 217.
301
Chapter Five
4.2. Direct recourse
Direct recourse involves a state complaining that an action adopted by a political 
organ is ultra vires.
Several international instruments allow direct appeal. For instance, Arts. 416, 
417 and 418 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for an appeal to the PCIJ against 
decisions of an international organisation. The Convention of Barcelona of 20 April 
1921 (Art. 10/5 of the Statute) deals with disputes based on incompetence or 
violation of international conventions governing navigable waterways. Art. 38/2 of 
the Convention of 23 July 1921 on the Statute of the Danube provides for decisions 
taken by the International Commission to be taken before a judge on the ground of 
incompetence or violation of the Convention. 144
Now, we turn to discuss the possibility of a decision of the UN’s political 
organs being taken directly before the ICJ by a state demanding its annulment.
In his opinion, Gros noted that “the organisation of the procedures for 
establishing means of redress against the acts of international authorities does raise 
large technical problems. It would suffice that a Member State, party to the 
international organisation concerned and fulfilling all the conditions required under 
Art. 35 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, should make a request 
against a decision taken within the organisation, and which it considers vitiated 
through incompetence, excess of power, or violation of the Charter of the 
organisation.” 145 The Institut de Droit International also adopted, in 1954, a 
decision based on a report by Max Huber, that “[i]t is a matter to widen the terms of 
Article 35 of the Statute, so as to grant access to the Court to international 
organisations ... as parties to the Statute of the Court” . 146
In fact, this optimistic view should be examined in the light of Art. 34 of the 
Court’s Statute. According to this article, “only states may be parties in cases 
before the Court”. Consequently, international organisations, including the UN
144 For more examples, see Gros, supra note 69, pp. 31-2.
145 Gros, ibid., p. 34.
146 Cited in El-Kadi, A., The Interpretation o f the International Organisations’ Decisions,
1971, p. 157.
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itself, are excluded from being a party in contentious proceedings. 147 This provision 
therefore limits the power of the Court to review the acts of the Assembly and the 
Council through direct recourse by any state that complains that their actions are 
ultra vires.14*
4.3. Advisory jurisdiction
Since member states are not entitled to request advisory opinions from the Court, 
only the political organs and specialised agencies of the UN, pursuant to Art. 96 of 
the Charter, may seek advisory opinions regarding their acts.
This judicial review could be ex post, taking place after the adoption of an 
action. It could also be a priori, taking place in advance of the promulgation of an 
action. 149 The Assembly has set a precedent in this regard in its request for an 
opinion in the Expenses case, where it referred to the ICJ a specific request to 
determine the validity or conformity of the resolutions in the light of the Charter.
147 During the drafting of the Statute of the PCIJ it was suggested that Art. 34 could permit 
an international organisation, as an association of states, to be a party. This suggestion was not 
adopted in the Statute of the PCIJ or in the Statute of the ICJ.
148 Suggestions were made to this effect when the adoption of the 1945 Statute was being 
discussed. The International Labour Office, for instance, in a memorandum communicated to 
governments by a circular letter of 13 April 1944, suggested that, in view of the trend to create a 
number of public international organisations with specialised functional responsibilities enjoying 
varying degrees of independence and likely to enter into agreements with each other analogous to 
treaties between states, “it would seem desirable that the permanent Court or any new Court which 
may be established should be empowered to assure jurisdiction of any dispute between two or more 
such organisations which the parties thereto may refer to it or in respect of which it may be granted 
jurisdiction by treaties or conventions binding upon the organisations concerned”. Official Bulletin 
o f the International Labour Office, vol. XXVI, 1 December 1944, p. 896. See also Jenks, C., “The 
Status of International Organisations in Relation to the International Court of Justice”, GS, 32, 1946, 
p. 25. At the San Francisco Conference, the Venezuelan delegation submitted a proposal that the 
Court should be authorised to settle conflicts of jurisdiction between inter-governmental 
organisations. The discussion at the preliminary Conference of Jurists held in Washington in April 
1945 and at the UN Conference on International Organisations held in San Francisco showed that 
any suggestion of giving international organisations a locus standi in judicio before the Court was 
premature. See UNCIO, 13, pp. 410,482.
149 Elias considers that the only procedure by which the Court may make a judicial 
determination must be an advisory opinion sought specifically for that purpose. Elias, supra note 
53, p. 89. Similarly, Gros noted that “the Court’s advisory function might provide an indirect path 
to a judicial supervision of the decision of organs of the UN and other international organisations”. 
Gros, A., “Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice” in Friedmann, W., et 
al. (eds.), Transnational Law in Changing Society. Essays in Honour o f  Philip Jessup, 1972, p. 324. 
In addition, Alvarez notes that “[ijgnoring the Court’s advisory jurisdiction in this connection 
[judicial review] seems short-sighted in view of the importance that jurisdiction has had in 
developing UN institutional law”. Alvarez, supra note 122, pp. 8, 27.
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The ICJ might be asked to give advisory opinions on questions concerning the 
constitutionality of acts, and there are two possible ways in which this may be done: 
in the first place, the organs may make a direct request for the determination of the 
constitutionality (legality) of an act in terms of the articles of the Charter; or the 
Court may, in connection with other questions, be called upon to give an opinion 
regarding the legality of an act.
Judge Bedjaoui, in his opinion in the Lockerbie cases, stressed the advisory 
procedure as an under-used method of achieving judicial review by the Court of the 
acts of the Council and the Assembly. 150 According to his opinion, this method 
should be resorted to whenever the legality of a decision about to be taken is 
doubtful.
Thomas Franck relies on this method as an avenue for any judicial review of 
the decisions of the political organs. He finds that Art. 96/1 of the Charter provides 
the Court with an irrefutable basis of jurisdiction. Moreover, it does this in the 
political context of a request that in practice has to be supported by a large voting 
majority of the members of the organisation, thereby rebutting the otherwise 
inevitable charge of judicial self-aggrandisement which might be levelled were the 
Court to discuss the validity of the resolutions of political organs in response to the 
pleadings of one state. In addition, this advisory opinion procedure has already 
established a credible record of judicial interpretation of the Charter; it appears 
through the Court’s precedents in the Reparation case, the Second Admission case 
and the Expenses case. Finally, an advisory opinion, being legally definitive but not 
necessarily binding on the political organs, does not set up so stark a confrontation 
between the branches of the international system as would judicial review exercised 
in a binding decision following adversarial litigation between individual states. 151
150 ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 152. It was also asserted by Gros that “[t]he States must first, however, 
apply to the organisation that its claim for an advisory opinion be granted, unless the Statute should 
declare this compulsory for the organisation, upon simple request of one of the member States”. 
Gros, supra note 69, pp. 30-1. Elias also observed that “the International Court of Justice should, to 
the extent of its power of review, be able to say whether or not one of the principal organs has acted 
ultra vires in any given case, albeit by way of an advisory opinion only”. Elias, T., supra note 53, p. 
89.
151 Franck, T., “The Political and the Judicial Empires: Must There Be Conflict over 
Conflict-Resolution?” Paper presented to the Doha Conference on International Legal Issues Arising 
under the United Nations Decade of International Law, 22-25 March, 1994, p. 17.
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It might be argued that judicial review through the advisory jurisdiction of the 
Court could play an important role as regards the legality of the Assembly’s and the 
Council’s acts, especially since their right to request advisory opinions extends to 
any legal question, pursuant to Art. 96 of the Charter. However, this route could 
encounter some difficulties. First, the request requires the support of the majority in 
the organ making the request (including non-use of the veto by the permanent 
members of the SC). Second, one cannot expect that the principal organs will agree 
to seek advisory opinions whenever a legal argument is made against a decision or a 
proposed decision. They are unlikely to encourage the practice of judicial review 
even on a non-binding basis. A political organ might, however, consider it 
advantageous to seek an advisory opinion in the belief that it would strengthen 
support for its decision or remove doubts as to its legality. 152 Third, as noted by 
some lawyers, the proceedings involved in obtaining an advisory opinion are far too 
slow to allow the decisions of an organ to be referred to the ICJ at all frequently, or 
with any regularity. 153
However, these difficulties could be overcome. As noted by some lawyers, 
what is perhaps required is that greater efforts should be made to refer more cases to 
the Court and a means should be devised to give binding force to the opinions of the 
Court in these cases. 154 With regard to the procedural problems, these issues could 
be referred to a Chamber of the Court for summary procedure, according to Art. 29 
of the Statute, in order to obtain decisions more rapidly.
4.4. Contentious jurisdiction
If a dispute between two or more states is referred to the Court, can it review the 
legality of an act of the UN organs at the request of these parties? Because the UN 
cannot be a party before the ICJ, the decisions of its organs can be submitted for 
review in contentious proceedings only in an indirect way. 155 Here the judicial
152 Schachter, O., “United Nations Law”, AJIL, 88,1994, p. 8.
153 Gros, supra note 69, p. 31.
154 Osieke, supra note 3, p. 275.
155 Gros, supra note 69, pp. 30-7; Rideau, J., Juridictions Internationales et Contrdle du 
Respect de Traites Constitutifs des Organisations Internationales, 1969, pp. 85-9; Dijk, supra note 
l ,p .  366.
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review occurs after the action has been promulgated or taken effect (a posteriori). 
This happened in the ICAO case156 and in the Lockerbie cases.
In the Lockerbie cases, Libya brought a suit against the UK and the USA on the 
basis of the Montreal Convention to which they are all parties. It challenged that 
the SC decision imposing limited economic sanctions on Libya was invalid. 
Although the Court denied Libya’s request for interim measures to stay the 
Council’s action, several judges took note of this challenge and stated that the Court 
might be competent to pass judgment on the legality of Council action that 
infringed the legal rights of states under the Charter. For instance, Judge Lachs 
affirmed the position of the ICJ within the UN as the “general guardian of 
legality” . 157 In other words, he agreed that this power should be exercised through 
the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. This view was affirmed by some lawyers 
who noted that, although the Court can practise the judicial review in this way, this 
power cannot extend to the Council’s decisions adopted according to Chapter VII. 
In their view, these decisions cannot be reviewed through contentious cases. 158
In fact, this method of judicial review is acceptable. If it is agreed that the 
Court can review through its advisory competence, there is no obstacle to its so 
doing through its contentious competence. This opinion is based on the fact that the 
judicial nature of the Court’s work in both competencies is identical.
However, it is noticeable that judicial review by this mean is not very effective. 
The lack of compulsory jurisdiction is considered to be an important obstacle to 
judicial review, because the Court’s jurisdiction is based on the will of the states. 
Nowadays, less than one-third of the parties to the Court’s Statute are bound by 
declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause and many 
of these declarations have crippling reservations. 159
Consequently, it is clear that the referral of ultra vires acts for judicial review is 
restricted to the advisory and contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
156 Since this case has been examined on pp. 274-5 above, the study will focus on the 
precedent of Lockerbie cases.
157 Sep. Op. of Judge Lachs, ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 26.
158 Caflisch, supra note 59, pp. 660-1.
159 Sloan, supra note 133, pp. 72-7.
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5. The scope of the judicial review
A critical point as regards the I d ’s power of judicial review of the acts of UN 
organs is its scope. The above precedents of the Court did not in any way illustrate 
the scope of this power nor in all these precedents has the Court so far declared an 
action to be illegal.
One may therefore ask: can the Court decide that an action is null and decide to 
abolish this action, or can it only return the matter to the organ to re-examine the 
question?
With regard to the ICJ, four questions might be relevant: first, whether or not 
the Court can make a judicial review de novo of all acts of the GA and the SC; 
second, whether or not the Court’s power could extend to examining the facts upon 
which a contested decision is based; third, whether or not the Court can possess the 
power to declare a resolution of either the Assembly or the Council invalid or void 
for any reason whatsoever; finally, whether or not the Court can extend its power of 
judicial review to the discretionary powers of the political organs.
5.1. Judicial review de novo
It has been noted that it is quite clear that the Court is not going to review de novo 
every case in which the SC decides that there is a threat to the peace to see whether 
it really thinks there is a threat to the peace. Yet between review de novo and total 
non-jurisdiction are many different options, and it could be very fruitful to find an 
appropriate middle path. 160
In this regard, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht noted in the Bosnia case that it could 
not be accepted either that “the SC can act free of all legal controls” or that the 
Court’s power of review is unlimited. That the Court has “some power of this kind 
can hardly be doubted”. He concluded:
“There can be no less doubt that it does not embrace any right of the Court to substitute 
its discretion for that of the Security Council in determining the existence of a threat to 
the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, or the political steps to be taken 
following such a determination. But the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the
160 Franck, supra note 63, p. 283. This view is repeated by Franck in his article “The 
Political and the Judicial Empires: Must There Be Conflict over Conflict-Resolution?” in Al-Nauimi, 
N., et al. (eds.), International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade o f  
International Law, 1995, pp. 599jf.
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United Nations, is entitled, indeed bound, to ensure the rule of law within the United 
Nations system and, in cases properly brought before it, to insist on adherence by all 
United Nations organs to the rules governing their operation.”161
Advocates of this view consider that it is essential to the legitimacy of the UN 
system that the bona fides and inter vires of the Council’s and the Assembly’s 
actions be reviewed by a neutral umpire applying the text of the Charter. Such 
umpiring is no trespass by the judges on the powers of the political branches of the 
system. They therefore find that the limited judicial review is a “good deal” for the 
political branches. Moreover, they assert that the political organs of the UN system 
are granted wide latitude by the Charter to resolve conflicts. The Charter also 
imposes limits on the majority of the GA and on the SC in order to protect the weak 
nations against the numerically and militarily powerful. These advocates believe 
that these limitations are essential to the social compact. Without them, states 
would be tempted to flee the community that puts their self-determination and 
sovereignty at risk. But limitations on power cannot be left to be nurtured by 
practice. Something more is required - in their view, the protection of an organ 
devoid of power yet replete with the prestige that derives from principled 
impartiality.
Advocates of this opinion nonetheless admit that this is not to say that the 
international system needs government by judges. But they note that the rules of 
evidence and principles of judicial restraint will make a limited degree of judicial 
review acceptable in the international system, as it is in many national systems. 
Consequently, they expect the Court to presume the validity of the decisions of the 
Council adopted pursuant to Chapter VII. Accordingly, the burden of proof will be 
on those who would assert that the Council has acted in bad faith or beyond the 
boundaries of its jurisdiction as defined by the Charter. They also expect that there 
is great restraint upon the Court in determining that a situation regarding which the 
Council has invoked Chapter VII has occurred. In addition, judges should declare 
their respect for the widest “ambit of choice” within which policy-makers are free to 
exercise their political discretion. 162
161 ICJ Rep., 1993, p. 439.
162 Franck, T., supra note 151, pp. 15-17.
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5.2. Examination of facts
Is the Court competent to make a pronouncement on the intrinsic correctness of the 
decision taken, i.e. the question whether the bases on which the organ reached its 
decision are valid?
It has been noted by some lawyers that interpretation of a given international 
convention normally includes investigation by a judge of the existence of those 
facts responsible for the action of the international organisation at the time when 
that action was taken. In doing so the judge in no way oversteps the limits of his 
role as an interpreter. Doubtless the judge cannot verify the expediency of the 
decision since his interest lies merely in ascertaining whether the facts did or did not 
occur. But, the nature of the facts set forth must be considered and, if it is a 
question of economic or financial facts, this does not render the judge incompetent. 
This opinion is based on the Oscar Chinn case between Great Britain and Belgium, 
which was related to a dispute over facts of an economic nature. 163 The question in 
this case was whether: “the measures complained of by the Government of the 
United Kingdom were in conflict (a) with the obligations of the Belgian 
Government towards the United Kingdom under the Convention of Saint- 
Germain? ” . 164
The advocates of this view note that the case was particularly concerned with 
fluvial transportation, the public utility aspect of an enterprise, and the principle of 
freedom and equality established under the Congo regime. In their view, the PCIJ 
examined all the facts at length, studied the respective reasons for the Belgian 
measures in dispute and thus assumed control of the existence of the facts. In this 
regard, Judges Gros and Fitzmaurice found no difficulty in looking to the bases and 
motives behind a resolution. 165
Conversely, some lawyers oppose this view and conclude that the review of 
decisions by international bodies should be limited to legal interpretation of the 
texts in question and procedures based on these texts. It would include charges of
163 PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 63,1934.
164 Ibid., p. 68.
165 ICJ Rep., 1971, Judge Fitzmaurice (p. 294 ff.) and Judge Gros (pp. 340 ff.).
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power being exceeded but not the revision of facts established by an international 
agency or body. In this opinion, examination of the merits of facts would weaken 
the trend towards international co-operation in the judicial field and undermine the 
authority of decisions taken by international agencies. The prospect that the 
decisions of international agencies and bodies, which after a long struggle between 
divergent views were created for the purpose of international co-operation, could be 
contested and be liable to be annulled by a supervisory judicial body after a new 
investigation into the merits of the facts might well cause many governments to 
abstain from joining the work of these agencies and the agreements relating to such 
agencies and bodies. Enabling review against decisions of international bodies to 
be brought before the ICJ should be welcomed, provided that this right of review for 
the member states concerned is restricted to disputes relating to the interpretation 
and application of these acts, including charges of alleged excess of power. Such 
machinery should prove very useful in practice, because it would require no special 
investigations of facts, merely legal considerations. 166
It is appropriate to note that neither view should be rigidly applied. On the one 
hand, it is important for the judges to look into the facts. This importance could be 
justified on the basis that the facts are considered to be an integral part of the 
decisions based on them. Therefore, the Court should consider whether such facts 
were real and true or not. But, at the same time, the Court’s power to examine the 
acts and their facts should not be such that it permits the Court to say, these being 
the facts, your decision should be different. Therefore, the Court should examine 
the legality of acts in the light of the facts.
5.3. Declaring the invalidity of an act
Does the ICJ in the exercise of its judicial review function possess the power to 
declare a resolution of the political organs or specialised agencies invalid or void for 
any reason?
It has been noted that it would not at present be easy for the Court to declare 
that an act of the political organs of the UN is “null and void” without an express
166 Adamkiewicz, W., in his reply to Gros, see Gros, supra note 69, pp. 38-9.
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demand for this in a relevant request to the Court. The most the Court would find is 
that a particular Council decision at issue is illegal. 167 It has also been noted that it 
is unlikely that the majorities that wield the decision-making power in the various 
inter-governmental organisations would be any more ready to confer on the Court 
the power of direct annulment of their acts, even if found by the Court to be illegal 
or unconstitutional. 168
5.4. Judicial review against the failure to act by the organs
If an organ fails to act upon a request by any member state, does this necessitate 
recourse to the Court for review on the basis that this refusal to act infringes the 
Charter? Some international institutional instruments allow judicial review upon 
the failure to act. According to the ECSC treaty, if the High Authority refuses to 
take a decision or make a recommendation within two months of the date on which 
it was invited to act, the concerned state may refer the matter to the ECJ for 
annulment. 169 Similarly, Art. 175/2 of the EEC treaty and Art. 148 (paras. 1 and 3) 
of the Euratom treaty indicate that the parties may institute proceedings as a 
consequence of the failure to act. In that event, the ECJ may pronounce the 
illegality of the inaction. At the same time, the Court cannot substitute its own 
decision or specify a particular action, but if the ECJ decides the illegality of 
inaction, the institution is under an obligation to take the necessary measures to 
comply with the judgment of the Court. 170
The question is, does the ICJ possess a similar power? Because the UN organs 
have been entrusted with various discretionary powers, and because there is no 
express provision in the Charter of the UN to this effect, the answer to this question 
could be in the negative, for two reasons. 171 First, as mentioned above, according to
167 Elias, supra note 53, p. 97; Alvarez, supra note 122, p. 5.
168 Fitzmaurice, G., “Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court” in Gross, L.
(ed.), The Future o f  the International Court o f Justice, 1976, vol. 2, p. 486.
169 Art. 35/3 of the ECSC treaty.
170 Arts. 34 o f the ECSC treaty, 176 of the EEC treaty, 149 of the Euratom treaty. 
Schermers, supra note 34, pp. 174 ff.\ Dijk, supra note 1, pp. 246ff.
171 In this regard, Brownlie notes that “it is true that the Rule of Law experts tend to have
difficulties with discretionary powers. Provided the powers have been lawfully conferred it is, so it
is said, impossible to regard discretion as incompatible with the Rule o f Law.” Brownlie, supra note
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the current draft of the Charter and the Court’s Statute states have no direct recourse 
to the ICJ against an act taken by the UN organs, whether negative or positive. 172 
Hence, recourse to the Court in this respect could be envisaged only through a 
contentious case. Second, it seems clear that empowering the ICJ without an 
express article would deprive these organs of their discretionary powers provided by 
the Charter. This is confirmed by some international lawyers, who notes that, “if 
the organs have acted in exercise of the particular responsibility conferred on them 
by the Charter, the Court has only a marginal power of review” . 173 Such a view 
makes judicial review possible only if the organ has acted beyond its discretionary 
powers and not because of its failure to act on the request of a state member.
Conclusion
This chapter has affirmed that the rule of law is recognised by international lawyers 
as applying within the UN, in a similar fashion to the domestic field and some other 
international organisations. The sources of law in the UN are the Charter, rules of 
procedures and the general principles of law.
Having recognised the application of the rule of law within the framework of 
the UN, the question was who can grant respect of the law in the UN system. It was 
noted that the Court has an explicit power provided by some constitutions of 
specialised agencies and the Court practised this power in the IMCO and ICAO 
cases.
With regard to the power of judicial review by the Court upon the political 
organs’ acts, it was noted that, despite the fact that neither the Charter nor the 
Statute refers to the power of the ICJ to review the acts of the UN organs, the Court 
has explicitly and in some cases implicitly reviewed the acts of the UN political 
organs. On the one hand, it has explicitly reviewed the legality of the acts of the 
political organs of the UN in the Admission case, the Second Admission case, the
13, p. 96; see also Osieke, E., “The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions o f International 
Organisations”, AJIL, 77, 1983, pp. 247 ff.
172 See pp. 302ff. above.
173 • •Kooijmans, supra note 71, p. 25.
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Expenses case, and the Namibia case. It has also implicitly recognised this power in 
the Northern Cameroon case, the Lockerbie cases, and the Bosnia case.
Having referred to the power of the ICJ to play a similar role to that of 
constitutional courts in the domestic field, it was noted that this power has so far 
been exercised through its advisory and contentious jurisdiction. The Court has no 
power of judicial review proprio motu or through direct recourse by states against 
the decisions adopted by the political organs of the UN. With regard to the scope of 
judicial review, it was noted that the Court has no power to review the UN political 
organs de novo. On the other hand, it can examine the legality of the political 
organs’ acts whenever cases are referred to it. Finally, it has no power to exercise 
judicial review over the failure of the organs to act, because the Charter empowers 
them with discretionary powers to fulfil its objectives.
In the view of the present writer, the exercise of the power of judicial review by 
the ICJ would indisputably contribute to the UN’s credibility and would generate a 
feeling of confidence and trust in the UN’s acts because the purposes and objectives 
of the UN would be safeguarded.
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Chapter Six
The International Court of Justice as a Court of Appeal
Introduction
In the previous chapters different aspects of the ICJ’s judicial role have been 
discussed. In order to complete the analysis of the Court’s role as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN, this chapter focuses on a different judicial function. This 
role relates to its position as a court of appeal over the judgments of other tribunals 
established within the framework of the UN. 1 From the outset it should be noted 
that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is restricted to the judgments of the 
Administrative Tribunals established within the framework of the UN.2 Although 
this function might be of limited practical value owing to the limited number of 
cases received by the ICJ and the recent resolution of the GA No. 50/54,3 it is
It should be noted that the ICJ’s judgments are not subject to judicial appeal. This is a 
consequence of Art. 60 of the ICJ’s Statute, which provides that the ICJ’s judgments are “final and 
without appeal”. It should be noted also that within the framework of the UN several tribunals have 
been established - for instance, the UN Tribunal for Libya, the UN Tribunal for Eritrea, the UN 
Administrative Tribunal, and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory o f the Former 
Yugoslavia. These tribunals have been established on the basis that, although the ICJ is the only 
judicial organ directly established by the Charter, and although it enjoys a position as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN, this does not mean that it is the only judicial organ that may be established, 
either by the UN as an organisation or by its individual members. See Rosenne, S., The World Court 
- What It Is and How It Works, 1995, pp. 33-4.
2 There are three Administrative Tribunals within the framework of the UN: the 
International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal (UNAT), and the World Bank Administrative Tribunal (WBAT). The ICJ’s 
power as a court of appeal over the judgments of the Administrative Tribunals is restricted 
nowadays to the judgments of the first tribunal (see note 3 below, and pp. 339 ff. below). With 
regard to the reasons for establishing international administrative tribunals and their role, see 
Akehurst, M., The Law Governing Employment in International Organisations, 1967, pp. 11 f f ;  
Bowett, D., The Law o f  International Institutions, 1982, pp. 317 f f ;  Amerasinghe, C., The Law o f  
the International Civil Service (As Applied by International Administrative Tribunals), 1994, vol. 1, 
pp. 31 ff.
3 Until December 1995, this role covered the judgments of the UNAT and the ILOAT in 
cases decided by them in disputes between staff members and their organisations. But, as of 
January 1996, this role has been restricted to the judgments rendered by the ILOAT as a 
consequence of GA Res. 50/54 adopted on 11 December 1995, in which it abolished Art. 11 o f the 
UNAT’s Statute, which was considered to be the basis of the ICJ’s role in this regard. For more 
details o f this resolution, see pp. 339 ff. below.
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nevertheless important because it clarifies the role of the ICJ within the framework 
of the UN.
This chapter will not deal with the institutional side of the Administrative 
Tribunals, such as their composition, the qualification of judges, and other 
procedural matters. It will deal exclusively with the appellate jurisdiction of the ICJ 
over their judgments.
Accordingly, consideration is given to the meaning of appellate jurisdiction and 
its distinction from the other judicial procedures. The legal basis of the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction as a court of appeal, the procedures of judicial appeal, the scope and 
grounds of the appellate jurisdiction of the ICJ, the parties to the appellate 
procedure, and the practice of the ICJ as a court of appeal will all be discussed. 
Finally, a study of GA Res. 50/54, by which Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute was 
abolished, will be provided.
1. Judicial appeal and other judicial activities
1.1. Judicial appeal
At the apex of any state’s legal system lies its final court of appeal, which receives 
and adjudicates appeals on major questions emanating from the courts below. The 
court of appeal deals with a dispute that has been before the lower courts on the 
request of one party to reconsider the judgment.
This is an effective means of ensuring the lower courts’ adherence to the law, 
and it is a means of challenge when failure to comply with jurisdictional 
requirements or principles of fair procedure occurs.4 The judicial appeal is based on 
a guarantee to the parties to the dispute of due process. The appellate court has the 
right to decide either to confirm the judgment of the lower court or to render a new 
judgment.
There is a vast spectrum of types of judicial appeal, which could be directed to 
procedures or to errors in law or principle.
4 Walker, R., et al., English Legal System, 1985, p. 125.
315
Chapter Six
1.2. The distinction between judicial appeal and other judicial procedures
Judicial appeal has some characteristic elements. First, its subject is a judgment 
rendered by another tribunal. Accordingly, the review of a legislative or executive 
act is not a judicial appeal in its strict sense. Second, it is carried out by a different 
tribunal from the one that rendered the judgment. Third, the appellate court deals 
with the same cases that were presented before the lower court. Judicial appeal is 
therefore, substantially different from other forms of judicial procedures.
It differs from a request for interpretation of the court’s judgment, whose aim 
is to clarify and/or interpret the meaning or the scope of a judgment in the event of a 
dispute arising in respect of a given judgment.5 This procedure is undertaken by the 
court that rendered the judgment, and not by another court. This procedure does not 
involve an appeal either on the facts or on the law.6
Judicial appeal also differs from the procedure of revision of a court’s 
judgment. This procedure might be made only upon the discovery of a fact that was 
unknown to the court when the judgment was rendered and also to the party 
claiming revision, provided that this fact is of the utmost relevance to the case and 
could have changed the judgment had it been presented to the court. However, 
ignorance of this fact should not be due to the negligence of the claiming party. 
This procedure allows the court to revise its judgments on the basis of the discovery 
of a material error of fact or of new material facts of decisive importance.7
Stanczyk, J., “Application for Interpretation of a Judgment by the International Court of 
Justice”, PYBIL, 17, 1988, pp. 193 f f
6 The ICJ, pursuant to Art. 60 of its Statute, has such a power in the event of a dispute 
arising as to the meaning or scope of its judgment. Accordingly, Art. 98 of the Rules of the Court 
stipulates that the request for interpretation may be made by means either o f a special agreement 
between the parties or of an application by one or more of the parties. In practice, two applications 
for interpretation of the ICJ’s judgment have been made, by Colombia in respect of the Asylum case 
(1950), and by Tunisia in respect of the Continental Shelf case between Tunisia and Libya (1985).
7 The ICJ, pursuant to Art. 61 of the Statute, has the power o f revision of its judgment in 
the case of “the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, 
when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always 
provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence”. Art. 99 of the ICJ’s Rules provides: “A 
request for the revision o f a judgment shall be made by an application containing the particulars 
necessary to show that the conditions specified in Article 61 of the Statute are fulfilled. Any 
documents in support of the application shall be annexed to it.” In practice, the ICJ was invited by 
Tunisia to revise to its judgment in the Continental Shelf case between Tunisia and Libya. See ICJ 
Rep., 1985, p. 192.
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Finally, judicial appeal differs from judicial review, where the power of the 
court is to decide upon the constitutionality of the acts adopted by the legislative or 
the executive organs. In this regard, the competent court has the power to declare 
an act unconstitutional by declaring it null and void or by annulling it, and as a 
result refusing to enforce it.8
2. The legal basis of the ICJ’s appellate jurisdiction over the Administrative 
Tribunals’ judgments9
As mentioned above, the appellate jurisdiction of the ICJ is restricted to judgments 
issued by some Administrative Tribunals within the UN framework. It therefore 
seems appropriate to illustrate the legal basis of the principal judicial organ of the 
UN as a court of appeal. 10
2.1. The Charter and the ICJ’s Statute
At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 it was proposed to confer on the Court an 
appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the Administrative Tribunals. In this 
respect, the Venezuelan delegation proposed the insertion of the following 
paragraph in Art. 34 of the Statute:
“(2) As a Court of Appeal, the Court will have jurisdiction to take cognisance over such 
cases as are tried under original jurisdiction by international administrative tribunals 
dependent upon the United Nations when the appeal would be provided in the Statute 
of such Tribunals.”11
See pp. 268 f f  above.
9 This role has been rejected by some lawyers who claim that the ICJ has no jurisdiction as 
an appellate court. This opinion is based on the refusal of the participants in the travaux 
preparatoires stage of the UN to empower the ICJ with this role. See Rosenne, S., The Law and 
Practice o f  the International Court, 1965, vol. 2, p. 689.
10 Ostrihansky, R., “Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice as Review of 
Judgments of International Administrative Tribunals”, PYBIL, XVII, 1988, pp. 102 f f
11 See UNCIO, 13, p. 482. The original Venezuelan proposal was as follows:
“(2) Upon request from any of the inter-governmental international organisations or offices 
dependent on the United Nations, the Court shall settle conflicts of jurisdiction which may arise 
among them. As a Court of Appeal, the Court shall have cognisance over such cases as are tried 
under original jurisdiction by international administrative tribunals dependent upon the United 
Nations.” UNCIO, 13, p. 480.
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This proposal was voted down after discussion of this matter in Committee IV/I. 12 
Summarising the discussion, the chairman of this Committee, Mr Gallagher, stated: 
“[t]he principle involved in Article 34 was that States, but not private individuals or 
international organisations, might be parties to cases.” 13 Accordingly, both the 
Charter and the ICJ’s Statute were drafted without a specific provision for any 
system of judicial appeal to the ICJ.
2.2. The Statutes of the Administrative Tribunals
The appellate jurisdiction of the ICJ was founded on the relevant provisions of the 
Statute of the ILOAT and the Statute of the UNAT. 14 It is accordingly necessary to 
consider closely the pertinent provisions of these Statutes.
2.2.1. Art. XII of the Statute of the ILOAT
As a consequence of the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, the 
International Labour Conference, acting on the request of the League Assembly, 
took over the League of Nations’ Administrative Tribunal after reconstituting it 
with some modifications to its Statute. 15 The ILOAT’s Statute was ratified by the 
ILO’s Assembly on 9 October 1946.16
See UNCIO, 13, p. 482.
13 See UNCIO, 14, p. 141.
14 Nada, G., International Employee: A Comparative Study in the International 
Administrative Law, 1986, pp. 273, 300.
15 International Labour Conference, Records of Proceedings, 29 Sess., 1946, pp. 341-3.
16 During the early years of the League of Nations attempts were made to establish a judicial 
body to settle disputes between the international organisation and its employees. As a consequence, 
a draft o f a Statute o f the Administrative Tribunal was formulated in 1927, and adopted by a 
resolution o f the Assembly o f the League on 26 September 1927 (LNOJ, 9th Year, No. 58, 1928, p. 
751, Annex I). According to its Statute, the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations was 
created to hear complaints alleging “non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of 
appointment of officials” and of relevant provisions of the staff regulations of the International 
Labour Office and of other international organisations that have recognised the competence o f the 
Tribunal. On the legislative history of the creation of this tribunal, see the memorandum submitted 
by the ILO to the ICJ in the UN Administrative Tribunal case (1954), ICJ Pled., 1953, pp. 51 ff.\ the 
written statement of the Secretary-General of the UN to the ICJ in this case, ibid., pp. 218 jf.\ the 
written statement o f UNESCO to the ICJ in the UNESCO case, ICJ Pled., 1955, pp. 33 ff.\ 
Friedmann, W., et al., “The United Nations Administrative Tribunal”, Int.Org ., 11, 1957, p. 15; 
Akehurst, supra note 2, pp. 13-14; Knapp, B., “International Labour Organisation Administrative 
Tribunal”, EPIL, 5, 1982, p. 94; Amerasinghe, supra note 2, vol. 1, pp. 49-52.
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In the same year, the ILOAT rendered two awards in favour of two former 
officials of the ILO. When the matter of the payment of these awards came before 
the Governing Body of the ILO, some members expressed the view that the ILO 
should not enforce these judgments. The chairman of the Governing Body stated 
that it was important to ensure that no difficulty arose regarding the execution of 
judgments of the Administrative Tribunal in the future. The chairman therefore 
suggested that a new provision might perhaps be made for “a court of appeal”, for 
example the ICJ. 17 Accordingly, the Staff Questions Committee was asked “to 
consider the arrangements concerning the functioning of the Administrative 
Tribunal in order to secure to the fullest degree possible that no difficulty might 
arise in the future as regards the execution of any future judgment the tribunal might 
hand down” . 18 A paper submitted to the Staff Questions Committee took the 
position that amending the Statute of the ILOAT by including a new article 
providing for an appellate procedure was advisable. It was concluded that the 
power to consider the Tribunal’s judgments should belong to the highest existing 
judicial authority, namely the ICJ. It was also proposed that “the Governing Body 
of the ILO or the Administrative Board of the Pension Fund might be enabled to 
appeal to the International Court of Justice against decisions of the Tribunal on the 
grounds that it had exceeded its jurisdiction or where the procedure followed has 
been vitiated by a fundamental fault” . 19 Accordingly, a new article (Art. XII) was 
added to the Statute of the ILOAT. This article reads as follows:
“ 1. In any case in which the Governing Body of the International Labour Office or the 
Administrative Board of the Pension Fund challenges a decision of the Tribunal 
confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a decision of the Tribunal is vitiated by a 
fundamental fault in the procedure followed, the question of validity of the decision
17 The ILO Memorandum submitted to the ICJ in the UN Administrative Tribunal case 
(1954) ICJ Pled., 1954, p. 71. It should be noted that the possibility of judicial appeal was not 
provided with regard to the judgments of the ILO’s predecessor, the Administrative Tribunal o f the 
League o f Nations. Pursuant to Art. VI of its Statute, its judgments were “final and without appeal”. 
The report of the Supervisory Commission of this tribunal stated: “No provision for the revision of 
judgments of the Tribunal is inserted in the Statute. It is considered that, in the interests of finality 
and o f the avoidance of vexatious proceedings, the tribunal’s judgments should be final and without 
appeal, as is provided in Article VI, paragraph I.” LNOJ, 9th Year, Special Supp., No. 58, 1928, p. 
254.
18 ICJ Pled., 1953, p. 72.
19 Ibid., pp. 72-3.
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given by the Tribunal shall be submitted by the Governing Body, for an advisory 
opinion, to the International Court of Justice.”20
Similarly, the executive boards of other inter-govemmental organisations that 
accepted the ILOAT’s Statute were granted the power to appeal against ILOAT 
judgments.21
2.2.2. Art. 11 of the Statute of the UNAT22
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the UNAT was established by GA Res. 351 A (IV), 
of 24 November 1949. According to the Statute, the UNAT is competent “to hear 
and pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of 
employment of staff members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or of the 
terms of appointment of such staff members”. To achieve this aim, the Tribunal is 
open to any staff member of the Secretariat even after his or her employment has 
ceased; to any person who succeeded to the staff member’s right on his or her death; 
and to any other person who can show that he or she is entitled to rights under any 
contract or terms of appointment.23 The original draft of the Statute had no 
provision corresponding to Art. XII of the ILOAT’s Statute, which provides the 
possibility of reviewing the ILO Administrative Tribunal’s judgments. This was 
justified by the fear that this procedure would cause further delay and would 
adversely affect staff morale.24 Therefore, Art. 10/2 stated that the Tribunal’s 
judgments are “final and without appeal”.
20 International Labour Conference, Records of Proceedings, 29 Sess., 1946, pp. 341-3.
21 In 1949, Art. XII of the ILOAT’s Statute was amended to permit inter-govemmental 
organisations to use the ILOAT. See International Labour Conference, Records of Proceedings, 32 
Sess., 1949, pp. 435-6. At present 25 other organisations are subject to the jurisdiction o f the 
ILOAT under this provision: WHO, including PAHO, UNESCO, ITU, WMO, FAO, CERN, ICITO- 
GATT, IAEA, WIPO, Eurocontrol, UPU, EPO, ESO, CIPEC, EFTA, IPU, EMBL, WTO, CAFRAD, 
OTIF, CIEPS, OIE, INIDO, Interpol and IFAD. See Amerasinghe, supra note 2, p. 53.
22 Despite the fact that this article was abolished by GA Res. 50/54, it is worth mentioning it 
because it was a basis of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction for about four decades.
23 Elias, T., United Nations Charter and the World Court, 1989, p. 156.
24 The only discussion of the possibility of reviewing the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal’s judgments appeared at the twenty-fifth meeting of the Fifth Committee on 15 November 
1946 when the representative of Belgium asked the Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee whether the 
decisions o f die Administrative Tribunal would be final or whether they would be subject to revision 
by the GA. The Rapporteur replied that, according to the draft Statute, there could be no appeal 
from the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal. The Advisory Committee feared an adverse 
effect on the morale of the staff if appeal beyond the Administrative Tribunal delayed the final
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In 1953, a number of cases were decided by the UNAT that resulted in lengthy 
discussion in the GA. Certain members of the GA questioned the correctness of 
several judgments rendered by the Tribunal and proposed that the awards made by 
the Tribunal should not be enforced. In response to those proposals the GA, by its 
Res. 785 A (VIII) of 9 December 1953, decided to request an advisory opinion of 
the ICJ on the questions whether or not the GA has the right on any grounds to 
refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by the Tribunal and what 
the principal grounds are on which the Assembly could lawfully exercise such a 
right.25 In its advisory opinion, adopted on 13 July 1954, the ICJ concluded that the 
GA has no right, on any grounds, to refuse to give effect to an award of 
compensation.26
During the discussion in the Fifth Committee of the above opinion, it was 
pointed out that the judgments of the Administrative Tribunal should be subject to 
review to obviate “miscarriages of justice” in the future.27 The majority of the 
Committee also believed that cases that had arisen in the League of Nations, in the 
specialised agencies, and in the UN had indicated a need for a judicial appeal 
procedure if a representative organ of the UN believed that the organisation’s 
interests demanded such a review. To support this view, the US representative drew 
the attention of the Committee to the following passage of the advisory opinion:
“The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal has not provided for any kind of review of 
judgments, which according to Article 10, paragraph 2, shall be fmal and without 
appeal ... In order that the judgments pronounced by such a judicial tribunal could be 
subjected to review by any body other than the tribunal itself, if would be necessary, in 
the opinion of the Court, that the statute of that tribunal or some other legal instrument 
governing it should contain an express provision to that effect. The General Assembly 
has the power to amend the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal by virtue of Article 
11 of that Statute and to provide for means of redress by another organ.”28
decision in a case that had already been heard before organs within the Secretariat created for that 
purpose. See GAOR, 10th Sess., Annexes X, 49,1955, p. 19.
25 Effect o f  Awards o f Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal 
case, ICJ Rep., 1954.
26 With regard to the Court’s opinion in this case, see pp. 130-1 above.
27 GAOR, 9th Sess., 5th Committee, pp. 271-2; UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 474, 1954.
28 ICJ Rep., 1954, pp. 54,56.
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Accordingly, a draft resolution was submitted by Argentina and the USA to the 
Fifth Committee proposing the establishment of machinery for judicial appeal 
through amendment of the Tribunal’s Statute.29 On 17 December 1954, the GA 
adopted Res. 8 8 8  B (IX), in which it accepted, “in principle”, judicial appeal of the 
Tribunal’s judgments and established a Special Committee that was to study the 
question of a procedure for such review “in all its aspects”, and to report back to the 
10th session of the GA.30
On 8  November 1955, the GA adopted Res. 957 (X), by which it decided to add 
Art. 11 to the Statute of the UNAT in accordance with the Special Committee’s 
recommendation.31 This article introduced a procedure for appeal to the ICJ.32 In
GAOR, 9th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 48, 1954, p. 3; UN Doc. A/C.5/L.317, 3 
December 1954.
30 Part B of this resolution reads as follows:
“2. Accepts in principle judicial review of judgments of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal;
3. Requests Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 1 July 1955, their 
views on the establishment of a procedure to provide for review of the judgments o f the 
Administrative Tribunal and to submit any suggestions which they may consider useful;
4. Invites the Secretary-General to consult on this matter with the specialised agencies 
concerned;
5. Establishes a Special Committee composed of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Cuba, El Salvador, France, India, Iraq, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Syria, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America, to meet at a time to be fixed in consultation with the Secretary-General to 
study the question of the establishment of such a procedure in all its aspects and to report to the 
General Assembly at its tenth session;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to notify all Member States of the date on which the Special 
Committee shall meet.” GAOR, 10th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 49, 1955, p. 1; UN Doc. 
A/2909, 10 June 1955.
31 Art. 11 provides: “A member state, a Secretary-General or a person in respect to whom a 
judgment has been rendered by the Tribunal (including anyone who has succeeded to that person's 
rights on his death) may object to the judgment on certain prescribed grounds and make a written 
application to the Committee.”
32 Although the members of this Committee were in agreement that the reviewing organ 
should be an independent, permanent, judicial body composed of highly respected jurists, there was 
a difference of opinion on whether the reviewing organ should be the ICJ, through its advisory 
procedure, or a new tribunal of the highest stature created specifically for the purpose of reviewing 
Administrative Tribunal judgments, or a panel within the framework of the Administrative Tribunal 
itself. The majority were in favour of the use of the advisory procedure of the ICJ as a means of 
appeal. This view was based on the experience of the ILO Tribunal, which was accepted by a 
number of specialised agencies. It was also pointed out that the position of the ICJ as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN justifies this authority. In addition, it was considered that it would be 
undesirable to create a new organ that would compete with the ICJ as a final arbiter on questions of 
UN law. For instance, see the statements of the UK, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 493, p. 
36; and o f Pakistan, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C. 5/SR. 495, 1955, p. 48.
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the light of this amendment, the UNAT’s judgments were subject to a review 
procedure similar to that provided in the ILOAT’s Statute.
One may conclude that, despite the fact that neither the Charter nor the ICJ’s 
Statute empowers the ICJ with an appellate jurisdiction over the Administrative 
Tribunals’ judgments, the Statutes of both the UNAT and the ILOAT have granted 
this power to the ICJ. This led to several doubts being raised as to the legality of 
conferring competence upon the ICJ by documents other than the Charter and the
Other representatives considered that the ICJ should not play any role in this regard, and the 
creation of a new organ would be desirable. In their view, the ICJ had been established to decide 
questions of international law in disputes between states, and consequently it should not be asked to 
adjudicate between the Secretary-General and a staff member. It was also noted that, pursuant to 
Art. 34 of the ICJ’s Statute, only states might be parties in cases before the Court, and any attempt to 
use the advisory procedure for the review of Administrative Tribunal judgments would be contrary 
to the spirit o f that Statute. Furthermore, the advocates of this opinion considered that the use o f the 
term “advisory opinion” in the UN Charter and the Court’s Statute clearly indicates that such an 
opinion is not binding on the organs concerned. Therefore, they believed that the use o f an advisory 
procedure to review binding judgments would be an anomaly. Finally, it was noted that the use of 
the advisory procedure of the ICJ would present a practical difficulty related to the participation of a 
staff member in proceedings before the Court. A staff member had no locus standi before the ICJ 
and it would be inequitable to deny a party the right to appear before the reviewing body. For 
instance, see the statements of Syria, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 495, p. 47; Yugoslavia, 
ibid., pp. 48-9; South Africa, ibid., p. 50; India, GAOR., 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 496, p. 57; 
and Sweden, ibid., p. 57.
In answer to these objections, it was pointed out by those representatives favouring the use of 
the ICJ that, under the Charter, the GA and other organs so authorised can request opinions o f the 
Court on legal questions. It was noted that the Court’s Statute is fully compatible with a request for 
an advisory opinion on legal questions that might be raised by a judgment of the Administrative 
Tribunal. It would be an advisory opinion and not an indirect means o f settling a question in 
dispute. In addition, it was considered that, although there are difficulties in using the advisory 
procedure o f the ICJ, these would not in practice prove substantial if the grounds of review were 
kept within narrow limits such as those laid down in Art. XII of the ILOAT’s Statute. Furthermore, 
it was considered that provision could be made for acceptance in advance of advisory opinions. 
Some representatives referred to the authoritative character and moral force of the advisory opinions 
o f the ICJ. Finally, with respect to the position of a staff member before the Court, it was believed 
that no injustice would result from the lack of complete formal equality. Adequate arrangements 
could be made for the presentation of a written memorandum by staff members to the Court as had 
been proposed by the Council of the League of Nations in a case concerning former officials o f the 
Governing Commission of the Saar Territory. Further, it was believed that there would always be at 
least one state prepared to support the position of a staff member before the ICJ. It was also 
suggested that the review procedure might be restricted to the consideration of documents and 
written briefs. It was pointed out that no one had objected to the position of staff members under the 
procedure provided in Art. XII of the ILOAT’s Statute or to the fact that staff members had not been 
able to participate in proceedings when an advisory opinion had been requested by the GA in 1953 
on questions directly affecting staff members of the UN. For instance, see the Canadian statement 
represented to the Special Committee on the Application for Review of Administrative Tribunal 
Judgments, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 493, 1955, p. 40; the statement o f Uruguay, 
GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 494, 1955, p. 45; the statement of the USA, GAOR, 10th 
Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 498, 1955, p. 66; the statement of Cuba, ibid., p. 67; and the statement 
of Poland, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 499, 1955, p. 72.
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Statute of the Court. It was argued that international organisations, whether the 
International Labour Organisation or the GA of the UN, have neither the capacity 
nor the right to impose such a function upon the ICJ except through an amendment 
to the Court’s Statute or the Charter.33
To consider this view, the Court’s jurisprudence in this regard should be 
examined. The above doubts were raised in the early stages of drafting Art. 11 of 
the UNAT’s Statute and it was proposed that the answer to this question should be 
left to be decided by the ICJ. In practice, the ICJ had on several occasions 
recognised its jurisdiction and concluded that it possessed competence. In its 
opinion in the UNESCO case, it stated that the Executive Board exercised a power 
conferred upon UNESCO by Art. XI of the Agreement between that organisation 
and the United Nations, approved by the GA on 14 December 1946. The Court 
referred to the amendment of Art. V of the UNESCO Constitution made by the 
General Conference by which UNESCO authorised the Executive Board to exercise 
that power between sessions of the General Conference. The Court complied with 
the request because it realised that the requested question was legal and concerned 
issues within the scope of the activities of UNESCO.34
In addition, the ICJ noted in the Fasla case, that, “[i]f a request for advisory 
opinion emanates from a body duly authorised in accordance with the Charter to 
make it, the Court is competent under Article 65 of its Statute to give such opinion 
on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of that body” .35 
Similar statements were made by the ICJ in the Mortished case36 and the Application 
for Review o f Judgment No. 333 o f the United Nations Administrative Tribunal case 
(1987).37
It therefore seems clear that the Court recognised its appellate jurisdiction and 
relied on its advisory jurisdiction as provided by Art. 96/2 of the Charter and Art. 65
33 Choi, W., “Judicial Review of International Administrative Tribunal Judgments” in 
Buergenthal, T. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Law. Essays in Honour o f  Louis B. 
Sohn, 1984, p. 355.
34 ICJ Rep., 1956, pp. 83-4.
35 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 172.
36 ICJ Rep., 1982, pp. 333-4.
37 ICJ Rep., 1987, pp. 30-1 (hereinafter the Yakimetz case).
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of the Statute. It saw no difficulty in its advisory jurisdiction being used for the 
review of judgments rendered by the Administrative Tribunals within the 
framework of the UN in cases involving disputes between the organisation and its 
officials.38
3. Procedures of judicial appeal
From the outset, it should be noted that the ICJ cannot examine the Administrative 
Tribunals’ judgments and adjudicate upon them proprio motu. The authorised 
person also cannot refer an application of appeal against the Administrative 
Tribunals’ judgments directly to the ICJ.
Therefore, as stated by the Statutes of the Administrative Tribunals, the only 
way to refer an application of appeal to the ICJ is through a special committee, 
usually referred to as the “Screening Committee” .39 Once the Committee receives 
the request, it is required to decide whether or not there is a “substantial basis” for 
the application to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ to review the judgment of 
the Administrative Tribunal. If the Committee’s opinion is that there is a 
substantial basis for application, it may request an advisory opinion of the ICJ; 
otherwise it takes no action.
Pursuant to Art. 11/4 of the UNAT’s Statute, a Committee on Applications for 
Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments was established and its powers 
defined.40 This Committee was established as a subsidiary organ of the GA pursuant 
to Art. 22 of the Charter. It is composed of the representatives of all member states 
on the GA of the most recent regular session of the GA.41 This Committee is 
authorised by the GA, pursuant to Art. 96/2 of the Charter, to request advisory
38 Diss. Op. of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Rep., 1982, p. 458.
39 Art. 11 o f the UNAT’s Statute stipulates that the authorised person has to make a written 
application to the Committee within 30 days.
40 UN Doc. At/11 Rev. 2 (UN pub. 62.X.3).
41 GA Res. 957 (X), 8 November 1955. It should be noted that this amendment was 
challenged on the basis that it undermined the “cornerstone of the Court’s Statute which provides 
that only states could be parties before the Court but not private individuals”. Diss. Op., of Judge 
Morozov in the Application fo r Review o f Judgment No. 273 o f  the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, ICJ Rep., 1982, pp. 325, 435.
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opinions of the ICJ in cases in which it finds a substantial basis for the application 
made to it.42
Pursuant to Art. XII of the ILOAT’s Statute, the judgments of the ILOAT may 
be referred to the ICJ only by the Governing Body of the ILO43 or by the equivalent 
boards of the other organisations that accept the jurisdiction of the ILOAT. 44
It seems clear that the function of this Screening Committee is to receive 
applications challenging the judgments of the Administrative Tribunals on one or 
more of the grounds set out in their Statutes, and to decide whether or not there is a 
substantial basis for the application. If it finds such a basis it may request an 
advisory opinion of the ICJ. In this regard, the ICJ defined the primary function of 
this Committee as “not the requesting of advisory opinions, but the examination of 
objections to judgments in order to decide in each case whether there is substantial 
basis for the application so as to call for a request for an advisory opinion. If it 
finds that there is not such a substantial basis for the application the Committee 
rejects the application without requesting an opinion of the Court.” 45
In the light of the above, one may describe the task of this Committee as a 
filter. It is not charged with the duty of reviewing the judgments of the 
Administrative Tribunals. It is - as noted by Judge Ago - a machinery to: (i) sift and 
examine the applications received for review of judgments of the Administrative 
Tribunals; (ii) decide whether or not there is “substantial basis” for each application;
42 The ICJ pointed out in its opinion in the Fasla case that “the Committee on Applications 
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments is an organ o f the United Nations, duly 
constituted under Articles 7 and 22 of the Charter, and duly authorised under Article 96, paragraph 
2, of the Charter to request advisory opinions of the Court for the purpose of Article 11 o f the 
Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. It follows that the Court is competent under 
Article 65 of its Statute to entertain a request for an advisory opinion from the Committee made 
within the scope of Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal.” ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 
175.
43 Although there exists a similarity between the Governing Body of the ILO and the 
Screening Committee o f the UN with regard to their power to refer a request for judicial appeal to 
the ICJ, there are some differences. The Governing Body is the executive committee of the ICJ, but 
the Screening Committee o f the UN is not the executive committee of the UN nor would its 
composition be comparable with that of the ILO Governing Body, which is a tripartite organ. See 
the statement presented by India to the Special Committee on Application for Review of 
Administrative Tribunals Judgments, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 496, 1955, p. 56.
44 With regard to the international organisations that accept the jurisdiction of the ILOAT, 
see note 21, p. 320 above.
45 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 174.
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(iii) select, among the various grounds for review laid down in the Statute of the 
Administrative Tribunal, those that it considers applicable to the case in hand, 
thereby taking responsibility for excluding the others outright; (iv) request, in such 
cases, an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the grounds not rejected.46
4. The scope and grounds of judicial appeal
Appeal procedures in domestic judicial systems suggest a great variety in the scope 
of review. One possibility is a review of the broadest scope. This would involve a 
complete review of the case in all its aspects, including both the law and the facts. 
In reviewing the findings of facts, some systems provide for an examination by the 
reviewing tribunal of the evidence gathered by the lower court but do not permit the 
taking of new evidence by the reviewing body, whereas other systems give the 
reviewing tribunal the power to hear new evidence or even to retry the case ab 
initio. A second possibility is a review of errors of law only. This includes the 
interpretation of the general rules and regulations and the general principles of law 
that might be involved. A third possibility is a more restricted review, allowing 
appeals to review specific issues such as the lack of jurisdiction of the lower 
tribunal, or a fundamental fault in the procedures followed.
The questions now are: what scope does the ICJ have in dealing with the 
review of the Administrative Tribunals’ judgments, or can the ICJ formulate its own 
scope of appeal?
The issues with respect to which a review of judgments of the Administrative 
Tribunals may be requested of the Court are stated precisely in the ILOAT’s and the 
UNAT’s Statutes.
Pursuant to Art. XII of the ILOAT’s Statute, two grounds for judicial appeal are 
provided: first, lack of jurisdiction in the tribunal; second, a fundamental defect in 
the procedure followed. This means that all other aspects of such judgments remain 
“final and without appeal”. Accordingly the request for an advisory opinion under 
Art. XII is not in the nature of an appeal on the merits of the judgment. Errors of
46 See the Sep. Op. of Judge Ago in the Yakimetz case, ICJ Rep., 1987, p. 108.
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fact or of law on the part of the ILOAT in its judgment on the merits cannot be the 
subject of judicial appeal to the ICJ.
This limited scope was not adopted by Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute,47 which 
laid down four grounds on which a judgment may be challenged: excess of, or 
failure to exercise, jurisdiction, an error on a question of law relating to the Charter, 
or a fundamental error of procedure causing a failure of justice.48
The first two grounds indicated in the UNAT Statute and the ILOAT Statute for 
judicial appeal are identical. They are concerned with the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunals or with questions of procedure.
The new ground provided by Art. 11 extended the scope of appeal to any 
important question of law. Its purpose was to determine whether the UNAT had 
correctly applied the law to the merits of a dispute.49 In this regard, it was noted that 
appeal under the new ground included not only a case where the Tribunal might be 
considered to have misinterpreted the Charter, but also a case where the Tribunal’s 
interpretation and application of staff regulations were inconsistent with the 
provisions of Chapter XV of the Charter.50 This is based on the preparatory work on
47 The scope o f judicial appeal over the UNAT was a matter of comprehensive discussion 
during the drafting of Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute. See the Report of the Special Committee on 
Application for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, GAOR, 10th Sess., Annexes X, 49, 
1955, pp. 4-5, 8; Choi, supra note 33, p. 356.
48 In this regard it has been noted by Singh that the grounds o f such an appeal must be one 
of the following: “that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdictional competence or that the tribunal has 
failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a question of law relating to the provisions 
of the Charter o f the United Nations, or has committed a fundamental error in procedure which has 
occasioned a failure o f justice.” Singh, N., The Role and Record o f  the International Court o f  
Justice, 1989, p. 163.
49 Accordingly, the US view regarding the range of legal issues on which appeal may be 
sought includes: “a question such as whether the Secretary-General’s judgment should be upheld in 
regard to the conduct o f a staff member under United Nations standards of efficiency, competence, 
and integrity prescribed in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter; or a question whether the 
Secretary-General’s action should be sustained in giving directions to the staff member or taking 
disciplinary action against him, in view of the Secretary-General’s position as Chief Administrative 
Officer of the organisation under Article 97; or a question involving the staff member’s duty to 
refrain from any action which might reflect on his position as an international official responsible 
only to the organisation under Article 100, Paragraph 1.” GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 
494, 1955, pp. 44-5.
50 Choi, supra note 33, p. 358. In this regard it was noted by Judge de Castro that “[a]n 
important divergence from Article XII of the Statute of the ILO Administrative Tribunal was 
introduced in the third ground of challenge laid down in Article 11 of the Statute of the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal. In place of a ‘fundamental fault in the procedures followed’ there 
is reference to the tribunal having ‘committed a fundamental error in procedure which has
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the UNAT Statute, which concluded that “the words ‘relating to the provisions of 
the Charter’ covered not only interpretations of the provisions of the Charter but 
also the interpretation or application of staff regulations deriving from chapter XV 
of the Charter” .51 This article was, therefore, considered to be an important 
innovation.
In practice, the above grounds for appeal were used by the Screening 
Committee as a basis for its requests. In the UNESCO case, the ILOAT’s judgment 
was challenged on two bases: (i) the ILOAT had no jurisdiction to decide cases 
referred to it by staff members of UNESCO; (ii) the ILOAT had no competence to 
determine the powers of the Director-General of UNESCO.52 The ICJ’s opinion 
with regard to the first challenge affirmed the jurisdiction of the ILOAT in respect 
of the four judgments submitted for its review on the ground, inter alia, of the 
possible non-observance of staff regulations on the part of the Director-General of 
UNESCO. The Court declined to answer the second allegation on the ground that it 
was beyond the scope of the Court’s function in reviewing the judgments of ILOAT 
under Art. XII of the Statute.53
The UNAT’s Judgment No. 158 was challenged by the applicant on the basis 
that the UNAT “failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it ... the Tribunal 
committed a fundemental error in procedure which has occasioned a failure of 
justice” .54
The UNAT’s Judgment No. 333 was also referred by the Committee to the ICJ 
for review on the grounds that “the Administrative Tribunal had failed to exercise 
jurisdiction vested in it” and that “the tribunal had erred on a question of law 
relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” .55
occasioned a failure of justice’. The source of the mention of ‘failure of justice’ was an amendment 
proposed by India and accepted without discussion. The effect thereof is far-reaching: the formula 
enables the Court, in the advisory opinion requested, to examine the question whether the decision 
of the Administrative Tribunal on the merits is just.” ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 283.
51 UN Doc. A/AC. 78/SR. 10, p. 3.
52 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 79.
53 Ibid., p. 9 8 #
54 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 167.
55 In this case, Mr Yakimetz, the applicant, urged the Committee on Applications on 21 June
1984 to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ on four grounds as follows:
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In this regard, a question that needs to be examined is whether the ICJ, while 
dealing with a request for appeal, can retry a case?
In the Fasla case, the ICJ established a principle that its role in the review 
proceedings is not to retry the case. The Court also noted that it is not therefore 
entitled to substitute its own opinion for that of the Tribunal on the merits of the 
case adjudicated by the Tribunal. Further, the Court observed hat under Article 11 
of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal a challenge to a 
decision for alleged failure to exercise jurisdiction or fundamental error in 
procedure cannot properly be transformed into a proceeding against the substance of 
the decision. Finally, the ICJ pointed out that Art. 11 does not mean that in an 
appropriate case, where the judgment has been challenged on the ground of an error 
on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, the Court may not be 
called upon to review the actual substance of the decision.56
The Court reiterated this passage in its opinion on the Mortished case. The 
Court carefully examined the question of its role when asked for an advisory 
opinion on the ground of an error on a question of law relating to provisions of the 
Charter. It re-emphasised that “the Court’s proper role is not to retry the case and to 
attempt to substitute its own opinion on the merits for that of the Tribunal” .57 The 
ICJ added that, “[i]n any event, the Court clearly could not decide whether a 
judgment about the interpretation of Staff Regulations or Staff Rules has erred on a 
question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, without looking at that 
judgment to see what the Tribunal did decide ... It is not the business of the Court... 
itself to get involved in the question of the proper interpretation of the Staff 
Regulations and the Staff Rules, as such, further than is strictly necessary in order to
“(i) The tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and competence.
(ii) The tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it.
(iii) The majority judgment of the tribunal errs on questions of law relating to provisions of the 
Charter.
(iv) The tribunal has committed fundamental errors of procedure which have resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.”
The Committee based its request for an advisory opinion upon grounds (ii) and (iii). See UN Doc. 
A/AC. 86/30, paras. 10 and 11; ICJ Rep., 1987, pp. \9 ff.
56 ICJ Rep., 1973, pp. 187-8.
57 ICJ Rep., 1982, p. 356.
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judge whether the interpretation adopted by the Tribunal is in contradiction with the 
requirements of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” 58
The ICJ was guided by this principle in the Yakimetz case. The ICJ determined 
the scope of its role, and decided not to deal with the problems raised by certain 
administrative steps taken by the Secretariat, and which had been the subject of 
criticism, at the same time as the Tribunal’s Judgment No. 333. The Court pointed 
out that it “should not express any view of the correctness or otherwise of any 
finding of the Tribunal in Judgment No. 333, unless it is necessary to do so in order 
to reply to the questions put to it” .59
In the light of the above dicta it seems obvious that the ICJ took into account 
the limits upon its competence laid down by Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute. The 
Court did not attempt to substitute its own opinion on the merits for that of the 
administrative tribunals.60
Is the ICJ a court of appeal?
Having looked at the scope and grounds of judicial appeal of the ICJ in the light of 
the Administrative Tribunals’ Statutes and the jurisprudence of the ICJ it is clear 
that the ICJ, as the principal judicial organ within the framework of the UN, plays a 
role similar to that of a court of appeal within domestic judicial systems. 
Accordingly, one may find it difficult to accept the description of some international 
lawyers from civil law systems that the ICJ’s role in “this process resembles the 
continental system of Cassation - review and not appeal - and no question relating 
to the facts can brought in” .61 Art. XII of the ILOAT Statute and Art. 11 of the
38 Ibid., 1982, p. 358.
59 ICJ Rep., 1987, pp. 33-4.
60 In this regard, it was noted by Judge de Castro in his dissenting opinion in the Fasla case 
that “[i]t should be observed that the grounds on which the judgment may be objected to are 
questions of law, the only questions on which the Court may give an opinion (Charter, Art. 96; 
Statute, Art. 65). The Court has no jurisdiction to consider all the complaints made by the person 
who challenges the judgment. It has no power to re-examine the evidence laid before the 
Administrative Tribunal, still less to consider facts or evidence which were not laid before the 
tribunal, or which were not taken into account by it.” ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 281.
61 In this regard, it has been noted by Basted that “la cour intemationale de justice a, dans un 
avis consultatif, confirm^ leur caractdre juriciaire, en tirant argument, tout h la fois, de la situation 
faite h leurs membres et des pouvoirs qui leur sont confrr^s. On a vu plus haut que les tribunaux des 
Nations Unies et de l’O.I.T. relevent par une sorte de recours en cassation de la cour de justice.” 
Basted, P., La Justice dans les Relations Internationales. La Justice, 1961, p. 445 (emphasis added).
331
Chapter Six
UNAT Statute do not restrict the role of the ICJ to reviewing faults in the 
interpretation or application of the law (the Charter) by the lower court. On the 
contrary, its role is extended to errors of procedure and the jurisdiction of the lower 
court. In addition, the ICJ’s dictum in the Fasla case held that the Court does not 
regard itself as precluded from examining in full liberty the facts of the case or from 
checking the Tribunal’s appreciation of the facts.62
To conclude, it might be argued that, despite the restricted scope of the ICJ’s 
power to review the judgments of the Administrative Tribunals, there is no doubt 
that the ICJ has acted as an appellate court.
5. The parties to judicial appeal
Who should have the right to initiate appellate procedures? Pursuant to Art. XII of 
the ILOAT’s Statute, the right to challenge a judgment of the ILOAT and request an 
appeal is restricted to the Governing Body of the ILO, the Administrative Board of 
the Pensions Fund, or the Executive Board of a specialised agency. Accordingly, as 
regards ILOAT’s judgments rendered in disputes between the international 
organisation and its staff members, only the organisation is accorded the right to 
challenge the validity of these decisions. The other party to the dispute, the staff 
member, has no corresponding right to request an appeal against these judgments.63 
Although this article might have its justification, there is no doubt that it is contrary 
to the fundamental principle of judicial procedure audiatur et altera pars, which 
provides that the right to request judicial appeal must be open to both parties.64 The
It has been noted also by Planty that “Quoique n’aboutissant pas h de veritables jugements, ces voies 
de recours exceptionnelles et rarement utilises s’apparentent k la cassation que connaissent divers
syst£mes juridiques contemporains”. Planty, A., Droit et Pratique de la Fonction Publique
Internationale, 1977, p. 455. In this regard it seems relevant to note that the Court o f Cassation in 
civil law systems has a similar role to that of the House of Lords in the English legal system. It is 
the highest court in the judicial system. It hears appeals on law from the courts of appeal. These 
courts may decide only whether or not the judgment of the tribunal of origin is valid. If  this decision 
is in the negative, then it quashes or annuls the judgment, but does not give a new judgment. Such a 
decision may in some cases settle the matter, for example if the judgment were annulled for lack of 
jurisdiction. In other cases, however, for example where there is an error in procedure, the case 
must be retried by the lower tribunal.
62 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 207.
63 Knapp, supra note 16, p. 96.
64 Gross, L., “Participation of Individuals in Advisory Proceedings before the International
Court of Justice: Question of Equality between the Parties”, AJIL, 52, 1958, pp. 18 ff.
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ICJ, in the UNESCO case, considered the question of equality between UNESCO 
and the officials. It said that:
“the advisory proceedings which have been instituted in the present case involve a 
certain absence of equality between Unesco and the officials both in origin and in the 
progress of those proceedings ... However, the inequality thus stated does not in fact 
constitute an inequality before the Court. It is antecedent to the examination o f the 
question by the Court. It does not affect the manner in which the Court undertakes that 
examination. Also, in the present case, that absence of equality between the parties 
to the Judgments is somewhat nominal since the officials were successful in the 
proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal and there was accordingly no question 
of any complaint on their part. This being so, it is not necessary for the Court to 
express an opinion upon the legal merits of Article XII of the Statute o f the 
Administrative Tribunal.”65
Although the Court found that equality between the parties before the ICJ had been 
achieved through the forwarding to the Court of a statement of the observations of 
the staff members’ legal adviser by the Executive Board of UNESCO,66 it admitted 
that inequality exists in the initial stages of appeal proceedings because the right to 
pre-trial the appeal procedure is conferred exclusively upon the Executive Board.67
The former Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute marked an improvement over Art. 
XII of the ILOAT. It placed the states, the Secretary-General and the staff members 
in a relatively equal position in initiating appeal procedure. Staff members were 
allowed to initiate a request for an advisory opinion by making an application to the 
Committee. Art. 11 also granted the procedural equality of staff members before 
the Court by requiring the Secretary-General to transmit the individuals’ views to 
the Court. In addition, to achieve equality between the parties before the ICJ, para. 
2 of the GA resolution whereby it adopted the above article recommended that
03 ICJ Rep., 1956, pp. 85-6.
66 It should be noted that this equality between the parties was achieved because no oral 
proceedings were held in this case. See ICJ Rep., 1956, pp. 85-7.
67 Judge Winiarski noted in his Sep. Op. in the UNESCO case that: “Unesco alone may 
apply to the Court to challenge the judgments of the Administrative Tribunal. It was legally 
impossible to confer the same right to the officials. They won their case before the Tribunal; had 
they lost it, no remedy would have been available to them.” ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 108. Judge Klaestad 
also noted that “ [t]he provisions of Article XII have thus established a manifest inequality between 
the parties to a dispute decided by the Administrative Tribunal. The Article has introduced a review 
procedure which fails to observe fundamental principles o f equality o f justice and impartiality of 
procedure. This lack of equality and impartiality is aggravated by the fact that the right to challenge 
the validity of a decision rendered by the Administrative Tribunal, while granted to the international 
organisation, is denied to the weaker party." ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 111 (emphasis added).
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member states and the Secretary-General should refrain from making oral 
statements in any proceedings before the Court. It established the right of the 
Secretary-General as well as the individual staff member concerned (including 
anyone who has succeeded to that person’s rights on his or her death) to initiate an 
appeal procedure before the Screening Committee. This article was applied in the 
Fasla and in the Mortished cases, where the applications for appeal were presented 
by staff members. This article extended this right to request an appeal to the 
member states of the organisation.68 This right was granted to them even if they did 
not participate in the proceedings of the UNAT, whether the staff member was one 
of its nationals or not, and even if both parties to the case, the staff member and the 
Secretary-General, accepted the judgment. Therefore, it should also be noted that
It should be noted that conferring the right on member states to initiate the appeal caused 
much debate among the participants on the Special Committee. On the one hand, it was concluded 
by some representatives that this right should be restricted to the Secretary-General and the staff 
member concerned. The advocates of this opinion believed that a right o f initiation by member 
states might derogate from the international character of the Secretariat, because staff members 
would look to their governments for protection in disputes with the Secretary-General. It was also 
noted that such authorisation to member states would be contrary to both the paragraphs of Art. 100 
of the Charter. In addition, it was noted that to permit member states to initiate a review would 
introduce a new party which had not participated in the original proceedings before the 
Administrative Tribunal, which would be contrary to generally accepted judicial principles. It was 
also believed that this would introduce a political element into what should be a strictly judicial 
procedure. Furthermore, it was considered that, since a member state could not act for the 
organisation as a whole, there was no interest in the proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal 
that could properly be represented by a member state. Staff members acted in their own interests 
and the Secretary-General acted both in his own interest and in the interests o f the organisation as a 
whole. The intervention of a member state would indicate a lack of confidence in the Secretary- 
General and would lower his prestige. For instance, see the statements presented by the 
representatives o f Norway, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 493, 1955, p. 38; Egypt, ibid., p. 
40; the Netherlands, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 494, 1955, p. 43; Syria, GAOR, 10th 
Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 495, 1955, p. 47; Yugoslavia, ibid., p. 49; Soviet Union, ibid., p. 50; and 
India, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 496, 1955, p. 55.
On the other hand, some representatives held the view that member states should also have 
some part in the initiation of review. According to this opinion, member states have legitimate and 
important interests which should be given expression. In addition, it was noted that, although the 
legitimate interests of a staff member and the position of the Secretary-General have to be 
safeguarded, those are not the only considerations involved and the review procedure would fail in 
its purpose if those considerations alone were take into account. Cases that had arisen in the League 
of Nations, in the specialised agencies and, recently, in the UN had indicated a need for a judicial 
review procedure when a representative organ of the UN believes that the organisation’s interests 
demand such a review. Certain interests of the organisation could be represented only by sovereign 
member states. Furthermore, it was indicated that a right of initiation by member states would not 
be contrary to Arts. 100 and 101 of the Charter, and could not impair the position of the Secretary- 
General. For instance, see the statements presented by Canada, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. 
A/C.5/SR. 493, 1955, p. 40; and Argentina, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN A/C.5/SR. 495, 1955, p. 50.
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this right did not mean that the state became a party to the litigation. The state had 
the right only to ask the Committee to make the request.
In practice, this power was used by the United States in the Mortished case, 
1982.69 Mr Mortished, who claimed in his written statement that “allowing a third 
party to raise objections to a judgment in which it has no legal right nor interest and 
to seek a review of the judgment is contrary to fundamental principles of judicial 
process”. The ICJ dealt with this claim and observed that, although a member state 
of the UN may not be a party to a judgment rendered by the UN AT in a dispute 
between a staff member and the organisation, it may well have a legal interest in 
initiating a review of the judgment. It also observed that the role of the states in this 
regard is to initiate the Committee’s discussion of the submitted application, but 
that the request comes from the Committee and not from the member state, once it 
has decided that there is a substantial basis.70
6. The ICJ’s practice as a court of appeal
Thus far the ICJ has acted as a court of appeal in four cases, one of them rendered 
by the ILOAT and the other three rendered by the UNAT.71 In none of these cases 
did the Court find that the Administrative Tribunals had erred.
The UNESCO case was the first occasion for the ICJ to practise its role as a 
court of appeal. UNESCO, which had accepted the jurisdiction provided by the 
Statute of the ILOAT for the purpose of settling certain disputes that might arise
69 The USA addressed a letter to the Acting Legal Counsel of the UN by a way of 
application to the Committee on Applications for Review of the UNAT’s Judgment No. 273 
pursuant to Art. 11/1 of the Statute of the Tribunal. The application read as follows: “[t]he United 
States requests the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments to 
request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter of Judgment No. 273 
of the Administrative Tribunal.” ICJ Rep., 1982, p. 343.
70 Ibid., p. 335. In his Sep. Op., Judge Lachs observed that “the General Assembly’s 1955 
decision to admit the possibility of an application for review being submitted by a member State 
constituted recognition that a member State, as a representative o f the organisation, can have a 
legitimate interest in questioning the Tribunal’s decision on a matter concerning the staff member’s 
rights and obligations vis-a-vis his ultimate employer, the organisation. On such occasions it is, I 
believe, misleading to visualise such an application as amounting to an intervention in a relationship 
between two other persons.” Ibid., p. 413.
71 For comprehensive details of these cases, see Elias, T., “The International Court of Justice 
in Relation to the Administrative Tribunals of the United Nations and the International Labour 
Organisation” in De Cooker, C., International Administration: Law and Management Practices in 
International Organisations, 1995, part V, pp. 6 ff.
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between the organisation and its staff members, 72 brought a case to the ICJ through 
its Executive Board. This appeal was to review a judgment rendered by the ILOAT 
in favour of four UNESCO staff members.73 UNESCO challenged this judgment on 
the basis that, pursuant to Art. II of ILOAT*s Statute, it lacked the jurisdiction to 
deal with the case.
In its advisory opinion of 23 October 1956, the ICJ held that Art. VI, para. 1, of 
the Tribunal’s Statute, which stipulates that the opinions of the Tribunal are “final 
and without appeal”, is subject to the provisions of Article XII, para. 1, of the 
Statute, which confers upon the Executive Board the right to challenge a decision of 
the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction. With regard to the competence of the 
Tribunal to decide the case, the Court disregarded the allegation that the Tribunal 
committed an excess of jurisdiction and acted ultra vires in the decision it gave. 
Accordingly, it held that the ILOAT was competent to hear the complaint in 
question.74
Since then, the ICJ has dealt with three cases rendered by the UNAT. The 
request for an advisory opinion in these cases was submitted by the Committee on 
Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments.
In 1972, this Committee requested the ICJ, for the first time, to give an 
advisory opinion regarding the UNAT’s Judgment No. 158, rendered on 28 April
UNESCO accepted the competence of the ILOAT to settle disputes that might arise 
between the organisation and its staff members. It further provides that the Tribunal’s judgments 
shall be final and without appeal, subject to the right of the organisation to challenge them. Finally, 
it provides that in the event of such a challenge the question of the validity of the decision shall be 
referred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, which will be binding.
73 The facts of this case are that four staff members held fixed-term appointments with the 
organisation that were due to expire on 31 December 1954 and 14 February 1955. The Director- 
General of UNESCO having refused to offer them further appointments when their current 
appointments expired, the employees concerned complained to the UNESCO Appeals Board. The 
Board gave its opinion that the decisions refusing to renew the contracts should be rescinded. The 
Director-General did not adopt the Board’s opinion. So an application was made by the staff 
members to the ILOAT, whose jurisdiction had been recognised by UNESCO for the purpose of 
settling disputes involving staff employment.
The ILOAT held that the Director-General had acted illegally and that the contracts had to be 
reinstated or compensation should be paid.
74 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 101; Cheng, B., “Revision of Judgments of the I.L.O. Administrative 
Tribunal by the International Court of Justice”, The Solicitor, 24, Part I, April, 1957, pp. 102 # ;  Part 
II, May, 1957, pp. 1 3 2 #
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1972.75 The ICJ, in its opinion of 12 July 1973, decided to comply with the 
Committee’s request. It observed that, “although [it] does not consider the review 
procedure provided by Article 11 as free from difficulty, it has no doubt that, in the 
circumstances of that case, it should comply with the request by the Committee on 
Applications”. With regard to the substance of the request, the Court found that the 
UN AT had not failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, as contended in the 
applicant's application to the Committee, and that the Tribunal had not committed a 
fundamental error in procedure which had occasioned a failure of justice, as 
contended in the applicant's application.76
Eight years later, the Committee requested the ICJ to review UNAT Judgment 
No. 273 on the eligibility for reparation grants of retiring UN employees, and the 
effect on the “acquired rights” of such employees of two successive UN GA 
resolutions conditioning eligibility for such grants upon evidence of the actual 
location of the employees concerned in their original home countries.77 The ICJ 
decided to grant the requested opinion. It found that the UNAT had not erred on a 
question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter. It considered also that the 
UNAT’s jurisdiction included staff regulations and rules, and concluded that the 
UNAT had not exceeded its jurisdiction or competence when it dealt with the case.78
The last and most recent opinion of the ICJ as a court of appeal was the 
Yakimetz case.79 The ICJ was asked to review the UNAT judgment based on the
75 The ICJ was asked to decide two questions: “ 1. Has the Tribunal failed to exercise
jurisdiction vested in it as contended in the applicant's application to the Committee on Applications 
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments? 2. Has the Tribunal committed a fundamental 
error in procedure which has occasioned a failure of justice as contended in the applicant's 
application to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments?” 
ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 167.
76 ICJ Rep., 1973, pp. 183,213.
77 For the facts of this case, see ICJ Pled., 1981, pp. 7-8.
78 ICJ Rep., 1982, pp. 365-6; Abou-El-Wafa, A., “Comment on the International Court of
Justice’s Advisory Opinion in Case No. 273 of the United Nations’ Administrative Tribunal”, REDI, 
38, pp. 229 ff.
79 The ICJ was asked the following questions: “ 1. In its judgment No. 333 o f 8 June 1984 
did the United Nations Administrative Tribunal fail to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by not 
responding to the question whether a legal impediment existed to the further employment in the 
United Nations of the applicant after the expiry of his contract?
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decision of the UN Secretariat not to extend a fixed-term appointment of a Soviet 
national who was an interpreter in the Russian translation service of the UN. The 
Court decided to comply with the request for an advisory opinion and proceeded to 
find that, in its Judgment No. 333, the UNAT had not failed to exercise the 
jurisdiction vested in it by not responding to the question whether a legal 
impediment existed to the further employment in the UN of the applicant after the 
expiry of his fixed-term contract on 26 December 1983. Having said that, the Court 
considered the allegation that the Tribunal had “erred on the question of law 
concerning” the Charter, and considered closely the provisions of the Charter 
covering the employment of staff by the Secretary-General and his powers and 
duties. The ICJ found that the UNAT had not erred on any question of law relating 
to the provisions of the Charter of the UN.80
Comments on the ICJ’s practice
A criticism may be directed at the Court for the minimal role that it has played as a 
court of appeal over the judgments of the Administrative Tribunals. This criticism 
is not valid because the ICJ has no right to review the judgments of the 
Administrative Tribunals proprio motu. It is the task of the Screening Committee to 
refer a request for judicial appeal to the ICJ, and this Committee adopted a strict or 
even a rigorous view of the existence of a “substantial basis” for requesting 
advisory opinions from the ICJ. This attitude can be justified on several grounds. 
First, the ICJ’s opinion in the UN Administrative Tribunals case indicated that those 
cases in which the validity of an award, and not its justice, is challenged constitute, 
ex definitione, “exceptional circumstances”.81 Second, the Secretary-General 
suggested, in the travaux preparatoires stage, that the appeal procedures should 
serve as an “outlet” only in exceptional circumstances and should not be applied to 
all cases as a matter of course. In his view, the success of the review procedure
2. Did the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in its judgment No. 333 err on a question of 
law relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” ICJ Pled., 1984, pp. 77 ff.\ ICJ 
Rep., 1987, p. 20.
80 ICJ Rep., 1987, p. 72.
81 ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 55.
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might actually be measured by the infrequency of its use.82 Third, the Staff 
Council’s view was that the advisory procedure of the ICJ should not be devised for 
regular use; it should serve only in exceptional cases and should not invite , 
unnecessary and unwarranted appeals.83
7. GA Resolution 50/54:84 A new trend and evaluation
7.1. GARes. 50/54
At the 48th session of the GA in 1993, the representatives of Australia, Benin, 
France and Ireland submitted a memorandum expressing their dissatisfaction with 
the appellate procedure against the UNAT’s judgments. This memorandum 
indicated that “in recent years several members of the Committee on Applications 
have, in the course of the Committee’s deliberations, voiced criticisms of the 
procedure under Article 11 as not furnishing an adequate means for review of the 
judgments of the Tribunal... Criticism has also been voiced in the Fifth Committee 
of the General Assembly.” It was further noted that several delegations had 
undertaken consultations on the issue prior to the 48th session of the Assembly and 
that a clear majority of those delegations considered that the procedure under Art.
11 should be abolished because it would not be feasible to render it adequate by 
adjusting it.85
Consequently, the GA, by its decision 48/415 of 9 December 1993, requested 
the Secretary-General to carry out a review of the procedure provided for under Art.
11 of the Statute of the UNAT, and to report thereon to the GA at its 49th session.
It also decided to include the matter entitled “Review of the procedures provided for 
under Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United
Report of the Special Committee, UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 493, 1955. This view was 
expressed in several statements by states before the Special Committee on Applications for Review 
of Administrative Tribunal Judgments for instance the statement of Argentina, GAOR, 10th Sess., 
UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 495, 1955, p. 50.
83 GAOR, 10th Sess., Annexes X, 49,1955, p. 4.
84 GA Res. 50/54, 11 December 1995.
85 UN Doc. A/48/232,17 September 1993.
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Nations” on its provisional agenda for the 49th session of the GA. Later on, the GA 
decided to include the item on its agenda and to allocate it to the Sixth Committee.
The Sixth Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General containing 
the views submitted by governments pursuant to GA decision 48/415,86 as well as a 
report of the Secretary-General on the same decision, which contained a review of 
the procedure provided for under Art. 11 of the Statute of the UNAT.87
The written statements submitted by member states indicated that Art. 11 of the 
UNAT’s Statute should be abolished. These statements can be classified according 
to the grounds of their opinions.
First, some states based their opinion on the terms of reference of the 
Committee on Applications. It was noted that this Committee does not play a 
useful role in the adjudication of staff disputes, owing to the restrictive nature of its 
terms of reference set out in para. 1 of Art. 11 of the Statute.88 Accordingly, some 
representatives noted that, in cases where the Committee discovers certain 
deficiencies in the Tribunal’s judgments that do not fall under one of the four 
grounds mentioned in para. 1 of Art. 11 of the Statute, the Committee should be 
entrusted with the authority to correct those deficiencies. In the light of the above, 
it was suggested that either the work of the Committee should be brought to an end 
or the Committee should be given the capacity to perform judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions. Finally, with regard to the issue of the competence of the Committee, 
some representatives noted that staff members did not appreciate the strictly limited 
scope of the review procedure and that there was an increasing tendency on the part 
of staff members to apply to the Committee in cases where there was no prospect 
whatsoever of success.89
Second, most of the statements relied on the political nature and composition of 
the Committee.90 They expressed the view that the Committee was a political body,
86 Pursuant to GA decision 48/415, the Secretary-General invited, by a note dated 28 
February 1994, the governments of member states to submit the required replies. See UN Doc. 
A/49/258, 15 July 1994.
87 UN Doc. A/C.6/49/2, 1994.
88 Ibid., p. 5.
89 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR. 36, 1994.
90 UN Doc. A/C.6/49/2, 1994, p. 6.
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consisting of member states, which was being asked to perform quasi-judicial 
functions by taking decisions that had clear legal implications. Accordingly, it was 
noted that this Committee, as a political body, had the potential to politicise cases. 
Furthermore, it was commented that, owing to the political composition of the 
Committee, its votes were sometimes explainable in terms more of geographical 
solidarity than of legal logic. In addition, it was mentioned that not all 
representatives attending sessions of the Committee were legally trained and, 
consequently, even from a practical point of view, the Committee was not equipped 
with the necessary expertise to perform its functions adequately. It was also 
observed that the composition of the Committee as a political body made 
applications by staff dependent on the will of a political body.
Third, some representatives based their opinion on the appropriateness of 
involving the ICJ in staff disputes. They stated that the matters that were subject to 
the Tribunal’s judgments did not seem to be such as to justify the involvement of 
the Court. They also pointed out that application of the review procedure provided 
for in Art. 11 resulted in the Court being seized of questions of civil service law that 
lay outside its usual purview. Moreover, it was felt that such matters ought not to 
be assigned the level of significance that the Court customarily deals with, namely 
primary matters between states. Furthermore, it was noted that the advisory 
procedure envisaged by the Statute of the Court did not provide an appropriate 
adversarial procedure necessary for an appeal tribunal, which was the Court’s 
present role in this process.91
Finally, representatives did not favour the creation of any new costly procedure, 
providing for the establishment of another judicial body that would be empowered 
to review judgments of the Administrative Tribunal and that would further 
complicate an already elaborate appeals system.
At the 35th meeting, on 9 November, the chairman of the Sixth Committee 
introduced a draft resolution in which the GA was recommended to delete Art. 11 of 
the Statute of the UNAT.92
91 UN Doc. A/C.6/ 49/2, 1994, p. 6.
92 With regard to this draft, see UN Doc. A/50/645,16 November 1995.
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In the light of the Sixth Committee’s recommendation, the GA, at its 84th 
plenary meeting on 9 December 1994, decided to consider this issue in its 50th 
session and included it on its provisional agenda. On 11 December 1995, the GA 
adopted Res. 50/54, which reads as follows:
“Noting that the procedure provided for under article 11 of the Statute o f the 
Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations has not proved to be a constructive or 
useful element in the adjudication of staff disputes within the organisation, and noting 
also the views of the Secretary-General to that effect,
1. Decides to amend the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations 
with respect to judgments rendered by the Tribunal after 31 December 1995 as follows:
(a) Delete article 11 ”93
The UNAT judgments rendered as far January 1996 would be final and without 
appeal.
7.2. Evaluation
Since the main basis of GA Res. 50/54 was related to the Screening Committee, it 
will help to consider first the importance of this Committee in the appellate 
procedures of the ICJ. This Committee played a great role as a filter. It was 
designed to avoid frivolous or unjustified objections being brought before the ICJ. 
It also helped in saving the time and effort of the Court’s judges. Further, as a 
consequence of granting this role to the ICJ, this Committee was needed to refer an 
application for an appeal to the ICJ on the basis of requesting an advisory opinion. 
Because the contentious function of the ICJ is strictly limited, pursuant to Art. 34/1 
of the ICJ’s Statute, to disputes between states, it cannot deal with cases involving 
individuals without the intervention of the Committee; therefore the ICJ could not 
fulfil its role as a court of appeal.94
The study now turns to discuss the bases of the GA resolution by which Art. 11 
of the UNAT’s Statute was abolished.
GA Res. 50/54,11 December 1995.
94 It has been observed by Keith that the establishment of this Committee was “doubtless 
accepted in this form to evade Article 34(1) of the Statute: ‘Only States may be parties in cases 
before the Court’. The result of this evasion is that cases which are contentious in nature but involve 
disputants other than States - a dispute between the staff member and the organisation - come before 
the Court in its advisory jurisdiction.” Keith, K., The Extent o f  the Advisory Jurisdiction o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice, 1971, p. 171.
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First, with reference to the criticism of the composition of the Committee as a 
political body, vested with functions that are “normally discharged by a legal body” 
and are to be regarded as “quasi-judicial in character”, it could be argued that this is 
unfounded in the light of the ICJ’s jurisprudence. In the Fasla case, the ICJ 
concluded that “there is no necessary incompatibility between the exercise of these 
functions by a political body and the requirements of judicial process ... [T]he 
compatibility or otherwise of any given system of review with the requirements of 
the judicial process depends on the circumstances and conditions of each particular 
system.” The ICJ also observed that:
“the Rules which the Committee has adopted take account of the quasi-judicial 
character of its functions. Thus, these Rules provide that the other party to the 
proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal may submit its comments with respect to 
the application, and that, if the Committee invites additional information or views, the 
same opportunity to present them is afforded to all parties to the proceedings. This means 
that the decisions of the Committee are reached after an examination o f the opposing 
views o f the interested parties.”95
The Court therefore denied that “there is anything in the character or operation of 
the Committee which requires the Court to conclude that the system of judicial 
appeal established by General Assembly resolution 957 (X) is incompatible with the 
general principles governing the judicial process” .96 One may also recall the 
observations by some states during the travaux preparatoires of drafting Art. 11 
that this Committee would decide only whether there was a genuine application 
within the grounds specified in Art. 11/1, and, if it found that an application was 
genuine, it would be under an obligation to request an advisory opinion. This
50 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 176.
96 Ibid., p. 177. In his Sep. Op., Judge de Ardchaga noted that “[a]s to the political 
composition of the Committee on Applications, this criticism may be exaggerated and the negative 
consequences which are deduced from it are in my view unjustified. We are, after all, concerned 
with international awards affecting member States, since those member States are finally bound to 
pay, directly or indirectly, any amounts awarded. In respect of international awards in general, the 
States affected by them possess under international law an undeniable right to challenge their 
validity, if they consider that there are grounds justifying such a challenge, subject of course to a 
general obligation to submit the dispute to a method of peaceful settlement. No criticism has ever 
been voiced in this respect on the ground that the challenge emanates from a political body - which 
the State undoubtedly is. In the case of awards of the Administrative Tribunal, some progress has 
been made as a result of Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal. Instead o f each 
State concerned retaining its individual power of challenge, it is an organ of the United Nations 
which is called upon to decide by a majority vote whether or not there is a substantial basis for the 
challenge which is requisite to seize the Court of the matter.” ICJ Rep., 1973, pp. 244-5.
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Committee would have no further discretion and could not for itself decide whether 
it was desirable to request an advisory opinion. Therefore, there would be no 
question of the influence of political considerations.97
Even if this criticism is sound, another suggestion could be adopted. This 
Committee could be replaced by a selected group of jurists and experts appointed to 
exercise a kind of judicial or quasi-judicial function. It would be better if the GA 
established a study group to submit the necessary changes to the composition of this 
Committee instead of abolishing Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute.
Second, the criticism that the appeals procedure would involve additional 
expenses for the organisation is also to be considered. One of the reasons for 
empowering the ICJ with the appellate function was to avoid unnecessary expenses 
by not establishing a new organ with this role.98 Even if this ground holds true 
nowadays, the aim of reducing any additional expenses could be achieved in several 
other ways, such as limiting the size of written pleadings and reducing the cost of 
referring a question to the Court.
Third, with regard to the appropriateness of the use of the Court’s advisory 
opinions in reviewing judgments of the Administrative Tribunals, one may find a 
reply in the ICJ’s dicta. The ICJ addressed the appropriateness of the appellate 
procedures provided by Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute in the Fas I a case. In this 
case, the Court stated that:
“The Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments is 
an organ of the United Nations, duly constituted under articles 7 and 22 of the Charter, 
and duly authorised under article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter to request advisory 
opinions of the Court for the purpose of Article 11 o f the Statute of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal. It follows that the Court is competent under article 65 o f its 
Statute to entrain a request for an advisory opinion from the Committee made within 
the scope o f Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal.”99
97 See the statement presented by Lord Fairfax, the representative of the UK, GAOR, 10th 
Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 493, 1955, p. 36; statement presented by the representative of the United 
States, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR494, 1955, p. 44.
98 See the Cuban statement submitted to the Special Committee on Applications for Review 
of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 493, 1955, p. 39; and 
the Greek statement, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 494, 1955, p. 45.
99 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 175.
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The ICJ also stated in the Yakimetz case that:
“That conclusion presupposes that in any specific case the conditions laid down by the
Charter, the Statute, and the Statute o f the Administrative Tribunal are complied with,
and in particular that a question on which the opinion o f the Court is requested is a
‘legal question’ and one ‘arising within the scope o f [the] activities’ of the requesting 
„iooorgan.
Several other reasons could be presented to argue against the GA’s resolution 
and to keep the role of the ICJ as a court of appeal on the UNAT’s judgments. First, 
as a result of this resolution, officials will be at the mercy of the organisation in the 
absence of a legal instrument to prevent the organisation from treating the UNAT’s 
judgments as null and void. Under Art. 11, the organisation could treat a judgment 
as invalid only if it had been found to be so by the ICJ. For forty years Art. 11 has 
stood out as the only safeguard giving effective protection to officials against 
arbitrary action by the organisation. Second, this resolution seems inconsistent with 
the purpose for which this process was originally instituted. In fact, this procedure 
was initiated to enable member states to challenge UNAT’s judgments that they 
consider as unacceptable and to do so before the principal judicial organ of the UN. 
It was also instituted as a direct consequence of the difficulties that had arisen both 
in the League Assembly and in the GA with regard to the implementation of the 
judgments of the Administrative Tribunals. No one can pretend that this difficulty 
has disappeared or will not arise in the future. Third, one may recall the statements 
by some international lawyers regarding the importance of this procedure. For 
instance, Judge de Arechaga observed that the existence of the system of judicial 
appeal has beneficial effects, “because of the care which must be exercised by the 
Administrative Tribunal in each of its judgments”. In his opinion, an organ of first 
instance does not know in advance which of its decisions is going to be scrutinised 
later by a higher tribunal. 101 One may also recall the Secretary-General’s conclusion 
in his report dated 17 October 1994. In his opinion, the adoption of the majority
100 ICJ Rep., 1987, p. 30.
101 Sep. Op. of Judge de Arechaga in the Fasla case, ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 244.
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opinion in the Committee to abolish Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute “might in the 
long run endanger the authority of the [administrative] tribunals themselves” . 102
Therefore, there is no doubt that GA Res. 50/54 could be considered to be a 
backward step because it restricts the appellate role of the ICJ as a court of appeal 
within the framework of the UN. Instead of deleting Art. 11, it would be better for 
the GA either to suggest an amendment to Arts. 34 and 6 6  of the Statute or to lay 
down the rules for fulfilling the appeal functions under Art. 11.
Conclusion
Granting an appellate jurisdiction to the ICJ over the judgments of the 
Administrative Tribunals of the ILO and the UN was considered to be a 
development in the role of the ICJ and an extension of its functions as the principal 
judicial organ within the framework of the UN.
As illustrated above, the institution of appellate procedures in regard to the 
judgments of both the ILO and the UN Administrative Tribunals was a direct 
consequence of the difficulties that had arisen both in the Executive Board of the 
ILO (and previously in the Assembly of the League of Nations) and in the UN 
General Assembly over the implementation of the judgments of their 
Administrative Tribunals. Accordingly, this power was given to the ICJ as the 
highest judicial authority in matters of UN law, and on the basis that it should be the 
final arbiter. 103 Art. XII of the ILOAT Statute and the former Art. 11 of the UNAT 
Statute allow a de facto appeal from the judgment of the Tribunal, and give 
individuals indirect access to the ICJ.
The ICJ has contributed to confirming this role. It has affirmed that its 
appellate jurisdiction is in conformity with its nature as a judicial tribunal, and it 
sees no problem in its advisory jurisdiction being used for the review of contentious 
proceedings, to which individuals are parties, that have taken place before the 
Administrative Tribunals.
102 UN Doc. A/C.6/49/2, 1994.
103 See the statement presented by New Zealand to the Special Committee on Applications 
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, GAOR, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.5/SR. 496, 
1955, p. 53.
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Through its dicta and the judges’ opinions, the Court has played an important 
role, either by its own findings or by its attitude to the findings of the 
Administrative Tribunals in the relevant cases, in the application, clarification and 
development of the rules of international administrative law. It seems obvious that 
this role has enhanced the position of individuals before the Court in advisory 
proceedings and may be deemed to have been yet another step towards making 
individuals the subject of the international legal order. Moreover, it enhanced the 
efficient functioning of the Secretariat, in accordance with Arts. 100 and 101 of the 
Charter, by giving both the organisation and staff members an additional guarantee 
of an equitable application of the relevant provisions, regulations and rules 
governing staff employment and conditions of service. 104 In addition, the ICJ was 
able to afford judicial protection of the rights of staff members of the UN and its 
specialised agencies. Through its appellate function, the Court has played an 
important role in contributing to the effectiveness of the UN.
Despite the fact that the Court had some problems with this role in the 
beginning, in the past few years the ICJ has been doing very well. For instance, the 
last opinion presented some very important legal principles, thus contributing to the 
development of what may be called the “employment law” or “administrative law” 
of the UN.
The GA resolution has resulted in restricting an established role for the ICJ and 
making the judgments of the UNAT final. There is now no procedure that will 
allow the parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal to challenge its judgments.
It could be argued that it would be better for the GA to take a step forward by 
improving the role and removing the suspicions surrounding it, than to take a step 
backwards by abolishing it. It would also be better for the GA to promote requests 
for advisory opinions, which are, as we have seen lately, a very helpful way of 
dealing with certain legal issues related to the function of the international 
organisations.
If there is no possibility that the GA resolution will be reconsidered, one hopes 
that this resolution will not affect the procedures established under the ILOAT’s
104 ICJ Rep., 1987, p. 63.
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Statute, which allow the executive bodies of the ILO and specialised agencies 
accepting the ILOAT’s Statute to request advisory opinions from the ICJ 
concerning judicial appeal procedures. 105 Otherwise, the appellate jurisdiction of the 
ICJ will disappear, to the detriment of the organisation.
105 Because the grounds for the GA’s resolution might be found in respect of the ILOAT too.
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General Conclusions and Suggestions
1. General evaluation of the Court’s role
Having analysed the different aspects of the Court’s role within the framework of 
the UN, which relate to its power to give advisory opinions, interpreting and 
developing the UN law, its role in facilitating the realisation of the purposes and 
principles of the UN through its contentious jurisdiction, its role as a constitutional 
court within the UN, and finally its role as a court of appeal upon some tribunals 
established within the framework of the UN, an evaluation of the Court’s overall 
role seems relevant. On the whole, it may be argued that the role played by the 
Court has been carried out in a satisfactory manner, if one compares it with the 
expectations of the founders of the court. However, the major drawback might be 
that this role was limited in scope. That is to say, although its role was carried out * 
satisfactorily, there remains much to be desired. The Court, it is argued, has not 
satisfied its full potential, and the ever-changing needs of the institution have, in the 
final analysis, not been met.
The above statement requires elucidation, therefore an overall evaluation of the 
different roles carried out by the Court and discussed by the study is given below.
If one were to analyse in more detail the role of the Court as a legal adviser to 
the UN organs and agencies, the record of the Court’s work shows that, since its 
establishment, it has rendered twenty-three opinions. In all these cases, the Court 
adopted a broad view of its jurisdiction as the judicial arm of the UN. It has 
adopted a broad definition of the term “legal question”, it has considered that the 
absence of the consent of any given state does not deprive it of its power to render 
opinions, and finally, despite the power given to the Court by the Statute to refuse to 
render advisory opinions, the Court has never exercised this right, on the basis that 
its assistance to the requesting organs is of great importance to both the requesting 
organ and the UN as whole. Through its advisory role, the Court has played a 
substantial role in the interpretation and development of UN law. It has applied the 
doctrine of implied powers to affirm some powers to the UN and its organs that 
were not explicitly provided by the Charter. This has been reflected in the
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expansion and development of the competence and functions of the UN’s organs. 
The ICJ has also affirmed the powers of the organs of the UN by specifying their 
roles in accordance with the Charter, and the limits imposed upon them in fulfilling 
their objectives. Finally, through this role, the Court has clarified the importance of 
its existence within the UN as one of its principal organs and it has also affirmed 
that its advisory jurisdiction is not a secondary function compared with its 
contentious jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the figure of twenty-three advisory opinions rendered over a 
period of fifty years is per se a clear manifestation of how limited this role has been. 
The fact that the number of authorised organs and agencies that currently have the 
power to request advisory opinions from the ICJ is over twenty, whereas they were 
only two in respect of the PCIJ, has not expanded the role of the ICJ as an adviser in 
the UN system. It is interesting to note, in respect of the total number of opinions 
rendered, that in its first decade the Court rendered eleven opinions, which represent 
almost half of the total opinions rendered, whereas in its second decade it rendered 
only two opinions. In its third decade, the Court rendered three opinions; in its 
fourth decade, the Court rendered two opinions; and finally, in its fifth decade, it 
rendered five opinions. There might be different causes for these figures. The 
effects of the cold war were reflected in the continued refusal of the Eastern bloc to 
support any attempts in the UN organs to request opinions from the Court. Another 
cause might be the lack of confidence on the part of the developing countries in the 
role of the Court.
Currently, the limited reference to the advisory jurisdiction, might be caused 
by the fact that the Court’s procedures result in a reply taking on average nine to 
twelve months. Hence, an organ might be reluctant to request an opinion from the 
Court.
In addition to its role as a legal adviser to the UN organs and agencies, the 
Court has played a satisfactory role in facilitating the realisation of the purposes and 
principles of the UN through its contentious jurisdiction. Despite the fact that its 
contentious jurisdiction depends upon the consent of the states, the ICJ as the 
principal judicial organ of the UN has contributed to the relaxation of tension
350
Conclusion
between states and the promotion of peace, which is the primary purpose of the UN. 
It has also defined and explained the other purposes and principles of the UN 
through its judgments in different cases between states. Through this role, the Court 
has made a very positive and substantial contribution to building international law. 
For instance, many clauses and provisions embodied in international treaties are 
based on the jurisprudence of the Court.
Despite this considerable role, one may note that there are some obstacles to the 
Court’s role in this regard. These obstacles are that the majority of states reject the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, 1 and those that have accepted it have 
appended to their acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction significant 
reservations that in effect deprive this acceptance of any value. Moreover, the high 
costs involved might deter some states, especially developing countries, from 
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction. This limited role may also be the result of an 
inadequate system for enforcing the Court’s judgments.
The Court plays a similar role to that of constitutional courts in the domestic 
field. It has confirmed its role as a constitutional court in relation to the acts of the 
specialised agencies that have recognised this power to the Court. Moreover, and 
despite the absence of any provision in the Charter allowing the ICJ to review the 
legality of the UN’s political organs, it has reviewed this legality in several cases. It 
has explicitly affirmed its power of judicial review over these acts in some cases, 
and it has confirmed this power implicitly by its refusal to uphold the arguments 
presented by some states denying its power of judicial review.
There nonetheless exists a threat to this role of the Court as a consequence of 
the silence of the Charter and in the light of the disagreement among international 
lawyers regarding the Court’s power to review the acts of the UN’s political organs.
The Statutes of the Administrative Tribunals established within the ILO and the 
UN have granted the Court, as the highest judicial tribunal within the framework of 
the UN, the power of an appellate tribunal. Despite the limited number of cases 
referred to the Court as a court of appeal, it has acted satisfactorily in all the cases
It is worth noting that only 59 out of the 185 of member states of the UN have accepted 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
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referred to it. In the 1970s and 1980s, about one-third of the Court’s opinions 
concerned the review of the Administrative Tribunals’ judgments.
Since the adoption of Res. 50/54 by the GA in 1995, this role is now restricted 
to the judgments rendered by the ILO Administrative Tribunal. According to this 
resolution, the GA has revoked the authority of the Committee on Applications for 
Review of Judgments of the UNAT to request the ICJ to review such judgments. 
This approach indeed limits the role of the Court in this respect.
2. Suggestions to enhance the Court’s role as the principal judicial organ of the 
UN
Having analysed and evaluated the Court’s role as the principal judicial organ of the 
UN, some suggestions can be presented for enhancing and increasing the Court’s 
role. These suggestions are important because they aim at modernising and 
updating the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute, which were drafted fifty years ago and 
were based to a large degree on the Covenant of the League and the PCIJ’s Statute, 
which were drafted seventy-five years ago. The underlying objective of these 
suggestions is to maintain and expand the role of the Court within the UN, because 
respect for the role of law can be achieved only through an efficient, reliable and 
trusted Court.
Before mentioning to these suggestions, some observations should be clarified.
(i) These suggestions will be limited to matters related to the role of the ICJ 
within the UN system. Many other suggestions have been made to enhance the role 
of the Court generally as a world court.2
(ii) These suggestions will be dealt with concisely, because a detailed account 
of most of these suggestions was the subject of examination in the study.
(iii) It should be understood that the implementation of these suggestions 
depends upon the will of the member states of the UN, and their belief in the 
Court’s role as the principal judicial organ of the UN.
See, for instance, Bowett, D., et al., “The International Court o f Justice: Efficiency of 
Procedures and Working Methods”, Report of the Study Group established by the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law as a Contribution to the UN Decade of International Law, ICLQ, 
45, 1996; Jennings, R., “The United Nations at Fifty: The International Court of Justice after Fifty 
Years”, AJIL, 89, 1995, pp. 493 ff.
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Having mentioned these observations, some suggestions can now be presented.
2.1. The Court’s advisory jurisdiction
First, efforts should be made to grant the Secretary-General the authority to request 
advisory opinions, so as to enjoy a similar authority to that of other principal 
organs. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this suggestion is based on the fact that the 
Secretary-General is the one in charge of issues involving the UN’s day-to-day 
activities. The need to grant such a power to the Secretary-General is supported by 
the fact that there is a new trend which aims at increasing the political functions of 
the Secretary-General and that the importance of the Secretary-General’s role is 
currently recognised in the international forum.
Secondly, since the expansion of the scope of the organs and agencies 
authorised by the GA to request advisory opinions was consider an improvement in 
the early stages of the establishment of the Court, this scope should be reconsidered. 
As we have seen in this study, the Court’s advisory role is significant in assisting 
the UN organs and agencies to decide issues with legal dimensions before them. 
Therefore, it seems that there is no reason nowadays to entitle the GA to exercise its 
discretion as to who should and should not have this power. Accordingly, a further 
step should be taken to authorise all UN organs, agencies and subsidiary organs to 
have direct power without the need for authorisation from any other organ within 
the UN. This suggestion would help to avoid any disagreement regarding the right 
of some organs or agencies to have such a power. It might also help to avoid any 
possibility of revocation of this authority by the GA at its discretion.
Thirdly, as mentioned above, the limited use of the advisory jurisdiction by the 
organs and agencies of the UN might be the result of the length of the procedures of 
the Court when dealing with a request for an advisory opinion. Therefore, it could 
be suggested that the Court might annually form, as regards its contentious 
jurisdiction, a permanent Chamber, pursuant to Arts. 26-29 of the Statute, to deal 
with requests for advisory opinions. This could be based on Art. 6 8  of the Statute, 
which indicates that “in the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall be 
guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to
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the extent to which it recognises them to be applicable” .3 In the writer’s view, such 
a Chamber, with rapid procedures, might help to encourage the organs and agencies 
to request opinions from the Court, which could lead to the Court being used as a 
legal adviser to the UN in toto*
2.2. The Court’s contentious jurisdiction
The UN organs and agencies should first endeavour to embody a clause for the 
settlement of disputes by the ICJ in the international conventions adopted under 
their auspices or at conferences directly sponsored by them. It is interesting to note 
that, despite there being more than 300 treaties that stipulate that in the event of a 
dispute between the signatories in relation to the application or interpretation of the 
treaty the matter shall be referred to the ICJ, a considerable number of such treaties 
do not include provisions for settling disputes through the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the ICJ. The Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1958, and the Law of 
the Sea Convention, 1982 are but two examples of conventions that do not refer to 
the Court’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that the ICJ has a significant jurisprudence 
in settling disputes in this area. The absence of the Court’s jurisdiction in this 
regard could be justified on the basis that such disputes have a special nature and 
should be left to specialised tribunals. In the writer’s view, in the light of the long 
history and significant jurisprudence of the Court in this area, the ICJ is capable of 
playing a role in settling such disputes. In addition, the increasing of number of 
treaties that ignore the Court’s jurisdiction in some areas of international law and 
establish specialised courts for them might result in the demise of the role of the 
Court. In this regard, one may recall Bowett’s statement that “the establishment of 
the Law of the Sea Tribunal will, in time, lead to a reduction in the number of the 
cases being referred to the Court. It is by no means certain that this will happen.” 5 
Moreover, the trend to establish specialised tribunals to deal with a certain type of
Jenks, C., “The Status of International Organisations in Relation to the International Court 
of Justice”, GS, 32, 1946, p. 24.
4 These Chambers have been used by states to settle inter-states disputes since 1982. In that 
year, an order constituted the Chamber for dealing with the case concerning the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area.
5 Bowett, et al., supra note 2, p. S2, note 4.
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dispute is questionable: it might lead to the establishment of a considerable number 
of courts, causing confusion, when the ICJ is in fact competent to deal with disputes 
of different natures. The best example might be the number of cases referred to it in 
the past decade on different aspects of international law.
Secondly, it can be submitted that some member states of the UN do not 
welcome the system of optional clauses. It is the writer’s view that member states 
should consider the “optional clause” system for acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, which was one of the most promising innovations of 1920, 
as a half-way house on the road to a complete system of international compulsory 
jurisdiction. The absence of compulsory jurisdiction is considered nowadays to be a 
fundamental defect in the organisation of the international community. In the 
writer’s view, the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction should apply to all member states 
of the UN. The Court’s practice shows that acceptance of its compulsory 
jurisdiction does not make it a supranational organ. In addition, member states 
should recognise that acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction does not prejudice their 
sovereignty,6 although there is no persuasive reason why the sovereignty of states 
should undermine the prevailing principle of the primacy of law in the international 
community. This is confirmed by the European Communities’ conventions, where 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is not dependent on the consent of 
the states concerned. Through the mere fact of their accession to the EC the 
member states have accepted its jurisdiction as compulsory and binding.7 In the 
light of the above, an amendment to the Statute can be suggested to the effect that 
all parties to the Statute would be deemed ipso facto to have accepted the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction unless they gave notice to the contrary, namely a 
“contracting-out” instead of the “contracting-in” process. Two factors favour
In this regard, it should be noted that, in his speech before the ICJ in its celebration of 
fifty years, the president of the GA stated that “we have been witnessing a change in the defining 
parameters of the concept of sovereignty and it is undeniable, today, that the old doctrine of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands”. He also stated that the submission to international 
jurisdiction and international law by all states must be left out of the defining parameters of modem 
states’ sovereignty. Speech by Diego Freitas de Amaral, president of the UN GA. ICJ Communique 
96/15, 19 April 1996.
7 Arts. 40/3 and 87 of the treaty o f the ECSC; Arts. 183 and 219 of the EEC treaty; Arts. 
155 and 193 o f the Euratom treaty.
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acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ: (i) if the ICJ became more 
involved this might give rise to greater confidence in it; (ii) the codification and 
progressive development of international law is also one of the results of the 
involvement of the Court.
Alternatively, and in the light of the current provisions, states should be 
required to increase the number of declarations pursuant to Art. 36/2 of the Statute.8 
They should also be required to withdraw earlier reservations to judicial clauses 
embodied in international treaties. In this regard, the permanent members of the SC 
should lead member states by example in accepting the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction. It is most unfortunate that currently the only state of the five 
permanent members of the SC accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction is the 
UK.9 This attitude is difficult to appreciate in the light of the intention of the 
Charter’s founders, who envisaged that these five states would have a predominant 
role in maintaining international peace and security in the post-war future. This role 
can be achieved, inter alia, by making the role of adjudication prevail.
Thirdly, Art. 34 of the Statute should be reconsidered. The present state of 
affairs, in which the UN and its specialised agencies have no locus standi before the 
Court, is unsatisfactory. 10 The wording of Art. 34 reflects what has been referred to 
as the orthodox doctrine of international law. According to this doctrine, 
international law is a law governing the relationship between states and states alone 
are capable of holding rights, being subject to duties and possessing a persona 
standi in judicio. Needless to say, this article represents an obstacle in the present 
system of the administration of justice, because it does not cover all subjects of 
international law. Therefore, Art. 34 of the Statute should be amended to allow
In this regard one may recall the statement by Kunz that “compulsory jurisdiction 
adjudication is of the utmost importance, should be the object of our greatest efforts, would 
constitute the greatest and the deepest single advance. But it alone cannot eliminate war, it can 
decide but not believe that it ever will be possible to transfer world history into nothing but a court 
procedure”. Kunz, J., “Compulsory International Adjudication and Maintenance o f Peace”, AJIL, 
38, 1944, p. 678.
9 It is worth noting that the Soviet Union (Russia) and China, two of the permanent 
members o f the SC, have never used the ICJ in contentious cases. France withdrew its acceptance of 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction after the Nuclear Test cases in 1974. The USA, too, after the 
Nicaragua case, withdrew its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.
10 Bowett, et al., supra note 2, pp. S24-S25; Jenks, supra note 3, pp. 24 ff.
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international organisations, inter alia the UN and its specialised agencies, to appear 
as a party in contentious cases before the ICJ. 11 This suggestion is justified by 
several factors. 12 First, it has been confirmed by lawyers that the UN possesses an 
international juridical personality. This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Reparation 
case, when it affirmed the right of the UN to sue any state for damages caused to the 
organisation itself. It also held that the UN can bring a claim for damages suffered 
by its agents. 13 This opinion was confirmed by the ICJ in the WHO and Egypt 
case. 14 It would therefore be anachronistic to have only states as parties to 
contentious litigation before the Court. 15 Second, recent activities of the UN and its 
specialised agencies have witnessed the growing participation and influence of the 
UN in international fields. The UN organs are entering into an increasing number 
of agreements with states and with one another and it seems regrettable that, in the 
event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of such an agreement, 
the UN should lack the procedural capacity to be a party in contentious proceedings 
before the ICJ. Third, international relations have developed, and the financial and 
property relationships between states and the UN and its specialised agencies are 
tending to become increasingly complex. Fourth, permitting the UN and its 
specialised agencies to appear before the Court would enlarge the role of the ICJ’s 
contentious jurisdiction and open up a new area of competence in a manner that the 
ICJ is perfectly capable of dealing with (as evidenced by various subjects settled by
11 It should be noted that it has been suggested by some international lawyers that this article 
should be amended also to extend the Court’s jurisdiction to individuals, corporations and legal 
entities other than states. See Jennings, supra note 2, p. 504.
12 In this regard, it has been noted by Fitzmaurice that “it would seem anomalous that an 
entity then found by the Court to have the capacity to sustain an international claim in the assertion 
of its own rights should not be able to be a party to a case before that same Court in which, 
precisely, it might wish to assert such rights”. Fitzmaurice, G., The Future o f  Public International 
Law and o f  the International Legal System in the Circumstances o f  Today, 1973, p. 295 (cited in
Jennings, supra note 2, p. 505). Jenks also points out that the Statute “generalises, and thereby
places in a new perspective, the principle that public international organisations have an amicus 
curiae function and responsibilities in cases relating to their activities”. Jenks, C., The Prospects o f  
International Adjudication, 1964, pp. 208-9. Jully expressed the hope that the revision of Art. 34 
would be one of the first tasks to be undertaken as being capable of bringing about an important 
improvement in this special province of international law. Jully, L., “Arbitration and Judicial 
Settlement - Recent Trends”, AJIL, 48,1954, p. 391.
13 ICJ Rep., 1949, pp. 181-4, 187.
14 ICJ Rep., 1980, pp. 73, 89-90.
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the ICJ through its advisory jurisdiction). Fifth, enabling the UN to be a party in 
contentious cases has been introduced by the UN itself in its acceptance of the 
binding advisory opinions provided for in the former Art. 11 of the UNAT’s Statute, 
section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, and 
section 21 of the Agreement between the UN and the USA regarding the 
headquarters of the UN. These represent the first steps towards a form of 
contentious procedure. Sixth, as Bowett notes, “[t]he idea that the Court might be 
unsuitable because, as a UN organ, it would lack impartiality in disputes between a 
UN and a third party is not to be entertained seriously: the Court’s independence has 
been demonstrated beyond question” . 16 Seventh, it is not sufficient to say that the 
UN and its agencies could use advisory opinions as an alternative to amendment of 
Art. 34, because in some cases the use of advisory opinions cannot be considered to 
be a completely satisfactory solution to the problem, either in principle or in 
practice, as long as the Court’s opinion is not a judgment and, technically, has no 
binding effect. Even if the UN and the other member states refer in the international 
conventions to the binding advisory opinion clauses in these treaties, this is 
inconsistent with the principle of equality, because the other parties have no similar 
power to request an advisory opinion. Finally, keeping Art. 34 unchanged might 
lead to disputes between the UN and its members being referred to arbitral tribunals. 
This method of settling such disputes has many precedents under the constitutions 
of the specialised agencies or under agreements concluded between them and one or 
more of their members. For instance, Art. XIII(c) of the Fund Agreement provides 
that, if “a disagreement arises between the Fund and a member which has 
withdrawn or between the Fund and any member during the liquidation of the 
Fund”, such a disagreement is to be “submitted to arbitration by a tribunal of three 
arbitrators, one appointed by the Fund, another by the member or withdrawing 
member, and an umpire”. Art. XI of the Bank Agreement provides a similar 
method for settling disputes between the Bank and its members. Needless to say,
15 Bedjaoui, M., The New World Order and the Security Council, 1994, pp. 115-16.
16 Bowett, D., “The Court’s Role in Relations to International Organisation” in Lowe, V. et 
al. (eds.), Fifty Years o f the International Court o f Justice, 1996, p. 189. A similar view has been 
expressed by Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht, E., Aspects o f  International Administration, 1991, pp. 60-6.
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such provisions would enhance the role of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of 
the UN.
2.3. The determination of the relationship between the ICJ and the other 
principal organs of the UN
Although the drafters of the Charter succeeded in drawing a line between the GA 
and the SC as regards the settlement of international disputes, the same result was 
not achieved in respect of the ICJ’s relationship with the SC and the GA. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, problems have already arisen and are anticipated to 
occur more often in the future as a consequence of the increase in the activities of 
these organs in settling international disputes. Therefore, consideration should be 
given to adding a new provision to the Charter whereby the judicial organ and the 
political organs of the UN can work in concert. The determination of this 
relationship between the Court as a judicial organ and the political organs in 
concurrent fields should grant the primacy of the law in preserving peace and 
promoting justice. Judicial settlement should be regarded as the major means of 
settling disputes, at least if the dispute has a legal dimension. It should be noted 
that if more disputes were settled on the basis of general and objective criteria, more 
states would resort to this means of settlement. It should be realised that the Court 
can contribute positively to the maintenance of international peace; as Vallat stated: 
“Peace needs law. Law needs the Court.” 17
2.4. The enforcement of the Court’s judgments
Non-compliance with the Court’s judgments affects its position as an instrument for 
settling international disputes by peaceful means, which at the end of the day 
affects, indirectly, the ability of the UN to achieve one of its important purposes and 
principles. Accordingly, Art. 94 of the Charter should be reviewed and 
reconsidered. Pursuant to this article, the SC can act neither proprio motu, nor upon 
the request of other members of the UN. The SC acts only when one party to a 
dispute does not act in conformity with a decision of the ICJ and the other party
17 Vallat, F., “The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” in Cambridge Essays in International 
Law. Essays in Honour o f  Lord McNair, 1965, p. 177.
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seeks the Council’s assistance. 18 Therefore, the SC should have the power to 
consider an issue on its own authority when the situation resulting from the non­
enforcement of a Court’s judgment is sufficiently serious. 19
In addition, the wording of Art. 94 gives the SC a discretionary power in this 
matter; in other words, the SC is not obliged to take action when requested to do so. 
Thought should therefore be given to amending the wording of Art. 94 to replace 
the word “may” by “should” in order to abolish the SC’s discretion to act.
The scope of the Court’s judgments should be well defined. The wording of 
Art. 94 refers in para. 1 to decisions, and in para. 2 to judgments, of the Court. This 
raises a question whether this power extends to the Court’s interim measures.20 It is 
suggested that this power should explicitly cover all the Court’s decisions, both 
judgments and interim measures.
In addition, the organs empowered to enforce the Court’s judgments should be 
explicitly expanded to entitle all the UN organs and specialised agencies to play a 
role in this respect, given that all these agencies play a significant role in 
international relations and can provide a number of mechanisms for obtaining 
compliance with judgments.21
Finally, it is suggested that Art. 94 should explicitly stipulate that a member of 
the Council that is a party to a litigation before the Court should abstain from voting 
in the SC while it is considering a draft resolution to take action to enforce the ICJ’s 
judgment. Otherwise, a situation of manifest conflict of interest could arise, with
18 Art. 13/4 of the Covenant reads as follows: “[t]he Members of the League agree that they 
will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered and that they will not 
resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure 
to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give 
effect thereto” (emphasis added).
19 During the travaux preparatoires stage of the Charter and the Court’s Statute it was noted 
that “the Security Council shall make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgment”. UNCIO, 4, p. 695; UNCIO, 13, pp. 508, 510.
20 There have been two cases concerning the SC’s enforcement of the Court’s interim 
measures: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (SCOR., 6th year, Supp. for October, November and 
December, at 1 and 2, S/2357; 560th mtg., paras. 28-39 and 43-67; 559th mtg., paras. 69-76; 562nd 
mtg., para. 48, S/2380; 563rd mtg., paras. 135 ff.\ 565th mtg., para. 62); and the Bosnia case (UN 
Doc. 25616; SC Res. 819, of 16 April 1993).
21 With regard to the specialised agencies of the UN that have a role in this regard, see pp. 
38-9 above.
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the member state refusing to enforce the Court’s judgment, yet at the same time 
being a voting member of the Council while it discusses what sort of action can be 
taken against the party refusing enforcement. The Nicaragua case is the best 
example in this regard.22 Therefore, Art. 27/3 of the Charter, which provides that a 
party to a dispute should abstain from voting on this dispute before the SC, should 
be extended and applied to cases brought to the SC pursuant to Art. 94.23 Such 
amendments would give the SC the authority to enforce the Court’s decisions 
against any non-complying party, even if that party is a permanent member of the 
SC.24
A related point is to consider the possibility of abolishing the use of the veto by 
the permanent members of the SC in such proceedings. Using the veto power 
deprives the Court’s decision of any legal effect. The suggestion is that non- 
compliance with a Court’s decision should either be considered as a procedural 
matter under Art. 27/2 of the Charter, which gives non-permanent members of the 
SC a way of exercising their veto power, or be considered as a non-procedural issue, 
in which case Art. 27/3 of the Charter should be applied whereby a party to the 
litigation should abstain from voting. Therefore, Art. 27/3 of the Charter should be 
amended to refer to the resolutions adopted to enforce the Court’s judgments as well 
as to resolutions based on Chapter VI.25 There is no doubt that the use of the veto 
by a permanent state that is a party to a dispute settled by the Court in order to
22 The non-compliance of the USA with the ICJ’s judgment in the Nicaragua case was 
examined by the SC pursuant to Art. 94/2. The draft resolution calling upon the USA to comply 
with the judgment was supported by eleven states, with three abstentions and one veto by the USA. 
UN Doc. S/18428. Therefore, the resolution was not adopted. The GA dealt with this matter, and a 
similar draft resolution was passed upon the request of Nicaragua. In all, 94 states voted for its 
adoption, 3 states voted against, and 47 states abstained. In 1988, when the same draft resolution 
was voted upon in the GA, it was supported by 89 states, with the USA voting against. Moreover, 
the US representative announced that his country would never comply with the judgment. See UN 
Doc. A/41/L.22; UN Doc. A/41/PV. 53, 1986.
23 It has been noted also that Art. 94 is not located in the chapters on peace and security, 
therefore the use of the right of veto has no ground in this respect. See O’Connell, M., “The 
Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the International Court of Justice: A Study of 
Nicaragua’s Judgments against the United Nations”, VJIL, 30, 1990, p. 908; Fakher, H., The 
Relationships Among the Principal Organs o f the United Nations, 1951, p. 68.
24 Reilly, P., “While the United Nations Slept: Missed Opportunities in the New World 
Order”, LLAICU, 17, 1995, pp. 958 ff.
25 See Tanzi, A., “Problems of Enforcement o f Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the Law of the United Nations”, EJIL, 6 , 1995, pp. 551 f f
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prevent the SC from enforcing the Court’s judgements deprives the Court of any 
value. This was realised as a consequence of the use of the veto by the United 
States against attempts to enforce the ICJ’s judgment in the Nicaragua case. This 
led some lawyers to note that “the United States predictably used its power of veto 
to defeat draft resolutions urgently calling for full and immediate compliance with 
the World Court’s judgment” 26 (emphasis added).
2.5. The constitutional role of the Court.
The review of the legality of the UN organs’ acts by the ICJ should be explicitly 
reconsidered. As noted in Chapter Five, the role of the ICJ as a constitutional court 
within the UN is still a matter of argument. It should be admitted that, even in the 
internal affairs of states, acceptance of the idea that the acts of the executive and 
legislative authority could be subject to judicial control by tribunals involves a long 
and arduous process. It is not surprising, therefore, that governments are reluctant 
to accept such control in international affairs
Therefore, any amendment to the Charter and the Statute should empower the 
Court to review the acts of the political organs, especially the GA and the SC. The 
importance of this suggestion depends, as has been mentioned earlier, on the fact 
that the rule of law cannot be separated from the idea of peace and justice. 
Providing the ICJ with powers similar to those of the constitutional courts in the 
domestic field would be good for the rule of law in international affairs and good 
for the UN. It should not be forgotten that entitling the ICJ to review the 
constitutionality of the political organs’ acts and granting the primacy of the law in 
the UN system would lead to more respect for the organisation and for the decisions 
adopted by its organs. In addition, the Court’s judicial review is a gratifying sign of 
the maturity of the system. Finally, in justifying such an explicit role for the Court, 
one may note that this will not be a new precedent in the international arena. For 
example, the European Court of Justice has the explicit power to decide whether the 
organs of the European Communities’ institutions have acted within the 
competencies conferred upon them by their constitutional instruments. The practice
26 White, N., The United Nations and the Maintenance o f  International Peace and Security, 
1990, p. 14.
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has shown that this Court has played a significant role in reviewing the acts of the 
political organs without endangering the achievement of their objectives.27
This new role could be implemented by means of the advisory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ, through the establishment of a standing GA committee empowered to 
request advisory opinions on application by states challenging the legality of the 
political organs’ acts. In addition, the review of constitutionality could be achieved 
through the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. If explicit provision is to be 
embodied in the Charter or the Statute, a new paragraph should be add to Art. 59 of 
the Charter whereby the Court’s judgment regarding the constitutionality of an act 
by a UN organ should have an erga omnes effect.
2.6. The Court’s judges
The system of election of the Court’s judges should also be reconsidered. The 
current system raises doubts in the eyes of some states about the judges’ 
independence from political influence, especially as the SC, with its limited 
membership, plays a role in this respect. These doubts have been explicitly 
affirmed by one of the Court’s judges, who notes that “judges of the Court are 
elected by the General Assembly and Security Council. That the process of election 
has its powerful political elements is undeniable.” 28 Therefore, amendment of the 
current methods should be considered to avoid any concern about influence by the 
permanent members of the SC when dealing with the election or renewal of the 
ICJ’s judges.29 In addition, under the current method of election, a state represented
See pp. 271-2 above.
28 Schwebel, S., “Relations Between the International Court of Justice and the United 
Nations” in Virally, M. (ed.), Le Droit International au Service de la Paix, de la Justice et du 
Dveloppement, 1991, p. 441.
29 It should be noted that the current system is based upon the system adopted in 1920 for 
the election of the PCIJ’s judges. Needless to say, this system was designed to protect the interests 
o f the Great Powers, which were assumed to predominate in the smaller electoral organ and 
therefore to be in a position to exert influence over it. It has also been held that the necessity of each 
Judge being elected by the Council as well as by the Assembly would secure the permanent 
representation of particular states as could fairly expect it. There is no need for this nowadays 
because the GA represents all members of the UN, and the results of the election should reflect 
tendencies prevalent in the UN. It has also become well established that the permanent members of 
the SC should have judges on the bench of the Court. See Rosenne, S., The Law and Procedures o f  
the International Court o f  Justice, 1985, p. 185. For the report of the Informal Inter-Allied 
Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice, see AJIL, 39, supp., 1945, 
p. 7.
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in the SC has a double vote, because it is also represented in the GA. Accordingly, 
the election of the Court’s judges should be left only to the GA.
If this suggestion is not welcomed on the ground that the SC should play a role 
in this regard, an alternative suggestion is that the tenure of judges could be 
extended and the possibility of re-election removed.30 As Leigh and Ramsey note, 
“these frequent elections tend to increase the political pressure on the judges and 
decrease the perception of judicial decision made without political motives” .31 This 
suggestion was made as early as 1954 when a proposal adopted by the Institute of 
International Law at its session in Aix-en-Provence concluded that, “[wjith a view 
to reinforcing the independence of the judges, it is suggested that members of the 
Court should be elected for 15 years and should not be re-eligible ... But it should be 
noted that if it is felt that 15 years is too long, a compromise period of 1 2  years 
might be agreed on, with the result that the interval for regular rotation would be 
fixed at four years.” 32
Having referred to these suggestions, it is worth noting that the achievement of 
some of these suggestions depends on the amendment of some provisions in the 
Charter and the Court’s Statute. In the writer’s view, the amendment of these 
instruments is not entirely impossible. For instance, the UN Charter has been 
amended several times. In 1963, Arts. 23, 27 and 61, relating to the composition of 
the SC and the ECOSOC, were amended: the membership of the SC was increased 
from eleven to fifteen and that of the ECOSOC from eighteen to twenty-seven. In 
1971, the composition of the ECOSOC was again increased from twenty-seven to
30 Pursuant to Art. 13 of the Statute, the Court’s judges are elected for nine-year terms, and 
may be re-elected.
31 Leigh, M., et al., “Confidence in the Court: It Need Not Be a ‘Hollow Chamber’” in 
Damrosch, L. (ed.), The International Court o f  Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, p. 109; Kelsen, H., 
The Law o f  the United Nations, 1951, pp. 466-75; Lauterpacht, H., The Function o f Law in the 
International Community, 1933, pp. 237-41.
32 Annuaire de ITnstitut de Droit International, 45 (II), p. 290. In his comments on this 
proposal, Judge Schwebel notes “that would be a wise revision of the Statute, were the Statute to be 
revised - a process which, however, might risk more than it would be likely to gain”. Schwebel, 
supra note 28, p. 441. It should be noted that, when the GA dealt with the role o f the ICJ, it was 
suggested by Cyprus that “with regard to the term of office o f the judges probably a fixed period 
instead of partial renewal would tend to securing more stability and continuity in the litigation”. UN 
Doc. A /8382,15 September 1971, p. 40.
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fifty-four. Moreover, Art. 109 of the Charter relating to the review conference was 
amended in 1965. In addition, between 1945 and 1966 sixty-one amendments were 
made by the specialised agencies of the UN to their constitutions.33
3. Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that the Court’s activities are expanding and that confidence in the 
Court will be maintained. This is illustrated by the changes that have occurred in 
the past decade. These changes give grounds for optimism as concerns an effective 
role for the ICJ within the framework of the UN in the future. Among these 
changes are:
(i) The new approach adopted by the so-called “Eastern bloc” states. For 
instance, Russia (Soviet Union) has removed the reservations it had lodged with 
respect to six compromise clauses found in treaties concluded between 1948 and 
1984 in the field of human rights law.34 A number of former Eastern bloc countries 
have also withdrawn their reservations to the compromise clauses and have thus 
provided jurisdiction to the ICJ in many conventions related to human rights. 
Further, several former allies of the Soviet Union, such as Poland, Bulgaria and 
Hungary, have made declarations accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.35 
Moreover, Hungary and the Slovak Republic have concluded a special agreement 
for the litigation of a series of difficult problems concerning the flow of the River 
Danube and measures for its protection against pollution.36
For details see Schwelb, E., “Amendments to Article 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter of the 
United Nations”, AJ1L, 59, 1965, p. 834; Schwelb, E., “The 1963/65 Amendments to the Charter of 
the United Nations: An Addendum”, AJIL, 60, 1966, p. 371; Schwelb, E., “The 1971 Amendment 
to Article 61 of the United Nations Charter and Arrangements Accompanying It”, ICLQ, 12, 1972, 
p. 497; Amerasinghe, C., Principles o f  the Institutional Law o f  International Organisations, 1996, 
pp. 405 ff.\ Phillips, L., “Constitutional Revision in the Specialised Agencies”, AJIL, 62, 1968, pp. 
6 5 7 #
34 This new attitude was illustrated by Petrovski, Deputy Foreign Minister o f the USSR, 
speaking on 6 October 1989, in the Sixth Committee of the GA, where he stated that “ [t]he Soviet 
Union has launched a process of withdrawing its earlier reservations regarding the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on a large number of treaties. As a first step, the 
Soviet Union dropped its reservations to human rights agreement.” UN Doc. A/42/574; S/19143, 
1987).
35 Jennings, supra note 2, pp. 494-5; Tyagi, Y., “The World Court after the Cold War” in 
Pathak, J. et al. (eds.), International Law in Transition: Essays in Memory o f  Judge Nagendra Singh, 
1992, p. 241.
36 ICJ Rep., 1994.
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(ii) The increasing confidence of states in the Court.37 There has been a growth 
in the number of declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under 
Art. 36/2 of the Court’s Statute (see Figure 1, p. 368 below). Moreover, many 
states have withdrawn their reservations against jurisdiction clauses in treaties, 
which is an important and welcome tendency. In addition, the developing countries 
have shown greater understanding of the ICJ’s role. This has been reflected in the 
increasing number of cases referred by states to the Court and decided by the Court 
in the past decade as well as in the impressive number of cases pending before the 
ICJ. (see Figure 2, p. 369 below) . 38 Finally, there has been an increase in the 
number of requests for advisory opinions by the organs and agencies of the UN in 
the past decade (see Figure 3, p. 370 below).
(iii) The Manila Declaration, unanimously adopted by the GA on 15 December 
1982. This urges the international community to make greater use of the advisory 
and compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and affirms that legal disputes as a general 
rule should be referred to the ICJ.39
(iv) The establishment of a Trust Fund in 1989. The purpose of the Fund is to 
provide financial assistance in order to encourage states to seek a solution to their 
legal disputes through the ICJ.40 The availability of external resources can be 
extremely helpful in states’ search for peaceful means of settling disputes through 
the Court.
(v) The change in the composition of the Court. Currently, many judges from 
developing countries, inter alia the current president, are on the bench.
37 Lutz, R., “Perspectives on the World Court, the United States, and the International 
Disputes Resolution in a Changing World”, The International Lawyer, 25, 1991, pp. 689 ff.
38 During the past decade many cases referred to the Court were between developing 
countries, including African states, such as Tunisia, Libya, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Chad, Namibia, 
and Botswana. See ICJ Rep., 1994-5, No. 49, p. 250 ff ',  Lachs, M., “Thoughts on the Recent 
Jurisprudence o f the International Court of Justice”, EILR, 4, 1990, pp. 79-80.
39 Part II, para. 5, of the declaration. See GA Res. 37/10,1982.
40 The Secretary-General announced the establishment the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund 
at the meeting of the UN held on 1 November 1989. The purpose of the fund is to provide, in 
accordance with the terms of reference, guidelines and rules, financial assistance to states for 
expenses incurred in connection with (i) a dispute submitted to the ICJ by way of a special 
agreement, or (ii) the execution of a judgment of the Court resulting from such special agreement. 
See ILM, 28, 1589(1989).
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All of these grounds for optimism reflect the fact that states perceive the ICJ to 
be the most valuable instrument yet available to the international community. It is 
the duty of the states, the UN and the Court to co-operate to make the Court an 
adequate forum that meets the needs of a changing world.
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